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8 Foreword 
With  the  opening-up  of  international  trade,  the  globalization  of  economies  and  the 
internationalization of markets,  competition is  taking on a worldwide dimension. For many 
economic operators and States, the temptation exists to  replace the State barriers which have 
been  so  carefully  dismantled  by  other  means  of limiting  access  to  markets  for  foreign 
competitors or protecting national champions. This is clearly not in the interest of consumers 
who will be deprived of the certain benefits of competition, nor in the interests of industry 
which, in the absence of new competitive pressures,  will have no  incentives to  innovate. 
Furthermore, in the field of competition policy, many difficulties arise for national authorities, 
whose jurisdiction is limited by territory, in addressing activities which span several countries. 
A worldwide approach to  competition policy is  needed.  What form  this should take is,  for 
the time being, an open question. There are several options including, at the bilateral levt(l, 
the creation of a network of cooperation agreements and,  at the multilateral level,  the adoption 
of common international principles and the creation of a body aimed at settling disputes between 
national authorities whenever they  arise.  All the options deserve careful consideration. In any 
case, there is  no doubt that we in the European Union will become more and more involved 
with our partner countries in implementing competition law. 
This conviction is shared by a growing number of partners of the European Union.  A network 
of bilateral arrangements had been set up  with European neighbour countries and with the 
United States of America, and we expect further arrangements in the future. We have decided 
to  publish a collection of the competition rules as  they  currently exist in the international field 
(for instance, in the framework of the OECD,  Unctad,  and the WTO) which are of relevance 
to the European Union and the texts of the bilateral agreements signed by the European Union 
in the belief that this will make the international aspects of competition policy better known 
and more accessible to  all concerned. 
Karel Van Miert 
9 I - Agreement on the European Economic Area Decision of the Council and the Commission of 13 December 1993 
on the conclusion of the Agreement on the European Economic Area between the 
European Communities, their Member States and the Republic of Austria, the 
Republic of Finland, the Republic of Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the 
Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden and the Swiss Confederation 
(9411/ECSC,  EC) I 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
1.  The  aim  of this  Agreement  of association  is  to  promote  a  continuous  and  balanced 
strengthening of trade  and  economic relations between the Contracting Parties  with equal 
conditions  of competition,  and  the  respect  of the  same  rules,  with  a  view  to  creating  a 
homogeneous European Economic Area,  hereinafter referred to  as the EEA. 
2.  In  order to  attain the  objectives set out in  paragraph  1,  the  association shall entail, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement: 
(a)  the free  movement of goods; 
(b)  the free movement of persons; 
(c)  the free  movement of services; 
(d)  the free  movement of capital; 
(e)  the  setting-up of a system ensuring that competition is  not distorted and that the rules 
thereon are equally respected;  as  well  as 
(f)  closer cooperation in other fields,  such as  research and  development,  the environment, 
education and social policy. 
[  ... ] 
Article 16 
1.  The Contracting Parties shall ensure that any  State monopoly of a commercial character 
be adjusted so that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured 
and marketed will exist between nationals of EC  Member States and EFf  A States. 
1  OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p.  1. 
13 2.  The provisions  of this  Article  shall  apply  to  any  body  through  which  the  competent 
authorities of the Contracting Parties, in law or in fact, either directly or indirectly supervise, 
determine or appreciably influence imports  or exports between Contracting Parties.  These 
provisions shall likewise apply to  monopolies delegated by the State to others. 
[ ... ] 
Article 26 
Anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and measures against illicit commercial practices 
attributable to third countries shall not be applied in relations between the Contracting Parties, 
unless otherwise specified in this Agreement. 
CHAPTER 5 
COAL AND STEEL PRODUCTS 
Article 27 
Provisions and arrangements concerning coal and steel products are  set out in Protocols 14 
and 25. 
[  ... ] 
RULES APPLICABLE TO UNDERTAKINGS 
Article 53 
1.  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may  affect trade between Contracting Parties and which have as  their objects 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the territory covered 
by this Agreement, and in particular those which: 
(a)  directly or indirectly fix  purchase or selling prices or any  other trading conditions; 
(b)  limit or control production, markets,  technical development, or investment; 
(c)  share markets or sources of supply; 
(d)  apply dissimilar conditions to  equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e)  make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,  have no  connection 
with the subject of such contracts. 
14 2.  Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any  agreement or category of agreement between undertakings; 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings; 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: 
(a)  impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions  which are not indispensable to  the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b)  afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question. 
Article 54 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the territory covered 
by this Agreement or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as  incompatible with the 
functioning of this Agreement in so far as it may affect trade between Contracting Parties. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a)  directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b)  limiting production, markets or technical development to  the prejudice of consumers; 
(c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d)  making  the  conclusion  of contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by  the  other  parties  of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
Article 55 
1.  Without prejudice to  the provisions giving effect to  Articles 53  and 54 as  contained in 
Protocol21 and Annex XIV of this Agreement, the EC Commission and the EFI'A Surveillance 
Authority provided for in Article  108(1) shall ensure the application of the principles laid 
down in Articles 53  and 54. 
The competent surveillance authority, as provided for in Article 56, shall investigate cases 
of suspected infringement of these principles, on its own initiative, or on application by a 
State within the respective territory or by the other surveillance authority.  The competent 
15 surveillance authority shall carry out these investigations in cooperation with the competent 
national authorities in the respective territory  and in cooperation with the  other surveillance 
authority,  which shall give it its assistance in accordance with its internal rules. 
If it finds that there has been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to  bring 
it to  an  end. 
2.  If the infringement is  not brought to  an end, the competent surveillance authority shall 
record such infringement of the principles in a reasoned decision. 
The competent surveillance authority may publish its decision and authorize States within the 
respective territory to take the measures, the conditions and details of which it shall determine, 
needed to remedy the situation. It may also request the other surveillance authority to  authorize 
States within the respective territory to  take  such measures. 
Article 56 
1.  Individual cases falling under Article 53  shall be decided upon by the surveillance authorities 
in accordance with the following  provisions: 
(a)  individual cases where only trade between EFTA States is effected shall be decided upon 
by  the EFT  A Surveillance Authority; 
(b)  without prejudice to subparagraph (c), the EFf  A Surveillance Authority decides,  as provided 
for  in  the provisions  set out in Article  58,  Protocol  21  and  the  rules  adopted for  its 
implementation,  Protocol  23  and  Annex  XIV,  on  cases  where  the  turnover  of the 
undertakings concerned in the territory of the EFTA States equals 33% or more of their 
turnover in the territory covered by this Agreement; 
(c)  the EC Commission decides on the other cases as  well as on cases under (b) where trade 
between EC Member States is affected, taking into account the provisions set out in Article 
58,  Protocol 21,  Protocol 23  and Annex XIV. 
2.  Individual cases falling under Article 54 shall be decided upon by the surveillance authority 
in the territory of which a dominant position is found  to exist. The rules  set out in paragraph 
1  (b)  and (c)  shall apply only if dominance exists within the territories of both surveillance 
authorities. 
3.  Individual cases falling under subparagraphs (c)  of paragraph  1,  whose effects on trade 
between EC State Members or on competition within the Community are  not appreciable, 
shall be decided upon by  the EFTA Surveillance Authority. 
4.  The terms  'undertaking'  and  'turnover'  are,  for the purposes of this Article, defined in 
Protocol 22. 
16 Article 57 
1.  Concentrations the control of which is provided for in paragraph 2 and which create or 
strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly 
impeded within the territory covered by this Agreement or a substantial part of it, shall be 
declared incompatible with this Agreement. 
2.  The control of concentrations falling under paragraph 1 shall be carried out by: 
(a)  the EC Commission in cases falling under Regulation (ECC) No 4064/89 in  accordance 
with that Regulation and in accordance with Protocols 21  and 24 and Annex XIV to this 
Agreement. The EC Commission shall, subject to the review of the EC Court of Justice, 
have sole competence to take decisions on these cases; 
(b)  the EFT  A Surveillance Authority in cases not falling  under subparagraph (a) where the 
relevant thresholds set out in Annex XIV are fulfilled in the territory of the EFT  A States 
in accordance with Protocols 21  and 24 and Annex XIV. This is  without prejudice to 
the competence of EC Member States. 
Article 58 
With a view to developing and maintaining a uniform surveillance throughout the European 
Economic Area in the field of competition and to promoting a homogeneous implementation, 
application and interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement to this end, the competent 
authorities shall cooperate in accordance with the provisions set out in Protocols 23  and 24. 
Article 59 
1.  In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to  which EC Member States or EFT  A 
States grant special or exclusive rights, the Contracting Parties shall ensure that there is neither 
enacted nor maintained in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Agreement, 
in particular to those rules provided for in Articles 4 and 53  to  63. 
2.  Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having 
the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this 
Agreement, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules 
does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact,  of the particular tasks assigned to  them. 
The development of trade must not be affected to  such an extent as  would be contrary to 
the interests of the Contracting Parties. 
3.  The EC Commission as  well as  the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall ensure within their 
respective  competence  the  application  of the  provisions  of this  Article  and  shall,  where 
necessary, address appropriate measures to the States falling within their respective territory. 
17 Article 60 
Annex XIV contains specific provisions giving effect to  the principles set out in Articles 53, 
54,  57  and 59. 
[  ... ] 
STATE AID 
Article 61 
1.  Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any  aid granted by EC Member States, 
EFT  A States or through State resources in any  form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to  distort competition by  favouring  certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall,  in  so  far  as  it affects  trade  between  Contracting  Parties,  be incompatible  with  the 
functioning of this Agreement. 
2.  The following shall be compatible with the functioning of this Agreement: 
(a)  aid having a social character,  granted to individual consumers, provided that such aid 
is  granted without discrimination related to the origin of the products concerned; 
(b)  aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c)  aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected 
by the division of Germany, in so far as  such aid is required in order to compensate for 
the economic disadvantages caused by  that division. 
3.  The following may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of this Agreement: 
(a)  aid  to  promote  the  economic  development  of areas  where  the  standard  of living  is 
abnormally low or where there is  serious underemployment; 
(b)  aid to promote the execution of an important project of common European interest or 
to  remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of an  EC Member State or an EFT  A 
State; 
(c)  aid to  facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas,  where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to  an  extent contrary 
to  the common interest; 
(d)  such other categories of aid as may be specified by the EEA Joint Committee in accordance 
with Part VII. 
Article 62 
1.  All existing systems of State aid in the territory of the Contracting Parties, as  well as  any 
plans to  grant or alter State aid,  shall be subject to  constant review as  to  their compatibility 
with Article 61. This review shall be carried out: 
18 (a)  as regards the EC Member States, by the EC Commission according to the rules laid down 
in  Article 93  of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community; 
(b)  as  regards the EFf  A States, by  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority according to the rules 
set out in  an agreement between the EFf  A States establishing the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority which is entrusted with the  powers and functions  laid down in Protocol 26. 
2.  With a view to ensuring a uniform surveillance in the field of State aid throughout the 
territory covered by this Agreement, the EC Commission and the EFf  A Surveillance Authority 
shall cooperate in accordance with the provisions set out in Protocol 27. 
Article 63 
Annex  XV contains specific provisions on State aid. 
Article 64 
1.  If one  of the  surveillance  authorities  considers  that  the  implementation  by  the  other 
surveillance authority of Articles 61  and 62 of this Agreement and Article 5 of Protocol 14 
is not in conformity with the maintenance of equal conditions of competition within the territory 
covered by this Agreement, exchange of views shall be held within two weeks according to 
the procedure of Protocol 27,  paragraph (f). 
If a commonly agreed solution has  not been found in the end of this two-week period, the 
competent authority of the affected Contracting Party may immediately adopt appropriate interim 
measures in order to  remedy the resulting distortion of competition. 
Consultations shall then be held in the EEA Joint Committee with a view to fmding a commonly 
acceptable solution. 
If within three months the EEA Joint Committee has not been able to  find  such a solution, 
and if the practice in question causes, or threatens to  cause, distortion of competition affecting 
trade between the Contracting Parties,  the interim  measures may  be replaced by definitive 
measures,  strictly necessary to  offset the effect of such distortion.  Priority shall be given to 
such measures that will least disturb the functioning of the EEA. 
2.  The provisions of this Article will also apply to  State monopolies, which are established 
after the date of signature of the Agreement. 
[  ... ] 
19 Surveillance procedure 
Article 108 
1.  The EFf  A States shall establish an independent surveillance authority (EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority) as well as procedures similar to those existing in the Community including procedures 
for ensuring the fulfilment of obligations under this Agreement and for control of the legality 
of acts of the EFf  A Surveillance Authority regarding competition. 
2.  The EFf  A States shall establish a court of justice (EFf  A Court). 
The EFf  A Court shall, in accordance with a separate agreement between the EFf  A States, 
with regard to  the application of this Agreement be competent, in particular, for: 
(a)  actions concerning the surveillance procedure regarding the EFf  A States; 
(b)  appeals concerning decisions in the field  of competition taken by  the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority; 
(c)  the  settlement of disputes between two  or more EFf  A States. 
Article 109 
1.  The fulfilment of the obligations under this Agreement shall be monitored by, on the one 
hand,  the EFf  A Surveillance  Authority  and,  on  the  other,  the  EC  Commission  acting  in 
conformity  with  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community,  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and this Agreement. 
2.  In order to ensure a uniform surveillance throughout the EEA,  the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority and the EC Commission shall cooperate, exchange information and consult each 
other on surveillance policy issues and individual cases. 
3.  The EC Commission and the EFfA Surveillance Authority shall receive any  complaints 
concerning the  application of this  Agreement.  They shall inform each other of complaints 
received. 
4.  Each of these bodies shall examine all complaints falling  within its competence and shall 
pass to the other body any complaints which fall  within the competence of that body. 
5.  In case of disagreement between these two bodies with regard to  the action to  be taken 
in relation to a complaint or with regard to  the result of the examination, either of the bodies 
may refer the matter to the EEA Joint Committee which shall deal with it in accordance with 
Article  111. 
20 Article 110 
Decisions under this Agreement by  the EFT  A Surveillance Authority and the EC Commission 
which impose a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States shall be enforceable. The 
same shall apply  to  such judgments under this  Agreement by the  Court of Justice of the 
European Communities, the Court of First Instance of the European Communities and the 
EFfA Court. 
Enforcement shall be governed by  the rules of civil procedure in force  in the  State in  the 
territory of which it is carried out.  The order for its enforcement shall be appended to  the 
decision,  without other formality  than verification of the authenticity of the decision, by the 
authority which each Contracting Party shall designate for this purpose and shall make known 
to  the other Contracting Parties, the EFT  A Surveillance Authority,  the EC Commission, the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities, the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities and the EFT  A Court. 
When these formalities have been completed on application by  the party concerned, the latter 
may proceed to enforcement, in accordance with the law of the State in the territory of which 
enforcement is to be carried out,  by bringing the matter directly before the competent authority. 
Enforcement may be suspended only by  a decision of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities, as  far as  decisions by the EC Commission, the Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities or the Court of Justice of the European Communities are concerned, 
or by a decision of the EFT  A Court as  far as  decisions by the EFT  A Surveillance Authority 
or the EFf  A Court are concerned. However, the courts of the States concerned shall have 
jurisdiction over complaints that enforcement is  being carried out in an irregular manner. 
[  ... ] 
21 PROTOCOL 8 ON STATE MONOPOLIES 
1.  Article  16 of the Agreement shall be applicable at the latest from  1 January  1995 in the 
case of the following State monopolies of a commercial character: 
- Austrian monopoly on salt; 
- Icelandic monopoly on fertilizers; 
- Swiss and Liechtenstein monopolies on  salt and gunpowder. 
2.  Article  16  shall also apply to wine  (HS  heading No  22.04). 
PROTOCOL 9 ON TRADE IN FISH AND OTHER MARINE PRODUCTS 
[  ... ] 
Article 4 
1.  Aid granted through State resources to  the fisheries  sector which distorts competition shall 
be abolished. 
2.  Legislation relating to  the market organization in the fisheries  sector shall be adjusted 
so  as  not to  distort competition. 
3.  The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to  ensure conditions of competition which will 
enable the other Contracting Parties to  refrain from  the application of anti-dumping measures 
and countervailing duties. 
[  ... ] 
PROTOCOL 13 ON THE NON-APPLICATION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
The application of Article 26 of the Agreement is limited to the areas covered by the provisions 
of the Agreement and in which the Community acquis is fully  integrated into the Agreement. 
Moreover, unless other solutions are agreed upon by the Contracting Parties, its application 
is  without prejudice to any  measures which  may be introduced by  the Contracting Parties to 
avoid circumvention of the following measures aimed at third countries: 
22 
anti-dumping measures; 
countervailing duties; 
measures against illicit commercial practices attributable to  third countries. PROTOCOL 14  ON TRADE ON  COAL AND STEEL PRODUCTS 
[  ... ] 
Article 4 
The substantive competition rules applicable to undertakings concerning products covered by 
this Protocol are included in Protocol 25.  Secondary legislation is set out in Protocol 21  and 
Annex XIV. 
Article 5 
The Contracting Parties shall comply with the rules for aid to the steel industry. They recognize 
in particular the relevance of, and accept, the Community rules for  aid to  the steel industry 
as  laid down in Commission Decision 322/89/ECSC which expires on 31  December 1991. 
The Contracting Parties declare their commitment to  integrate into the EEA Agreement new 
Community rules for aid to the steel industry by the entry into force of this Agreement, provided 
that they  are  substantially similar to  those of the aforementioned act. 
Article 6 
1.  The Contracting Parties shall exchange information on markets.  The EFf  A States shall 
use their best endeavours in order to ensure that steel producers, consumers and merchants 
provide such information. 
2.  The EFf  A States shall use their best endeavours in order to ensure that the steel-producing 
undertakings established within their territories will participate in  annual surveys concerning 
investment referred to in Article 15 of Commission Decision 3302/81/ECSC of 18  November 
1991. The Contracting Parties will exchange, without prejudice to the requirements of business 
confidentiality, information on significant investment or disinvestment projects. 
3.  All matters relating to  the exchange of information between the Contracting Parties shall 
be covered by the general institutional provisions of this Agreement. 
Article 7 
The Contracting Parties note that the rules of origin laid down in Protocol 3 of the Free Trade 
Agreements concluded between the European Economic Community and individual EFfA 
States are replaced by Protocol 4 to  this Agreement. 
[ ... ] 
23 PROTOCOL 21  ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION RULES 
APPLICABLE TO UNDERTAKINGS 
Article 1 
The EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall, in agreement between the EFT  A States, be entrusted 
with equivalent powers and similar functions  to  those of the EC Commission, at the time of 
the signature of the Agreement,  for the application of the competition rules of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community and the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community, enabling the EFTA Surveillance Authority to give effect to  the 
principles laid down in Articles  1(2)(e) and 53  to  60 of the Agreement, and in  Protocol 25. 
The Community shall, where necessary,  adopt the  provisions giving effect to  the principles 
laid down in Articles  1(2)(e) and 53  to 60 of the Agreement,  and in Protocol 25,  in order 
to  ensure that the EC Commission has  equivalent powers and similar functions  under this 
Agreement to  those  which  it  has,  at  the  time  of the  signature  of the  Agreement,  for  the 
application  of the  competition  rules  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community and the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Article 2 
If,  following  the  procedures  set  out  in  Part  VII  of the  Agreement,  new  acts  for  the 
implementation of Articles  1(2)(e) and 53  to  60 and of Protocol 25,  or on amendments of 
the  acts  listed in Article 3 of this  Protocol are adopted,  corresponding amendments shall be 
made in the agreement setting up the EFT  A Surveillance Authority so  as  to ensure that the 
EFT  A Surveillance Authority will be entrusted simultaneously with equivalent powers and 
similar functions  to those of the EC  Commission. 
Article 3 
1.  In addition to  the  acts listed in Annex XIV,  the following  acts  reflect the powers and 
functions  of the EC Commission for  the  application of the  competition rules of the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community: 
Control of concentrations 
1.  389 R 4064: Articles 6 to  25  of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 
1989  on the  control of concentrations between undertakings  (OJ  L 395,  30.12.1989, 
p.  1),  as  corrected by  OJ  L  257, 21.9.1990, p.  13. 
2.  390  R  2367:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2367/90  of 25  July  1990  on  the 
notifications  time-limits  and  hearings  provided  for  in  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L  219,  14.8.1990, 
p.  5). 
24 General procedural rules 
3.  362  R  0017:  Council  Regulation  No  17/62  of 6  February  1962.  First  Regulation 
implementing Articles 85  and 86 of the Treaty (OJ  13,  21.2.1962,  p.  204/62), as amended 
by: 
- 362 R 0059: Regulation No  59/62 of 3 July  1962 (OJ 58,  10.7.1962, p.  1655/62), 
- 363  R 0118:  Regulation No  118/63  of 5 November 1963  (OJ  162,  7.11.1963,  p. 
2696/63), 
- 371  R  2822:  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2822/71  of 20  December  1971  (OJ  L  285, 
29.12.1971, p.  49), 
- 172 B:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and 
the  United Kingdom of Great Britain and  Northern Ireland (OJ  L 73,  27.3.1972, 
p.  92), 
- 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession  to  the  European Communities  of the  Hellenic  Republic  (OJ  L  291, 
19.11.1979, p.  93), 
- 185  I:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic (OJ L 302,  15.11.1985, p.  165). 
4.  362  R  0027:  Commission  Regulation  No  27/62  of 3  May  1962.  First  Regulation 
implementing Council Regulation No  17/62 of 6 February  1962 (form,  content and other 
details  concerning  applications  and  notifications)  (OJ  35,  10.5.1962,  p.  1118/62),  as 
amended by: 
- 368 R  1133: Regulation (EEC) No  1133/68 of 26 July  1968 (OJ L 189,  1.8.1968, 
p.  1), 
- 375  R  1699:  Regulation (EEC)  No  1699175  of 2 July  1975  (OJ  L  172,  3.7.1975, 
p.  11), 
- 178 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession  to  the  European Communities  of the  Hellenic  Republic  (OJ  L  291, 
19.11.1979, p.  94), 
- 385 R 2526: Regulation (EEC) No 2526/85  of 5 August 1985  (OJ L 240, 7.9.1985, 
p.  1), 
- 185  I:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the Adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese 
Republic (OJ L 302,  15.11.1985, p.  166). 
5.  363 R 0099: Commission Regulation No 96/63 of 25 July  1963 on the hearings provided 
for in Article  19(1) and (2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No  17/62 (OJ  127,  20.8.1963, 
p.  2268/63 ). 
25 Transport 
6.  362 R 0141: Council Regulation No 141/62 of 26 November 1962 exempting transport 
from  the  application  of Council  Regulation  No  17/62  amended by Regulations  Nos 
165/65/EEC and 1002/67/EEC (OJ  124, 28.11.1962, p.  2751/62). 
7.  368 R  1017: Article 6 and Articles  10 to  31  of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1017/68 
of 19  July  1968  applying  rules  of competition  to  transport  by  rail,  road  and  inland 
waterway (OJ L  175, 23.7.1968, p.  1). 
8.  369 R 1629: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1629/69 of 8 August 1969 on the form, 
content and other details of complaints pursuant to Article  10,  applications pursuant to 
Article 12 and notifications pursuant to  Article 14( 1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1017/68 of 19  July  1968  (OJ L  209, 21.8.1969,  p.  1). 
9.  369 R  1630:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1630/69 of August 1969 on the hearings 
provided for in Article 26(1) and (2)  of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1017/68 of 19 
July  1968  (OJ L 209, 21.8.1969, p.  11). 
10.  374 R 2988:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  2988174  of 26 November 1974 concerning 
limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of 
the European Economic Community relating to  transport and  competition (OJ L  319, 
29.11.1974, p.  1). 
11.  386 R 4056:  Section II of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 
laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85  and 86 of the Treaty to 
maritime transport (OJ L  378, 31.12.1986, p.  4). 
12.  388 R 4260:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4260/88 of 16  December 1988 on the 
communications, complaints and applications and the hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 
85  and 86 of the Treaty to  maritime transport (OJ L  376, 31.12.1988, p.  1  ). 
13.  387 R 3975: Council Regulation (EEC) No  3975/87 of 14 December 1987  laying down 
the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to undertakings in  the air 
transport sector (OJ  L  374, 31.12.1987, p.  1),  as  amended by: 
- 391  R  1284:  Council Regulation (EEC)  No  1284/91  of 14 May  1991  (OJ L  122, 
17.5.1991, p.  2). 
14.  388 R 4261: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4261/88 of 16 December 1988 on the 
form,  content and other details of complaints and of applications, and the hearings provided 
for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 laying down the procedure for the application 
of the  rules  of competition  to  undertakings  in  the  air  transport  sector  (OJ  L  376, 
31.12.1988, p.  10). 
2.  In addition to  the acts  listed in Annex XIV,  the following  acts reflect the powers and 
functions of the EC Commission for the application of the competition rules of the Treaty 
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): 
26 1.  Article (ECSC) 65(2), subparagraphs 3 to  5,  (3),  (4),  subparagraph 2,  and (5). 
2.  Article (ECSC) 66(2), subparagraphs 2 to  4,  and (4) to  (6). 
3.  354  D  7026:  High  Authority  Decision  No  26/54  of 6  May  1954  laying  down  in 
implementation of Article 66(  4) of the Treaty a regulation concerning information to 
be  furnished  (Official  Journal  of the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  No  9, 
11.5.1954, p.  350/54). 
4.  378 S 0715: Commission Decision No 715n8/ECSC of 6 April 1978 concerning limitation 
periods in proceedings and the  enforcement of sanctions under the Treaty establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community (OJ L 94,  8.4.1978,  p.  22). 
5.  384 S 0379: Commission Decision 379/84/ECSC of 15 February  1984 defining the powers 
of officials and  agents of the Commission instructed to  carry out the checks provided 
for the ECSC Treaty and decisions taken in application thereof (OJ  L  46,  16.2.1984, 
p.  23). 
Article 4 
1.  Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in Article 53(1) which 
come into existence after the entry into force of the Agreement and in respect of which the 
parties seek application of Article 53(3) shall be notified to the competent surveillance authority 
pursuant to Article 56, Protocol 23  and the rules referred to in Articles  I  to 3 of this Protocol. 
Until they have been notified,  no decision in application of Article 53(3) may be taken. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply  to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices where: 
(a)  the only parties thereto are undertakings from one EC Member State or from one EFTA 
State and the agreements, decisions or concerted practices do not relate either to imports 
or to exports between Contracting Parties; 
(b)  not more than two undertakings are party thereto,  and the  agreements only: 
(i)  restrict  the  freedom  of one  party  to  the  contract  in  determining  the  prices  or 
conditions of business upon which the goods which he has obtained from the other 
party to the contract may be resold, or 
(ii)  impose restrictions on the exercise of the rights of the assignee or user of industrial 
property rights - in particular patents, utility  models, designs or trademarks - or 
the person entitled under a contract to the assignment, or grant, of the right to use 
a method of manufacture or knowledge relating to  the use and to the application 
of industrial processes; 
(c)  they have as  their sole object: 
(i)  the development or uniform application of standards or types,  or 
(ii)  joint research or development, or 
27 (iii)  specialization in the manufacture of products including agreements necessary for 
achieving this: 
- where the products which are the subject of specialization do not, in a substantial 
part of the territory covered by the Agreement, represent more than 15% of 
the  volume  of business  done  in identical  products  or those  considered  by 
consumers to be similar by reason of their characteristics, price and use, and 
- where the total annual turnover of the participating undertakings does not exceed 
ECU 200 million. 
These  agreements,  decisions  and  concerted  practices  may  be  notified  to  the  competent 
surveillance authority pursuant to Article 56, Protocol 23  and the rules referred to in Articles 
1 to 3 of this Protocol. 
Article 5 
1.  Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in Article 53(1) which 
are in existence at the date of entry into force of the Agreement and in respect of which the 
parties seek application of Article 53(3) shall be notified to the competent surveillance authority 
pursuant to  the provisions in Article 56, Protocol 23  and the rules referred to in Articles  1 
to 3 of this Protocol within six months of the date of entry into force of the Agreement. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices of the kind 
described in Article 53(1) of the Agreement and falling under Article 4(2) of this Protocol; 
these may be notified to the competent surveillance authority pursuant to Article 56, Protocol 
23  and the rules referred to in Articles  1 to 3 of this Protocol. 
Article 6 
The competent surveillance authority shall specify in its decisions pursuant to  Article 53(3) 
the date from which the decisions shall take effect. That date may be earlier than the date 
of notification as  regards agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings or concerted 
practices falling under Articles 4(2) and 5(2) of this Protocol, or those falling under Article 
5(1) of this Protocol which have been notified within the time-limit specified in Article 5(1). 
Article 7 
I.  Where agreements, decisions or concerted practices of the kind described in Article 53(1) 
which are in existence at the date of entry into force of the Agreement and notified within 
the time-limits specified in Article 5(1) of this Protocol do not satisfy the requirements of 
Article 53(3) and the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned cease to  give 
effect to them or modify them in such a manner that they no longer fall under the prohibition 
contained in Article 53(1) or that they satisfy the requirements of Article 53(3), the prohibition 
contained in Article 53(1) shall apply only for a period fixed by the competent surveillance 
authority.  A decision by the competent surveillance authority pursuant to the foregoing sentence 
28 shall not apply as  against undertakings and associations of undertakings which did not expressly 
consent to the notification. 
2.  Paragraph  1 shall apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices falling under Article 
4(2) of this Protocol which are in existence at the date of entry into force of the Agreement 
if they  are notified within six  months after that date. 
Article 8 
Applications and notifications submitted to the EC Commission prior to the date of entry into 
force  of the Agreement shall be deemed to  comply  with the  provisions on application and 
notification under the Agreement. 
The competent surveillance authority  pursuant to  Article 56 of the Agreement and  Article 
10 of Protocol 23  may  require a duly  completed form  as  prescribed for the implementation 
of the Agreement to  be submitted to  it within such time  as  it shall appoint.  In  that event, 
applications and notifications shall be treated as properly made only if the forms are submitted 
within the prescribed period and in  accordance with the provisions of the Agreement. 
Article 9 
Fines for infringement of Article 53(1) shall not be imposed in  respect of any  act prior to 
notification of the  agreements, decisions and concerted practices to  which Articles 5 and 6 
of this Protocol apply and  which have been notified within the  period specified therein. 
Article 10 
The Contracting Parties shall ensure that the measures affording the necessary assistance to 
officials of the EFT  A Surveillance Authority  and  the EC Commission, in order to enable them 
to  make their investigations as  foreseen  under the Agreement, are taken within six months 
of the entry into force of the Agreement. 
Article 11 
As  regards agreements, decisions and concerted practices already in existence at the date of 
entry into force of the Agreement which fall  under Article 53(1),  the prohibition in Article 
53(1) shall not apply  where the  agreements,  decisions or practices are modified within six 
months  from  the  date  of entry  into  force  of the  Agreement  so  as  to  fulfil  the  conditions 
contained in  the block exemptions provided for in  Annex XIV. 
29 Article 12 
As regards agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices already 
in existence at the date of entry into force of the Agreement which fall  under Article 53(1), 
the  prohibition in  Article  53(1)  shall  not  apply,  from  the  date  of entry  into  force  of the 
Agreement, where the agreements, decisions or practices are modified within six months from 
the date of entry into force of the Agreement so as not to fall under the prohibition of Article 
53(1) any more. 
Article 13 
Agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices which benefit 
from  an  individual  exemption  granted  under  Article  85(3)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Economic Community before the entry into force of the Agreement shall continue 
to be exempted as regards the provisions of the Agreement, until their date of expiry as provided 
for in the decisions granting these exemptions or until the EC Commission otherwise decides, 
whichever date is  the earlier. 
PROTOCOL 22  CONCERNING THE DEFINITION OF 'UNDERTAKING' 
AND  'TURNOVER' (ARTICLE 56) 
Article 1 
For the purposes of the attribution of individual cases pursuant to Article 56 of the Agreement, 
an  'undertaking' shall be any entity carrying out activities of a commercial or economic nature. 
Article 2 
'Turnover'  within the meaning of Article 56 of the Agreement shall comprise the  amounts 
derived by  the  undertakings  concerned, in the territory covered by  the  Agreement,  in the 
preceding financial year from the sale of products and the provision of services falling  within 
the undertaking's ordinary score of activities after deduction of sales rebates and of value-added 
tax and other taxes directly related to  turnover. 
Article 3 
In place of turnover, the following shall be used: 
(a)  for credit institutions and other financial institutions, their total assets multiplied by the 
ratio between loans and advances to  credit institutions and customers in transactions with 
residents in the territory covered by  the Agreement and the total sum of those loans and 
advances; 
30 (b)  for insurance undertakings, the value of gross premiums received from residents in the 
territory  covered by  the  Agreement,  which shall  comprise  all  amounts  received  and 
receivable in respect of insurance  contracts issued by  or on behalf of the  insurance 
undertakings, including also outgoing reinsurance premiums, and after deduction of taxes 
and parafiscal contributions or levies charged by reference to the amounts of individual 
premiums or the total value of premiums. 
Article 4 
1.  In derogation from the definition of the turnover relevant for the application of Article 
56 of the Agreement, as  contained in Article 2 of this Protocol, the relevant turnover shall 
be constituted: 
(a)  as regards agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
related to  distribution and supply arrangements between non-competing undertakings, 
of the amounts derived from the sale of goods or the provision of services which are 
the subject matter of the agreements, decisions or concerted practices, and from the other 
goods  or services  which  are  considered  by  users  to  be  equivalent  in  view  of their 
characteristics, price and intended use; 
(b)  as regards agreements, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practices 
related to arrangements on transfer of technology between non-competing undertakings, 
of the amounts derived from  the sale of goods or the provision of services which result 
from the technology which is the subject matter of the agreement, decisions or concerted 
practices, and of the amounts derived from the sale of those goods or the provision of 
those services which that technology is designed to  improve or replace. 
2.  However, where at the time of the coming into existence of arrangements as  described 
in paragraph 1(a) and (b)  turnover as  regards the sale of goods or the provision of services 
is not in evidence, the general provision as  contained in Article 2 shall apply. 
Article 5 
1.  Where individual cases concern products falling within the scope of application of Protocol 
25, the relevant turnover for the attribution of those cases shall be the turnover achieved in 
these products. 
2.  Where individual cases concern products falling within the scope of application of Protocol 
25  as  well as products or services falling  within the scope of application of Articles 53  and 
54 of the Agreement, the relevant turnover is determined by  taking into account all the products 
and services as  provided for in Article 2. 
31 PROTOCOL 23 CONCERNING THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 
SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITIES (ARTICLE 58) 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
The EFf  A Surveillance Authority and the EC  Commission shall exchange information and 
consult each other on general policy issues at the request of either of the surveillance authorities. 
The EFf  A Surveillance Authority and the EC Commission, in accordance with their internal 
rules,  respecting Article 56 of the Agreement on Protocol 22 and the autonomy of both sides 
in their decisions,  shall cooperate in the handling of individual cases falling  under Article 
56(1)(b) and (c),  (2) second sentence and (3),  as  provided for in the provisions below. 
For the purposes of this Protocol, the term  'territory of a surveillance authority'  shall mean 
for the EC Commission the territory of the EC Member States to which the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community or the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, as  the case may be,  applies,  upon the terms laid down in those Treaties,  and 
for the EFf  A Surveillance Authority the territories of the EFf  A States to which the Agreement 
applies. 
THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Article 2 
In cases falling under Article 56(1)(b) and (c),  (2),  second sentence and  (3) of the Agreement, 
the EFf  A Surveillance Authority and the EC Commission shall  without undue .delay forward 
to  each other notifications and complaints to the extent that it is  not apparent that these have 
been addressed to both surveillance authorities. They shall also inform each other when opening 
ex officio procedures. 
The  surveillance  authority  which  has  received  information  as  provided  for  in  the  first 
subparagraph may present its comments thereon within 40 working days of its receipt. 
Article 3 
The competent surveillance authority shall, in cases falling under Article 56(1 )(b) and (c), 
(2),  second sentence and (3) of the Agreement, consult the other surveillance authority when: 
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publishing its intention to  give a negative clearance, 
publishing its intention to take a decision in application of Article 53(3), or 
addressing to the undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned its statement 
of objections. The other surveillance authority may deliver its comments within the time-limits set out in 
the abovementioned publication or statement of objections. 
Observations received from the undertakings concerned or third parties shall be transmitted 
to the other surveillance authority. 
Article 4 
In cases falling under Article 56(l)(b) and (c),  (2),  second sentence and (3) of the Agreement, 
the  competent surveillance  authority  shall  transmit to  the  other surveillance authority  the 
administrative letters by  which a file  is  closed or a complaint rejected. 
Article 5 
In cases falling under Article 56(l)(b) and (c),  (2),  second sentence and (3)  of the Agreement, 
the competent surveillance authority shall invite the other surveillance authority to be represented 
at hearings of the undertakings concerned. The invitation shall also extend to  the States falling 
within the competence of the other surveillance authority. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEES 
Article 6 
In cases falling under Article 56(l)(b) and (c),  (2),  second sentence and (3) of the Agreement, 
the competent surveillance authority shall, in due time, inform the other surveillance authority 
of the date of the meeting of the Advisory Committee and transmit the relevant documentation. 
All  documents  forwarded  for  that  purpose  from  the  other surveillance  authority  shall  be 
presented to the Advisory Committee of the surveillance authority which is competent to  decide 
on a case in accordance with Article 56 together with the material sent out by that surveillance 
authority. 
Each surveillance authority and the States falling  within its competence shall be entitled to 
be present in the Advisory Committees of the other surveillance authority and to express their 
views therein;  they shall not have, however, the right to vote. 
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS 
AND THE RIGHT TO MAKE OBSERVATIONS 
Article 7 
In cases falling under Article 56(1)(b) and (c),  (2),  second sentence and  (3) of the Agreement, 
the competent surveillance authority which is  not competent to  decide on a case in accordance 
with Article 56 may  request at all  stages of the  proceedings copies of the most important 
33 documents lodged with the competent surveillance authority  for the purpose of establishing 
the existence of infringements of Articles 53  and 54 or of obtaining a negative clearance or 
exemption, and may  furthermore,  before a final decision is  taken,  make  any  observations it 
considers appropriate. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE 
Article 8 
1.  When sending a request for information to an undertaking or association of undertakings 
located  within  the  territory of the  other surveillance authority,  the  competent surveillance 
authority,  as defined in Article 56 of the Agreement,  shall at the same time forward a copy 
of the request to  the other surveillance authority. 
2.  Where  an  undertaking or association of undertakings  does  not  supply  the  information 
requested  within  the  time-limit fixed  by  the  competent surveillance  authority,  or  supplies 
incomplete information,  the  competent surveillance authority  shall by  decision require the 
information to be supplied. In the case of undertakings or associations of undertakings located 
within the territory of the other surveillance authority, the  competent surveillance authority 
shall forward  a copy of that decision to the other surveillance authority. 
3.  At the request of the competent surveillance authority,  as  defined in Article 56 of the 
Agreement, the other surveillance authority shall, in accordance with its internal rules, undertake 
investigations  within  its  territory  in  cases  where  the  competent  surveillance  authority  so 
requesting considers it to  be necessary. 
4.  The competent surveillance authority is entitled to be represented and take an active part 
in investigations carried out by  the other surveillance authority in respect of paragraph 3. 
5.  All information obtained during such investigations on request shall be  transmitted to the 
surveillance authority which requested the investigations immediately after their finalization. 
6.  Where the competent surveillance authority, in  cases falling under Article 56(1)(b) and 
(c),  (2),  second sentence and (3) of the Agreement, carries out investigations within its territory, 
it shall inform the other surveillance authority of the fact that such investigations have taken 
place and,  on  request,  transmit to  that authority the relevant results of the investigations. 
Article 9 
1.  Information acquired as  a result of the application of this Protocol shall be used only  for 
the purpose of procedures under Articles 53  and 54 of the Agreement. 
2.  The EC Commission, the EFT  A Surveillance Authority,  the competent authority of the 
EC Member States and the EFT  A States, and their officials and other servants shall not disclose 
information acquired by  them as  a result of the application of this Protocol and of the kind 
covered by  the obligation of professional secrecy. 
34 3.  Rules  on  professional  secrecy  and  restricted  use  of information  provided  for  in  the 
Agreement or in  the  legislation of the  Contracting  Parties  shall  not  prevent exchange  of 
information as  set out in this Protocol. 
Article 10 
1.  Undertakings shall, in cases of notifications of agreements,  address the notification of the 
competent surveillance authority in accordance with Article 56 of the Agreement. Complaints 
may  be  addressed to  either surveillance authority. 
2.  Notifications or complaints addressed to the surveillance authority which,  pursuant to Article 
56,  is  not competent to  decide  on a  given case  shall  be  transferred  without delay  to  the 
competent surveillance authority. 
3.  If, in the preparation or initiation of ex officio proceedings, it becomes apparent that the 
other surveillance authority is  competent to  decide on a case in accordance with Article 56 
of the Agreement, this case shall be transferred to  the competent surveillance authority. 
4.  Once a case is transmitted to the other surveillance authority as  provided for in paragraphs 
2 and 3,  a retransmission of the case may  not take place.  A transmission of a case may not 
take place after the publishing of the intention to  give a negative clearance, the publishing 
of the  intention to  take  a  decision  in  application  of Article  53(3)  of the  Agreement,  the 
addressing  to  undertakings  or associations  of undertakings  concerned  of the  statement of 
objections or the sending of a letter informing the applicant that there are insufficient grounds 
for pursuing the complaint. 
Article 11 
The date of submission of an application or notification shall be the date on which it is received 
by  the  EC Commission or the EFf  A Surveillance Authority,  regardless of which of these 
is competent to decide on the case under Article 56 of the Agreement. Where, however, the 
application or notification is sent by  registered post, it shall be deemed to  have been received 
on the date shown on the postmark of the place of posting. 
LANGUAGES 
Article 12 
Undertakings shall be entitled to address and be addressed by the EFf  A Surveillance Authority 
and the EC Commission in an official language of an EFf  A State or the European Community 
which they choose as  regards notifications, applications and complaints. This shall also cover 
all instances of a proceeding,  whether it be opened on notification,  application or complaint 
or ex officio by  the competent surveillance authority. 
35 PROTOCOL 24 ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CONTROL OF 
CONCENTRATIONS 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
Article 1 
1.  The EFT  A Surveillance Authority and the EC  Commission shall exchange information 
and consult each other on general policy issues at the request of either of the surveillance 
authorities. 
2.  In cases falling under Article 57(2)(a), the EC  Commission and  the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority shall cooperate in the handling of concentrations as  provided for in the provisions 
set out below. 
3.  For the purposes of this Protocol, the term  'territory of a surveillance authority'  shall mean 
for the EC Commission the territory of the EC Member States to  which the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community or the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community, as  the case may be,  applies, upon the terms laid down in  those Treaties,  and 
for the EFT  A Surveillance Authority the territories of the EFT A States to which the Agreement 
applies. 
Article 2 
1.  Cooperation shall take place, in accordance with the provisions set out in  this Protocol, 
where: 
(a)  the combined turnover of the undertakings concerned in the territory of the EFTA States 
equals 25% or more of their total turnover within the territory covered by the Agreement, 
or 
(b)  each of at least two of the undertakings concerned has  a turnover exceeding ECU 250 
million in the territory of the EFT  A States, or 
(c)  the concentration is liable to create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the territories of the EFT  A States 
or a substantial part thereof. 
2.  Cooperation shall also take place where: 
(a)  the concentration threatens to create or strengthen a dominant position as a result of which 
effective competition would be significantly impeded on a market within an EFT  A State 
which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market,  be it a substantial part of the 
territory covered by  this Agreement or not,  or 
(b)  an EFT  A State wishes to adopt measures to protect legitimate interests as set out in Article 
7. 
36 INITIAL PHASE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Article 3 
1.  The  EC  Commission  shall  transmit  to  the  EFT  A  Surveillance  Authority  copies  of 
notifications of the cases referred to in Article 2(1) and (2)(a) within three working days and, 
as  soon as  possible, copies of the most important documents lodged with or issued by the 
EC Commission. 
2.  The EC Commission shall carry out the procedures set out for the implementation of Article 
57 of the Agreement in close and constant liaison with the EFT  A Surveillance Authority. The 
EFT  A Surveillance Authority and EFT  A States may express their views upon those procedures. 
For the purposes of Article 6 of this Protocol, the EC  Commission shall obtain information 
from the competent authority of the EFT  A State concerned and give it the opportunity to make 
known its  views at every  stage of the procedures up to  the  adoption of a decision pursuant 
to  that Article. To that end,  the EC Commission shall give it access to the file. 
HEARINGS 
Article 4 
In  cases referred to  in  Article 2(1)  and  (2)(a),  the EC Commission shall  invite the  EFTA 
Surveillance Authority to  be represented at the hearings of the undertakings concerned. The 
EFT  A States may  likewise be represented at those hearings. 
THE EC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CONCENTRATIONS 
Article 5 
1.  In cases referred to in Article 2(1) and (2)(a), the EC Commission shall in due time inform 
the EFT  A Surveillance Authority of the date of the  meeting of the EC Advisory Committee 
on Concentrations and transmit the relevant documentation. 
2.  All documents forwarded for that purpose from the EFT  A Surveillance Authority, including 
documents emanating from EFT  A States, shall be presented to  the EC Advisory Committee 
on  Concentrations  together  with  the  other  relevant  documentation  sent  out  by  the  EC 
Commission. 
3.  The EFT  A Surveillance Authority and the EFT  A States shall be entitled to  be present 
in the EC Advisory Committee on Concentrations and to express their views therein;  they 
shall not have,  however, the right to  vote. 
37 RIGHTS  OF INDIVIDUAL STATES 
Article 6 
1.  The EC Commission may,  by means of a decision notified without delay  to the undertakings 
concerned, to the competent authorities of the EC Member States and to the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority, refer a notified concentration to  an EFf  A State where a concentration threatens 
to create or strengthen a dominant position as  a result of which effective competition would 
be significantly impeded on a market within that State, which presents all the characteristics 
of a distinct market, be it a substantial part of the territory covered by  the Agreement or not. 
2.  In cases referred to  in  paragraph  1,  any EFf  A State may appeal to  the European Court 
of Justice,  on the same grounds and conditions as  an EC  Member State under Article  173 
of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular request the 
application of interim measures, for the purpose of applying its  national competition law. 
Article 7 
1.  Notwithstanding the sole competence of the EC Commission to deal with concentrations 
of a Community dimension as  set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 
1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p.  1,  as 
corrected by OJ L  257,  21.9 .1990,  p.  13 ),  EFT  A States may  take  appropriate measures  to 
protect legitimate interests other than those taken into consideration according to  the above 
Regulation and compatible with the general principles and other provisions as  provided for, 
directly or indirectly, under the Agreement. 
2.  Public security, plurality of media and  prudential rules  shall be regarded as  legitimate 
interests within the meaning of paragraph  1. 
3.  Any  other public  interest must be ·communicated to  the  EC  Commission and shall  be 
recognized by  the EC Commission after an  assessment of its compatibility with the general 
principles and other provisions as  provided for,  directly or indirectly, under the Agreement 
before the measures referred to  above may  be taken. The EC Commission shall inform the 
EFf  A Surveillance Authority and the EFf  A State concerned of its decision within one month 
of that communication. 
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE 
Article 8 
1.  In  carrying out the duties assigned  to  it  for  the implementation of Article 57,  the  EC 
Commission may obtain all necessary information from the EFf  A Surveillance Authority and 
EFT  A States. 
38 2.  When sending a request for information to  a person,  an undertaking or an association 
of undertakings  located  within  the  territory  of the  EFf  A  Surveillance  Authority,  the  EC 
Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of the request to  the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority. 
3.  Where such  persons, undertakings or associations  of undertakings  do  not provide the 
information requested within the period fixed by the EC Commission, or provide incomplete 
information, the EC Commission shall by decision require the information to be provided and 
forward a copy of that decision to  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority. 
4.  At the request of the EC Commission, the EFf  A Surveillance Authority shall undertake 
investigations within its territory. 
5.  The EC Commission is entitled to  be represented and take an active part in investigations 
carried out pursuant to  paragraph 4. 
6.  All information obtained during such investigations on request shall be transmitted to  the 
EC Commission immediately after their finalization. 
7.  Where the EC Commission carries out investigations within the territory of the Community, 
it shall, as regards cases falling  under Article 2(1) and (2)(a) inform the EFfA Surveillance 
Authority of the fact that such investigations have taken place and on request transmit in an 
appropriate way the relevant results of the investigations. 
PROFESSIONAL SECRECY 
Article 9 
1.  Information acquired as  a result of the application of this Protocol shall be used only for 
the purpose of procedures under Article 57  of the Agreement. 
2.  The EC Commission, the EFf  A Surveillance Authority, the competent authorities of the 
EC Member States and of the EFf  A States, and their officials and other servants shall not 
disclose information acquired by them as  a result of the application of this Protocol and of 
the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy. 
3.  Rules  on  professional  secrecy  and  restricted  used  of information  provided  for  in  the 
Agreement or the legislation of the Contracting Parties shall not prevent the exchange and 
use of information as  set out in this Protocol. 
NOTIFICATIONS 
Article 10 
1.  Undertakings shall address their notifications to  the competent surveillance authority in 
accordance with Article 57(2) of the  Agreement. 
39 2.  Notifications or complaints addressed to the authority  which, pursuant to  Article 57, is 
not competent to  take decisions on a given case shall be transferred without delay  to  the 
competent surveillance authority. 
Article 11 
The date of submission of a notification shall be the  date on which it is received by  the 
competent surveillance authority. 
The date of submission of a notification shall be the date on which it is received by the EC 
Commission or the EFf  A Surveillance Authority, if the case is  notified in accordance with 
the implementing rules under Article 57  of the Agreement, but falls under Article 53. 
LANGUAGES 
Article 12 
1.  Undertakings shall be entitled to  address and be addressed by  the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority and the EC Commission in an official language of an EFf  A State or the European 
Community which they choose as  regards notifications. This shall also cover all instances 
of a proceeding. 
2.  If  undertakings choose to  address a surveillance authority in a language which is  not one 
of the official languages of the States falling  within the competence of that authority, or a 
working  language of that authority, they shall simultaneously supplement all documentation 
with a translation into an official language of that authority. 
3.  As far as undertakings are concerned which are not parties to the notification, they shall 
likewise  be  entitled  to  be  addressed  by  the  EFf  A  Surveillance  Authority  and  the  EC 
Commission in an appropriate official language of an EFf  A State or the Community or in 
a working language of one of those authorities. If  they choose to address a surveillance authority 
in  a  language  which  is  not  one of the  official  languages  of the  States  falling  within  the 
competence of that authority, or a working language of that authority, paragraph 2 shall apply. 
4.  The language which is chosen for the translation shall determine the language in  which 
the undertakings may be addressed by the competent authority. 
TIME-LIMITS AND OTHER PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS 
Article 13 
As regards time-limits and other procedural provisions, the rules implementing Article 57  shall 
apply  also for the purpose of the cooperation between the EC Commission and the EFf  A 
Surveillance Authority and EFf  A States, unless otherwise provided for in this Protocol. 
40 TRANSITION RULE 
Article 14 
Article 57  shall not apply  to  any  concentration which  was  the subject of an  agreement or 
announcement  or where  control  was  acquired  before  the  date  of entry  into  force  of the 
Agreement.  It shall not in any  circumstances apply  to  a concentration in respect of which 
proceedings  were  initiated before that date  by  a national  authority  with  responsibility  for 
competition. 
PROTOCOL 25 ON  COMPETITION REGARDING COAL AND STEEL 
Article 1 
1.  All  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted practices in respect of particular products referred to  in Protocol  14 which may  affect 
trade between Contracting Parties tending directly or indirectly to  prevent, restrict or distort 
normal competition within the territory covered by  this Agreement shall be prohibited, and 
in particular those tending: 
(a)  to  fix  or determine prices, 
(b)  to  restrict or control production, technical development or investment, 
(c)  to  share markets,  products, customers or sources of supply. 
2.  However,  the  competent  surveillance  authority,  as  provided  for  in  Article  56  of the 
Agreement, shall authorize specialization agreements or joint-buying or joint-selling agreements 
in respect of the products referred to in paragraph  1,  if it finds  that: 
(a)  such  specialization  or such joint buying  or joint selling  will  make  for  a  substantial 
improvement in the production or distribution of those products; 
(b)  the agreement in  question is essential in order to  achieve these results and is not more 
restrictive than is  necessary for that  purpose;  and 
(c)  the  agreement is  not liable to  give the undertakings concerned the  power to  determine 
the  prices, or to  control or restrict the  production or marketing,  of a substantial part of 
the  products in question within the territory covered by  the Agreement, or to shield them 
against effective competition from other undertakings within the territory covered by the 
Agreement. 
If the competent surveillance authority  finds  that certain agreements  are  strictly analogous 
in nature and  affect to  those referred to  above,  having particular regard to  the  fact  that this 
paragraph applies to  distributive undertakings, it shall authorize them also  when satisfied that 
they meet the same requirements. 
3.  Any agreement or decision prohibited by paragraph 1 shall be automatically void and may 
not be relied upon before any court or tribunal in the EC Member States or the EFf  A States. 
41 Article 2 
1.  Any transaction shall require the prior authorization of the competent surveillance authority, 
as  provided for in Article 56 of the Agreement,  subject to  the provisions of paragraph 3 of 
this Article, if it has in itself the direct or indirect effect of bringing about within the territory 
covered by  the Agreement, as  a result of action by  any  person or undertaking or group of 
persons or undertakings, a concentration between undertakings at least one of which is covered 
by Article 3,  which may affect trade between Contracting Parties,  whether the  transaction 
concerns a single product or a number of different products, and  whether it is  effected by 
merger, acquisition of shares or parts of the undertaking or assets, loan,  contract or any other 
means of control. 
2.  The competent surveillance authority,  as  provided for  in Article 56 of the Agreement, 
shall grant the authorization referred to in paragraph 1 if it finds that the proposed transaction 
will not give to  the persons or undertakings concerned the power, in  respect of the product 
or products within its jurisdiction: 
to  determine prices, to control or restrict production or distribution or to hinder effective 
competition in a substantial part of the market for those products, or 
to  evade  the  rules  of competition  instituted  under  this  Agreement,  in  particular  by 
establishing an artificially privileged position involving a substantial advantage in access 
to supplies or markets. 
3.  Classes of transactions may,  in view of the size of the assets or undertakings concerned, 
taken in conjunction with the kind of concentration to  be  effected,  be exempted from  the 
requirement of prior authorization. 
4.  If the competent surveillance authority, as  provided for in Article 56 of the Agreement, 
finds that public or private undertakings which, in law or in fact,  hold or acquire in the market 
for  one of the  products within its jurisdiction a dominant position  shielding them  against 
effective competition in a substantial part of the territory covered by this Agreement are using 
that position for purposes contrary to the objectives of this Agreement and if such abuse may 
affect trade between Contracting Parties, it shall make to them such recommendations as  may 
be  appropriate to  prevent the position from being so used. 
Article 3 
For the purposes of Articles  1 and 2 as  well as  for the purposes of information required for 
their application and proceedings in connection with them,  'undertaking' means any  undertaking 
engaged in production in the  coal or the steel industry within the  territory covered by  the 
Agreement, and any undertaking or agency regularly engaged in distribution other than sale 
to  domestic consumers or small craft industries. 
42 Article 4 
Annex XIV to the Agreement contains specific provisions giving effect to the principles set 
out in Articles  1 and  2. 
Article 5 
The EFT A Surveillance Authority and the EC  Commission shall ensure the application of 
the principles laid down in Articles  1 and 2 of this Protocol in accordance with the provisions 
giving effect to Articles  1 and 2 as contained in Protocol 21  and Annex XIV to the Agreement. 
Article 6 
Individual cases referred to  in Articles  1 and 2 of this Protocol shall be decided upon by the 
EC Commission or the EFT A Surveillance Authority in accordance with Article 56 of the 
Agreement. 
Article 7 
With a  view to  developing  and maintaining a uniform  surveillance  through the  European 
Economic Area in the field of competition and of promoting a homogeneous implementation, 
application and interpretation of the  provisions of the Agreement to this end,  the competent 
authorities shall cooperate in accordance with the provisions set out in Protocol 23. 
PROTOCOL 26  ON THE POWERS AND  FUNCTIONS 
OF THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
IN THE FIELD OF STATE AID 
The EFT A Surveillance Authority shall, in an agreement between the EFT  A States, be entrusted 
with equivalent powers and similar functions to  those of the EC Commission, at the time of 
the  signature of the Agreement, for the application of the competition rules applicable to  State 
aid  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community,  enabling  the  EFT A 
Surveillance Authority to  give effect to the principles expressed in Articles  1(2)(e), 49 and 
61  to 63  of the Agreement. The EFT A Surveillance Authority shall also have such powers 
to give effect to the competition rules applicable to State aids relating to products falling under 
the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community as  referred to  in Protocol 
14. 
PROTOCOL 27  ON COOPERATION 
IN THE FIELD OF STATE AID 
In order to ensure a uniform implementation, application and interpretation of the rules on 
State aid  throughout the  territory  of the  Contracting Parties  as  well  as  to  guarantee  their 
43 harmonious development,  the  EC  Commission and  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority  shall 
observe the following  rules: 
(a)  exchange of information and views on general policy issues such as the implementation, 
application and interpretation of the rules on State aid set out in the Agreement shall 
be  held periodically or at the request of either surveillance authority; 
(b)  the  EC  Commission and  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority  shall  periodically  prepare 
surveys on State aid in their respective States. These surveys shall be made available 
to the other surveillance authority; 
(c)  if the procedure referred to  in  the  first  and  second subparagraphs of Article 93(2) of 
the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community or the corresponding procedure 
set out in  an agreement between the EFf  A States establishing the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority is opened for State aid programmes and cases, the EC Commission or the EFf  A 
Surveillance Authority  shall give notice to  the  other surveillance authority  as  well as 
to the  parties concerned to  submit their comments; 
(d)  the surveillance authorities shall inform each other of all decisions  as  soon as  they are 
taken; 
(e)  the opening of the  procedure referred to  in  paragraph (c)  and the decisions referred to 
in paragraph (d)  shall be published by  the competent surveillance authorities; 
(f)  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of this  Protocol,  the  EC  Commission  and  the  EFf  A 
Surveillance Authority shall,  at the request of the other surveillance authority, provide 
on  a  case-by-case  basis  information  and  exchange  views  on  individual  State  aid 
programmes and cases; 
(g)  information obtained in  accordance with paragraph (f)  shall be treated as  confidential. 
[  ... ] 
PROTOCOL 35 ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EEA RULES 
Whereas this Agreement aims  at achieving a homogeneous European Economic Area,  based 
on common rules,  without requiring any  Contracting Parties to transfer legislative powers to 
any  institution of the European Economic Area;  and 
Whereas this  consequently will have to  be  achieved through national procedures; 
Sole article 
For cases of possible conflicts between implemented EEA rules and other statutory provisions, 
the EFf  A States undertake to  introduce, if necessary, a statutory provision to the effect that 
EEA rules prevail in these cases. 
[  ... ] 
44 ANNEX XIII 
TRANSPORT 
ACTS REFERRED TO 
I - Inland transport 
[  ... ] 
(iii) Competition rules 
6.  360 R 0011:  Council Regulation No  11  concerning the  abolition of discrimination in 
transport rates and conditions, in implementation of Article 79(3) of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic Community (OJ  52,  16.8.1960, p.  1121160)  as amended and 
supplemented by: 
- 172 B:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession to  the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ L 73, 27 .3.1972, p. 
148). 
- 384 R 3626: Council Regulation (EEC) No  3626/84 of 19  December 1984 (OJ  L 
335, 22.12.1984, p.  4). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following  adaptation: 
For the application of Articles  11  to  26 of this Regulation, see Protocol 21. 
7.  368 R  1017:  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68 of 19 July  1968, applying rules of 
competition to  transport by rail,  road and inland waterway (OJ L 175, 23.7.1968, p.  1).
1 
8.  369 R 1629: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1629/69 of 8 August 1969 on the form, 
content and other details of complaints pursuant to Article 10, applications pursuant to 
Article  12 and notifications pursuant to  Article  14( 1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1017/68 of 19 July  1968 (OJ L 209,  21.8.1969, p.  1). 
2 
9.  369 R 1630: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1630/69 of 8 August 1969 on the hearings 
provided for in Article 26(1) and (2)  of Council Regulation (EEC) No  1017/68 of 19 
July  1968  (OJ L 209, 21.8.1969, p.  11). 
2 
10.  374 R 2988:  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2988174  of 26 November 1974 concerning 
limitation periods in proceedings and the enforcement of sanctions under the rules of 
the European Economic Community relating to transport and competition (OJ L 319, 
29.11.1974, p.  1). 
2 
1  Listed here for purposes of information only. For application, see Annex XIV. 
2  Listed here for purposes of information only. For application, see Protocol 21. 
45 (  iv) State aid 
11.  370 R  1107:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  1101n0 of 4 June 1970 on the granting of 
aids for transport by rail,  road  and inland  waterway  (OJ  L  130,  15.6.1970,  p.  1),  as 
amended and supplemented by: 
[  ... ] 
- 172 B:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (OJ L 73,  27.3.1972, p. 
149), 
- 375 R  1473:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  1473n5 of 20 May  1975  (OJ L  152, 
12.6.1975, p.  1), 
- 382 R  1658: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1658/82 of 10 June 1982 supplementing, 
by  provisions on combined transport,  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1101n0 (OJ  L  184, 
29.6.1982, p.  1), 
- 389 R  1100: Council Regulation (EEC) No 1100/89 of 27  April 1989 (OJ L  116, 
28.4.1989, p.  24). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptation: 
In Article 5  'Commission' shall read 'the competent authority as  defined in Article 62 
of the EEA Agreement'. 
ACTS REFERRED TO 
VI - Civil aviation 
(i)  Competition rules 
60.  387 R 3975: Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down 
the procedure for the application of the rules on competition to  undertakings in the air 
transport sector (OJ L  374, 31.12.1987, p.  1). 
1 
61.  388  R  4261:  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4261/88  of 16  December  1988  on the 
complaints, application and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 
(OJ L 376, 31.12.1988, p.  10). I 
[  ... ] 
1  Listed here for purposes of information only. For application, see Protocol 21. 
46 ANNEX XIV 
COMPETITION 
List provided for in Article 60 
Introduction 
When the acts referred to in this Annex contain notions or refer to procedures which are specific 
to  the Community legal order,  such as 
preambles; 
the addressees of the Community acts; 
references to  territories or languages of the EC; 
references to rights and obligations of EC Member States, their public entities, undertakings 
or individuals in relation to  each other;  and 
references to information and notification procedures; 
Protocol 1 on horizontal adaptations shall apply, unless otherwise provided for in this Annex. 
Sectoral adaptations 
Unless otherwise provided for,  the provisions of this Annex shall, for the purposes of the present 
Agreement, be read with the following adaptations: 
(I)  the term  'Commission'  shall read  'competent surveillance authority'; 
(II)  the term  'common market'  shall read  'the territory covered by  the EEA Agreement'; 
(III)  the term  'trade between Member States'  shall read  'trade between Contracting Parties'; 
(IV)  the term  'the Commission and  the authorities of the Member States'  shall read  'the 
EC Commission, the EFf  A Surveillance Authority, the authorities of the EC Member 
States and of the EFTA States'; 
(V)  References to  Articles of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC) or the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community  (ECSC) 
shall be read as  references to  the EEA Agreement (EEA)  as  follows: 
Article 85  (EEC) - Article 53  (EEA), 
Article 86  (EEC) - Article 54  (EEA), 
Article 90 (EEC) - Article 59  (EEA), 
Article 66  (ECSC) - Article 2 of Protocol 25  to  the EEA Agreement, 
Article 80 (ECSC) - Article 3 of Protocol 25  to  the EEA Agreement; 
47 (VI)  the term  'this Regulation'  shall read  'this Act'; 
(VII)  the term  'the competition rules of the Treaty'  shall read  'the competition rules of the 
EEA Agreement'; 
(VIII)  the  term  'High Authority'  shall read  'competent surveillance authority'. 
Without prejudice to the rules on control of concentrations, the term  'competent surveillance 
authority'  as  referred to  in  the  rules  below  shall read  'the surveillance authority  which is 
competent to  decide on a case in accordance with Article 56 of the EEA Agreement'. 
ACTS  REFERRED TO 
A -Merger control 
1.  389 R 4064: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings (OJ  L  395, 30.12.1989, p.  1),  as  corrected by 
OJ  L  257,  21.9.1990,  p.13. 
48 
The  provisions  of Articles  1 to  5  of the  Regulation  shall,  for  the  purposes  of the 
Agreement, be read with  the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in  Article  1  (1 ),  the  phrase  'or the corresponding provision envisaged in  Protocol 
21  to  the EEA Agreement'  shall be inserted after the words  'Without prejudice to 
Article 22' ; 
furthermore  the  term  'Community dimension'  shall be  replaced by  'Community 
or EFT  A dimension'; 
(b)  in Article 1(2), the term 'Community dimension'  shall be replaced by  'Community 
or EFTA dimension respectively'; 
furthermore,  the term  'Community-wide turnover' shall be replaced by  'Community-
wide or EFTA-wide turnover'; 
in the last subparagraph,  the  term  'Member State'  shall be replaced by  'State'; 
(c)  Article  1(3)  shall not apply; 
(d)  in Article 2(1),  first subparagraph, the term  'common market'  shall be replaced by 
'functioning of the EEA Agreement'; 
(e)  in  Article  2(2),  at  the  end,  the  term  'common  market'  shall  be  replaced  by 
'functioning of the EEA Agreement'; 
(f)  in  Article  2(3),  at  the  end,  the  term  'common  market'  shall  be  replaced  by 
'functioning of the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  in Article 3(5)(b), the term 'Member State'  shall be replaced by  'EC Member State 
or an EFTA State'; (h)  in Article 4(1), the term  'Community dimension'  shall be replaced by  'Community 
or EFTA dimension'; 
furthermore,  in the first sentence, the phrase  'in accordance with Article 57  of the 
EEA  Agreement'  shall  be  inserted  after  the  words  ' ...  shall  be  notified  to  the 
Commission'; 
(i)  in Article 5(1 ),  the last subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: 
'Turnover, in the Community or in  an EC  Member State,  shall comprise products 
sold and services provided to undertakings or consumers, in the Community or in 
that EC Member State as the case may be. The same shall apply as regards turnover 
in the territory of the EFT  A States as  a whole or in an  EFT  A State.'; 
(j)  in Article 5(3)(a), second subparagraph, the term  'Community-wide turnover'  shall 
be replaced by  the  words  'Community-wide or EFTA-wide turnover'; 
furthermore,  the term  'Community residents'  shall be replaced by  'Community or 
EFT  A residents, respectively'; 
(k)  in  Article 5(3)(a), third subparagraph, the term  'Member State'  shall be replaced 
by  'EC Member State or EFT  A State'; 
(1)  in Article 5(3)(b  ),  the last phrase  ' ... , gross premiums received from  Community 
residents and from  residents of one Member State respectively shall be taken into 
account'  shall be replaced by the following: 
' ... , gross premiums received from  Community residents and from residents of one 
Member State respectively  shall be taken into account.  The same shall apply  as 
regards gross premiums received from residents in the territory of the EFT  A States 
as  a whole and from residents in one EFTA State, respectively.' 
B - Exclusive dealing agreements 
2.  383  R  1983:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1983/83  of 22  June  1983  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements 
(OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p.  1), as corrected by OJ L 281,  13.10.1983, p.  24,  and as amended 
by: 
185 1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom of Spain and  the Portuguese Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  166). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 5(1), the term 'the Treaty' shall read  'the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community'; 
49 (b)  in Article 6, introductory paragraph, the phrase 'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(c)  the following  paragraph shall be added at the end of Article 6: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any notification 
from  the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(d)  Article 7 shall not apply; 
(e)  Article  10 shall read: 
'This Act shall expire on  31  December 1997'. 
3.  383  R  1984:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1984/83  of 22  June  1983  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements 
(OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p.  5), as corrected by OJ L 281,  13.10.1983, p.  24,  and as amended 
by: 
185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom of Spain and  the Portuguese Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  166). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 5(1), the term 'the Treaty' shall read  'the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community'; 
(b)  in Article  14, introductory paragraph, the phrase  'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulations 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling  within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(c)  the following paragraph shall be added at  the end of Article 14: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any  notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(d)  Article  15  shall not apply; 
(e)  Article  19  shall read: 
'This Act shall expire on 31  December 1997' . 
4.  385 R 0123:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No  123/85 of 12  December 1984 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  categories of motor vehicle distribution and 
servicing agreements (OJ L  15,  18.1.1985, p.  16),  as  amended by: 
50 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  to  the  European  Communities  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the 
Portuguese Republic (OJ L 302,  15.11.1985, p.  167). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 5(1), subparagraph (2)(d), the term 'Member State' shall read  'EC Member 
State or EFfA State'; 
(b)  Article 7 shall not apply; 
(c)  Article 8 shall not apply; 
(d)  Article 9 shall not apply; 
(e)  in Article 10, introductory paragraph, the phrase 'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulations 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(f)  in Article 10(3), the term  'Member States'  shall read  'Contracting Parties'; 
(g)  the following paragraph shall be added at  the end of Article  10: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(h)  Article 14  shall read: 
'This Act shall remain in force until  30 June 1995'. 
C - Patent licensing agreements 
5.  384 R 2349:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2349/84 of 23 July 1984 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  certain categories of patent licensing agreements (OJ 
L  219,  16.8.1984, p.  15), as  amended by: 
185 1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  167). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 4(1), the phrase  'on condition that the agreements in question are notified 
to  the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation 
No 27,  as  last amended by Regulation (EEC) No  1699n5, and that the Commission 
does not oppose' shall read  'on condition that the agreements in question are  notified 
to  the EC Commission or the EFf  A Surveillance Authority in accordance with the 
provisions of Commission Regulation No 27/62, as last amended by Regulation (EEC) 
51 No 2526/85, and the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA 
Agreement, and that the competent surveillance authority does not oppose'; 
(b)  in Article 4(2), the term  'the Commission'  shall read  'the EC Commission or the 
EFT  A Surveillance Authority'; 
(c)  Article 4(4) shall not apply; 
(d)  in Article 4(5), the  second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'It shall oppose exemption if it receives a request to do so from  a State falling  within 
its  competence  within  three  months  of the  transmission  to  those  States  of the 
notification referred to  in paragraph  1  '; 
(e)  in Article 4(6), the  second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'However, where the opposition was  raised at the request of a State falling  within 
its  competence  and  this  request is  maintained,  it  may  be  withdrawn  only  after 
consultation  of its  Advisory  Committee  on  Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant 
Positions'; 
(f)  the  following shall be added to  the end of Article 4(9): 
'or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  Article 6 shall not apply; 
(h)  Article 7 shall not apply; 
(i)  Article 8 shall not apply; 
(j)  in Article 9,  introductory paragraph, the phrase 'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling  within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(k)  the  following  paragraph shall be added at the end of Article 9: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any  notification 
from  the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(1)  Article  14 shall read: 
'This Act shall apply until 31  December 1994'. 
D - Specialization and research and development agreements 
6.  385  R 0417:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 417/85 of 19  December 1984 on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements (OJ 
L  53,  22.2.1985,  p.  1),  as  amended by: 
52 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom of Spain and  the Portuguese Republic  (OJ  L 302, 
15.11.1985, p.  167). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 4(1), the phrase  'on condition that the agreements in question are notified 
to  the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation 
No 27  and that the Commission does not oppose'  shall read  'on condition that the 
agreements in question are notified to the EC Commission or the EFT  A Surveillance 
Authority in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation No 27/62, 
as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2526/85, and the corresponding provisions 
envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement, and that the competent surveillance 
authority does not oppose'; 
(b)  in Article 4(2), the  term 'the Commission'  shall read  'the EC Commission or the 
EFfA Surveillance Authority'; 
(c)  Article 4(4)  shall not apply; 
(d)  in Article 4(5), the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'It shall oppose exemption if it receives a request to do so from a State falling within 
its  competence  within  three  months  of the  transmission  to  those  States  of the 
notification referred to in paragraph 1  '; 
(e)  in Article 4(6),  the second sentence shall be replaced as follows: 
'However, where the opposition was raised at the request of a State falling within 
its  competence  and  this  request  is  maintained,  it may  be withdrawn  only  after 
consultation of its  Advisory  Committee  on Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant 
Positions'; 
(f)  the following  shall be added to  the end of Article 4(9): 
',or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  in Article 8, introductory paragraph, the phrase 'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2821n1' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the 
other surveillance authority or a State falling  within its competence or of natural 
or legal persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(h)  the following paragraph shall be added at  the end of Article  10: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(i)  Article 10  shall read: 
'This Act shall apply until 31  December 1997'. 
53 7.  385 R 0418:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of 19  December 1984 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty  to  categories of research  and development 
agreements (OJ L 53,  22.2.1985, p.  5),  as  amended by: 
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185 1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom of Spain and  the  Portuguese Republic  (OJ L 302, 
15.11.1985, p.  167). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 7(1), the phrase  'on condition that the agreements in question are notified 
to the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation 
No 27  and that the Commission does  not oppose'  shall read  'on condition that the 
agreements in question are notified to the EC Commission or the EFr  A Surveillance 
Authority in accordance with the  provisions of Commission Regulation No 27/62, 
as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2526/85, and the corresponding provisions 
envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, and that the competent surveillance 
authority does not oppose'; 
(b)  in Article 7(2),  the term  'the Commission'  shall read  'the EC Commission or the 
EFr  A Surveillance Authority'; 
(c)  Article 7(4) shall not apply; 
(d)  in Article 7(5), the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'It shall oppose exemption if it receives a request to do so from a State falling within 
its  competence  within  three  months  of the  transmission  to  those  States  of the 
notification referred to in paragraph 1  '; 
(e)  in Article 7(6), the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'However, where the opposition was raised at the request of a State falling  within 
its  competence  and  this  request  is  maintained,  it  may  be  withdrawn  only  after 
consultation  of its  Advisory  Committee  on  Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant 
Positions'; 
(f)  the following shall be added to the end of Article 7(9): 
', or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  in Article 10, introductory paragraph, the phrase 'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 2821n1' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the 
other surveillance authority or a State falling  within its competence or of natural 
or legal persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(h)  the following paragraph shall be added at the end of Article  10: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement, without any  notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; (i)  Article  11  shall not apply; 
(j)  Article  13  shall read: 
'This Act shall apply until 31  December 1997'. 
E - Franchising agreements 
8.  388 R 4087: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements (OJ  L 
359,  28.12.1988, p.  46). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the  purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 6(1), the phrase  'on condition that the agreements in question  are notified 
to  the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation 
No  27,  and that the Commission does not oppose'  shall read  'on condition that the 
agreements in question are notified to  the EC Commission or the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation No  27/62, 
as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2526/85, and the corresponding provisions 
envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, and that the competent surveillance 
authority does  not oppose'; 
(b)  in Article 6(2),  the term  'the Commission'  shall read  'the EC Commission or the 
EFfA Surveillance Authority'; 
(c)  Article 6(4) shall not apply; 
(d)  in Article 6(5),  the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'It shall oppose exemption if it receives a request to do  so from a State falling  within 
its  competence  within  three  months  of the  forwarding  to  those  States  of the 
notification referred to in  paragraph  1  '; 
(e)  in Article 6(6),  the  second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'However, where the opposition was raised at the request of a State falling  within 
its  competence  and  this  request is  maintained,  it  may  be  withdrawn  only  after 
consultation  of its  Advisory  Committee  on  Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant 
Positions'; 
(f)  the following  shall be added to  the end of Article 6(9): 
', or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  in Article 8,  introductory paragraph, the phrase  'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling  within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
55 (h)  the following paragraph shall be added at the end of Article 8: 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6  and 8  of Regulation No 17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(i)  in Article 8(c), the term 'Member States'  shall read 'EC Member States or EFfA 
States'; 
(j)  Article 9 shall read: 
'This Act shall remain in force until 31  December 1999'. 
F - Know-how licensing agreements 
9.  389 R 0556: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of know-how licensing agreements 
(OJ L  61, 4.3.1989, p.  1). 
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The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in  Article  1  (2),  the  term  'EEC'  shall  read  'the  territory  covered  by  the  EEA 
Agreement'; 
(b)  Article 1  (  4) shall read: 
'In so far as the obligations referred to in paragraph 1(1) to (5) concern territories 
including EC Member States or EFf  A  States in  which the same technology  is 
protected by necessary patents,  the exemption provided for in paragraph  1 shall 
extend for those States as  long as  the licensed product or process is protected in 
those States by such patents,  where the duration of such protection exceeds the 
periods specified in paragraph 2.'; 
(c)  in Article 1(7), points 6 and 8,  the term  'Member States'  shall read 'EC Member 
States or EFfA States'; 
(d)  in Article 4(1), the phrase  'on condition that the agreements in question are notified 
to  the Commission in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation 
No 27, and that the Commission does not oppose' shall read 'on condition that the 
agreements in question are notified to the EC Commission or the EFf  A Surveillance 
Authority in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation No 27/62, 
as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2526/85, and the corresponding provisions 
envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, and that the competent surveillance 
authority does not oppose'; 
(e)  in Article 4(3), the term  'the Commission'  shall read  'the EC Commission or the 
EFfA Surveillance Authority'; 
(f)  Article 4(5) shall not apply; (g)  in Article 4(6), the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'It shall oppose exemption if it receives a request to do so from  a State falling  within 
its  competence  within  three  months  of the  transmission  to  those  States  of the 
notification referred to in  paragraph  1  '; 
(h)  in Article 4(7),  the second sentence shall be replaced as  follows: 
'However, where the opposition was raised at the request of a State falling  within 
its  competence  and  this  request  is  maintained,  it  may  be  withdrawn  only  after 
consultation  of its  Advisory  Committee  on  Restrictive  Practices  and  Dominant 
Positions'; 
(i)  the following shall be added to  the end of Article 4(10): 
', or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement'; 
(j)  in Article 7,  introductory paragraph, the phrase  'pursuant to Article 7 of Regulation 
No  19/65/EEC' shall read  'either on its own initiative or at the request of the other 
surveillance authority or a State falling within its competence or of natural or legal 
persons claiming a legitimate interest'; 
(k)  in Article 7,  the following  shall be added at the end points  (S)(a) and  (b): 
'The  competent  surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  issue  a  decision  in 
accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  17/62, or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, without any  notification 
from the undertakings concerned being required'; 
(1)  Article 8 shall not apply; 
(m)  Article 9 shall not apply; 
(n)  Article  10 shall not apply; 
(  o)  Article  12 shall read: 
'This Act shall apply until 31  December 1999'. 
G- Transport 
10.  368 R 1017:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1017/68 of 19 July  1968 applying rules 
of competition to  transport by  rail,  road and inland waterway  (OJ  L  175,  23.7.1968, 
p.1). 
The provisions of Articles 1 to  5 and of Articles 7 to  9 of the Regulation shall, for the 
purposes of the Agreement, be read with the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 2,  the introductory paragraph shall read as  follows: 
'Subject to  the  provisions of Articles  3 to  5,  Article 6 of Regulation (EEC) No 
1017/68 and to the provision corresponding to Article 6 as it is envisaged in Protocol 
21  to  the EEA Agreement, the following  shall be prohibited as  incompatible with 
57 the functioning of the EEA Agreement, no prior decision to that effect being required: 
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices liable to affect trade between Contracting Parties which have 
as their objects or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the territory covered by the EEA Agreement, and in particular those which:'; 
(b)  Article 3(2) shall not apply; 
(c)  Article 6 shall not apply; 
(d)  in the first subparagraph of Article 8,  the phrase  'incompatible with the common 
market'  shall read  'incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement'; 
(e)  Article 9( 1)  shall read: 
'In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to  which EC Member States 
or EFfA States grant special or exclusive rights,  Contracting Parties shall ensure 
that there is neither enacted nor maintained in force any  measure contrary to the 
provisions of the foregoing Articles.'; 
(f)  in Article 9(2), the term  'Community'  shall read  'the Contracting Parties'; 
(g)  Article 9(3) shall read: 
'The EC Commission and the EFf  A Surveillance Authority shall see to  it that the 
provisions of this Article are applied and shall, where necessary, address appropriate 
measures to  States falling  within their respective competence.' 
11.  386 R 4056: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Articles 85  and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport 
(OJ L 378, 31.12.1986, p.  4). 
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The provisions of Section I of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, 
be read with the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 1(2), the term  'Community Ports' shall read  'ports in the territory covered 
by the EEA Agreement'; 
(b)  Article 2(2) shall not apply; 
(c)  in Article 7(1), introductory paragraph, the term  'Section II' shall read 'Section II 
or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement'; 
furthermore, in the second indent, the term  'Article 11 (  4  )' shall read  'Article 11 (  4) 
or the corresponding provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement'; 
(d)  in Article 7(2)(a), the term  'Section II' shall read  'Section II or the corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(e)  the following subparagraphs shall be added to Article 7(2)(c)(i): 
'If any of the Contracting Parties intends to  undertake consultations with a third 
country in accordance with this Regulation, it shall inform the EEA Joint Committee. 
Whenever appropriate,  the Contracting Party initiating the procedure may request 
the other Contracting Parties to  cooperate in these procedures. If one or more  of the other Contracting Parties object to  the intended action,  a 
satisfactory  solution  will  be  sought  within  the  EEA  Joint  Committee.  If the 
Contracting Parties do  not reach  agreement,  appropriate measures  may  be  taken 
to  remedy subsequent distortions of competition.'; 
(f)  in  Article 8(2),  the  phrase  'at the request of a Member State'  shall read  'at the 
request of a State falling  within its competence'; 
furthermore,  the  term  'Article  10'  shall  read  'Article  10  or the  corresponding 
provisions envisaged in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(g)  in Article 9(1), the term  'Community trading and shipping interests'  shall read the 
'trading and shipping interests of the Contracting Parties'; 
(h)  the following paragraph shall be added to  Article 9: 
'4. If  any of the Contracting Parties intends to  undertake consultations with a third 
country in accordance with this Regulation, it shall inform the EEA Joint Committee. 
Whenever appropriate, the Contracting Parties initiating the procedure may request 
the  other Contracting Parties to cooperate in these procedures. 
If one or more  of the  other Contracting Parties  object to  the  intended  action,  a 
satisfactory  solution  will  be  sought  within  the  EEA  Joint  Committee.  If the 
Contracting Parties do  not reach  agreement,  appropriate measures  may  be  taken 
to  remedy subsequent distortions of competition.' 
H- Public undertakings 
12.  388  L 0301: Commission Directive 88/301/EEC of 16 May  1988 on competition in the 
markets in telecommunications terminal equipment (OJ L  131,  27.5.1988, p.  73). 
The provisions of the Directive shall,  for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with 
the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in the second subparagraph of Article 2,  the  phrase  'notification of this Directive' 
shall be replaced by  'entry into force  of the EEA Agreement'; 
(b)  Article  10 shall not apply; 
(c)  in addition,  the following shall apply: 
as regards EFT  A States, it is understood that the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall 
be the addressee of all the information, communications, reports and notifications 
which according to this Directive are,  within the Community, addressed to  the EC 
Commission. 
As regards the different transition periods provided for in this Act, a general transition 
period of six months as from the entry into force  of the EEA Agreement shall apply. 
13.  390 L 0388: Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the 
markets for telecommunications services (OJ  L  192,  24.7.1990,  p.  10). 
59 The provisions of the Directive shall,  for the  purposes of the Agreement,  be  read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 3,  the fifth  subparagraph shall be replaced by  the  following: 
'Before  they  are  implemented,  the  EC  Commission  or  the  EFT  A  Surveillance 
Authority shall,  in  their respective competence,  verify  the compatibility of these 
projects with the EEA Agreement'; 
(b)  in the second subparagraph of Article 6, the phrase  'harmonized Community rules 
adopted by  the Council'  shall be replaced by  'harmonized rules  contained in the 
EEA Agreement'; 
(c)  the first paragraph of Article  10 shall not apply; 
(d)  in addition,  the following  shall apply: 
as  regards EFT  A States, it is understood that the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall 
be the addressee of all the information, communications, reports  and  notifications 
which according to this Directive are,  within the Community, addressed to  the EC 
Commission. Likewise, the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall be responsible, as 
regards EFT  A States, for making the necessary reports or assessments. 
As regards the different transition periods provided for in this Act, a general transition 
period of six months as from the entry into force of the EEA Agreement shall apply. 
I - Coal and steel 
14.  354  D  7024:  High  Authority  Decision  No  24/54  of 6  May  1954  laying  down  in 
implementation of Article 66(1) of the Treaty a Regulation on  what constitutes control 
of an  undertaking (Official Journal of the European Coal and  Steel Community,  No  9, 
11.5.1954, p.  345/54). 
The provisions of the Decision shall, for the purposes of the Agreement,  be  read with 
the following adaptation: 
Article 4 shall not apply. 
15.  367  D  7025:  High  Authority  Decision  No  25/67  of 22  June  1967  laying  down  in 
implementation of Article 66(3) of the Treaty a Regulation concerning exemption from 
prior authorization (OJ  154,  14.7.1967,  p.  11), as  amended by: 
60 
378 S 2495:  Commission Decision No 2495n81ECSC of 20  October 1978  (OJ  L 
300, 27.10.1978, p.  21). 
The provisions of the Decision shall,  for the purposes of the Agreement,  be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article  1(2), the phrase 'and within the EFTA States'  shall be inserted after  ' ... 
within the Community'; (b)  in the heading of Article 2,  the  phrase  'the scope of the Treaty'  shall read  'the scope 
of Protocol 25  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(c)  in the heading of Article 3, the phrase 'the scope of the Treaty'  shall read  'the scope 
of Protocol 25  to  the EEA Agreement'; 
(d)  Article  11  shall not apply. 
ACfS OF WinCH THE EC COMMISSION AND THE EFfA SURVEILLANCE AU1HORITY 
SHALL TAKE DUE ACCOUNT 
In  the  application of Articles 53  to  60 of the Agreement and the provisions referred to  in 
this Annex, the EC Commission and the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall take due account 
of the principles and rules contained in the following  acts: 
Control of concentrations 
16.  C/203/90/p. 5:  Commission notice regarding restrictions ancillary to concentrations (OJ 
c 203,  14.8.1990, p.  5). 
17.  C/203/90/p.  10: Commission notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations 
under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (OJ C 203,  14.8.1990, p.  10). 
Exclusive dealing agreements 
18.  0101/84/p. 2:  Commission notice concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No  1983/83 
and (EEC) No  1984/83 of 22 June  1983  on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
to  categories of exclusive distribution and exclusive purchasing agreements (OJ C  101, 
13.4.1984, p.  2). 
19.  017/85/p. 4: Commission notice concerning Regulation (EEC) No 123/85 of 12 December 
1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle 
distribution and servicing agreements (OJ C  17,  18.1.1985, p.  4). 
Other 
20.  362 X  1224 (01):  Commission notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial 
agents (OJ  139,  24.12.1962,  p.  2921/62). 
21.  075/68/p. 3:  Commission notice concerning agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
in the field of cooperation between enterprises (OJ C 75,  29.7.1968,  p.  3)  as corrected 
by  OJ C 84,  28.8.1968, p.  14. 
22.  C/11117?Jp.  13:  Commission notice concerning imports into the Community of Japanese 
goods falling within the scope of the  Rome Treaty (OJ C 111,  21.10.1972,  p.  13 ). 
61 23.  Clln9/p. 2:  Commission notice of 18 December 1978 concerning its assessment of certain 
subcontracting  agreements  in  relation  to  Article  85(1)  of the  EEC  Treaty  (OJ  C  1, 
3.1.1979, p.  2). 
24.  C/231/86/p. 2:  Commission notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall 
under Article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (OJ 
c 231,  12.9.1986, p.  2). 
25.  C/233/91/p.  2:  Guidelines  on  the  applications  of  EEC  competition  rules  in  the 
telecommunications sector (OJ C 233,  6.9.1991,  p.  2). 
62 ANNEX XV 
STATE AID 
List provided for in Article 63 
Introduction 
When the acts referred to in this Annex contain notions or refer to procedures which are specific 
to  the Community legal order,  such as 
preambles; 
the addressees of the Community acts; 
references to  territories or languages of the EC; 
references to rights and obligations of EC Member States, their public entities, undertakings 
or individuals in relation to each other;  and 
references to information and notification procedures; 
Protocol 1 on horizontal adaptations shall apply, unless otherwise provided for in this Annex. 
ACTS REFERRED TO 
Public undertakings 
1.  380 L 0723:  Commission Directive 801723/EEC  of 25  June  1980 on the transparency 
of financial  relations  between  Member  States  and  public  undertakings  (OJ  L  195, 
29.7.1980,  p.  35), as  amended by: 
385 L 0413:  Commission Directive 85/413/EEC of 24 July  1985 amending Directive 
801723/EEC on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and 
public undertakings (OJ L 229, 28.8.1985, p.  20). 
The provisions of this Directive shall,  for the purposes of the present Agreement,  be read 
with the following  adaptations: 
(a)  The term  'Commission'  shall read  'competent surveillance authority as defined in Article 
62 of the EEA Agreement'; 
(b)  The term  'trade between Members'  shall read  'trade between Contracting Parties'. 
ACTS OF WHICH THE EC COMMISSION AND THE EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY 
SHALL TAKE DUE ACCOUNT 
In the  application of Articles  61  to  63  of the Agreement and  the  provisions referred to  in 
this Annex, the EC Commission and the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall take due account 
of the principles and rules contained in the following acts: 
63 Scrutiny by the  Commission 
Prior notification of State aid plans and other procedural rules 
2.  C/25'})80/p.  2:  The notification of State aids to  the Commission pursuant to  Article 93(3) 
of the EEC Treaty; the failure  of Member States to  respect their obligations (OJ C 252, 
30.9.1980, p.  2). 
3.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(81)  12740 of 2 October 1981. 
4.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(89) D/5521  of 27  April  1989. 
5.  Letter from  the Commission to  the Member States SG(87) D/5540 of 30 April  1989: 
Procedure under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty - time-limits. 
6.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(90) D/28091  of 11  October 1990: 
State aid - informing Member States about aid cases not objected by  the Commission. 
7.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(91) D/4577  of 4 March  1991: 
Communication to  the Member States concerning the  procedure for the notification of 
aid plans and procedures applicable when aid is provided in breach of the rules of Article 
93(3) of the EEC Treaty. 
Evaluation of aid of minor importance 
8.  C/40/90/p.  2:  Notification of an  aid scheme of minor importance (OJ  C 40,  20.2.1990, 
p.  2). 
Public authorities' holdings 
9.  Application of Articles 92 and  93  of the  EEC Treaty  to  public  authorities'  holdings 
(Bulletin EC 9-1984  ). 
Aid granted illegally 
10.  C/318/83/p.  3:  Commission  communication  on  aids  granted  illegally  (OJ  C  318, 
24.11.1983, p.  3). 
State guarantees 
11.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(89) D/4328 of 5 April  1989. 
12.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(89) D/12772 of 12 October 1989. 
64 Frameworks on sectoral aid schemes 
Textile and clothing industry 
13.  Commission communication to the Member States on the Community framework on aid 
to  the textile industry (SEC(71) 363  final,  July  1971 ). 
14.  Letter from  the Commission to  the Member States SG(77) D/1190 of 4 February  1977 
and Annex (Doc.  SEC(77) 317,  25 .1.1977):  Examination of the present situation with 
regard to aids to the textile and clothing industries. 
Synthetic fibres industry 
15.  C/173/89/p. 5:  Commission communication on aid to  the EEC synthetic fibres  industries 
(OJ  C 173,  8.7.1989,  p.  5). 
Motor vehicle industry 
16.  C/123/89/p. 3:  Community framework on  State aid to  the  motor vehicle industry (OJ 
c 123,  18.5.1989, p.  3). 
17.  C/81/91/p. 4:  Community framework on State aid  to  the motor vehicle industry (OJ  C 
81,  26.3.1991,  p.  4). 
Frameworks on general systems of regional aid 
18.  471  Y 1104: Council resolution of 20 October 1971  on general systems of regional aid 
(OJ  C 111, 4.11.1971, p.  1). 
19.  C/111n11p. 7:  Commission communication on the Council resolution of 20 October 1971 
on general systems of original aid (OJ C 111, 4.11.1971, p.  7). 
20.  Commission communication to  the Council on general aid systems (COM(75) 77  final). 
21.  C/31n9/p.9: Commission communication of 21  December 1978 on regional aid systems 
(OJ  C 31,  3.2.1979,  p.  9). 
22.  C/212/88/p.  2:  Commission communication on the method for  the  application of Article 
92(3)(a) and (c) to  regional aid (OJ  C 212,  12.8.1988, p.  2). 
23.  C/10/90/p.  8:  Commission communication on the revision of the communication of 21 
December 1978  (OJ C  10,  16.1.1990,  p.  8). 
24.  C/163/90/p.  5: Commission communication on the method of application of Article 92(3)(c) 
to  regional aid (OJ C 163,  4.7.1990,  p.  5). 
65 25.  0163/90/p. 6: Commission communication on the method of application of Article 92(3)(a) 
to regional aid (OJ  C 163, 4.7.1990,  p.  6). 
Horizontal frameworks 
Community framework on State aid in environmental matters 
26.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States S/74/30.807 of 7 November 1974. 
27.  Letter from the Commission to  the Member States SG(80) D/8287 of 7 July  1980. 
28.  Commission communication to  the Member States (Annex to the letter of 7 July  1980). 
29.  Letter from  the Commission to  the Member States SG(87) D/3795  of 29  March  1987. 
Community framework on State aid to research and development 
30.  C/83/86/p.  2:  Community framework for State aids  for research and development (OJ 
c 83,  11.4.1986, p.  2). 
31.  Letter from the Commission to the Member States SG(90) D/01620 of 5 February 1990. 
Rules applicable to  general aid schemes 
32.  Letter from the Commission to  the  Member States SG(79) D/10478  of 14 September 
1979. 
33.  Control of aid for  rescue and restructuring (Eight Report on  Competition Policy,  point 
228). 
Rules applicable to  cases of cumulation of aid for different purposes 
34.  C/3/85/p.  2:  Commission communication on the cumulation of aids for different purposes 
(OJ  C 3,  5.1.1985,  p.  2). 
Aid to  employment 
35.  Sixteenth Report on  Competition Policy, point 253. 
36.  Twentieth  Report on Competition Policy,  point 280. 
Control of aid to  the steel industry 
37.  C/320/88/p.  3:  Framework for certain steel sectors not covered by  the ECSC Treaty (OJ 
c 320,  13.12.1988, p.  3). 
66 JOINT DECLARATION CONCERNING RULES ON COMPETITION 
The Contracting Parties declare that the implementation of the EEA competition rules, in cases 
falling within the responsibility of the EC Commission, is based on the existing Community 
competences, supplemented by the provisions contained in the Agreement. In case falling within 
the  responsibility  of the  EFT  A  Surveillance  Authority,  the  implementation  of the  EEA 
competition rules  is  based  on  the  agreement establishing that authority  as  well  as  on  the 
provisions contained in the EEA Agreement. 
JOINT DECLARATION ON ARTICLE 61(3)(B) OF THE AGREEMENT 
The Contracting Parties declare that in establishing whether a derogation can be granted under 
Article 61 (3 )(b) the EC Commission shall take the  interest of the EFT  A States into account 
and the EFT  A Surveillance Authority shall take the interest of the Community into account. 
JOINT DECLARATION ON ARTICLE 61(3)(C) OF THE AGREEMENT 
The Contracting Parties take note that even if eligibility of the regions has  to  be denied in 
the context of Article 61(3)(a) and according to the criteria of the first stage of analysis under 
subparagraph (c)  (see Commission communication on the method for the application of Article 
92(3)(a) and (c) to regional aid- OJ C 212,  12.8.1988, p.  2) examination according to  other 
criteria, for example very low population density, is possible. 
JOINT DECLARATION ON AID GRANTED THROUGH THE EC STRUCTURAL 
FUNDS OR OTHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 
The Contracting Parties declare that financial  support to  undertakings financed  by the  EC 
Structural Funds or receiving assistance from the European Investment Bank or from  any other 
similar financial instrument or fund shall be in keeping with the provisions of this Agreement 
on State aid.  They declare that exchange of information and  views on these forms of aid shall 
take place at the request of either surveillance authority. 
JOINT DECLARATION ON PARAGRAPH (C) OF PROTOCOL 27 TO THE 
AGREEMENT 
The notice referred to in paragraph (c)  of Protocol 27  shall contain a description of the State 
aid programme or case concerned, including all elements  which are necessary for  a proper 
evaluation of the programme or case (depending on the State aid elements concerned,  such 
as  type of State aid,  budget, beneficiary, duration).  Moreover,  the  reasons for  the  opening 
of the procedure referred to  in Article 93(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic 
Community or of the corresponding procedure set out in an  agreement between the EFT  A 
States  establishing  the  EFT  A  Surveillance  Authority  shall  be communicated to  the  other 
surveillance authority. Exchange of information between the two surveillance authorities shall 
take place on a reciprocal basis. 
67 JOINT DECLARATION ON SIDPBUILDING 
The Contracting Parties agree that, until the expiry of the seventh shipbuilding Directive (i.e. 
at the end of 1993), they  will refrain from  the application of the general rules on State aid 
laid down in Article 61  of the Agreement to  the sector of shipbuilding. 
Article 62(2) of the Agreement as  well as  the Protocols referring to State aid  are  applicable 
to the  sector of shipbuilding. 
[  ... ] 
JOINT DECLARATION ON PROTOCOL 35 TO THE AGREEMENT 
It is the understanding of the Contracting Parties that Protocol 35  does not restrict the effects 
of those existing internal rules which provide for direct effect and primacy of international 
agreements. 
[  ... ] 
JOINT DECLARATION ON THE AGREED INTERPRETATION OF 
ARTICLE 4(1) AND (2)  OF PROTOCOL 9 ON TRADE IN FISH AND 
OTHER MARINE PRODUCTS 
1.  While the EFf  A States will not take over the acquis communautaire concerning the fishery 
policy,  it  is  understood  that,  where  reference  is  made  to  aid  granted  through  State 
resources,  any  distortion of competition is  to  be assessed by the Contracting Parties in 
the context of Articles 92 and 93 of the EEC Treaty and in relation to relevant provisions 
of the acquis communautaire concerning the fishery  policy and the content of the Joint 
Declaration regarding Article 61(3)(c) of the Agreement. 
2.  While the EFf  A States will not take over the acquis communautaire concerning the fishery 
policy,  it  is  understood  that,  where  reference  is  made  to  legislation  relating  to  the 
organization of the market,  any  distortion of competition cause by  such legislation is 
to be assessed in relation to  the principles of the acquis communautaire concerning the 
common organization of the market. 
Whenever  an  EFf  A  State  maintains  or  introduces  national  provisions  on  market 
organization in the fisheries  sector, such provisions shall be considered a priori to  be 
compatible with the principles, referred to  in the first subparagraph, if they contain at 
least the following elements: 
(a)  the  legislation  on  producers'  organizations  reflects  the  principles  of  the  acquis 
communautaire regarding: 
68 
establishment on the producers'  initiative; 
freedom to become and cease to  be a member; absence  of a  dominant  position,  unless  necessary  in  pursuance  of objectives 
corresponding to  those specified in Article 39 of the EEC Treaty; 
(b)  whenever the rules of producers' organizations are extended to non-members of producers' 
organizations, the provisions to  be  applied correspond to  those laid down in Article 7 
of Regulation (EEC)  No  3687/91; 
(c)  whenever provisions in respect of interventions to support prices exist or are established, 
they correspond to  those specified in Title III of Regulation (EEC) No  3687/91. 
[  ... ] 
AGREED MINUTES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN  AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, THE EUROPEAN 
COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AND THEIR MEMBER STATES AND  THE 
EFTA STATES ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 
The Contracting Parties agreed that: 
Ad Article 26 and Protocol 13 
before the entry into force of the Agreement the Community shall, together with the interested 
EFf  A States, examine whether the conditions are fulfilled in which Article 26 of the Agreement, 
irrespective of the provisions set forth in the first paragraph of Protocol 13, will apply  between 
the Community and the EFf  A States concerned in the fisheries  sector; 
Ad Article 56(  3) 
the word  'appreciable' in Article 56(3) of the Agreement is understood to  have the meaning 
it has in the Commission notice of 3 September 1986 on  agreements of minor importance 
which do  not  fall  under Article  85(1)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European Economic 
Community (OJ C 231,  12.9.1986, p.  2); 
[  ... ] 
Ad Protocols 23 and 24 (Article  12  concerning languages) 
the  EC  Commission  and  the  EFT  A  Surveillance  Authority  will  provide  for  practical 
arrangements for mutual assistance or any  other appropriate solution concerning in particular 
the question of translations. 
[  ... ] 
69 DECLARATIONS BY ONE OR MORE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES TO 
THE AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 
DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FINLAND, ICELAND, NORWAY 
AND SWEDEN ON ALCOHOL MONOPOLIES 
Without prejudice to  the obligations arising under the Agreement, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden recall that their alcohol monopolies are based on important health and social policy 
considerations. 
DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF LIECHTENSTEIN AND 
SWITZERLAND ON ALCOHOL MONOPOLIES 
Without prejudice to  the obligations arising under the Agreement, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
declare that their alcohol monopolies are based on important agricultural, health and social 
policy considerations. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORWAY ON THE DIRECT 
ENFORCEABILITY OF DECISIONS BY THE EC INSTITUTIONS REGARDING 
PECUNIARY OBLIGATIONS ADDRESSED TO ENTERPRISES LOCATED IN 
NORWAY 
The attention of the Contracting Parties is  drawn to  the fact that the present constitution of 
Norway does not provide for direct enforceability of decisions by the EC institutions regarding 
pecuniary obligations addressed to  enterprises located in Norway.  Norway  acknowledges that 
such decisions should continue to be addressed directly to these enterprises and that they should 
fulfil their obligations in accordance with the present practice. The said constitutional limitations 
to  direct enforceability of decisions by the EC institutions regarding pecuniary obligations 
do not apply to subsidiaries and assets in the territory of the Community belonging to enterprises 
located in Norway. If  difficulties should arise,  Norway is  prepared to enter into consultations 
and work towards a mutually satisfactory solution. 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The Commission will keep the situation referred to  in  Norway's unilateral declaration under 
constant review. It may at any  time initiate consultations with Norway with a view to  finding 
satisfactory solutions to  such problems as  may  arise. 
70 DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRIA ON  THE 
ENFORCEMENT ON  ITS TERRITORY OF DECISIONS BY  EC INSTITUTIONS 
REGARDING PECUNIARY OBLIGATIONS 
Austria declares that its obligation to enforce on its territory decisions by EC institutions which 
impose pecuniary obligations shall only refer to  such decisions which are fully  covered by 
the provisions of the EEA Agreement. 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The Community understands the Austrian declaration to  mean that the enforcement of decisions 
imposing pecuniary obligations on undertakings will be ensured on Austrian territory to  the 
extent that the decisions imposing such obligations are based- even if not exclusively -on 
provisions contained in the EEA Agreement. 
The Commission may at  any  time initiate consultations with the Government of Austria with 
a view to  finding  satisfactory solutions to  such problems as  may arise. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON SHIPBUILDING 
It is the agreed policy of the European Community progressively to reduce the level of contract-
related production aid paid to shipyards. The Commission is  working to  bring down the level 
of the ceiling as far as  and as fast  as  is consistent with the  seventh Directive (90/684/EEC). 
The seventh Directive expires at  the end of 1993.  In deciding whether a new  Directive is 
necessary, the Commission will also review the competitive situation in shipbuilding throughout 
the EEA in the light of progress made towards the reduction or elimination of contract-related 
production aid.  When conducting this review the Commission will closely consult with the 
EFT  A States, taking due account of the result of efforts in a wider international context and 
with a view to  creating conditions which ensure that competition is not distorted. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON  THE RIGHTS FOR 
THE EFTA STATES BEFORE THE EC COURT OF JUSTICE 
1.  In order to  reinforce  the  legal homogeneity  within  the  EEA  through  the  opening of 
intervention possibilities for EFT  A States and the EFT  A Surveillance Authority before 
the EC Court of Justice,  the Community will  amend Articles 20 and 37  of the Statute 
of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities. 
71 2.  In addition, the Community will take the necessary measures to ensure that EFf  A States, 
in so  far  as  the implementation of Articles  2(2)(b)  and  6 of Protocol 24 to the EEA 
Agreements is concerned, will have the same rights as EC Member States under Article 
9(9) of Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON THE RIGHTS OF 
LAWYERS OF THE EFTA STATES UNDER COMMUNITY LAW 
The Community undertakes to  amend the Statute of the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities so as  to  ensure that agents appointed for each 
case, when representing an EFf  A State or the EFf  A Surveillance Authority,  may  be assisted 
by an  adviser or by a lawyer entitled to practise before a court of an EFf  A State.  It also 
undertakes to  ensure that lawyers entitled to  practise before a court of an EFf  A State may 
represent individuals and economic operators before the Court of Justice and the Court of 
First Instance of the European Communities. 
Such agents,  advisers and lawyers shall, when they appear before the Court of Justice and 
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, enjoy the rights and immunities 
necessary to  the independent exercise of their duties,  under the conditions to be laid down 
in the rules of procedure of those Courts. 
[  ... ] 
[  ... ] 
[  ... ] 
PROTOCOL ADJUSTING THE AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMIC AREA 
PROTOCOL 6 ON  THE BUILDING-UP OF COMPULSORY RESERVES BY 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
Article 11 
In Protocol 8 on State monopolies the words  'Swiss and'  shall be deleted. 
[  ... ] 
72 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 3/94 of 8 February 1994 amending 
Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, on the implementation of competition rules 
applicable to undertakings 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
In Article 3(1) of Protocol 21  to the Agreement the following shall be inserted in point 13 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87) after the indent referring to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1284/91: 
[  ... ] 
392 R 2410: Council Regulation (EEC) No 2410/92 of 23 July  1992 (OJ L 240, 24.8.1992, 
p.  18). 
I  OJ L 85, 30.3.1994, p. 65. 
73 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No  7194  of 21  March 1994 amending Protocol 
47  and certain Annexes to the EEA Agreement 
1 
[  ... ] 
ANNEX 12 
TO DECISION NO 7194  OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE 
Annex XIV  (Competition) to  the EEA Agreement shall be amended as  specified below. 
(a)  Chapter C.  - Patent licensing agreements 
1.  The following indent shall be added in  point 5 (Council Regulation (EEC)  No  394/84) 
before the adaptations: 
393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93  of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21,  29.1.1993, p.  8).' 
(b)  Chapter D. - Specialization and research and development agreements 
1.  The following indent shall be added in  point 6 (Council Regulation (EEC)  No  418/85) 
before the  adaptations: 
393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93  of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21,  29.1.1993,  p.  8).' 
2.  The following indent shall be added in point 7 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85) 
before the adaptations: 
'- 393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93  of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21,  29.1.1993, p.  8).' 
(c)  Chapter F.  -Know-how licensing agreements 
1.  The following indent shall be added in point 9 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No 556/89) 
before the  adaptations: 
'as amended by: 
- 393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93  of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21,  29.1.1993, p.  8).' 
I  OJ L 160, 28.6.1994, p.  1. 
74 (d)  Chapter G.  -Transport 
1.  The following  new points shall be inserted after point 11  (Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 4056/86): 
'11a.  393 R 3652: Commission Regulation (EC) No 3652/93 of 22 December 1993  on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  certain categories of agreements 
between undertakings relating to computerized reservation systems for air transport 
services (OJ L  333, 31.12.1993, p.  37). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read 
with the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in  Article  9(i),  the  term  "Community  air carriers"  shall  read  "air carriers 
established in  the territory covered by  the EEA Agreement"; 
(b)  in Article 9(  4  ),  a new sentence shall be inserted after the  second sentence 
reading:  ''The competent surveillance authority shall also infonn the EEA Joint 
Committee"; 
(c)  in Article  14,  introductory paragraph, the phrase "Pursuant to  Article 7 of 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  3976/87" shall  read  "Either on the  initiative of the 
competent surveillance authority or at the request of the other surveillance 
authority or a State falling within its competence or of natural or legal persons 
claiming a legitimate interest"; 
(d)  the  following  shall  be  added  at  the  end  of Article  14:  "The  competent 
surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  take,  pursuant  to  Article  13  of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, or the corresponding provisions envisaged in 
Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement,  all appropriate measures for the purpose 
of bringing these infringements to  an end. Before taking such decision,  the 
competent surveillance authority may address recommendations for termination 
of the infringement to  the persons concerned"; 
(e)  The second paragraph of Article  15  shall read: 
''This Act shall apply with retroactive effect to  agreements in existence at the 
date  of entry  into  force  of the  EEA  Agreement,  from  the  time  when  the 
conditions of application of this Act were fulfilled." 
llb.  393 R 1617:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  1617/93 of 25  June 1993  on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint 
operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services 
and slot allocations at airports (OJ L  155,  26.6.1993,  p.  18). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read 
with the following  adaptations: 
(a)  in Article 1, the term "Community airports" shall read "airports in the territory 
covered by the EEA Agreement"; 
75 (b)  in  Article  6,  introductory  paragraph,  the  phrase "pursuant to  Article 7  of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87" shall read "either on its own initiative or at 
the request of the other surveillance authority or a State falling  within its 
competence or of natural or legal persons claiming a legitimate interest"; 
(c)  the  following  shall  be  added  at  the  end  of Article  6:  ''The  competent 
surveillance  authority  may  in  such  cases  take,  pursuant  to  Article  13  of 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, or the corresponding provisions envisaged in 
Protocol 21  to the EEA Agreement, all appropriate measures for the  purpose 
of bringing these infringements to  an  end.  Before taking such decision, the 
competent surveillance authority may address recommendations for termination 
of the infringement to  the persons concerned"; 
(d)  The last paragraph of Article 7 shall read: 
''This Act shall apply  with  retroactive effect to  agreements,  decisions  and 
concerted practices in existence at the date of entry into force of the EEA 
Agreement, from the time when the conditions of application of this Act were 
fulfilled .. "' 
(e)  Chapter I - Coal and steel 
I.  The following indent shall be added in point 15  (High Authority Decision No  25/67) 
before the adaptations: 
'- 391  S 3654: Commission Decision 3654/91/ECSC of 13  December 1991  (OJ  L 
348,  17.12.1991, p.  12). 
(f)  The following new chapter and new points shall be added after point 15  (High Authority 
Decision No 25/67): 
76 
'J.  - Insurance sector 
15a.  392 R 3932: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  3932/92 of 21  December 1992 
on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector (OJ L 398, 31.12.1992, 
p.  7). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall,  for the purposes of the Agreement, be read 
with the following adaptations: 
(a)  in Article  17,  introductory paragraph,  the  phrase "pursuant to  Article 7 of 
Regulation (EEC) No  1534/91" shall read "either on its own initiative or at 
the request of the other surveillance authority or a State falling  within  its 
competence or of natural or legal persons claiming a legitimate interest"; 
(b)  the  following  shall  be  added  at  the  end  of Article  17:  "The  competent 
surveillance authority may in such cases issue a decision in accordance with 
Articles  6  and  8  of Regulation  (EEC)  No  17/62,  or the  corresponding 
provisions  envisaged in Protocol  21  to  the  EEA Agreement,  without  any 
notification from the undertakings being required"; (c)  Article  18  shall not apply; 
(d)  Article 19  shall not apply; 
(e)  Article 20 shall not apply; 
(f)  Article 21  shall read:  ''This Act shall apply  until 31  March 2003."' 
(g)  Acts of which the EC Commission and the EFf  A surveillance authority shall take due 
account 
The following  shall be added after point 25  (C/233/91/p.  2)  as  a new section: 
'General 
I.  The above acts  were  adopted by  the EC Commission up  to  31  July  1991.  Upon 
entry into force of the Agreement, corresponding acts are to be adopted by  the EFf  A 
Surveillance Authority under Articles 5(2)(b) and  25  of the  Agreement between 
the EFf  A States on the establishment of a surveillance authority and  a Court of 
Justice.  They  are to  be published in  accordance  with the exchange of letters on 
publication of EEA relevant information. 
II.  As regards EEA relevant acts adopted by  the EC Commission after 31  July  1991, 
the EFf  A Surveillance Authority, in accordance with the powers vested in it under 
the Agreement between the EFf  A States on the establishment of a surveillance 
authority  and  a  Court of Justice,  is  to  adopt,  after  consultations  with  the  EC 
Commission, corresponding acts in order to maintain equal conditions of competition. 
The acts  adopted by the Commission will not be integrated into this  Annex but a 
reference to  their publication in the Official Journal of  the European Communities 
will be made in the EEA Supplement to  the Official Journal. The corresponding 
acts  adopted by  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority are to  be published in the EEA 
Supplement to,  and  the  EEA  section of,  the  Official Journal.  Both surveillance 
authorities shall take due account of these acts in  cases where they are competent 
under the Agreement. 
77 ANNEX 13 
TO DECISION NO 7194  OF THE EEA JOINT COMMITTEE 
Annex XV  (State aid) to  the EEA Agreement shall be amended as  specified below: 
(a)  Public undertakings: 
(a)  The following indent shall be added in point 1 (Commission Directive 80n23/EEC) 
before the adaptations: 
'- 393  L 0084:  Commission Directive 93/84/EEC of 30 September 1993  (OJ  L 
254,  12.10.1993, p.  16).' 
(b)  The  following  adaptation  shall  be  added  in  point  1  (Commission  Directive 
801723/EEC): 
'(c)  In Article 5a(3), second subparagraph, the phrase "in the Member States" 
shall read "in the EC  Member States or EFTA States".' 
(b)  The following  new  heading  and  new point shall be  added after point  1 (Commission 
Directive 801723/EEC): 
78 
'Aid to  the  steel industry 
1a.  391  S 3855: Commission Decision 3855/91/ECSC of 27 November 1991  establishing 
Community rules for  aid to  the steel industry (OJ L  362,  31.12.1991,  p.  5). 
The provision of the Decision shall,  for the purposes of the present Agreement,  be read 
with the following adaptations: 
(a)  The term "Commission" shall read  "competent surveillance authority  as  defined 
in Article 62 of the EEA Agreement"; 
(b)  the  term  "trade between Member States" shall  read  "trade between Contracting 
Parties"; 
(c)  the  term  "compatible with the common market"  shall read "compatible with  the 
functioning  of the EEA Agreement"; 
(d)  in Article 4(1), second indent, the following  shall be added:  "or, in the case of an 
EFT  A State, the aid relative to the payments does not exceed what may be granted 
to  an  EC steel undertaking in a similar situation"; 
(e)  in  Article 6(1), ''under the EEC Treaty" shall read "under the EEC Treaty or the 
Agreement between the EFT A States on the establishment of a surveillance authority 
and a Court of Justice"; 
(f)  in Article 6(4), "Article 88 of the Treaty" shall read "Article 88 of the Treaty and 
the corresponding procedure set out in the Agreement between the EFT  A States 
on the establishment of a surveillance authority and  a Court of Justice".' (c)  Acts of which the EC Commission and the EFf  A Surveillance Authority shall take due 
account 
The following shall be added after point 37  (C/320/88/p.  3) as a new section: 
'General 
I.  The above acts were adopted by the EC Commission up to  31  July  1991. Upon 
entry into force of the Agreement, corresponding acts are to be adopted by the EFf  A 
Surveillance Authority under Articles 5(2)(b) and 24  of the  Agreement between 
the EFf  A States on the establishment of a surveillance authority and a Court of 
Justice.  They are to  be published in accordance with the exchange of letters on 
publication of EEA relevant information. 
II.  As regards EEA relevant acts adopted by the EC Commission after 31  July  1991, 
the EFf  A Surveillance Authority, in accordance with the powers vested in it under 
the  Agreement between the EFf  A States on the  establishment of a surveillance 
authority  and  a  Court  of Justice,  is  to  adopt,  after  consultation  with  the  EC 
Commission corresponding acts in order to maintain equal conditions of competition. 
The acts adopted by the Commission will not be integrated into this Annex. In their 
publication in the Official Journal of  the European Communities indication will be 
given as  to their relevance for the EEA and a reference to  this publication will be 
made in the EEA Supplement of the Official Journal. The corresponding acts adopted 
by the EFf  A Surveillance Authority are  to  be published in the EEA Supplement 
to,  and the EEA section of, the Official Journal Both surveillance authorities shall 
take  due  account  of these  acts  in  cases  where  they  are  competent  under  the 
Agreement.' 
79 [  ... ] 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 23/95 of 28  April 1995 amending 
Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement 
1 
Article 1 
The following indent shall be added in point 5 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No  2349/84) 
of Annex XIV  to  the Agreement before the adaptation: 
'395 L 0700:  Commission Regulation  (EC)  No  70/95  of 17  January  1995  amending 
Regulation (EEC) No  2349/84 on the application of Article 85  (3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of patent licensing agreements (OJ  L 12,  18.1.1995,  p.  13).'. 
Article 2 
In adaptation (1) in point 5,  the date '31  December 1994' shall be replaced by  '30 June  1995'. 
Article 3 
The texts of Regulation (EC) No 70/95 in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages,  which are 
annexed to  the respective language versions of this Decision, are authentic. 
Article 4 
This Decision shall enter into force on  1 May  1995,  provid~ that all the notifications under 
Article 103 (1) of the Agreement have been made to  the EEA Joint Committee. It shall apply 
from  1 January 1995. 
[  ... ] 
I  OJ L 139, 22.6.1995, p.  14. 
80 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 21/95 of 5 April 1995 amending Annex XV 
(State aid) to the EEA Agreement 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
1.  The following new heading and new point shall be added after point 1  a (Commission 
Decision No 3855/91/ECSC) of Annex XV to the Agreement: 
'Aid to shipbuilding 
lb.  390 L 0684: Council Directive 90/684/EEC of 21  December 1990 on aid to  shipbuilding 
(OJ L 380, 31.12.1990, p.  27), as amended by: 
- 393  L  01115:  Council  Directive  93/115/EEC  of 16  December  1993  (OJ  L  326, 
28.12.1993, p.  62), 
- 394 L 0073: Council Directive 94n31EC of 19 December 1994 (OJ L 351, 31.12.1994, 
p.  10). 
The provisions of the Directive shall, for the purposes of the present Agreement, be read with 
the following adaptations: 
(a)  the term "Member States" shall read "EC Member States or EFfA States"; 
(b)  the term "Member State" shall read "EC Member State or EFf  A State"; 
(c)  the  term  "Commission"  shall  read  "competent  surveillance  authority  as  defined  in 
Article 62 of the EEA Agreement"; 
(d)  in Article 1 (d), first subparagraph, the phrase "State aid within the meaning of Articles 92 
and 93 of the Treaty" shall read "State aid within the meaning of Articles 61  and 62 
of the EEA Agreement"; 
(e)  in Article 3 (2) the term "Community shipyards" shall read "Community shipyards or 
EFfA States' shipyards"; 
(f)  in Article 3 (4) the term "Community rules" shall read "rules under the EFfA Agreement"; 
(g)  in  Article  4  ( 1)  the  term  "common  market"  shall  read  "functioning  of  the  EEA 
Agreement"; 
(h)  in Article 4 (2), first subparagraph, the term "Community yards" shall read "yards within 
the territory covered by the EEA Agreement"; 
(i)  the following shall be added at the end of the fist  subparagraph of Article 4  (2): 
"Before fixing the ceiling the competent surveillance authorities as defined in Article 62 
of the EEA Agreement shall, in order to  obtain uniform application in the EEA context, 
exchange information and consult each other closely."; 
I  OJ L 158, 8.7.1995, p. 43. 
81 (j)  in Article 4 (3)  the  phrase "contrary to  Community interests" shall read  "contrary to 
common interests"; 
(k)  the  following  shall  be  added  after  the  second  sentence  in  the  first  subparagraph  of 
Article 4 (3): 
''Before reviewing the ceiling the competent surveillance authorities as defined in Article 62 
of the EEA Agreement shall, in order to  obtain uniform application in the EEA context, 
exchange information and consult each other closely."; 
(1)  Article 4 (5),  second subparagraph, shall read: 
"However, where there is competition between yards in different States within the territory 
covered by  the EEA Agreement,  the  competent surveillance authorities  as  defined in 
Article  62 of the  EEA  Agreement shall  require  prior notification of the  relevant aid 
proposals at the request of any  State. In such cases the competent surveillance authority 
shall adopt its decision, after consulting the other surveillance authority, within 30 days 
of notification; such proposals may not be implemented before the competent surveillance 
authority has given its authorization. By its decision the competent surveillance authority 
shall ensure that the  planned aid does  not affect trading conditions within the territory 
covered by the EEA Agreement to  an  extent contrary to the common interest."; 
(m)  in Article 6 (2)  the  phrase "in a Member State's only existing yard,  provided that the 
effect of the yard in question on the Community market is  minimal" shall read "in an 
EC Member State's or EFf  A State's only existing yard,  provided that the effect of the 
yard in question on the EEA market is  minimal"; 
(n)  in Article 6 (4) the term "Community objectives" shall read "common objectives"; 
(o)  in Article 7 (1),  fourth  subparagraph, the term "Commission's prior approval" shall read 
"prior approval by the competent surveillance authority  as  defined in  Article 62 of the 
EEA  Agreement"~ 
(p)  in Article 7 (1) fifth  subparagraph, the term "Commission's decision" shall read "decision 
of the competent surveillance authority as defined in Article 62 of the EEA Agreement"; 
(q)  in Article 7 (3) the term "Community legislation and rules" shall read "rules under the 
EEA Agreement"; 
(r)  in Article 8 (2) the  phrase "as defined by the Commission in Annex I to  the Community 
framework for State aids  for research and development" shall read "as defined by  the 
Commission in Annex I to  the Community framework for State aids  for research and 
development 
1 and by  the EFf  A Surveillance Authority in Section 14 of its Procedural 
and  Substantive Rules in the Field of State Aid" 
2
; 
(s)  in Article  1 (1)  the term "Articles 92 and 93  of the Treaty" shall read "Articles 61  and 
62 of the EEA Agreement".' 
I  OJ c 83,  11.4.1986, p. 2. 
2  OJ L 231, 3.9.1994, p. 25. 
82 Article 2 
The texts of Council Directive 90/684/EEC, the Council Directive 931115/EEC  and  Council 
Directive 94173/EC  in  the  Icelandic  and  Norwegian  languages,  which  are  annexed  to  the 
respective language versions of this Declaration, are  authentic. 
Article 3 
This Declaration shall enter into force on 1 May  1995, provided that all the notifications under 
Article  103  (1) of the Agreement have been made to  the EEA Joint Committee. 
[  ... ] 
83 [ ... ] 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 25/95 of 19 May 1995 amending 
Annexes XI (Telecommunication services) and XIV (Competition) to the EEA 
Agreement 
1 
Article 1 
1.  The following shall be added to point 3 (Commission Directive 90/388/EEC) of Annex XI 
to  the Agreement: 
', as  amended by: 
394 L 0046: Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13  October 1994 (OJ L 268, 19.10.1994, 
p.  15).' 
2.  The following footnote shall be added in relation to Commission Directive 90/388/EEC: 
'C)  Listed here for purposes of information only.  For application, see Annex XIV.' 
Article 2 
1.  The  following  shall  be  added  to  point  12  (Commission  Directive  88/301/EEC)  of 
Annex XIV  to the Agreement before the adaptation: 
', as  amended by: 
394 L 0046: Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13 October 1994 (OJ L 268,  19.10.1994, 
p.  15).' 
2.  The  following  shall  be  added  in  point  13  (Commission  Directive  90/388/EEC)  of 
Annex XIV  to the Agreement before the adaptation: 
', as  amended by: 
394 L 0046: Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13  October 1994 (OJ L 268,  19.10.1994, 
p.  15).' 
Article 3 
The texts of Directive 94/46/EC in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, which are annexed 
to the respective language versions of this Decision, are authentic. 
Article 4 
This Decision shall enter into force on 1 June 1995, provided that all the notifications under 
Article 103  (1) of the Agreement have been made to  the EEA Joint Committee. 
[  ... ] 
I  OJ L 251, 19.10.1995, p. 31. 
84 Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No 65/95 of 22 November 1995 amending 
Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
The following indent shall be added in point 5 (Commission Regulation (EEC) No  2349/84) 
of Annex XIV  to  the Agreement before the adaptation: 
'- 395 R 2131:  Commission Regulation (EC) No  2131/95  of 7 September 1995  amending 
Regulation (EEC) No  2349/84 on the application of Article 85  (3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of patent licensing (OJ  L 214,  8.9.1995, p.  6).' 
Article 2 
In adaptation (1) in point 5,  the date  '30 June 1995' shall be replaced by  '31  December 1995'. 
Article 3 
The texts of Regulation (EC) No  2131/95  in the Icelandic and Norwegian languages,  which 
are annexed to the respective language versions of this Declaration, are  authentic. 
Article 4 
This Decision shall enter into force  on  1 December 1995, provided that all the notifications 
under Article 103 (1) of the Agreement have been made to the EEA Joint Committee. It shall 
apply from  1 July  1995. 
[ ... ] 
I  OJ L 8,  11.1.1996, p. 86. 
85 [  ... ] 
Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No  12/96 of 1 March 1996 amending 
Annex XIV (Competition) to the EEA Agreement 
1 
Article 1 
The  following  point  shall  be  inserted  after  point  1l.B  (Commission  Regulation  (EEC) 
No  1617/93) of Annex XIV to  the Agreement: 
'11.C.  395  R  0870:  Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  870/95  of 20  April  1995  on  the 
application of Article 85  (3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and  concerted practices  between  liner shipping  companies  (consortia)  pursuant to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No  479/92 (OJ  L 89,  21.4.1995,  p.  7). 
The provisions of the Regulation shall, for the purposes of the Agreement, be read with the 
following adaptations: 
(a)  In Article 2 the words "Community ports" shall read "ports in the territory covered by 
the EEA Agreement"; 
(b)  In Article 7  (1) the  phrase "on condition that the agreements in questions are notified 
to  the Commission in accordance with the  provisions of Commission Reg1,1lation  (EEC) 
No 4260/88 and that the Commission does not oppose" shall read "on condition that the 
agreements in question are  notified  to  the EC Commission or the EFT  A Surveillance 
Authority in accordance with the provisions of Commission Regulation (EEC)  No 4260/88, 
and the corresponding provisions in Pro!ocgL21  to  the EEA Agreement,  and  that the 
competent surveillance authority does not oppose"; 
(c)  In Article 7 (2) the term "the Commission" shall read "the EC Commission or the EFT  A 
Surveillance Authority"; 
(d)  In Article 7 (5) the second sentence shall be replaced by  the following: 
"It shall oppose the exemption if it receives a request to do  so from  a State falling  within 
its competence within three months of the transmission to  those States of the notification 
referred to  in paragraph  1  "; 
(e)  In Article 7 (6) the second sentence shall be replaced by  the following: 
"However, where the opposition was raised at  the request of a State falling  within its 
competence and this request is maintained, it may be withdrawn only  after consultation 
of its Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions in  Maritime 
Transport"; 
(f)  The following shall be added at the end of Article 7 (9): 
", or the corresponding provision in Protocol 21  to  the EEA Agreement"; 
I  OJ L 124, 23.5.1996, p.  13. 
86 (g)  In  Article  12,  introductory  paragraph,  the  phrase  "in  accordance  with  Article  6  of 
Regulation (EEC)  No  479/92" shall read "either on its own initiative or at the request 
of the other surveillance authority or a State falling  within its  competence or of natural 
or legal persons claiming a legitimate interest".' 
Article 2 
The texts of Regulation (EC) No  870/95  in  the Icelandic and Norwegian languages, which 
are  annexed to  the respective language versions of this Decision,  are  authentic. 
Article 3 
This Decision shall enter into force  on  1 April  1996,  provided that all the notifications under 
Article  103  (1)  of the Agreement have been made  for  the EEA Joint Committee. 
[  ... ] 
87 II - Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden Act 
concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of 
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments 
to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded 
(94/C 241/08) I 
[ ... ] 
ADAPTATIONS TO ACTS ADOPTED BY THE INSTITUTIONS 
Article 29 
The acts  listed in Annex I to this Act shall be adapted as  specified in that Annex. 
[ ... ] 
APPLICABILITY OF THE ACTS OF THE INSTITUTIONS 
[ ... ] 
Article 171 
Agreements, decisions and concerted practices in existence at the time of accession which 
come within the scope of Article 65  of the ECSC Treaty by reason of the accession must 
be notified to the Commission within three months of accession.  Only agreements and decisions 
which have been notified shall remain provisionally in force until a decision has been taken 
by the Commission. However, this Article shall not apply to agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices which at the date of accession already fall  under Articles  1 and 2 of Protocol 25 
to the EEA Agreement. 
Article 172 
1.  From  the  date  of accession,  the  new  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  any  relevant 
notification or information transmitted to the EFT  A Surveillance Authority or to  the Standing 
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without delay to  the Commission. Such transmission shall be deemed to  be notification or 
information to  the Commission for the purposes of the corresponding Community provisions. 
2.  From the  date of accession,  the new Member States  shall ensure that cases which are 
pending before the EFI'  A Surveillance Authority immediately prior to accession under Articles 
53, 54,  57,  61  and 62 or 65  of the EEA Agreement or Article  1 or 2 of Protocol 25  to  that 
Agreement and which fall  under the Commmission' s competence as  a result of accession, 
including cases in which the facts  came to an end before the date of accession, are transmitted 
without delay to the Commission, which shall continue to  deal with them under the relevant 
Community provisions while ensuring that the right of defence continues to be observed. 
3.  Cases  which  are  pending before the Commission under Article  53  or 54  of the  EEA 
Agreement or Article  1 or 2 of Protocol 25  to  that Agreement and  which fall under Article 
85  or 86 of the EC Treaty or Article 65  or 66  of the ECSC Treaty as  a result of accession, 
including cases in which the facts came to an end before the date of accession, shall continue 
to be dealt with by the Commission under the relevant Community provisions. 
4.  Any individual exemption decisions taken and negative clearance decisions taken before 
the date of accession under Article 53  of the EEA Agreement or Article  1 of Protocol 25 
to that Agreement, whether by the EFI'  A Surveillance Authority or the Commission, and which 
concern cases which fall under Article 85  of the EC Treaty or Article 65  of the ECSC Treaty 
as  a result of accession shall, on accession,  remain valid for the purposes of Article 85  of 
the EC Treaty or,  as  the  case may  be,  Article 65  of the ECSC Treaty until the  time-limit 
specified therein expires or until the Commission takes a duly motivated decision to the contrary, 
in accordance with the basic principles of Community law. 
5.  All decisions taken by  the EFI'A Surveillance Authority  before the  date of accession 
pursuant to Article 61  of the EEA Agreement and which fall under Article 92 of the EC Treaty 
as  a result of accession shall, on accession, remain valid with respect to  Article 92 of the 
EC Treaty unless the Commission decides otherwise pursuant to  Article 93  of the EC Treaty. 
This paragraph shall not apply  to  decisions subject to  the proceedings provided for in  Article 
64 of the EEA Agreement. Without prejudice to  paragraph 2 above,  State aids granted by 
new  Member States  during  1994  but  which,  in  contravention  of the  EEA  Agreement  or 
arrangements made thereunder, either have not been notified to the EFT  A Surveillance Authority 
or have been notified but granted before the EFI'  A Surveillance Authority took a decision, 
shall not as  a consequence be considered as  existing State aids under Article 93(1) of the 
EC Treaty. 
6.  From the date of accession, the new Member States shall ensure that all other cases, where 
the EFT  A Surveillance Authority has been seized in the framework of the surveillance procedure 
under the EEA Agreement before accession, are transmitted without delay to the Commission 
which shall continue to deal with them under the relevant Community provisions while ensuring 
that the right of defence continues to be observed. 
92 7.  Without prejudice to  paragraphs 4 and 5,  the decisions taken by the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority remain valid after accession unless the Commission takes a duly motivated decision 
to the contrary in accordance with the basic principles of Community law. 
[  ... ] 
9. Joint declaration on Article 172 of the Act of Accession 
The Contracting Parties note that any  amendment to  the EEA Agreement and the Agreement 
between the EFT A States on the establishment of a surveillance authority and a Court of Justice 
needs the consent of the contracting parties concerned. 
[ ... ] 
93 Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995 
[ ... ] 
adjusting the instruments concerning the accession of new Member States 
to the European Union. 
(95/1/EC, Euratom, ECSC) 
1 
Article 2 
The following is  substituted from the title of the Act concerning the conditions of accession 
of the Kingdom of Norway,  the Republic of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom 
of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded: 
'Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria,  the Republic of Finland 
and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union 
is founded'. 
The Act referred to  above is hereinafter also referred to  as  'the Act of Accession'. 
[  ... ] 
Article 39 
Annex I to  the Act of Accession is replaced by  the Annex to  this Decision. 
[  ... ] 
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LIST REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 29 OF THE ACT OF ACCESSION 
I - External relations 
[  ... ] 
III - Competition 
A - Enabling Regulations 
1.  365 R 0019: Council Regulation No  19/65/EEC of 2 March 1965 on the application of 
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  certain categories of agreements and  concerted practices 
(OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p.  533/65), as  amended by: 
- 172 B:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (OJ L 
73, 27.3.1972, p.  14), 
- 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
-Accession of the Hellenic Republic  (OJ L 291,  19.11.1979, p.  17), 
- 185  I:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
In Article 4: 
- the following subparagraph is  added to  paragraph  1: 
'The provisions of the preceding subparagraphs shall apply in the same way in the 
case of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden'. 
- paragraph 2 is  supplemented by  the following subparagraph: 
'Paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements and concerted practices to  which Article 
85(1) of the Treaty applies by virtue of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
and which must be notified within six months of accession, in accordance with Articles 
5 and 25  of Regulation No  17,  unless they  have been so  notified within that period. 
The present paragraph shall not apply  to  agreements and concerted practices which 
at the date of accession already fall under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement'. 
2.  371  R  2821:  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  2821171  of 20  December  1971  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices (OJ L  285, 29.12.1971, p.  46) as  amended by: 
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- 372 R 2743: Council Regulation (EEC) No  2743172 of 19  December 1972 (OJ L 
291,  28.12.1972, p.  144), - 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ L 291,  19.11.1979, p.  17), 
- 185  H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom  of Spain and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
In Article 4: 
- paragraph 1 is  supplemented by the following subparagraph: 
'The provisions of the preceding subparagraphs shall apply  in the same way in the 
case of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden'. 
- paragraph 2 is  supplemented by the following subparagraph: 
'Paragraph 1 shall not apply to agreements and concerted practices to  which Article 
85(1) of the Treaty applies by virtue of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
and which must be notified within six months of accession, in accordance with Articles 
5 and 25  of Regulation No  17, unless they  have been so notified within that period. 
The present paragraph shall not apply to  agreements and  concerted practices which 
at the date of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement'. 
3.  387  R  3976:  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  3976/87  of 14  December  1987  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted 
practices in the air transport sector (OJ  374, 31.12.1987, p.  9)  as  amended by: 
- 390 R  2344:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  2344/90 of 24  July  1990 (OJ L 217, 
11.8.1990, p.  15), 
- 392 R  2411:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  2411192  of 23  July  1992 (OJ L 240, 
24.8.1992, p.  19). 
The following Article is inserted: 
'Article 4a 
A regulation pursuant to  Article 2 may  stipulate that the prohibition contained in Article 
85(1)  of the Treaty  shall  not apply,  for  such  period as  fixed  by  that  Regulation,  to 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices already in existence at the date of accession 
to  which Article 85(1) applies by virtue of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
and which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 85(3). However, this Article shall not 
apply to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices which at the date of accession 
already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement'. 
4.  392 R 0479: Council Regulation (EEC) No 479/92 of 25 February  1992 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices between liner companies (consortia) (OJ L 55,  29.2.1992, p.  3). 
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'Article 3a 
A Regulation pursuant to  Article 1 may  stipulate that the prohibition contained in Article 
85(1)  of the  Treaty  shall  not apply,  for  such period  as  fixed  by  that  Regulation,  to 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices already in existence at the date of accession 
to  which Article 85(1) applies by virtue of the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
and which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 85(3). However, this Article shall not 
apply to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices which at the date of accession 
already fall  under Article 53(1) of the  EEA Agreement.' 
B- Procedural Regulations 
1.  362 R 0017:  First Council Regulation No  17 of 6 February  1962 implementing Articles 
85  and 86 of the Treaty (OJ  13,  21.2.1962,  p.  204/62), as amended by: 
- 362 R 0059: Council Regulation No 59 of 3 July  1962 (OJ 58,  10.7.1962, p.  1655/62), 
- 363  R  0118:  Council Regulation  No  118/63/EEC of 5 November  1963  (OJ  162, 
7.11.1963, p.  2696/63), 
- 371  R 2822: Council Regulation (EEC) No  2822171  of 20 December 1971  (OJ  285, 
29.12.1971,  p.  49), 
- 172 B:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and  the United Kingdom (OJ L 
73,  27.3.1972,  p.  14), 
- 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Hellenic Republic  (OJ L  291,  19.11.1979, p.  17), 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
The following  paragraph is added to Article 25: 
'6.  The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 still apply  in the same way  in the case of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. However, they do  not apply  to agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices which at the date of accession already fall under Article 
53  of the EEA Agreement.' 
2.  368 R 1017:  Council Regulation (EEC) No  1017/68 of 19 July  1968  applying rules of 
competition to transport by rail, road and inland waterway (OJ L  175, 23.7.1968, p.  1), 
as  amended by: 
- 172 B: Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom (OJ L 
73, 27.3.1972,  p.  14), 
98 - 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
-Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ L 292,  19.11.1979, p.  17), 
In Article 30: 
- paragraph 3 is  supplemented by the following  subparagraph: 
'The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices which were in existence at the date of accession of Austria, 
Finland and Sweden and which, by  reason of that accession, fall  within the scope 
of Article 85(1) if,  within six months from  the date of accession, they are so  amended 
that they comply with the conditions laid down in Articles 4 and 5 of this Regulation. 
This subparagraph does not apply to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
which at the date of accession already fall under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
3.  386 R 4056: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down 
detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport 
(OJ  L  378, 31.12.1986, p.  4). 
The following  Article is  inserted: 
'Article 26a 
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to  agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices which were in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden and which, by reason of that accession, fall  within the scope of Article 85(1) 
if, within six months from the date of accession, they are so amended that they comply 
with the conditions laid down in Articles 3 and 6 of this Regulation.  However, this Article 
shall not apply  to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices which at the date of 
accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
4.  389 R 4064: Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21  December 1989 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L  395, 30.12.1989, p.  1),  as  corrected by 
OJ L 257,  21.9.1990, p.  13. 
The following  paragraph is added to Article 25: 
'3.  As  regards concentrations to  which this Regulation applies by virtue of accession, 
the date of accession shall be substituted for the date of entry into force of this Regulation. 
The provision of paragraph 2,  second alternative, applies in the same way  to  proceedings 
initiated by a competition authority of the new Member States or by the EFT  A Surveillance 
Authority.' 
C - Implementing Regulations 
I.  362 R 0027:  Commission Regulation No 27 of 3 May  1962: First Regulation implementing 
Council Regulation No  17  of 6 February 1962  (OJ  L  35,  10.5.1962,  p.  1118/62),  as 
amended by: 
- 375 R  1699: Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  1699175 of 2 July  1975  (OJ L  172, 
3.7.1975, p.  11), 
99 - 179 H:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession of the Hellenic Republic (OJ L 291,  19.11.1979, p.  17), 
- 385 R 2526:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No  2526/85 of 5 August  1985  (OJ L 
240, 7.9.1985, p.  1), 
- 185  I:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23), 
- 393  R 3666: Commission Regulation (EC) No  3666/93 of 15  December 1993  (OJ 
L  336, 31.12.1993, p.  1). 
In Article 2(1) 'fifteen' is replaced by  'eighteen'. 
2.  369 R 1629: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  1629/69 of 8 August 1969 on the form, 
content and other details of complaints pursuant to  Article  10,  applications pursuant to 
Article 12 and notifications pursuant to  Article  14( 1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1017/68 (OJ L  209,  21.8.1969, p.  1),  as  amended by: 
- 393  R 3666:  Commission Regulation (EC) No  3666/93 of 15  December 1993  (OJ 
L  336, 31.12.1993, p.  1). 
In Article 3(5)  'fifteen'  is  replaced by  'eighteen'. 
3.  388 R 4260:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  4260/88 of 16 December 1988 on  the 
communications, complaints and  applications and the hearings provided for in Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 
85  and 86 of the Treaty to  maritime transport (OJ L 376, 31.12.1988, p.  1)  as  amended 
by: 
- 393  R 3666:  Commission Regulation (EC) No  3666/93 of 15  December 1993  (OJ 
L  336, 31.12.1993, p.  1). 
In Article 3(5)  'fifteen'  is  replaced by  'eighteen'. 
4.  388 R 4261:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  4261/88 of 16 December 1988 on the 
complaints and applications and the hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No  3975/87 laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on competition 
to  undertakings in the air transport sector (OJ L 376,  31.12.1988,  p.  10),  as  amended 
by: 
- 393  R 3666:  Commission Regulation (EC) No  3666/93 of 15  December 1993  (OJ 
L  336, 31.12.1993, p.  1). 
In Article 3(4)  'fifteen' is replaced by  'eighteen'. 
5.  390 R 2367:  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2367/90 of 25 July  1990 on the notifications, 
time-limits and hearings provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the 
100 control of concentrations between undertakings (OJ L 219,  14.8.1990, p.  5),  as amended 
by: 
- 393  R 3666: Commission Regulation (EC)  No  3666/93 of 15  December 1993  (OJ 
L  336, 31.12.1993, p.  1). 
In Article 2(2)  'twenty-one' shall be replaced by  'twenty-four'  and  'sixteen' by  'nineteen'. 
D - Block exemption Regulations 
1.  383  R  1983:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1983/83  of 22  June  1983  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements 
(OJ  L  173, 30.6.1983, p.  1),  as  amended by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
The following Article is inserted: 
'Article  7a 
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to agreements which were 
in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden and which,  by  reason 
of this accession, fall within the scope of Article 85(1) if,  within six months from the 
date of accession, they are so amended that they comply with the conditions laid down 
in this Regulation. However, this Article shall not apply to  agreements which at the date 
of accession already fall  under Article 53  of the EEA Agreement.' 
2.  383  R  1984:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1984/83  of 22  June  1983  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of exclusive purchasing agreements 
(OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, p.  5),  as  corrected by  OJ L 281,  13.10.1983, p.  24,  as  amended 
by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
The following  Article is inserted: 
'Article  15a 
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply  to  agreements which were 
in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden and  which,  by  reason 
of this accession, fall  within the scope of Article 85(1) if,  within six months from the 
date of accession, they are so amended that they comply with the conditions laid down 
in this Regulation. However, this Article shall not apply to agreements which at the date 
of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
101 3.  384 R 2349:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2349/84 of 23 July  1984 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  categories of patent licensing agreements (OJ L 219, 
16.8.1984, p.  15), as amended by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23), 
- 393  R 0151:  Council Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93 of 23  December 1992 (OJ L 21, 
29.1.1993,  p.  8). 
The following  paragraph is  added to  Article 8: 
'4.  As  regards agreements to  which Article 85  of the Treaty applies as  a result of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Articles 6 and 7 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
on the understanding that the relevant dates shall be the date of accession instead of 13 
March  1962 and six  months after the date of accession instead of 1 February  1963,  1 
January  1967 and 1 April 1985. The amendment made to these agreements in accordance 
with Article 7 need not be notified to  the Commission.  However,  this paragraph shall 
not apply to  agreements which at the date of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) 
of the EEA Agreement.' 
4.  385  R 0123:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  123/85 of 12 December 1984 on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of motor vehicle distribution and 
servicing agreements (OJ L 15,  18.1.1985, p.  16),  as  amended by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23). 
The following paragraph is added to  Article 9: 
'4.  As regards agreements to  which Article 85  of the Treaty applies as  a result of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Articles 7 and 8 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
on the understanding that the relevant dates shall be the date of accession instead of 13 
March 1962 and six  months after the date of accession instead of 1 February  1963;  1 
January  1967  and  1  October  1985.  The  amendment  made  to  these  agreements  in 
accordance with Article 8 need not be notified to the Commission.  However, this paragraph 
shall not apply to  agreements  which  at  the date of accession already fall  under Article 
53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
5.  385 R 0417:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  417/85  of 19  December 1984 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialization agreements (OJ 
L 53,  22.2.1985,  p.  1),  as  amended by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23), 
102 - 393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93  of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21,  29.1.1993,  p.  8). 
The following  paragraph is  added to  Article 9a: 
'As regards  agreements  to  which  Article  85  of the  Treaty  applies  as  a result  of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, the preceding paragraph shall apply  mutatis 
mutandis on the understanding that the relevant dates  shall be  the date of accession of 
those countries and  six  months after the date of accession respectively.  However,  this 
paragraph shall not apply to  agreements which at the date of accession already fall under 
Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
6.  385  R 0418:  Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of 19  December 1984 on the 
application of Article  85(3)  of the  Treaty  to  categories of research  and  development 
agreements (OJ L 53,  22.2.1985,  p.  5), as  amended by: 
- 185  1:  Act concerning the conditions of accession and the adjustments to  the Treaties 
- Accession  of the  Kingdom  of Spain  and  the  Portuguese  Republic  (OJ  L  302, 
15.11.1985, p.  23), 
- 393  R 0151:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  151/93 of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L 21, 29.1.1993, p.  8). 
The following paragraph is  added to  Article 9a: 
'7.  As regards agreements to  which Article 85  of the Treaty applies as  a result of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, paragraphs 1 to 3 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
on the understanding that the relevant dates shall be the date of accession instead of 13 
March  1962 and six  months after the  date of accession instead of 1 February  1963,  1 
January  1967,  1 March  1985  and  1 September  1985.  The amendment made to  these 
agreements in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 need  not be notified to  the 
Commission.  However, this paragraph shall not apply to  agreements which at the date 
of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the  EEA Agreement.' 
7.  388  R 4087: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements (OJ L 
359,  28.12.1988, p.  46). 
The following  Article is inserted: 
'Article 8a 
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply  to the franchise agreements 
which were in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland and  Sweden and 
which,  by  reason of this  accession, fall  within the  scope of Article 85(1) if,  within six 
months  from  the  date  of accession,  they  are  so  amended  that  they  comply  with  the 
conditions  laid  down  in  this  Regulation.  However,  this  Article  shall  not  apply  to 
agreements  which at the date of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA 
Agreement.' 
103 8.  389 R 0556: Commission Regulation (EEC) No 556/89 of 30 November 1988 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of know-how licensing 
agreements (OJ L 61,  4.3.1989, p.  1),  as  amended by: 
- 393 R 0151: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  151/93 of 23  December 1992 (OJ 
L  21,  29.1.1993, p.  8). 
The following paragraph is added to  Article  10: 
'4.  As regards agreements to  which Article 85  of the Treaty applies as  a result of the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Articles 8 and 9 shall apply mutatis mutandis 
on the understanding that the relevant dates shall be the date of accession instead of 13 
March 1962 and six months after the date of accession instead of 1 February 1963 and 
1 January  1967. The amendments made to the agreements in accordance with Article 
9 need not be notified to the Commission.  However, this paragraph shall not apply to 
agreements which at the date of accession already fall under Article 53(1) of the EEA 
Agreement.' 
9.  392 R 3932: Commission Regulation (EEC) No  3932/92 of 21  December 1992 on the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices in the insurance sector (OJ L  398, 31.12.1992, p.  7). 
The following paragraph is added to Article 20: 
'4.  As regards agreements covered by Article 85 of the Treaty as a result of the accession 
of Austria, Finland and Sweden, Articles 18  and 19 shall apply mutatis mutandis on the 
understanding that the relevant dates shall be the date of accession instead of 13  March 
1962 and six months after the date of accession instead of 1 February  1963 and 1 January 
1967, 31  December 1993 and  1 April  1994. The amendments made to the agreements 
in accordance with Article  19  need not be notified to  the Commission.  However, the 
present paragraph shall not apply to  agreements which at the date of accession already 
fall under Article 53(  1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
10.  393  R  1617:  Commission  Regulation  (EEC)  No  1617/93  of 25  June  1993  on the 
application of the Treaty to  certain categories of agreements  and  concerted practices 
concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations 
on passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports 
(OJ L  155, 26.6.1993, p.  18). 
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The following Article is inserted: 
'Article 6a 
The prohibition in Article 85(1) of the Treaty shall not apply to  agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices which were in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland 
and Sweden and which, by reason of this accession, fall  within the scope of Article 85(1) 
if,  within six months from the date of accession, they are so amended that they comply 
with the conditions laid down in this Regulation. However, this Article shall not apply to  agreements, decisions and concerted practices which at the date of accession already 
fall under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
11.  393  R 3652:  Commission Regulation (EEC)  No  3652/93  of 22 December 1993  on  the 
application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to  certain categories of agreements between 
undertakings relating to computerized reservation systems for air transport services (OJ 
L  333, 31.12.1993, p.  37). 
[ ... ] 
The following Article is inserted: 
'Article 14a 
The prohibition in Article 85( 1) of the Treaty shall not apply  to agreements which were 
in existence at the date of accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden and which,  by reason 
of this accession, fall within the  scope of Article 85(1) if,  within six months from  the 
date of accession, they  are so amended that they comply with the conditions laid down 
in this Regulation. However, this Article shall not apply  to  agreements which at the date 
of accession already fall  under Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.' 
105 III- Multilateral texts 1. OECD- Recommendation of 27 and 28 July 1995 
Revised recommendation of the Council concerning cooperation between 
member countries on anticompetitive practices affecting international trade 
(C(95)  130 final) 
THE COUNCIL 
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development of 14 December 1960, 
Having regard to the fact that international cooperation among OECD countries in the control 
of anticompetitive practices affecting international trade has long existed, based on successive 
recommendations of the Council of 5 October 1967 (C(67) 53  final),  3 July  1973  (C(73) 99 
final),  25  September 1979 (C(79)  154 final)  and  21  May  1986 (C(86) 44 final), 
Having regard to  the recommendations made in the study of transnational mergers and merger 
control procedures prepared for the Committee on Competition Law  and Policy, 
Recognizing that anticompetitive practices may constitute an  obstacle to  the achievement of 
economic growth, trade expansion and other economic goals of member countries, 
Recognizing  that  the  continued  growth  in  internationalization  of  business  activities 
correspondingly  increases  the  likelihood  that  anticompetitive  practices  in  one  country  or 
coordinated behaviour of firms located in different countries may adversely affect the interests 
of member countries and also increases the number of transnational mergers that are subject 
to  the merger control laws of more than one member country, 
Recognizing that the unilateral application of national legislation,  in cases  where business 
operations in other countries are involved,  raises  questions as  to  the  respective spheres of 
sovereignty of the countries concerned, 
Recognizing the need for member countries to give effect to the  principles of international 
law and comity and to use moderation and self-restraint in the interest of cooperation in the 
field  of anticompetitive practices, 
Recognizing that anticompetitive practices investigations and proceedings by one member country 
may,  in certain cases,  affect important interests of other member countries, 
Considering, therefore, that member countries should cooperate in the implementation of their 
respective national legislation in order to combat the harmful effects of anticompetitive practices, 
109 Considering also that closer cooperation between member countries is needed to deal effectively 
with anticompetitive practices operated by enterprises situated in member countries when they 
affect the interests of one or more other member countries  and  have  a  harmful effect on 
international trade, 
Considering, moreover,  that closer cooperation between member countries in  the  form  of 
notification, exchange of information, coordination of action, consultation and  conciliation, 
on a fully  voluntary basis, should be encouraged, it being understood that such cooperation 
should not,  in any  way,  be construed to  affect the legal positions of member countries with 
regard to  questions of sovereignty, and,  in particular the extra-territorial application of laws 
concerning anticompetitive practices, as  may  arise, 
Recognizing the desirability of setting forth  procedures by  which the Competition Law and 
Policy Committee can act as a forum for exchanges of views, consultations and conciliation 
on matters related to  anticompetitive practices affecting international trade, 
Considering that if member countries find it appropriate to enter into bilateral arrangements 
for cooperation in the enforcement of national competition laws,  they should take into account 
the present Recommendation and guiding principles, 
I.  RECOMMENDS to  governments of member countries that in so far as their laws permit: 
A - Notification,  exchange of information and coordination of action 
1.  When a member country undertakes under its  competition laws an investigation or 
proceeding which may affect important interests of another member country or countries, 
it should notify such member country or countries, if possible in advance,  and, in any 
event,  at  a  time  that  would  facilitate  comments  or  consultations;  such  advance 
notification would enable the proceeding member country, while retaining full freedom 
of ultimate decision, to  take account of such  views as  the other member country  may 
wish to  express and of such remedial action as  the other member country may  find 
it feasible to take under its own laws,  to deal with the anticompetitive practices. 
2.  Where two or more member countries proceed against an anticompetitive practice in 
international  trade,  they  should  endeavour  to  coordinate  their  action  in  so  far  as 
appropriate and practicable. 
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3.  Through consultations or otherwise, the member countries should cooperate in developing 
or applying mutually satisfactory and beneficial measures for dealing with anticompetitive 
practices in international trade.  In this connection, they should supply each other with 
such relevant information on anticompetitive practices as their legitimate interests permit 
them to disclose; and should allow, subject to appropriate safeguards, including those 
relating to  confidentiality, the disclosure of information to the competent authorities 
of member countries by the other parties concerned, whether accomplished unilaterally 
or in the  context of bilateral or multilateral understandings, unless such cooperation 
or disclosure would be contrary to significant national interests. B - Consultation and conciliation 
4.  (a)  A  member country  which  considers  that  an  investigation  or proceeding  being 
conducted by  another member country under its competition laws may  affect its 
important interests should transmit its views on the matter to or request consultation 
with the other m!!mber country. 
(b)  Without prejudice to the continuation of its action under its competition law and 
to its full freedom of ultimate decision, the member country so addressed should 
give full and sympathetic consideration to  the views expressed by the requesting 
country, and, in particular, to any suggestions as to alternative means of fulfilling 
the needs or objectives of the competition investigation or proceeding. 
5.  (a) A member country which considers that one or more enterprises situated in one 
or more other member countries  are  or have  been engaged  in anticompetitive 
practices of whatever origin that are substantially and adversely affecting its interests 
may request consultation with such other member country or countries, recognizing 
that entering into such consultations is without prejudice to any  action under its 
competition law and to the full freedom of ultimate decision of the member countries 
concerned. 
(b)  Any member country so addressed should give full and sympathetic consideration 
to such views and factual materials as may be provided by the requesting country 
and, in particular, to the nature of the anticompetitive practices in question, the 
enterprises  involved  and  the  alleged  harmful  effects  on the  interests  of the 
requesting country. 
(c) The member country addressed which agrees that enterprises situated in its territory 
are engaged in anticompetitive practices harmful to the interests of the requesting 
country should attempt to  ensure that these enterprises take remedial action,  or 
should itself take whatever remedial action it considers appropriate, including actions 
under its legislation on anticompetitive practices or administrative measures, on 
a voluntary basis and considering its legitimate interests. 
6.  Without prejudice to any of their rights, the member countries involved in consultations 
under paragraph 4 and 5 above should endeavour to  fmd a mutually acceptable solution 
in the light of the respective interests involved. 
7.  In the event of a satisfactory conclusion to the consultations under paragraphs 4 and 
5 above, the requesting country, in agreement with, and in the form accepted by, the 
member countries or countries addressed, should inform the Competition Law and Policy 
Committee of the nature of the anticompetitive practices in question and of the settlement 
reached. 
8.  In the event that no  satisfactory conclusion can be  reached,  the  member countries 
concerned, if they so agree, should consider having recourse to the good offices of 
the Competition Law and Policy Committee with a view to conciliation. If  the member 
111 countries concerned agree to  the use of another means of settlement, they should, if 
they consider it appropriate, inform the Committee of such features of the settlement 
as  they feel  they can disclose. 
II.  RECOMMENDS that member countries take into account the guiding principles set out 
in the Appendix to this Recommendation. 
III.  INSTRUCTS the Competition Law and Policy Committee: 
1.  to  examine periodically  the  progress  made  in  the  implementation of the  present 
Recommendation and to  serve periodically or at the  request of a member country 
as  a forum for exchanges of views on matters related to  the Recommendation on 
the understanding that it will  not reach conclusions on  the conduct of individual 
enterprises or governments; 
2.  to consider the reports submitted by member countries in accordance with paragraph 
7 of Section I above; 
3.  to consider the requests for conciliation submitted by member countries in accordance 
with paragraph 8 of Section I above and to assist, by offering advice or by any  other 
means, in the settlement of the matter between the member countries concerned; 
4.  to report to the Council as appropriate on the application of the present Recommendati-
on. 
IV.  DECIDES  that  this  Recommendation  and  its  Appendix  cancel  and  replace  the 
Recommendation of the Council of 21  May  1986 (C(86) 44 final). 
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GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR NOTIFICATIONS, EXCHANGE OF 
INFORMATION, COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATIONS AND PROCEEDINGS, 
CONSULTATIONS AND  CONCILIATION OF ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES 
AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Purpose 
1.  The purpose of these principles is to clarify the procedures laid down in the Recommendati-
on and  thereby  to  strengthen cooperation and  to  minimize conflicts in the enforcement of 
competition laws.  It is recognized that implementation of the recommendations herein is fully 
subject to  the national laws of member countries,  as  well as  in all cases to  the judgment of 
national authorities that cooperation in a specific matter is consistent with the member country's 
national interests. Member countries may wish to consider appropriate legal measures, consistent 
with their national policies, to  give effect to this Recommendation in appropriate cases. 
Definitions 
2.  (a)  'Investigation or proceeding' means any official factual inquiry or enforcement action 
authorized or undertaken by  a competition authority of a member country pursuant 
to  the competition laws of that country. Excluded, however,  are:  (i) the review of 
business conduct or routine filings, in advance of a formal or informal determination 
that the matter may be anticompetitive; or (ii) research, studies or surveys the objective 
of which is to  examine the general economic situation or general conditions in specific 
industries. 
(b)  'Merger'  means  merger,  acquisition, joint venture and  any  other form  of business 
amalgamation that falls  within the scope and definitions of the competition laws of 
a member country governing business concentrations or combinations. 
Notification 
3.  The circumstances in which a notification of an  investigation or proceeding should be 
made,  as recommended in paragraph I.A. I  of the Recommendation, include: 
(a)  when it is proposed that,  through a written request, information will be sought from 
the territory of another member country or countries; 
(b)  when it concerns a practice (other than a merger) carried out wholly or in part in the 
territory of another member country or countries, whether the practice is purely private 
or whether it is believed to  be required, encouraged or approved by the government 
or governments of another country or countries; 
113 (c)  when the investigation or proceeding previously notified may reasonably be expected 
to  lead to  a prosecution or other enforcement action which may  affect an important 
interest of another member country or countries; 
(d)  when it involves remedies that would require or prohibit behaviour or conduct in the 
territory of another member country; 
(e)  in the  case of an investigation or proceeding involving a merger,  and in addition to 
the circumstances described elsewhere in this paragraph, when a party directly involved 
in the merger, or an enterprise controlling such a party, is incorporated or organized 
under the laws of another member country; 
(f)  in any  other situation where the investigation or proceeding may involve important 
interests of another member country or countries. 
Procedure for notifying 
4.  (a)  Under the Recommendation, notification ordinarily should be provided at the first stage 
of an investigation or proceeding when it becomes evident that notifiable circumstances 
described in paragraph 3 are present.  However, there may be cases where notification 
at that stage could prejudice the investigative action or proceeding. In such a case, 
notification and,  when requested, consultation should take place as  soon as  possible 
and in sufficient time to enable the views of the other member countries to  be taken 
into account. Before any formal legal or administrative action is taken, the notifying 
country should ensure, to the fullest extent possible in the circumstances, that it would 
not prejudice this process. 
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(b)  Notification of an investigation or proceeding should be made in writing through the 
channels  requested  by  each  country  as  indicated  in  a  list  to  be established  and 
periodically updated by the Competition Law and Policy Committee. 
(c)  The content of the  notification  should  be sufficiently  detailed to  permit an  initial 
evaluation by  the  notified country  of the  likelihood  of any  effects on its  national 
interests.  It  should  include,  if possible,  the  names  of the  persons  or enterprises 
concerned,  the  activities  under investigation,  the  character of the  investigation  or 
procedure and  the  legal provisions concerned,  and,  if applicable,  the need to  seek 
information  from  the  territory  of another  member  country.  In  the  case  of an 
investigation or proceeding involving a merger, notification should also include: 
(i)  the fact of initiation of an investigation or proceeding; 
(ii)  the fact of determination of the investigation or proceeding, with a description 
of any  remedial action ordered or voluntary steps undertaken by the parties; 
(iii)  a description of the issues of interest to  the notifying member country, such as 
the relevant markets affected, jurisdictional issues or remedial concerns; 
(iv)  a statement of the time period within which the notifying member country either 
must act or is planning to  act. Coordination of investigations 
5.  The coordination of concurrent investigations, as recommended in paragraph I.A.2 of the 
Recommendation, should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, where the relevant member 
countries agree that it would be in their interests to  do  so.  This coordination process shall 
not,  however,  affect each member country's right to  take a decision independently based on 
the investigation. Coordination might include any of the following  steps, consistent with the 
national laws of the countries involved: 
(a) providing notice of applicable time periods and schedules for  decision-making; 
(b)  sharing  factual  and  analytical  information  and  material,  subject  to  national  laws 
governing the confidentiality of information and the principles relating to  confidential 
information set forth in paragraph 1  0; 
(c)  requesting, in appropriate circumstances, that the subjects of the investigation voluntarily 
permit the  cooperating  countries  to  share  some or all  of the  information  in  their 
possession, to  the extent permitted by national laws; 
(d)  coordinating discussions or negotiations regarding remedial actions, particularly when 
such remedies could require conduct or behaviour in the territory of more than one 
member country; 
(e)  in those member countries in which advance notification of mergers is  required or 
permitted, requesting that the notification include a statement identifying notifications 
also made or to be made to other countries. 
Assistance in an investigation or proceeding of a member country 
6.  Cooperation among member countries by means of supplying information on anticompetitive 
practices in response to a request from a member country, as recommended in  paragraph I.A.3 
of the Recommendation, should be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, where it would be 
in  the interests of the  relevant member countries to  do  so.  Cooperation might include any 
of the following steps, consistent with the national laws of the countries involved: 
(a)  assisting  in  obtaining  information  on  a  voluntary  basis  from  within  the  assisting 
member's country; 
(b)  providing  factual  and  analytical  material  from  its  files,  subject  to  national  laws 
governing confidentiality of information and the  principles relating to  confidential 
information set forth in paragraph 1  0; 
(c)  employing on behalf of the requesting member country its authority to  compel the 
production of information in the form of testimony or documents, where the national 
law of the requested member country provides for such authority; 
115 (d)  providing information in the public domain relating to the relevant conduct or practice. 
To facilitate  the exchange of such information,  member countries should consider 
collecting and maintaining data about the nature and sources of such public information 
to which other member countries could refer. 
7.  When a member country learns of an anticompetitive practice occurring in the territory 
of another member country that could violate the laws of the latter, the former should consider 
informing the latter and providing as  much information as practicable, subject to national laws 
governing  the  confidentiality  of information  and  the  principles  relating  to  confidential 
information set forth in paragraph 10,  consistent with other applicable national laws and its 
national interests. 
8.  (a)  Member countries should use moderation and self-restraint and  take into account 
the substantive laws and procedural rules in the foreign forum when exercising their 
investigatory powers with a view to obtaining information located abroad. 
(b)  Before seeking information located abroad, member countries should consider whether 
adequate information is conveniently available from sources within their national 
territory. 
(c)  Any  requests for information located abroad should be  framed  in terms that are 
as  specific as  possible. 
9.  The provision of assistance or cooperation between member countries may be subject to 
consultations regarding the sharing of costs of these activities. 
Confidentiality 
10.  The exchange of information  under  this  Recommendation  is  subject  to  the  laws  of 
participating member countries governing the confidentiality of information. A member country 
may  specify the  protection that shall be  accorded the information to  be  provided and any 
limitations that may apply to the use of such information. The requested member country would 
be justified in declining to  supply information if the requesting member country is unable 
to  observe those requests.  A receiving member country should take all  reasonable steps to 
ensure observance of the confidentiality and use limitations specified by the sending member 
country, and, if a breach of confidentiality or use limitation occurs, should notify the sending 
member country of the breach and take appropriate steps to  remedy the effects of the breach. 
Consultations between member countries 
11.  (a)  The country notifying an investigation or proceeding should conduct its investigation 
or proceeding, to  the extent possible under legal and practical time constraints, in 
a manner that would allow the notified country to  request informal consultations 
or to  submit its views on the investigation or proceeding. 
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should be made as soon as possible after notification and explanation of the national 
interests affected should be provided in sufficient detail to enable full consideration 
to be given to them. 
(c)  The notified member country should,  where appropriate, consider taking remedial 
action under its own legislation in  response to  a notification. 
(d)  All countries involved in consultations should give full  consideration to  the interests 
raised and to the views expressed during the consultations so as  to avoid or minimize 
possible conflict. 
Conciliation 
12.  (a)  If they  agree  to  the  use  of the  Committee's  good  offices  for  the  purpose  of 
conciliation in  accordance with paragraph I.B.8 of the Recommendation, member 
countries should inform the chairman of the Committee and the Secretariat with 
a view to invoking conciliation. 
(b)  The  Secretariat  should  continue  to  compile  a  list  of persons  willing  to  act  as 
conciliators. 
(c)  The  procedure  for  conciliation  should  be  determined  by  the  chairman  of the 
Committee in agreement with the member countries concerned. 
(d)  Any conclusions drawn as a result of the conciliation are not binding on the  member 
countries concerned and the proceedings of the conciliation will be kept confidential 
unless the member countries concerned agree otherwise. 
117 2.  The set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules 
for the control of restrictive business practices (Unctad) 
Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices 
as an annex to its resolution of 22 April 1980 
THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON  RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Recognizing that restrictive business practices can adversely affect international trade, particularly 
that of developing countries, and the economic development of these countries, 
Affirming that a set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of 
restrictive business practices can contribute to  attaining the objective in the establishment of 
a new international economic order to eliminate restrictive business practices adversely affecting 
international trade and thereby contribute to development and improvement of international 
economic relations on a just and equitable basis, 
Recognizing also the need to ensure that restrictive business practices do not impede or negate 
the realization of benefits that should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
affecting international trade, particularly those affecting the trade and development of developing 
countries, 
Considering the possible adverse impact of restrictive business practices,  including among 
others those resulting from the increased activities of transnational corporations, on the trade 
and development of developing countries, 
Convinced of the need for action to be taken by countries in a mutually reinforcing manner 
at the national, regional and international levels to eliminate or effectively deal with restrictive 
business practices, including those of transnational corporations, adversely affecting international 
trade, particularly that of developing countries, and the economic development of these countries, 
Convinced also of the benefits to be derived from a universally applicable set of multilaterally 
agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive business practices and that 
all countries should encourage their enterprises to follow in all respects the provisions of such 
a set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules, 
Convinced further that the adoption of such a set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles 
and rules for the control of restrictive business practices will thereby facilitate the adoption 
and strengthening of laws and policies in the area of restrictive business practices at the national 
and regional levels and thus lead to improved conditions and attain greater efficiency and 
participation in international trade and development, particularly that of developing countries, 
119 and to protect and promote social welfare in general, and in particular the interests of consumers 
in both developed and developing countries, 
Affirming also the need to eliminate the disadvantages to  trade and development which may 
result from the restrictive business practices of transnational corporations or other enterprises, 
and  thus  help  to  maximize  benefits  to  international  trade  and  particularly  the  trade  and 
development of developing countries, 
Affirming further the need that measures adopted by States for the control of restrictive business 
practices  should  be  applied  fairly,  equitably,  on  the  same basis  to  all  enterprises  and  in 
accordance with established procedures of law,  and for States to take into account the principles 
and objectives of the set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules, 
HEREBY AGREES ON the following set of principles and rules for the control of restrictive 
business practices, which take the form of recommendations: 
A - Objectives 
Taking into account the interests of all countries, particularly those of developing countries, 
the  set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules are framed in order to  achieve 
the following objectives: 
1.  To ensure that restrictive business practices do  not impede or negate the realization of 
benefits that should arise from the liberalization of tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting world 
trade, particularly those affecting the trade and development of developing countries. 
2.  To attain greater efficiency in international trade and development,  particularly that of 
developing countries, in accordance with national aims of economic and social development 
and existing economic structures, such as through: 
(a)  the creation, encouragement and protection of competition; 
(b)  control of the concentration of capital and/or economic power; 
(c)  encouragement of innovation. 
3.  To  protect  and  promote  social  welfare  in  general  and,  in  particular,  the  interests  of 
consumers in both developed and developing countries. 
4.  To eliminate the disadvantages  to  trade  and development  which  may  result from  the 
restrictive business practices of transnational corporations or other enterprises, and thus help 
to  maximize benefits  to  international trade  and  particularly  the  trade  and  development of 
developing countries. 
5.  To provide a set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of 
restrictive business practices for adoption at  the international level and thereby to  facilitate 
the adoption and strengthening of laws and policies in  this area at the national and regional 
levels. 
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For the purpose of this set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules: 
(  i)  Definition 
1.  'Restrictive business practices' means acts or behaviour of enterprises which, through an 
abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market power, limit access to markets 
or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on 
international trade,  particularly that of developing countries, and on the economic development 
of these countries, or which,  through formal,  informal, written or unwritten agreements or 
arrangements among enterprises, have the same impact. 
2.  'Dominant position of market power' refers to  a situation where an enterprise, either by 
itself or acting together with a few  other enterprises, is in a position to control the relevant 
market for a particular good or service or group of goods or services. 
3.  'Enterprises' means firms,  partnerships, corporations, companies, other associations, natural 
or juridical persons, or any combination thereof, irrespective of the mode of creation or control 
or ownership, private or State, which are engaged in commercial activities, and includes their 
branches, subsidiaries, affiliates, or other entities directly or indirectly controlled by them. 
4.  The set of principles and rules applies to restrictive business practices, including those 
of transnational  corporations,  adversely  affecting  international  trade,  particularly  that  of 
developing countries and the economic development of these countries. It applies irrespective 
of whether such practices involve enterprises in one or more countries. 
5.  The 'principles and rules for enterprises, including transnational corporation' apply to all 
transactions in goods and services. 
6.  The 'principles and rules for enterprises, including transnational corporations' are addressed 
to all enterprises. 
7.  The provisions of the  set of principles and  rules shall be universally applicable to  all 
countries and enterprises regardless of the parties involved in the transactions, acts or behaviour. 
8.  Any reference to  'States' or 'Governments' shall be construed as including any  regional 
groupings of States, to the extent that they have competence in the area of restrictive business 
practices. 
9.  The set of principles and rules shall not apply to  intergovernmental agreements,  nor to 
restrictive business practices directly caused by such agreements. 
121 C - Multilaterally agreed equitable principles for the control of restrictive business 
practices 
In line with the objectives set forth,  the following  principles are to  apply: 
(i)  General principles 
1.  Appropriate action should be taken in  a mutually reinforcing manner at national,  regional 
and international levels to  eliminate, or effectively deal with,  restrictive business practices, 
including those of transnational corporations, adversely affecting international trade, particularly 
that of developing countries and the economic development of these countries. 
2.  Collaboration between governments at bilateral and multilateral levels should be established 
and,  where such collaboration has been established, it should be improved to  facilitate  the 
control of restrictive business practices. 
3.  Appropriate mechanisms should be devised at the  international level and/or the  use of 
existing international machinery improved to facilitate exchange and dissemination of information 
among Governments with respect to  restrictive business practices. 
4.  Appropriate means should be devised to facilitate the holding of multilateral consultations 
with regard to  policy issues relating to the control of restrictive business practices. 
5.  The provisions of the set of principles and rules  should not be construed as justifying 
conduct by enterprises which is unlawful under applicable national or regional legislation. 
(ii)  Relevant factors  in the  application of the set of  principles and rules 
6.  In order to  ensure the fair and equitable application of the set of principles and rules, 
States, while bearing in mind the need to ensure the comprehensive application of the set of 
principles and rules,  should take due account of the extent to  which the conduct of enterprises, 
whether or not created or controlled by  States,  is  accepted under applicable legislation or 
regulations, bearing in mind that such laws and  regulations  should be clearly defined and 
publicly and readily  available,  or is required by  States. 
(iii)  Preferential or differential treatment for developing countries 
7.  In  order to  ensure the equitable  application of the  set of principles  and  rules,  States, 
particularly developed countries, should take into account in their control of restrictive business 
practices the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries, in particular of 
the  least-developed countries, for the purposes especially of developing countries in: 
(a)  promoting the establishment or development of domestic industries and the economic 
development of other sectors of the economy,  and 
122 (b)  encouraging their economic development through regional or global arrangements among 
developing countries. 
D - Principles and rules for enterprises, including transnational corporations 
1.  Enterprises should conform to  the restrictive business practices laws, and the provisions 
concerning restrictive business practices in other laws, of the countries in which they operate, 
and,  in the event of proceedings under these laws,  should be subject to  the competence of 
the courts and relevant administrative bodies therein. 
2.  Enterprises should consult and cooperate with competent authorities of countries directly 
affected in controlling restrictive business practices adversely affecting the interests of those 
countries. In this regard, enterprises should also provide information, in particular details of 
restrictive arrangements, required for this  purpose, including that which may be located in 
foreign countries, to the extent that in the latter event such production or disclosure is not 
prevented by applicable law or established public policy. Whenever the provision of information 
is  on  a  voluntary  basis,  its  provision  should  be in  accordance  with  safeguards  normally 
applicable in this field. 
3.  Enterprises, except when dealing with each other in the context of an economic entity 
wherein they are under common control, including through ownership, or otherwise not able 
to act independently of each other, engaged on the market in rival or potentially rival activities, 
should refrain from practices such as  the following  when, through formal,  informal, written 
or unwritten agreements or arrangements, they  limit access to markets or otherwise unduly 
restrain competition, having or being likely  to  have adverse effects on international trade, 
particularly that of developing countries, and on the economic development of these countries: 
(a)  agreements fixing prices, including as  to  exports and imports; 
(b)  collusive tendering; 
(c)  market or customer allocation agreements; 
(d)  allocation by quota as to  sales and production; 
(e)  collective action to  enforce arrangements, by  concerted refusals to deal; 
(f)  concerted refusal of supplies to  potential importers; 
(g)  collective  denial  of access  to  an  arrangement,  or  association,  which  is  crucial  to 
competition. 
123 4.  Enterprises should refrain from the following acts or behaviour in a relevant market when, 
through an abuse 
1 or acquisition and  abuse of a dominant position of market power,  they 
limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition having or being likely to  have 
adverse effects on international trade,  particularly that of developing countries,  and on  the 
economic development of these countries: 
(a)  predatory behaviour towards competitors, such as using below-cost pricing to eliminate 
competitors; 
(b)  discriminatory (i.e. unjustifiable differentiated) pricing or terms or conditions in the supply 
of purchase of goods or services, including by  means of the use of pricing policies in 
transactions between affiliated enterprises which overcharge or undercharge for goods 
or services purchased or supplied as  compared with prices for similar or comparable 
transactions outside the affiliated enterprises; 
(c)  mergers, takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control, whether of a horizontal, 
vertical or a conglomerate nature; 
(d)  fixing the prices at which goods exported can be resold in importing countries; 
(e)  restrictions on the importation of goods which have been legitimately marked abroad 
with a trade mark identical with or similar to the trade mark protected as  to  identical 
or similar goods in the importing country where the trade marks in question are of the 
same origin,  i.e.  belong to the same owner or are used by  enterprises between which 
there is economic, organizational, managerial or legal interdependence and where the 
purpose of such restrictions is  to  maintain artificially high prices; 
(f)  when not for ensuring the achievement of legitimate business purposes, such as quality, 
safety,  adequate distribution or service: 
(i)  partial or complete refusals to  deal on the enterprise's customary commercial terms; 
(ii)  making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the acceptance 
of restrictions on the distribution or manufacture of competing or other goods; 
1  Whether acts or behaviour are abusive or not should be examined in terms of their purpose and effects 
in the actual situation, in particular with reference to whether they limit access to markets or otherwise 
unduly restrain competition, having or being likely to have adverse effects on international trade, particularly 
that of developing countries, and on the economic development of these countries, and to whether they 
are: 
(a)  appropriate in the light of the organizational, managerial and legal  relation~hip among the enterprises 
concerned, such as in the context of relations within an economic entity and not having restrictive 
effects outside the related enterprises; 
(b)  appropriate in the light of special conditions or economic circumstances in the relevant market such 
as exceptional conditions of supply and demand or the size of the market; 
(c)  of types which are usually treated as  acceptable under pertinent national or regional laws and 
regulations for the control of restrictive business practices; 
(d)  consistent with the purposes and objectives of these principles and rules. 
124 (iii)  imposing restrictions concerning where, or to  whom, or in what form or quantities, 
goods supplied or other goods may be resold or exported; 
(iv)  making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the purchase of 
other goods or services from  the suppliers or his designee. 
E - Principles and rules for States at national, regional and subregional levels 
1.  States  should,  at the national level or through regional groupings,  adopt,  improve and 
effectively  enforce  appropriate  legislation  and  implementing  judicial  and  administrative 
procedures for the control of restrictive business practices,  including those of transnational 
corporations. 
2.  States should base their legislation primarily on the principle of eliminating or effectively 
dealing with acts or behaviour of enterprises which,  through an  abuse or acquisition an abuse 
of a dominant position of market power,  limit access to  markets or otherwise unduly  restrain 
competition,  having  or being  likely  to  have  adverse  effects  on  their  trade  or  economic 
development,  or  which,  through  formal,  informal,  written  or  unwritten  agreement  or 
arrangements among enterprises have the same impact. 
3.  States, in their control of restrictive business practices, should ensure treatment of enterprises 
which is fair,  equitable, on the same basis to all enterprises, and in accordance with established 
procedures of law. The laws and regulations should be publicly and readily  available. 
4.  States should seek appropriate remedial or preventive measures to prevent and/or control 
the use of restrictive business practices within their competence when it comes to the attention 
of States that such practices adversely affect international trade, and  particularly the trade and 
development of the developing countries. 
5.  Where, for the purposes of the control of restrictive business practices,  a State obtains 
information from  enterprises  containing  legitimate  business  secrets,  it should accord  such 
information reasonable safeguards normally applicable in this field,  particularly to  protect its 
confidentiality. 
6.  States should institute or improve procedures for obtaining information from enterprises, 
including transnational corporations, necessary for their effective control of restrictive business 
practices, including in this respect details of restrictive agreements, understandings and other 
arrangements. 
7.  States should establish appropriate mechanisms at the  regional and  subregional levels to 
promote exchange of information on restrictive business practices and on the application of 
national laws  and  policies in  this  area,  and to  assist each other on  their mutual  advantage 
regarding control of restrictive business practices at the regional and subregional levels. 
8.  States with greater expertise in the operation of systems for the control of restrictive business 
practices  should,  on  request,  share  their  experience  with,  or otherwise  provide  technical 
assistance to,  other States wishing to develop or improve such systems. 
125 9.  States should, on request, or at their own initiative when the need comes to  their attention, 
supply to other States, particularly developing countries, publicly available information, and, 
to the extent consistent with their laws and established public policy, other information necessary 
to  the receiving interested State for its effective control of restrictive business practices. 
F - International measures 
Collaboration at the international level should aim at eliminating or effectively dealing with 
restrictive business practices, including those of transnational corporations, through strengthening 
and improving controls over restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, 
particularly that of developing countries, and the economic development of these countries. 
In this regard, action should include: 
1.  Work, aimed at achieving common approaches in national policies relating to  restrictive 
business practices compatible with the set of principles and rules. 
2.  Communication annually to  the Secretary-General of Unctad of appropriate information 
on steps  taken  by  States  and  regional  groupings  to  meet their commitment to  the  set of 
principles and rules, and information on the adoption, development and application of legislation, 
regulations and policies concerning restrictive business practices. 
3.  Continued publication annually by Unctad of a report on developments in  restrictive business 
practices legislation and on restrictive business practices adversely affecting international trade, 
particularly the trade and development of developing countries, based upon publicly available 
information and as  far as  possible other information,  particularly on the basis of requests 
addressed to all member States or provided at their own initiative and,  where appropriate, 
to the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations and other competent international 
organizations. 
4.  Consultations: 
(a)  where a State, particularly of a developing country, believes that a consultation  with 
another State or States is appropriate in regard to  an issue concerning control of restrictive 
business practices, it may request a consultation with those States with a view to finding 
a mutually acceptable solution. When a consultation is to  be held, the States involved 
may  request the Secretary-General of Unctad to  provide mutually  agreed conference 
facilities for such a consultation; 
(b)  States should accord full consideration to requests for consultations and, upon agreement 
as  to  the subject of and the procedures for such a consultation, the consultation should 
take place at an appropriate time; 
(c)  if the States involved so agree, a joint report on the consultations and their results should 
be prepared by the States involved and, if they so wish, with the assistance of the Unctad 
Secretariat, and be made available to  the Secretary-General of Unctad for inclusion in 
the annual report on restrictive business practices. 
126 5.  Continued work within Unctad on the elaboration of a model law or laws on restrictive 
business practices in order to  assist developing countries in devising  appropriate legislation. 
States should provide the necessary information and experience to  Unctad in this connection. 
6.  Implementation within or facilitation by  Unctad,  and other relevant organizations of the 
United Nations system in conjunction with Unctad, of technical assistance, advisory and training 
programmes on restrictive business practices, particularly for developing countries: 
(a)  experts should be provided to assist developing countries, at their request, in formulating 
or improving restrictive business practice legislation and procedures; 
(b)  seminars, training programmes or courses should be held, primarily in developing countries, 
to  train officials involved or likely to  be involved in administering restrictive business 
practices'  legislation and,  in  this connection,  advantage should be taken,  inter alia of 
the  experience  and  knowledge  of administrative  authorities,  especially  in  developed 
countries, in detecting the use of restrictive business practices; 
(c)  a handbook on restrictive business practice legislation should be compiled; 
(d)  relevant books,  documents,  manuals  and  any  other information on matters  related  to 
restrictive  business  practices  should  be  collected  and  made  available,  particularly  to 
developing countries; 
(e)  exchange of personnel between restrictive business practice authorities should be arranged 
and facilitated; 
(f)  international conferences on restrictive business practice legislation and policy should 
be arranged; 
(g)  seminars for an exchange of views on restrictive business practices among persons in 
the public and private sectors should be arranged. 
7.  International organizations and financing  programmes, in particular the United Nations 
Development Programme,  should be  called upon to  provide resources  through  appropriate 
channels and modalities for the financing of activities set out in paragraph 6 above. Furthermore, 
all countries are invited, in particular the developed countries, to  make voluntary financial 
and other contributions to  the abovementioned activities. 
G - International institutional machinery 
(i)  Institutional arrangements 
1.  An Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices operating within 
the framework of a Committee of Unctad will provide the institutional machinery. 
2.  States which have accepted the set of principles and rules should take appropriate steps 
at the national or regional level to  meet their commitments to the set of principles and rules. 
127 (ii)  Functions of the  Intergovernmental Group 
3.  The Intergovernmental Group shall have the following functions: 
(a)  to  provide a forum and modalities for multilateral consultations, discussion and exchange 
of views between States on matters related to the set of principles and rules, in particular 
its operation and the experience arising therefrom; 
(b)  to  undertake and disseminate periodically studies and research on  restrictive business 
practices  related to  the  provisions of the  set of principles  and  rules,  with  a  view  to 
increasing exchange of experience and giving greater effect to  the set of principles and 
rules; 
(c)  to  invite  and  consider  relevant  studies,  documentation  and  reports  from  relevant 
organizations of the United Nations system; 
(d)  to study matters relating to the set of principles and rules and which might be characterized 
by data covering business transactions and other relevant information obtained upon request 
addressed to  all  States; 
(e)  to  collect and disseminate information on matters relating to  the set of principles and 
rules to the overall attainment of its goals and to the appropriate steps States have taken 
at  the  national  or regional  level  to  promote an  effective  set  of principles  and  rules, 
including its objectives and principles; 
(f)  to  make  appropriate  reports  and  recommendations  to  States  on  matters  within  its 
competence, including the application and implementation of the  set of multilaterally 
agreed equitable principles and rules; 
(g)  to  submit reports at least once a year on its work. 
4.  In the performance of its functions,  neither the Intergovernmental Group nor its subsidiary 
organs shall act like a tribunal or otherwise pass judgment on  the  activities or conduct of 
individual governments or of individual enterprises in connection with  a specific business 
transaction.  The Intergovernmental Group  or its  subsidiary organs should avoid becoming 
involved when enterprises to  a specific business transaction are in dispute. 
5.  The Intergovernmental Group shall establish such procedures as may be necessary to  deal 
with issues related to  confidentiality. 
(iii) Review procedure 
6.  Subject to  the approval of the General Assembly, five years after the adoption of the set 
of principles and rules, a United Nations Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations under the auspices of Unctad for the purpose of reviewing all the aspects 
of the set of principles and rules. Towards this end, the Intergovernmental Group shall make 
proposals  to  the  Conference  for  the  improvement  and  further  development  of the  set  of 
principles and rules. 
128 IV - Agreements with the Central and East 
European countries 1.  Europe Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, 
of the other part 
Decision of the Council and the Commission of 13 December 1993 
(93/743/Euratom, ECSC, EC) 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 32 
The Member States and Poland shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial 
character so  as  to ensure that,  by  the end of the fifth year following  the entry  into force  of 
this Agreement, no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured 
and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of Poland. The Association 
Council will be informed about the measures adopted to implement this objective. 
[ ... ] 
Article 63 
1.  The following are incompatible with the  proper functioning  of the Agreement,  in so  far 
as  they  may affect trade between the Community and Poland: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Poland as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid  which distorts  or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Article 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
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131 3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Until these rules are adopted, the provisions of the Agreement on interpretation and application 
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade shall be applied 
as the rules for the implementation of paragraph 1(iii) and related parts of paragraph 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement any public 
aid granted by Poland shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Poland shall 
be regarded as an area identical to those areas of the Community described in Article 
92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Association Council 
shall, taking into account the economic situation of Poland, decide whether that period 
should be extended by further periods of five  years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia  by reporting 
annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by providing, upon request, information on aid schemes. Upon request by one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to products referred to in Chapters II and III of Title III: 
- the provisions of paragraph 1(iii) do not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  l(i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, and in particular of those established in Council 
Regulation No 26/62. 
6.  If the Community or Poland considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph 1,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3, or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious 
prejudice to  the interest of the other Party or material injury to its  domestic industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph l(iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may, where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in accordance with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
132 7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to  the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the  Parties shall exchange information taking  into  account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the subject of Protocol 2. 
[ ... ] 
Article 65 
With regard to public undertakings, and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that as from  the third year following the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, in particular Article 90, and the principles of the concluding document 
of the April 1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
in particular entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 68 
The Contracting Parties recognize that the major precondition for Poland's economic integration 
into the Community is  the approximation of that country's existing and  future  legislation to 
that of the Community. Poland shall use its best endeavours to ensure that future  legislation 
is compatible with Community legislation. 
Article 69 
The approximation of laws  shall extend to the following  areas in particular:  customs law, 
company law,  banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace, financial services,  rules on competition, protection of health and 
life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
standards, transport and the environment. 
[ ... ] 
Article 122 
In the event that, pending the completion of the procedures necessary for the entry into force 
of this Agreement, the provisions of certain parts of this Agreement, in particular those relating 
to  the movement of goods,  are put into effect in  1992 by  means of an Interim Agreement 
133 between the Community and Poland, the Contracting Parties agree that, in such circumstances 
for the purposes of Title III,  Articles 63, 65  and 66 of this Agreement and Protocols  1,  2, 
3,  4,  5,  6 and 7 hereto,  the terms  'date of entry into force of this Agreement'  shall mean: 
- the date of entry into force of the Interim Agreement in relation to obligations taking effect 
on that date,  and 
- 1 January  1992 in relation to  obligations taking effect after the date of entry into force 
by reference to  the date of entry into force. 
[  ... ] 
134 [  ... ] 
PROTOCOL 2 ON  ECSC PRODUCTS TO THE EUROPE AGREEMENT 
('THE AGREEMENT') 
Article 8 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the proper functioning  of the Agreement,  in so  far 
as  they  may  affect trade between the Community and Poland: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings,  decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Poland as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in any  form  whatsoever except derogations  allowed pursuant to  the ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, Article 
85  of the EEC Treaty, and the rules  on State aids,  including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall,  within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Parties  recognize  that during  the  first  five  years  after the  entry  into  force  of the 
Agreement, and by derogation to  paragraph 1(iii), Poland may exceptionally, as regards ECSC 
steel products, grant public aid for restructuring purposes provided that: 
- the restructuring programme is  linked to  a global rationalization and reduction of capacity 
in Poland, 
- it leads to  the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at the end 
of the restructuring period, and 
- the  amount and intensity of such aid  are  strictly limited to  what is  absolutely  necessary 
in order to  restore such viability  and are progressively reduced. 
The Association Council shall,  taking into account the economic situation of Poland, decide 
whether the period of five  years could be extended. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in  the  area of public aid by a full  and continuous 
exchange of information to  the other Party, including amount, intensity and purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
135 6.  If  the Community or Poland considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph 1 as  amended by  paragraph 4,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause prejudice 
to the interests of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
the affected Party may take appropriate measures if no solution is found  within 30 days through 
consultation. Such consultation shall be held in 30 days. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph  l(iii), such appropriate measures may 
only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid 
down by the  General Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade  and any  other relevant instrument 
negotiated under its  auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
[  ... ] 
136 JOINT DECLARATIONS 
[  ... ] 
11.  Article 63 
1.  The Association Council shall establish appropriate measures to ensure that all agreements 
covered by Article 63(1) of the Agreement and affecting trade between the Contracting Parties 
and which were concluded before the entry into force of the Agreement will be dealt with 
in a manner similar to what is provided in Article 7 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 17/62. 
2.  The Parties shall not make improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to  prevent 
the disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
3.  Parties may request the Association Council at a later stage, and after the  adoption of 
the implementing rules referred to in Article 63(3), to examine to  what extent and under which 
conditions certain competition rules may be directly applicable, taking into account the progress 
made in  the integration process between the Community and Poland.  I 
12.  Article 63(2) 
When applying the criteria arising from the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 
92 of the Treaty, the notion of affectation of trade between Member  ~tates defined in such 
Articles shall be replaced by the notion of affectation of trade between the Community and 
Poland. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY  THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
[  ... ] 
2.  Article 8(  4) of Protocol 2 on ECSC products 
I 
It is understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is strictly 
limited to  the particular case of Poland and does not impair the positipn of the Community 
in relation to  other cases nor prejudge international commitments. Tile possible derogation 
provided  for  in  paragraph  4  takes  into  account  the  particular  difficulties  of Poland  in 
restructuring the steel sector and the fact that this process has been launched very  recently. 
[  ... ] 
137 LETTER FROM THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 
CONCERNING PROTOCOL 2 
The Government of Poland declares that it will not invoke the provisions of Protocol 2 on 
ECSC products, in particular Article 8,  so as not to call into question the compatibility with 
this Protocol of the agreements made by  the Community coal industry with the  electricity 
companies and the steel industry to  secure the sale of Community coal. 
[  ... ] 
138 Implementing rules for  the application of the competition provisions applicable to 
undertakings provided for in Article 33, paragraphs l(i), l(ii) and 2,  of the  Interim 
Agreement between the EC  and Poland (Article 63 of the  Europe Agreement 
between the EC  and Poland) 
1 
Article 1 
General principle 
Cases relating to agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition as well as to abuses of dominant position in the territories 
of the Community or of Poland as a whole or in a substantial part thereof, which may  affect 
trade between the EC and Poland shall be settled according to the principles contained in Article 
33, paragraphs 1 and 2,  of the Interim Agreement and Article 63, paragraphs  1 and  2,  of the 
Europe Agreement. 
For this purpose, these cases are dealt with by the EC Commission (DG IV) on the EC side 
and the Polish Antimonopoly Office (AMO) on the Polish side. 
The competences of the EC Commission and the AMO to deal with these cases shall follow 
from the existing rules of the respective legislations of the EC and Poland, including where 
these rules are applied to undertakings located outside the respective territory. 
Both authorities shall settle the cases in accordance with their own substantive rules,  and having 
regard to the provisions set out below. The relevant substantive rules of the authorities are 
the competition rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community as  well as the ECSC 
Treaty including the competition-related secondary legislation, for the EC Commission and 
the Polish Antimonopoly Law for the AMO. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EEC TREATY 
Article 2 
Competence of both competition authorities 
Cases under Article 33  of the Interim Agreement and Article 63  of the Europe Agreement 
which may affect both the EC and the Polish market and which may fall under the competence 
of both competition authorities shall be dealt with by the EC Commission and the  AMO, 
according to the rules under this Article. 
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139 2.1. Notification 
2.1.1.  The competition authorities shall notify to each other those cases they  are dealing with, 
which,  according to the general principle laid down in Article  1,  appear to fall  as  well under 
the competence of the other authority. 
2.1.2.  This situation may  arise in particular in cases concerning activities that: 
involve anticompetitive activities carried out in the other authority's territory; 
are  relevant to  enforcement activities of the  other competition authority; 
involve remedies that would require or prohibit conduct in the other authority's territory. 
2.1.3.  Notification under this Article shall include sufficient information to permit an initial 
evaluation by  the recipient Party of any  effects on its interests. Copies of the notifications 
shall be submitted on a regular basis to  the Joint Committee under the Interim Agreement, 
and to the Association Council under the Europe Agreement. 
2.1.4.  Notification shall be made in advance, as soon as possible and at the latest at the stage 
of an investigation still far enough in advance of the adoption of a settlement or decision, 
so  as  to  facilitate comments or consultations and to  enable the proceeding authority to  take 
into account the other authority's views,  as  well as  to take such remedial action it may  find 
feasible under its own laws, in order to  deal with the case in question. 
2.2.  Consultation and comity 
Whenever the EC Commission or the AMO  consider that anticompetitive activities carried 
out on the territory of the other authority are substantially affecting important interests of the 
respective Party, it may request consultation with the other authority, or it may request that 
the other Party's competition authority  initiate any appropriate procedures with a view to taking 
remedial action under its legislation on anticompetitive activities. This is without prejudice 
to any action under the requesting Party's competition law and does not hamper the full  freedom 
of ultimate decision of the authority so  addressed. 
2.3.  Finding of an understanding 
The competition authority so addressed shall give full and sympathetic consideration to  such 
views and factual materials as  may be provided by the requesting authority and,  in particular, 
to  the  nature of the anticompetitive activities in question, the enterprises involved and the 
alleged harmful effects on the important interests of the requesting Party. 
Without prejudice to  any  of their rights or obligations, the competition authorities involved 
in consultations under this Article shall endeavour to find  a mutually  acceptable solution in 
the light of the respective important interests involved. 
140 Article 3 
Competence of one  competition authority only 
3.1.  Cases falling under the exclusive competence of one competition authority, in accordance 
with the principle laid down in Article 1,  and which may affect important interests of the 
other Party, shall be handled having regards to the provisions set out in Article 2,  and taking 
account of the principles set out below. 
3.2.  In particular, whenever one of the competition authorities undertakes an investigation 
or proceeding in a case which reveals to  affect important interests of the other Party,  the 
proceeding authority shall notify this case to the other authority,  without formal request by 
the latter. 
Article 4 
Request for information 
Whenever the competition authority of a Party becomes aware of the fact that a case, falling 
as well or only under the competence of the other authority, appears to affect important interests 
of the first Party, it may request information about this case from the proceeding authority. 
The proceeding authority shall give sufficient information to the extent possible and at a stage 
of its proceedings far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision or settlement to enable 
the requesting authority's views to be taken into account. 
Article 5 
Secrecy and confidentiality of information 
5.1.  Having regard to Article 33, paragraph 7, of the Interim Agreement, and Article 63, 
paragraph 7, of the Europe Agreement, neither competition authority is required to  provide 
information to the other authority if disclosure of that information to  the requesting authority 
is prohibited by the law of the authority possessing the information, or would be incompatible 
with important interests of the Party whose authority is  in possession of the information. 
5.2.  Each authority agrees to maintain, to  the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of 
any information provided to it in confidence by the other authority. 
Article 6 
Block exemptions 
In  the  application of Article  33  of the  Interim Agreement  and  Article 73  of the  Europe 
Agreement as  provided for in Articles 2 and 3 above,  the competition authorities shall ensure 
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applied integrally.  The AMO  shall  be  informed of any  procedure related  to  the  adoption, 
abolition or modification of block exemptions by the EC. 
Where such block exemption regulations encounter serious objections on the Polish side, and 
having  regard  to  the  approximation  of legislation  as  foreseen  in  the  Europe  Agreement, 
consultations shall take place in the Joint Committee or Association Council, in accordance 
with the provisions contained in Article 9. 
The same  principles  shall  apply  regarding  other significant changes  in  the  EC  or Polish 
competition policies. 
Article 7 
Merger control 
With regard to mergers which fall  within Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89 and which have 
a significant impact on the Polish economy,  the  AMO  shall be entitled to  express its  views 
in  the  course of the  procedure, taking into  account the time-limits  as  provided for in  the 
aforementioned Regulation. The EC Commission shall give due consideration to  that view. 
Article 8 
Activities of  minor importance 
8.1.  Anticompetitive activities whose effects on trade between the Parties or on competition 
are negligible do not fall under Article 33, paragraph 1,  of the Interim Agreement and Article 
63, paragraph 1, of the Europe Agreement, and, therefore, are not to be treated under Articles 
2 to  6 of the present implementing rules. 
8.2.  Negligible effects in the sense of Article  8.1  are generally presumed to  exist when: 
the aggregate annual turnover of the participating undertakings does not exceed ECU 200 
million, and 
the goods or services which are the subject of the agreement, together with the participating 
undertakings' other goods or services which are considered by users to be equivalent in 
view of their characteristics, price and intended use, do  not represent more than 5%  of 
the total market for such goods or services in the area of the common market affected 
by the agreement, and the Polish market affected by  the agreement. 
Article 9 
Joint Committee/Association Council 
9.1.  Whenever the procedures provided for in Articles 2 and 3 above do not lead to a mutually 
acceptable solution, as well as in other cases explicitly mentioned in the present implementing 
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at the request of one Party within three months following  the  request. 
9.2  Following this exchange of views, or after expiration of the delay stated above, the Joint 
Committee or Association Council may  make appropriate recommendations for the settlement 
of these cases,  without prejudice to  Article 33,  paragraph 6,  of the Interim Agreement and 
Article  63,  paragraph  6,  of the  Europe  Agreement.  In  these  recommendations,  the  Joint 
Committee or Association Council may  take into account eventual failure of the requested 
authority to  give its point of view to  the requesting authority within the delay provided for 
in Article 9.1. 
9.3.  These procedures in the Joint Committee or Association Council are without prejudice 
to  any  action under the respective competition laws in force in the territory of the Parties. 
Article 10 
Negative conflict of competence 
When both the EC Commission and the AMO consider that neither of them is  competent to 
handle a case on the basis of their respective legislation an exchange of views shall take place 
on request in the Joint Committee. The EC and Poland shall endeavour to  find a mutually 
acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved with the support 
of the Joint Committee or Association Council, which may  take appropriate recommendations, 
without prejudice  to  Article  33,  paragraph  6,  of the  Interim  Agreement  and  Articles  63, 
paragraph 6,  of the Europe Agreement, and the rights of individual EC Member States on 
the basis of their competition rules. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE ECSC TREATY 
Article 11 
Treaty establishing the  European  Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The provisions contained in Articles  1 to  10  above shall also apply  with respect to  the coal 
and  steel  sector as  referred to  in Protocol 2 to  the  Interim Agreement and to  the  Europe 
Agreement. 
Article 12 
Administrative assistance (languages) 
The EC Commission and the AMO will provide for practical arrangements for mutual assistance 
or any other appropriate solution concerning in particular the question of translations. 
143 2.  Europe Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Hungary, of the other part 
Decision of the Council and the  Commission of 13 December 1993 
(931742/Euratom, ECSC, EC) 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 32 
The  Member  States  and  Hungary  shall  progressively  adjust  any  State  monopolies  of a 
commercial character so  as  to  ensure that, by  the end of the  fifth  year following  the entry 
into force of this Agreement, no  discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and  marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and  of Hungary. 
The Association Council  will  be  informed about the  measures  adopted  to  implement this 
objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 62 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement,  in so  far 
as  they  may  affect trade between the Community and Hungary: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Hungary as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
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145 4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by  Hungary shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Hungary 
shall be regarded as  an area identical to  those areas of the Community described in 
Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The 
Association Council shall, taking into account the economic situation of Hungary, decide 
whether that period should be extended by  further periods of five years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by  reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the  distribution of the  aid  given 
and by providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to  products referred to  in Chapters II  and III of Title III: 
- the provisions of paragraph 1(iii) do not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic Community,  and  in  particular of those established in Council 
Regulation No  26/1962. 
6.  If the Community or Hungary considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph  1,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in  paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and  if such practice causes or threatens  to  cause serious 
prejudice to  the  interest of the  other Party or material injury  to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days  following  referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1(iii), such appropriate measures may, 
where  the  General  Agreement on Tariffs  and  Trade  applies  thereto,  only  be  adopted  in 
accordance with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and any  other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices which 
are applicable between the Parties. 
7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to  the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the  Parties shall exchange information taking into account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the  subject of Protocol 2. 
[  ... ] 
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With regard to public undertakings, and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that as  from  the third year following the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, in particular Article 90,  and the principles of the concluding document 
of the April 1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and  Cooperation in Europe, 
in particular entrepreneurs' freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 67 
The  Contracting  Parties  recognize  that  the  major  precondition  for  Hungary's  economic 
integration into the Community is  the  approximation of that country's existing  and  future 
legislation to  that of the Community. Hungary shall act to  ensure that future legislation is 
compatible with Community legislation as  far as  possible. 
Article 68 
The approximation of laws shall extend to  the following  areas in  particular:  customs law, 
company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes,  intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition,  protection of health and 
life of humans,  animals and plants, food  legislation, consumer protection including product 
liability, indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment. 
[  ... ] 
Article 124 
In the event that,  pending the completion of the procedures necessary for the entry into force 
of this Agreement, the provisions of certain parts of this Agreement, in particular those relating 
to  the movement of goods,  are put into effect in 1992 by  means of an Interim Agreement 
between the Community and Hungary, the Contracting Parties agree that, in such circumstances 
for the  purposes of Title III, Articles 63  and 65  of this Agreement and Protocols  1,  2,  3,  4, 
5,  6 and 7 hereto, the terms  'date of entry into force  of this Agreement'  shall mean: 
- the date of entry into force of the Interim Agreement in relation to obligations taking effect 
on that date,  and 
- 1 January  1992 in relation to obligations taking effect after the date of entry into force 
by  reference to  the  date of entry into force. 
[ ... ] 
147 PROTOCOL 2 ON ECSC PRODUCTS COVERED BY  THE ECSC TREATY 
[  ... ] 
Article 8 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they  may affect trade between the Community and Hungary: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings,  decisions 
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Hungary as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in  any  form  whatsoever except derogations  allowed pursuant to  the ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any practices contrary to  this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, Article 
85  of the EEC Treaty, and the rules on State aids,  including the  secondary legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall,  within three years of the entry into force  of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Parties  recognize  that during  the  first  five  years  after the  entry  into force  of the 
Agreement, and by derogation to paragraph 1(iii), Hungary may exceptionally, as regards ECSC 
steel  products,  grant  public  aid  for  restructuring  purposes  leading  to  the  viability  of the 
benefiting firms  and aiming at a global reduction of capacity in Hungary,  provided that the 
amount and intensity of such aid are strictly limited to what is  absolutely necessary in order 
to  reach these goals and  that they  are  progressively reduced. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in  the area of public aid by a full  and continuous 
exchange of information to  the other Party, including amount, intensity and  purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
6.  If the Community or Hungary considers that a particular practice is incompatible with 
the terms of the first paragraph as  amended by  paragraph 4,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause prejudice 
to  the interests of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
the affected Party may take appropriate measures if no solution is found  within 30 days through 
consultation. Such consultation shall be held in  30 days. 
148 In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph  l(iii), such appropriate measures may 
only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid 
down by  the  General Agreement on  Tariffs  and Trade and  any  other relevant instrument 
negotiated under its  auspices which are  applicable between the Parties. 
[  ... ] 
149 JOINT DECLARATION 
[  ... ] 
12.  Article 62 
The Parties shall not make improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to prevent the 
disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
[  ... ] 
UNILATERAL DECLARATION 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
[  ... ] 
2.  Article 8( 4) of Protocol 2 on ECSC products 
It is understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is  strictly 
limited to the particular case of Hungary and does not impair the position of the Community 
in relation to  other cases nor prejudge international commitments. The possible derogation 
foreseen in paragraph 4 takes into account the particular difficulties of Hungary in restructuring 
the steel sector and the fact that this process has been launched very recently. 
[  ... ] 
LETTER FROM THE HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE COMMUNITY 
CONCERNING PROTOCOL 2 
The Government of Hungary declares that it will not invoke the provisions of Protocol 2 on 
ECSC products, in particular Article 8,  so as not to call into question the compatibility with 
this Protocol of the agreements made by the Community coal industry with the electricity 
companies and the steel industry to secure the sale of Community coal. 
150 Implementing rules for the application of the competition provisions applicable to 
undertakings provided for in Article 62 (1)  (i), (1)  (ii) and (2)  of the Europe 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Hungary, of the other part 
1 
Article 1 
General principle 
Cases relating to agreements between undertakings, decisions by  associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition as  well  as  to  abuses  of a dominant position in  the 
territories of the Community or of Hungary as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof,  which 
may  affect trade  between  the  Community  and  Hungary,  shall be  settled  according  to  the 
principles contained in Article 62 (1) and (2) of the Europe Agreement. 
For this purpose, these cases are dealt with by the Commission of the European Communities 
(DG  IV)  on the Community side and  the Office of Economic Competition (GVH)  on the 
Hungarian side. 
The competences of the Commission and the GVH to deal with these cases shall flow  from 
the existing rules of the respective legislation of the Community and Hungary, including where 
these rules are  applied to  undertakings located outside the respective territory. 
Both authorities shall settle the cases in accordance with their own substantive rules,  and having 
regard to  the provisions set out below. The relevant substantive rules of the authorities are 
the competition rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community as well as the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  including  the  competition-related 
secondary  legislation,  for  the  Commission,  and  the  Hungarian  Act LVII  of 1996  on  the 
Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Practices, for the GVH. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EC TREATY 
Article 2 
Competence of both competition authorities 
Cases under Article 62 of the Europe Agreement which may  affect both the Community and 
the Hungarian market and  which may  fall under the competence of both competition authorities 
shall be dealt with by the Commission and the GVH,  according to the rules under this Article. 
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151 2.1.  Notification 
2.1.1.  The competition authorities shall notify to each other those cases they  are dealing 
with,  which,  according to the general principle laid down in Article  1,  appear also 
to  fall  under the competence of the other authority. 
2.1.2.  This situation may  arise in particular in cases concerning activities that: 
- involve anticompetitive activities carried out in the other authority's territory; 
- are relevant to  enforcement activities of the other competition authority, 
- involve remedies that would require or prohibit particular conduct in the other 
authority's territory. 
2.1.3.  Notification under this Article shall include sufficient information to permit an initial 
evaluation  by  the  recipient  party  of any  effects  on  its  interests.  Copies  of the 
notifications shall be submitted on a regular basis to  the Association Council. 
2.1.4.  Notification shall be made in advance, as soon as possible and at the latest at the stage 
of an  investigation still far enough in advance of the  adoption of a settlement or 
decision,  so as  to  facilitate comments or consultations and to  enable the  proceeding 
authority to  take into account the  other authority's views,  as  well  as  to  take  such 
remedial action it may find  feasible under its own laws,  in order to deal with the case 
in question. 
2.2.  Consultation and comity 
Whenever the Commission or the GVH consider that anticompetitive activities carried 
out on the territory of the other authority are substantially affecting important interests 
of the respective Party, it may request consultation with the other authority, or it may 
request that the other party's competition authority initiate any appropriate procedures 
with a view to  taking remedial action under its legislation on anticompetitive activities. 
This is without prejudice to any action under the requesting party's competition law 
and does not hamper the full freedom of ultimate decision of the authority so addressed. 
2.3.  Finding of an understanding 
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The competition authority so addressed shall give full and sympathetic consideration 
to  such views  and factual materials as  may be provided by  the  requesting authority 
and,  in  particular,  to  the  nature  of the  anticompetitive  activities  in  question,  the 
enterprises involved and the alleged harmful effects on the important interests of the 
requesting Party. 
Without prejudice to  any  of their rights  or obligations, the competition authorities 
involved  in  consultations  under  this  Article  shall  endeavour  to  find  a  mutually 
acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved. Article 3 
Competence of one competition authority only 
3.1.  Cases falling under the exclusive competence of one competition authority, in  accordance 
with the principle laid down in Article 1,  and  which may  affect important interests of 
the other Party, shall be handled having regard to the provisions set out in Article 2, 
and taking account of the principles set out below. 
3.2.  In particular, whenever one of the competition authorities undertakes an investigation 
or proceeding in a case which is  found to  affect important interests of the other Party, 
the proceeding authority shall notify this case to the other authority, without formal request 
by  the  latter. 
Article 4 
Request for information 
Whenever the competition authority of Party becomes aware of the fact that a case, falling 
also or only under the competence of the other authority, appears to affect important interests 
of the first Party, it may request information about this case from  the proceeding authority. 
The proceeding authority shall give sufficient information to the extent possible and at a stage 
of its proceedings far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision or settlement to enable 
the requesting authority's views to be taken into account. 
Article 5 
Secrecy and confidentiality of information 
5.1.  Having regard to  Article 62 (7) of the Europe Agreement, neither competition authority 
is  required to  provide information to the other authority if disclosure of that information 
to  the  requesting  authority  is  prohibited  by  the  law  of the  authority  possessing  the 
information, or would be incompatible with important interests of the Party whose authority 
is  in possession of the information. 
5.2.  Each authority agrees to maintain,  to  the fullest extent possible,  the confidentiality of 
any  information provided to it in confidence by the other authority. 
Article 6 
Block exemptions 
In the application of Article 62 (7) of the Europe Agreement as  provided for in Articles 2 
and 3 of these Implementing Rules, the competition authorities shall ensure that the principles 
153 contained in the Block Exemption Regulations in force in the Community are applied in full. 
The GVH shall be informed of any  procedure related to the adoption, abolition or modification 
of Block Exemptions by  the Community. 
Where such Block Exemption Regulations encounter serious objections on the Hungarian side, 
and having regard to  the approximation of legislation as  provided for in the Europe Agreement, 
consultations shall take place in the Association Council, in accordance with the provisions 
contained in Article 9 of these Implementing Rules. 
The same principles shall  apply  regarding other significant changes in  the  Community  or 
Hungarian competition policies. 
Article 7 
Merger control 
With  regard  to  mergers  which  fall  within  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of 
21  December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings
1  and have significant 
impact on the Hungarian economy, the GVH shall be entitled to express its view in the course 
of the procedure taking into account the time limits as  provided for in  the  aforementioned 
Regulation. The Commission shall give due consideration to that view,  without prejudice to 
any  action under the Parties'  respective competition laws. 
Article 8 
Activities of minor importance 
8.1.  Anticompetitive activities whose effects on trade between the Parties or on competition 
are  negligible do  not fall  under Article 62 (  1)  of the Europe Agreement and therefore 
are not to be treated under the Articles 2 to  6 of these Implementing Rules. 
8.2.  Negligible effects within the meaning of 8.1.  are  generally presumed to exist when 
- the  aggregate  annual  turnover  of the  participating  undertaking  does  not  exceed 
ECU 200 million,  and 
- the  goods  or services  which  are  the  subject  of the  agreement  together  with  the 
participating undertakings' other goods or services which are considered by users to 
be equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use, do  not represent 
more than 5% of the total market for such goods or services in the area of the common 
market affected by the agreement, and the Hungarian market affected by the agreement, 
respective. 
1  OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p.  1. Regulation as last amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2367/90 (OJ L 219, 
14.8.1990, p. 5). 
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Association Council 
9  .1.  Whenever the procedures provided for in Articles 2 and 3 above do not lead to a mutually 
acceptable solution, as  well as in other cases explicitly mentioned in these Implementing 
Rules, an exchange of views shall take place in the Association Council at  the request 
of one Party within three months following the request. 
9.2.  Following  this  exchange  of  views,  or  after  expiry  of  the  period  referred  to  in 
paragraph 9  .I, the Association Council may  make appropriate recommendations for the 
settlement of these cases, without prejudice to  Article 62 (6)  of the Europe Agreement. 
In these recommendations, the Association Council may take into account eventual failure 
of the requested authority to  give its point of view to  the requesting authority  within 
the period referred to  in 9.1. 
9.3.  These procedures in the Association Council are  without prejudice to  any  action under 
the respective competition laws in  force in the territory of the Parties. 
Article 10 
Negative conflict of competence 
When both the Commission and the GVH consider that neither of them is competent to handle 
a case on the basis of their respective legislation, an exchange of views  shall take place on 
request in the Association Council The Community and Hungary  shall endeavour to  find a 
mutually acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved with 
the support of the Association Council, which may  make appropriate recommendations,  without 
prejudice to  Article 62 (6) of the Europe Agreement, and the  rights of individual Member 
States of the European Communities on the basis of their competition rules. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES  UNDER THE ECSC TREATY 
Article 11 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The provisions contained in Articles  I to  6 and 8 to  I 0 above shall also  apply  with respect 
to  the  coal and steel sector as referred to  in Protocol 2 to  the Europe Agreement. 
Article 12 
Administrative assistance (languages) 
The Commission and the GVH shall provide for practical arrangements for mutual assistance 
or any  other appropriate solution concerning in particular the question of translations. 
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3.  Europe Agreement establishing an association between 
the European Communities and their Member States, 
of the one part, and the Czech Republic, of the other part 
Decision of the Council and the Commission of 19 December 1994 
(94/910/ECSC, EC, Euratom) 
1 
Article 33 
The Member States and the Czech Republic shall progressively adjust any State monopolies 
of a commercial character so as to ensure that, by the end of the fifth year following the entry 
into force of this Agreement, no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of the Czech 
Republic. The Association Council will be informed about the measures adopted to implement 
this objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 64 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and the Czech Republic: 
(i)  all  agreements  between undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by one or more undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of the Czech Republic as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition by  favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to  this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
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157 3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2.  Until the implementing 
rules are adopted, practices incompatible with paragraph 1 shall be dealt with by the Contracting 
Parties on their respective territories according to  their respective legislations. This is  without 
prejudice to  paragraph 6. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by the Czech Republic shall be  assessed taking into account the fact that 
the  Czech  Republic  shall  be  regarded  as  an  area  identical  to  those  areas  of the 
Community  described in  Article 92(3)(a)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic Community. The Association Council shall, taking into account the economic 
situation of the Czech Republic, decide whether that period should be extended by 
further periods of five years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by  reporting 
annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by  providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to  products referred to in Chapters II and III of Title III: 
- the provisions of paragraph  1(iii) do not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1(i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic Community,  and  in  particular of those  established in Council 
Regulation No 26/62. 
6.  If  the Community or the Czech Republic considers that a particular practice is incompatible 
with the terms of paragraph  1,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in  paragraph 3,  or 
- in  the absence of such rules,  and if such  practice causes or threatens to  cause serious 
prejudice to  the  interest of the  other Party or material injury to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may  take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days following referral for  such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may,  where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto,  only be 
adopted in accordance with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
158 7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to  the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the Parties shall exchange information taking into  account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the subject of Protocol 2. 
[  ... ] 
Article 66 
With regard to  public undertakings, and undertakings to  which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that as  from  the third year following the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, in particular Article 90, and the principles of the concluding document 
of the April  1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
in particular entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision,  are  upheld. 
[ ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 69 
The Contracting Parties recognize that the major precondition for the Czech Republic's economic 
integration into the Community is  the approximation of the Czech Republic's existing and 
future  legislation to that of the Community. The Czech Republic shall endeavour to  ensure 
that its  legislation will be  gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
Article 70 
The approximation of laws  shall extend to  the  following  areas in particular:  customs law, 
company law,  banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace,  financial  services,  rules on competition, protection of health and 
life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
standards, nuclear law and regulation, transport and the environment. 
[  ... ] 
Article 124 
1.  In view of the fact that provisions equivalent to  those of certain parts of the  Agreement 
and thus  of the Europe Agreement signed between the Community and its Member States 
on 16 December 1991  and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic,  in particular those relating 
159 to  the movements of goods,  were put into effect since 1 March  1992 by  means of an Interim 
Agreement on trade and trade-related measures between the Community and  the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic signed on  16  December 1991,  as  amended by  the supplementary 
Protocols between the Community and each of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, 
the Parties agree that in such circumstances for the purposes of Title III, Articles 64, 66 and 
67  of the Agreement and Protocols  1 (with the exception of its Article 3),  2,  3,  4,  5 and 6, 
'date of entry into force of the Agreement'  shall mean: 
- 1 March  1992 in relation to  obligations taking effect on the date of entry  into force  of 
the Agreement, and 
- 1 January  1992 in relation to  obligations taking effect after the date of entry  into force 
by  reference to the date of entry into force. 
2.  In the case of entry into force of the Agreement after 1 January in any year, the provisions 
of Protocol 7 shall apply. 
[ ... ] 
160 [  ... ] 
PROTOCOL 2 ON  ECSC PRODUCTS TO THE EUROPE AGREEMENT 
('THE AGREEMENT') 
Article 8 
1.  The following are incompatible with the  proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and  the Czech Republic: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings, decisions 
by  associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of the  Slovak Republic  as  a whole or in  a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in any  form  whatsoever except derogations allowed pursuant to  the  ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any  practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, Article 
85  of the EEC Treaty, and the rules on State aids,  including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Contracting Parties recognize that during the first five years after the entry into force 
of the Agreement, and by derogation to paragraph  1(iii), the Czech Republic may exceptionally, 
as  regards ECSC steel products, grant public aid for restructuring purposes provided that: 
- it leads to  the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at the end 
of the restructuring period, and 
- the amount and intensity of such aid are  strictly limited to  what is  absolutely necessary 
in order to  restore such viability and are progressively reduced, 
- the restructuring programme is  linked to  a global rationalization and reduction of capacity 
in the Czech Republic. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the  area of public aid by a full and continuous 
exchange of information to  the other Party,  including amount, intensity and purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
6.  If  the Community or the Czech Republic considers that a particular practice is incompatible 
with the terms of paragraph  1 as  amended by  paragraph 4,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in  the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to cause prejudice 
to  the interests of the other Party or material injury to  its domestic industry, 
161 the affected Party may take appropriate measures if no  solution is found through consultation 
which shall last a maximum of 30 working days. Such consultation shall be held in  30 days 
from  the date the official request is introduced. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph  1  (iii),  such appropriate measures may 
only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid 
down by  the General Agreement on Tariffs  and  Trade  and  any  other relevant instrument 
negotiated under its auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
[  ... ] 
162 JOINT DECLARATION 
[ ... ] 
10.  Article 64 
The Parties shall not make improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to  prevent the 
disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
[  ... ] 
3.  Article 8( 4) of Protocol 2 on ECSC products 
It is  understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is  strictly 
limited to the particular case of the Czech Republic and does not impair the position of the 
Community in relation to  other cases nor prejudge international commitments. The possible 
derogation foreseen in paragraph 4 takes into account the particular difficulties of the Czech 
Republic in restructuring the steel sector and the fact that this process has been launched very 
recently. 
LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC TO THE 
COMMUNITY CONCERNING PROTOCOL 2 
The Government of the Czech Republic declares  that it will  not  invoke the provisions of 
Protocol 2  on ECSC products,  in  particular Article  8,  so  as  not  to  call into question the 
compatibility with this Protocol of the agreements made by the Community coal industry with 
the electricity companies and the steel industry to  secure the sale of Community coal. 
163 Implementing rules for the application of the competition provisions referred to in 
Article 64 (1)  (i),  (1)  (ii) and (2) of the Europe Agreement establishing an association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Czech Republic, of the other part, and in Article 8 (1)  (i), (1)  (ii) and (2)  of 
Protocol 2 on ECSC products to that agreement 
1 
Article 1 
General principle 
Cases relating to agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition as  well  as  to  abuses of a dominant position in the 
territories of the Community or of the Czech Republic as  a whole or in a substantial part 
thereof,  which may affect trade between the Community and the Czech Republic, shall be 
settled according to the principles contained in Article 64 (1)  and (2) of the Europe Agreement. 
For this purpose, these cases are dealt with by the Commission of the European Communities 
(DG IV) on the Community side and the Czech Ministry for Economic Competition (MEC) 
on the Czech side. 
The competences of the Commission and the MEC to deal with these cases shall flow  from 
the existing rules of the respective legislation of the Community and the Czech Republic, 
including where these rules are applied to undertakings located outside the respective territory. 
Both authorities shall settle the cases in accordance with their own substantive rules,  and having 
regard to the provisions set out below. The relevant substantive rules of the authorities are 
the competition rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community as well as the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  including  the  competition-related 
secondary legislation, for the Commission, and the Czech Competition Protection Act for the 
ME  C. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EC TREATY 
Article 2 
Competence of both competition authorities 
Cases under Article 64 of the Europe Agreement which may affect both the Community and 
the Czech market and which may  fall under the competence of both competition authorities 
shall be dealt with by the Commission and the MEC,  according to the rules under this Article. 
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164 2.1.  Notification 
2.1.1.  The competition authorities shall notify to  each other those  cases they  are dealing 
with, which, according to the general principle laid down in Article 1,  appear also 
to  fall  under the competence of the other authority. 
2.1.2.  This situation may  arise in particular in cases concerning activities that: 
- involve anticompetitive activities carried out in the other authority's territory, 
- are relevant to  enforcement activities of the other competition authority, 
- involve remedies that would require or prohibit conduct in the other authority's 
territory. 
2.1.3.  Notification under this Article shall include sufficient information to permit an initial 
evaluation  by  the  recipient  party  of any  effects  on  its  interests.  Copies  of the 
notifications shall be submitted on a regular basis to  the Association Council under 
the Europe Agreement. 
2.1.4.  Notification shall be made in advance, as soon as possible and at the latest at the stage 
of an  investigation  still far enough in  advance of the  adoption of a settlement or 
decision, so  as  to  facilitate comments or consultations and  to  enable the proceeding 
authority to  take  into  account the  other authority's views,  as  well  as  to  take such 
remedial action it may find  feasible under its own laws,  in order to deal with the case 
in question. 
2.2.  Consultancy and comity 
Whenever the Commission or the MEC considers that anticompetitive activities carried 
out on the territory of the other authority are substantially affecting important interests 
of the respective Party, it may request consultation with the other authority, or it may 
request that the other Party's competition authority initiate any appropriate procedures 
with a view to taking remedial action under its legislation on anticompetitive activities. 
This is  without prejudice to  any action under the requesting Party's competition law 
and does not hamper the full freedom of ultimate decision of the authority so addressed. 
2.3.  Finding of an  understanding 
The competition authority so addressed shall give full  and sympathetic consideration 
to  such views  and factual materials as  may  be provided by  the requesting authority 
and,  in  particular,  to  the  nature  of the  anticompetitive  activities  in  question,  the 
enterprises involved and the alleged harmful effects on the important interests of the 
requesting Party. 
Without prejudice to  any  of their rights or obligations, the  competition authorities 
involved  in  consultations  under  this  Article  shall  endeavour  to  find  a  mutually 
acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved. 
165 Article 3 
Competence of one competition authority only 
3.1.  Cases falling under the exclusive competence of one competition authority, in accordance 
with the principle laid down in Article 1,  and which may affect important interests of 
the other Party, shall be handled having regard to the provisions set out in Article 2, 
and taking account of the principles set out below. 
3.2.  In particular,  whenever one of the competition authorities undertakes an investigation 
nor proceeding in a case which is found to  affect important interests of the other Party, 
the proceeding authority shall notify this case to the other authority, without formal request 
by  the latter. 
Article 4 
Request for information 
Whenever the competition authority of a Party becomes aware of the fact that a case, falling 
also or only under the competence of the other authority, appears to affect important interests 
of the first Party, it may request information about this  case from the proceeding authority. 
The proceeding authority shall give sufficient information to the extent possible and at a stage 
of its proceedings far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision or settlement to enable 
the requesting authority's views to be taken into account. 
Article 5 
Secrecy and confidentiality of information 
5.1.  Having regard to Article 64 (7) of the Europe Agreement, neither competition authority 
is required to  provide information to  the other authority if disclosure of that information 
to  the  requesting  authority  is  prohibited  by  the  law  of the  authority  possessing  the 
information, or would be incompatible with important interests of the Party whose authority 
is in possession of the information. 
5.2.  Each authority agrees to  maintain,  to  the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of 
any  information provided to it in confidence by the other authority. 
Article 6 
Block exemptions 
In the application of Article 64 of the Europe Agreement as  provided for in Articles 2 and 
3  of these  implementing rules,  the competition authorities  shall ensure  that the  principles 
166 contained in  the block exemption regulations in  force  in the Community are  applied in full. 
The MEC shall be informed of any  procedure related to the adoption, abolition or modification 
of block exemptions by  the Community. 
Where such block exemption regulations encounter serious objections on the Czech side,  and 
having regard to the approximation of legislation as  provided for in the Europe Agreement, 
consultations shall take place in the Association Council, in accordance with the provisions 
contained in Article 9 of these implementing rules. 
The same principles shall apply regarding other significant changes in the Community or Czech 
competition policies. 
Article 7 
Merger control 
With  regard  to  mergers  which  fall  within  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of 
21  December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings and have significant 
impact on the Czech economy,  the MEC shall be entitled to  express its  view in  the course 
of the procedure taking into account the time  limits  as  provided for in the abovementioned 
Regulation. The Commission shall give due consideration to  that view,  without prejudice to 
any  action under the Parties'  respective competition laws. 
Article 8 
Activities of minor importance 
8.1.  Anticompetitive activities whose effects on trade between the Parties or on competition 
are negligible do  not fall  under Article 64 ( 1)  of the Europe Agreement and therefore 
are not to be treated under Articles 2 to  6 of these implementing rules. 
8.2.  Negligible effects within the meaning of paragraph 8 (1) are generally presumed to  exist 
when 
- the  aggregate  annual  turnover  of the  participating  undertakings  does  not  exceed 
ECU 200 million,  and 
- the  goods  or services  which  are  the  subject  of the  agreement  together  with  the 
participating undertakings'  other goods or services which are considered by  users to 
be equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use, do not represent 
more than 5% of the total market for such goods or services in the area of the common 
market affected by  the  agreement, and the Czech market affected by the  agreement, 
respectively. 
167 Article 9 
Association Council 
9  .1.  Whenever the procedures provided for in Articles 2 and 3 above do not lead to a mutually 
acceptable solution, as well as in other cases explicitly mentioned in these implementing 
rules,  an exchange of views shall take place in the Association Council at the request 
of one Party within three months,  following  the request. 
9.2.  Following  this  exchange  of  views,  or  after  expiry  of  the  period  referred  to  in 
paragraph 9.1,  the Association Council may  take appropriate recommendations for the 
settlement of these cases, without prejudice to  Article 64 (6) of the Europe Agreement. 
In these recommendations, the Association Council may take into account any failure 
of the requested authority to  give its  point of view to  the requesting authority within 
the period referred to  in paragraph 9  .1. 
9.3.  These procedures in the Association Council are without prejudice to  any  action under 
the respective competition laws in force  in the territory of the Parties. 
Article 10 
Negative conflict of competence 
When both the Commission and the MEC consider that neither of them is competent to handle 
a case on the basis of their respective legislation, an exchange of views  shall take place on 
request in the Association Council. The Community and the Czech Republic shall endeavour 
to find a mutually acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved 
with the support of the Association Council, which may make appropriate recommendations, 
without prejudice to  Article 64  (6)  of the Europe Agreement,  and the  rights  of individual 
Member States of the European Communities on the basis of their competition rules. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES  UNDER THE ECSC TREATY 
Article 11 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The provisions contained in  Articles  1 to 6 and 8 to  10 above shall also  apply  with respect 
to  the coal and steel sector as  referred to in Protocol 2 to  the Europe Agreement. 
Article 12 
Administrative assistance (languages) 
The Commission and the MEC  shall provide for practical arrangements for mutual assistance 
or any other appropriate solution concerning in particular the question of translations. 
168 4.  Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and the Slovak Republic, of the other part 
Decision of the Council and the  Commission of 19 December 1994 
(94/909/ECSC, EC, Euratom) 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 33 
The Member States and the Slovak Republic shall progressively adjust any State monopolies 
of a commercial character so as to ensure that,  by the end of the fifth year following the entry 
into force  of this Agreement, no  discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of the Slovak 
Republic. The Association Council will be informed about the measures adopted to implement 
this objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 64 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and the Slovak Republic: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of the Slovak Republic  as  a whole or in  a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid which distorts or threatens  to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any  practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the  application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
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169 3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and  2.  Until the implementing 
rules are adopted, practices incompatible with paragraph 1 shall be dealt with by the Contracting 
Parties on their respective territories according to  their respective legislations. This is  without 
prejudice to paragraph 6. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by the Slovak Republic shall be assessed taking into account the fact that 
the  Slovak Republic  shall  be  regarded  as  an  area  identical  to  those  areas  of the 
Community  described  in  Article 92(3)(a)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic Community. The Association Council shall, taking into account the economic 
situation of the Slovak Republic, decide whether that period should be extended by 
further periods of five  years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the  aid given 
and by  providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to  products referred to  in Chapters II  and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1(iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic Community,  and in particular of those  established in Council 
Regulation No 26/62. 
6.  If the Community or the Slovak Republic considers that a particular practice is incompatible 
with the terms of paragraph  1,  and:  ;. 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in paragraph 3,  or 
- in  the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens  to  cause serious 
prejudice  to  the  interest of the  other Party  or material injury to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its  services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph  1(iii),  such appropriate measures may, 
where  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  applies  thereto,  only  be  adopted  in 
accordance with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by  the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and any  other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices which 
are applicable between the Parties. 
170 7.  Notwithstanding any  provisions to  the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the Parties  shall exchange information taking into  account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the subject of Protocol 2. 
[  ... ] 
Article 66 
With regard to public undertakings, and undertakings to  which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that as  from  the  third year following the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, in particular Article 90,  and the principles of the concluding document 
of the April 1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
in particular entrepreneurs' freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 69 
The Contracting  Parties  recognize  that  the  major  precondition  for  the  Slovak  Republic's 
economic integration into the Community is  the approximation of Slovak Republic's existing 
and future legislation to that of the Community. The Slovak Republic shall endeavour to ensure 
that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
Article 70 
The approximation of laws  shall extend to the following  areas  in  particular:  customs law, 
company law,  banking law, company accounts and taxes,  intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace,  financial  services, rules on competition,  protection of health and 
life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation, technical rules and 
standards, nuclear law and regulation,  transport and the environment. 
[  ... ] 
Article 124 
1.  In view of the fact that provisions equivalent to  those of certain parts of the Agreement 
and thus  of the Europe Agreement signed between the Community and its Member States 
171 on  I6 December I99I and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, in particular those relating 
to the movements of goods,  were put into effect since  I March  I992 by means of an Interim 
Agreement on trade and trade-related measures between the Community  and  the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic signed on  I6 December  I99I, as  amended by  the supplementary 
Protocols between the Community and each of the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, 
the Parties agree that in such circumstances for the purposes of Title III, Articles 64, 66 and 
67  of the Agreement and Protocols  1 (with the exception of its Article 3),  2,  3,  4,  5 and 6, 
the term  'date of entry into force  of the Agreement'  shall mean: 
- I March  I992 in relation to  obligations taking effect on the date of entry into force of 
the Agreement, and 
- I January  1992 in relation to  obligations taking effect after the date of entry into force 
by  reference to  the date of entry into force. 
2.  In the case of entry into force of the Agreement after 1 January in any  year, the provisions 
of Protocol 7 shall apply. 
[ ... ] 
I72 [  ... ] 
PROTOCOL 2 ON ECSC PRODUCTS TO THE EUROPE AGREEMENT 
('THE AGREEMENT') 
Article 8 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so far 
as  they may  affect trade between the Community and the Slovak Republic: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings, decisions 
by  associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant position  in the  territories  of the 
Community or of the Slovak Republic as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in  any  form  whatsoever except derogations allowed pursuant to the ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, Article 
85  of the EEC Treaty, and the rules on State aids,  including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Contracting Parties recognize that during the first five years after the entry into force 
of the Agreement, and by derogation to paragraph 1(iii), the Slovak Republic may exceptionally, 
as  regards ECSC steel products, grant public aid for restructuring purposes provided that: 
- it leads to the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at the end 
of the restructuring period, and 
- the  amount and intensity of such aid are strictly limited to  what is absolutely  necessary 
in order to restore such viability and are progressively reduced, 
- the restructuring programme is linked to  a global rationalization and reduction of capacity 
in the Slovak Republic. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid by  a full  and continuous 
exchange of information to the other Party, including amount, intensity and  purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
173 6.  If  the Community or the Slovak Republic considers that a particular practice is incompatible 
with the terms of paragraph  1 as amended by paragraph 4,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause prejudice 
to the interests of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
the affected Party may take appropriate measures if no solution is found through consultation 
which shall last a maximum of 30 working days. Such consultation shall be held in 30 days 
from  the date the official request is introduced. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1(iii), such appropriate measures may 
only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid 
down by  the General  Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade and  any  other relevant instrument 
negotiated under its auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
[ ... ] 
174 JOINT DECLARATION 
[  ... ] 
10.  Article 64 
The Parties shall not make improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to  prevent the 
disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
[  ... ] 
3.  Article 8(4) of Protocol 2 on  ECSC products 
It is  understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is strictly 
limited to the particular case of the Slovak Republic and does not impair the position of the 
Community in relation to  other cases nor prejudge international commitments. The possible 
derogation foreseen in paragraph 4 takes into account the particular difficulties of the Slovak 
Republic in restructuring the steel sector and the fact that this process has been launched very 
recently. 
LETTER FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC TO THE 
COMMUNITY CONCERNING PROTOCOL 2 
The Government of the Slovak Republic declares that it will not invoke the provisions of 
Protocol 2  on ECSC products,  in particular Article  8,  so  as  not to  call into question  the 
compatibility with this Protocol of the agreements made by the Community coal industry with 
the electricity companies and the steel industry to  secure the sale of Community coal. 
175 Implementing rules for the application of the competition provisions referred to in 
Article 64 (1)  (i), (1)  (ii) and (2) of the Europe Agreement establishing an association 
between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and 
the Slovak Republic, of the other part, and in Article 8 (1)  (i), (1)  (ii) and (2)  of 
Protocol No  2 on ECSC products to that agreement 
1 
Article 1 
General principle 
Cases relating to  agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition as  well as  to  abuses of a dominant position in  the 
territories of the Community or of the Slovak Republic as  a whole or in a substantial part 
thereof,  which may affect trade between the Community and the Slovak Republic, shall be 
settled according to  the principles contained in Article 64 (1)  and  (2) of the Europe Agreement. 
For this purpose, these cases are dealt with by the Commission of the European Communities 
(DG IV) on the Community side and the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) 
on the Slovak side. 
The competences of the Commission and the AMO to deal with these cases shall flow  from 
the existing rules of the respective legislation of the Community and the Slovak Republic, 
including where these rules are applied to undertakings located outside the respective territory. 
Both authorities shall settle the cases in accordance with their own substantive rules, and  having 
regard to the provisions set out below. The relevant substantive rules of the authorities are 
the competition rules of the Treaty establishing the European Community as well as the Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community,  including  the  competition-related 
secondary legislation, for the Commission, and the Slovak Act on the Protection of Economic 
Competition for the AMO. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EC TREATY 
Article 2 
Competence of both competition authorities 
Cases under Article 64 of the Europe Agreement which may  affect both the Community and 
the Slovak market and which may fall under the competence of both competition authorities 
shall be dealt with by the Commission and the AMO, according to the rules under this Article. 
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176 2.1.  Notification 
2.1.1.  The competition authorities shall notify to  each other those cases  they  are  dealing 
with,  which,  according to the general principle laid down in Article  1,  appear also 
to  fall  under the competence of the other authority. 
2.1.2.  This situation may arise in particular in  cases concerning activities that: 
- involve anticompetitive activities carried out in the other authority's territory, 
- are relevant to  enforcement activities of the other competition authority, 
- involve remedies that would require or prohibit conduct in the  other authority's 
territory. 
2.1.3.  Notification under this Article shall include sufficient information to permit an initial 
evaluation  by  the  recipient  party  of any  effects  on  its  interests.  Copies  of the 
notifications shall be submitted on a regular basis to  the Association Council under 
the Europe Agreement. 
2.1.4.  Notification shall be made in advance, as soon as possible and at the latest at the stage 
of an  investigation still far  enough in  advance of the  adoption of a settlement or 
decision,  so as  to  facilitate comments or consultations and  to  enable the  proceeding 
authority  to  take into account the  other authority's views,  as  well  as  to  take such 
remedial action it may find feasible under its own laws, in order to deal with the case 
in question. 
2.2.  Consultation and comity 
Whenever the Commission or the AMO consider that anticompetitive activities carried 
out on the territory of the other authority are substantially affecting important interests 
of the respective Party, it may request consultation with the other authority, or it may 
request that the other Party's competition authority initiate any appropriate procedures 
with a view to taking remedial action under its legislation on anticompetitive activities. 
This is  without prejudice to  any  action under the  requesting Party's competition law 
and does not hamper the full freedom of ultimate decision of the authority so addressed. 
2.3.  Finding of an understanding 
The competition authority so addressed shall give full  and sympathetic consideration 
to  such views  and factual  materials as  may  be provided by  the requesting authority 
and,  in  particular,  to  the  nature  of the  anticompetitive  activities  in  question,  the 
enterprises involved and the alleged harmful effects on the important interests of the 
requesting Party. 
Without prejudice to  any  of their rights  or obligations, the competition authorities 
involved  in  consultations  under  this  Article  shall  endeavour  to  find  a  mutually 
acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved. 
177 Article 3 
Competence of one competition authority only 
3.1.  Cases falling under the exclusive competence of one competition authority, in accordance 
with the principle laid down in Article 1,  and which may affect important interests of 
the  other Party, shall be handled having regard to the provisions set out in Article 2, 
and taking account of the principles set out below. 
3.2.  In particular,  whenever one of the competition authorities undertakes an investigation 
or proceeding in a case which is  found  to  affect important interests of the other Party, 
the proceeding authority shall notify this case to the other authority, without formal request 
by the latter. 
Article 4 
Request for information 
Whenever the competition authority of a Party becomes aware of the fact that a case, falling 
also or only under the competence of the other authority, appears to  affect important interests 
of the first Party, it may request information about this case from the proceeding authority. 
The proceeding authority shall give sufficient information to the extent possible and at a stage 
of its proceedings far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision or settlement to enable 
the requesting authority's views to be taken into account. 
Article 5 
Secrecy and confidentiality of information 
5.1.  Having regard to Article 64 (7) of the Europe Agreement, neither competition authority 
is  required to provide information to the other authority if disclosure of that information 
to  the  requesting  authority  is  prohibited  by  the  law  of the  authority  possessing  the 
information, or would be incompatible with important interests of the party whose authority 
is  in possession of the information. 
5.2.  Each authority agrees to  maintain, to  the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of 
any  information provided to  it in confidence by the other authority. 
Article 6 
Block exemptions 
In the application of Article 64 of the Europe Agreement as  provided for in Articles 2 and 
3 of these implementing Rules,  the  competition authorities shall ensure that the  principles 
178 contained in the block exemption Regulations in force in the Community are applied in  full. 
The AMO shall be informed of any  procedure related to  the adoption,  abolition or modification 
of block exemptions by the Community. 
Where such block exemption Regulations encounter serious objections on the Slovak side, 
and having regard to  the approximation of legislation as  provided for in the Europe Agreement, 
consultations shall take place in the Association Council, in accordance with the provisions 
contained in Article 9 of these Implementing Rules. 
The same principles shall apply regarding other significant changes in the Community or Slovak 
competition policies. 
Article 7 
Merger control 
With  regard  to  mergers  which  fall  within  Council  Regulation  (EEC)  No  4064/89  of 
21  December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings and have significant 
impact on the Slovak economy, the AMO shall be entitled to express its views in the course 
of the procedure taking into account the time limits as  provided for  in the aforementioned 
Regulation.  The Commission shall give due consideration to  that view,  without prejudice to 
any action under the Parties' respective competition laws. 
Article 8 
Activities of minor importance 
8.1.  Anticompetitive activities whose effects on trade between the Parties or on competition 
are negligible do  not fall  under Article 64 (1) of the Europe Agreement and  therefore 
are not to be treated under the Articles 2 to  6 of these Implementing Rules. 
8.2.  Negligible effects within the meaning of paragraph 8 (1) are generally presumed to exist 
when: 
- the  aggregate  annual  turnover  of the  participating  undertakings  does  not  exceed 
ECU 200 million,  and 
- the  goods  or  services  which  are  the  subject  of the  agreement  together  with  the 
participating undertakings' other goods or services which are considered by users to 
be equivalent in view of their characteristics, price and intended use, do not represent 
more than 5% of the total market for such goods or services in the area of the common 
market affected by the agreement, and the Slovak market affected by  the agreement, 
respectively. 
179 Article 9 
Association Council 
9  .1.  Whenever the procedures provided for in Articles 2 and 3 above do not lead to a mutually 
acceptable solution, as well as in other cases explicitly mentioned in  these Implementing 
Rules,  an  exchange of views shall take place in  the  Association Council at the request 
of one Party within three months following  the request. 
9.2.  Following  this  exchange  of  views,. or  after  expiry  of  the  period  referred  to  in 
paragraph 9.1, the Association Council may make appropriate recommendations for the 
settlement of these cases, without prejudice to Article 64 (6) of the Europe Agreement. 
In these recommendations,  the Association Council may  take into account any failure 
of the requested authority  to  give its point of view  to  the requesting authority within 
the period referred to in paragraph 9.1. 
9.3.  These procedures in  the Association Council are  without prejudice to any  action under 
the respective competition laws in force  in the territory of the Parties. 
Article 10 
Negative conflict of competence 
When both the Commission and the AMO consider that neither of them is competent to handle 
a case on the basis of their respective legislation, an exchange of views shall take place on 
request in the Association Council. The Community and the Slovak Republic shall endeavour 
to find a mutually acceptable solution in the light of the respective important interests involved 
with the support of the Association Council, which may make appropriate recommendations, 
without prejudice to  Article 64  (6)  of the Europe Agreement,  and  the  rights  of individual 
Member States of the European Communities on the basis of their competition rules. 
ECONOMIC ACTIVffiES UNDER THE ECSC TREATY 
Article 11 
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
The provisions contained in Articles  1 to  6 and  8 to  10 above shall also  apply  with  respect 
to  the coal and  steel sector as  referred to in Protocol 2 to the Europe Agreement. 
Article 12 
Administrative assistance (languages) 
The Commission and the AMO  shall provide for practical arrangements for mutual assistance 
or any  other appropriate solution concerning in particular the question of translations. 
180 5.  Europe Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic 
of Bulgaria, of the other part 
Decision of the  Council and the  Commission of 19 December 1994 
(94/908/ECSC, EC, Euratom) 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 33 
The  Member  States  and  Bulgaria  shall  progressively  adjust  any  State  monopolies  of a 
commercial character so  as  to  ensure that,  by  the end of the fifth  year following the entry 
into force  of this Agreement,  no  discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of Bulgaria. 
The Association  Council  will  be informed  about the  measures  adopted  to  implement this 
objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 64 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, in so far 
as  they may  affect trade between the Community and Bulgaria: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Bulgaria as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid which distorts  or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
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181 3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provision of paragraph  1  (iii),  the Parties recognize 
that during the first five  years after the entry into force of the Agreement, any public 
aid granted by  Bulgaria shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Bulgaria 
shall be regarded as  an area identical to  those areas of the Community described in 
Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The 
Association Council shall, taking into account the economic situation of Bulgaria, decide 
whether that period should be extended by  further periods of five  years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the  aid given 
and by  providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to products referred to  in  Chapters II and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1(iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic Community  and  in  particular of those  established  in  Council 
Regulation No 26/62. 
6.  If the Community or Bulgaria considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph  1,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in  paragraph 3,  or 
- in  the  absence of such rules,  and if such  practice causes or threatens to  cause serious 
prejudice to  the  interest of the  other Party or material  injury to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days following referral for such consultation. 
In  the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may,  where the  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the  Parties shall exchange information taking into account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
182 8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the subject of Protocol 2. 
[ ... ] 
Article 66 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that, as from the third year from the date 
of entry into force of the Agreement,  the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, notably Article 90, and the principles of the concluding document of 
the April 1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (notably 
entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision) are upheld. 
[ ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 69 
The Parties recognize that an important condition for  Bulgaria's economic integration into 
the Community is  the approximation of Bulgaria's existing and future legislation to  that of 
the Community. Bulgaria shall endeavour to ensure that its  legislation will be gradually made 
compatible with that of the Community. 
Article 70 
The approximation of laws shall extend to  the following  areas in  particular:  customs law, 
company law,  banking law, company accounts and taxes,  intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace, financial  services, rules on competition,  protection of health and 
life of humans,  animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation,  technical rules and 
standards, nuclear law  and regulation, transport and the environment. 
[ ... ] 
Article 125 
1.  In the event that, pending the completion of the  procedures necessary for the entry  into 
force of this Agreement, the provisions of certain parts of this Agreement, in particular those 
relating  to  the  movement of goods,  are  put  into  effect  in  1993  by  means  of an  Interim 
Agreement between the Community and Bulgaria, the Contracting Parties agree that,  in such 
183 circumstances for the purposes of Title III, Articles 64 and 67 of this Agreement and Protocols 
1,  2, 3, 4,  5, 6 and 7 hereto, the terms 'date of entry into force of this Agreement'  shall mean: 
- the date of entry into force of the Interim Agreement in relation to obligations taking effect 
on that date,  and 
- 1 January  1993  in relation to obligations taking effect after the date of entry into force 
by reference to the date of entry into force. 
2.  In the case of entry into force  after 1 January, the provisions of Protocol 7 shall apply. 
[  ... ] 
184 PROTOCOL 2 ON ECSC PRODUCTS 
[  ... ] 
Article 9 
1.  The following are incompatible with the  proper functioning of the  Agreement, in so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and Bulgaria: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings,  decisions 
by  associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Bulgaria as a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in any  form  whatsoever except derogations allowed pursuant to  the ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC, Articles 
85  and  86 of the Treaty establishing the EEC and the rules on State aids,  including secondary 
legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Contracting Parties recognize that during the first five  years  after the entry into force 
of the Agreement,  and by derogation to paragraph 1(iii), Bulgaria may  exceptionally,  as regards 
ECSC steel products, grant public aid for restructuring purposes, provided that: 
- it leads to  the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at the end 
of the restructuring period, and 
- the  amount and intensity of such aid are  strictly limited to  what is  absolutely necessary 
in order to  restore such viability  and are progressively reduced, 
- the restructuring programme is linked to  a global rationalization and reduction of overall 
production capacity in Bulgaria. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public  aid  by  a full  and  continuous 
exchange of information to  the other Party, including amount, intensity and  purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
6.  If the  Community or Bulgaria considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph 1 as  amended by paragraph 4 of this Article,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in  the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to cause prejudice 
to  the interests of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
185 the affected Party may take appropriate measures if no solution is found within 30 days of 
the day the official request was introduced. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article, such appropriate 
measures may only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the 
conditions laid down by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant 
instrument negotiated under its auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
[  ... ] 
186 JOINT DECLARATIONS 
[  ... ] 
15.  Article 64 
The Parties shall not make an improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to  prevent 
the disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
[  ... ] 
19.  Articles 5 and 9(4) of Protocol 2 to  the Agreement 
The Community  and  Bulgaria declare  that  Articles  5  and  9(4)  of Protocol  2  cannot  be 
considered as  a precedent in Bulgaria's negotiations for accession to  the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade or to the Multilateral Trade Organization which could emerge from the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. 
[ ... ] 
UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS BY mE COMMUNITY 
[  ... ] 
4.  Article 9(1)(iii) and (4)  of  Protocol 2 to  the Agreement 
The Community confirms its understanding that the references to public aids in Article 9(1 )(iii) 
and (4) imply the exclusion of transport subsidies acting as  direct or indirect subsidies to the 
steel industry. 
5.  Article 9(  4) of Protocol 2 to  the  Agreement 
It is  understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is  strictly 
limited to the particular case of Bulgaria and does not impair the position of the Community 
in relation to  other cases nor prejudge international commitments. The possible derogation 
foreseen in paragraph 4 takes into account the particular difficulties of Bulgaria in restructuring 
the steel sector and the fact that this  process has been launched very  recently. 
[  ... ] 
187 Letter from the Bulgarian Government to  the Community 
The Government of Bulgaria declares that it will not invoke the provisions of Protocol 2 on 
ECSC products, in  particular Article 9,  so  as  not to call into question the compatibility with 
this Protocol of the agreements made by  the Community coal industry  with  the electricity 
companies and the steel industry to  secure the sale of Community coal. 
[  ... ] 
188 6.  Europe Agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, 
and Romania, of the other part 
Decision of the Council and the  Commission of 19  December 1994 
(94/907/ECSC, EC,  Euratom) 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 33 
The  Member  States  and  Romania  shall  progressively  adjust  any  State  monopolies  of a 
commercial character so as  to  ensure that,  by  the end of the fifth  year following  the entry 
into force  of this Agreement,  no  discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of Romania. 
The Association Council  will  be  informed  about the  measures  adopted  to  implement this 
objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 64 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, in so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and Romania: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Romania as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
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189 3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of the Agreement,  any public 
aid granted by Romania shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Romania 
shall be regarded as  an area identical to  those areas of the Community described in 
Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. The 
Association Council shall,  taking into account the economic situation of Romania, 
decide whether that period should be extended by  further periods of five  years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by  providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to  products referred to in Chapters II  and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1  (iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the  European Economic  Community  and  in particular of those  established  in  Council 
Regulation No 26/62. 
6.  If the Community or Romania considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph  1,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the  absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause serious 
prejudice to  the  interest of the  other Party or material  injury to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its  services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Association Council or after 
30 working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may, where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to  the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the  Parties shall exchange information taking  into account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
190 8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the  subject of Protocol 2. 
[  ... ] 
Article 66 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Association Council shall ensure that, as from the third year from the date 
of entry into force of the  Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, notably Article 90,  and the principles of the concluding document of 
the April  1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (notably 
entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision) are applied in the  operation of this Agreement. 
[  ... ] 
APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 69 
The Parties recognize that an important condition for Romania's economic integration into 
the Community is  the approximation of Romania's existing and future  legislation to  that of 
the Community. Romania shall endeavour to ensure that its legislation will be gradually made 
compatible with that of the Community. 
Article 70 
The approximation of laws shall extend to  the following  areas in particular:  customs law, 
company law,  banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property, protection of 
workers at the workplace, social security, financial  services, rules on competition, protection 
of health and life of humans,  animals and plants, consumer protection, indirect taxation,  technical 
rules and standards, nuclear law and regulation, transport and the environment. 
[ ... ] 
Article 126 
1.  In the event that, pending the completion of the procedures necessary for the entry  into 
force of this Agreement, the provisions of certain parts of this Agreement, in particular those 
relating  to  the  movement of goods,  are  put  into  effect in  1993  by  means  of an  Interim 
Agreement between the Community and Romania, the Contracting Parties agree that,  in  such 
191 circumstances for the purposes of Title III, Articles 64 and 67 of this Agreement and Protocols 
1,  2,  3, 4,  5,  6 and 7 hereto, the terms  'date of entry into force of this Agreement'  shall mean: 
- the date of entry into force of the Interim Agreement in relation to obligations taking effect 
on that date,  and 
- 1 January  1993  in relation to obligations taking effect after the date of entry into force 
by  reference to the date of entry into force. 
2.  In the case of entry into force  after  1 January, the provisions of Protocol 7 shall apply. 
[  ... ] 
192 PROTOCOL 2 ON ECSC PRODUCTS 
[  ... ] 
Article 9 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the  proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they  may  affect trade between the Community  and Romania: 
(i)  all  agreements of cooperative or concentrative nature between undertakings,  decisions 
by  associations of undertakings and concerted practices between undertakings which have 
as  their object or effect the  prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Romania as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  public aid in any  form  whatsoever except derogations allowed pursuant to the  ECSC 
Treaty. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 65  and  66 of the Treaty establishing the ECSC and 
the rules on State aids,  including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Association Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of the Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Contracting Parties recognize that during the first five  years after the entry into force 
of the  Agreement,  and  by  derogation  to  paragraph  1  (iii)  of this  Article,  Romania  may 
exceptionally, as  regards ECSC  steel products, grant public aid for  restructuring purposes, 
provided that: 
- it leads to  the viability of the benefiting firms under normal market conditions at the end 
of the  restructuring period,  and 
- the amount and intensity of such aid  are  strictly limited to  what is absolutely  necessary 
in order to  restore such viability and are progressively reduced, 
- the restructuring programme is linked to a global rationalization and reduction of capacity 
in Romania. 
5.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid by a full  and  continuous 
exchange of information to  the other Party, including amount, intensity and purpose of the 
aid and detailed restructuring plan. 
6.  If the Community or Romania considers that a particular practice is incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph 1 as  amended by  paragraph 4 of this  Article, and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules  referred to  in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and  if such practice causes or threatens to  cause prejudice 
to the interests of the other Party or material injury to  its domestic industry, 
193 the affected Party may  take appropriate measures if no solution is found within 30 days through 
consultation. Such consultation shall be held in 30 days. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may only cover measures adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the 
conditions laid down by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and  any  other relevant 
instrument negotiated under its auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
[  ... ] 
194 JOINT DECLARATION 
[ ... ] 
Article 64 
The Parties shall not make an improper use of provisions on professional secrecy to  prevent 
the disclosure of information in the field of competition. 
[ ... ] 
DECLARATIONS BY THE COMMUNITY 
PROTOCOL 2 ON ECSC PRODUCTS 
Article 9,  paragraphs l(iii) and 4 of Protocol 2 on  ECSC products 
The Community confirms its understanding that the references to  public aids referred to  in 
Article 9,  paragraphs  l(iii) and 4 are exclusively for  the purposes of restructuring as  defined, 
and stresses that transport subsidies acting as direct or indirect subsidies to  the steel industry 
are excluded. 
Article 9(4) of Protocol 2 to  ECSC products 
It is  understood that the possibility of an exceptional extension of the five-year period is strictly 
limited to  the particular case of Romania and does not impair the position of the  Community 
in relation to other cases nor prejudge international commitments. The possible derogation 
foreseen in paragraph 4 takes into account the particular difficulties of Romania in restructuring 
the  steel sector and the fact that this  process has been launched very recently. 
DECLARATION BY THE COMMUNITY 
The Community  takes  note  of the  fact  that  the  Romanian  authorities  will  not invoke  the 
provisions of Protocol 2 on ECSC products,  in particular Article 9,  so  as  not to call into 
question the compatibility with this Protocol of the  agreements made by the Community coal 
industry with the electricity companies and the steel industry to secure the sale of Community 
coal. 
[ ... ] 
195 7.  Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part 
Council and Commission decision of 25 November 1996 
(961752/Euratom, ECSC, EC) 
1 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
PAYMENTS, COMPETITION AND  OTHER ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
[  ... ] 
Article 33 (EA  65) 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, in  so far 
as  they  may  affect trade between the Community and Slovenia: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Slovenia as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or certain products. 
2.  Any practices contrary to  this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the  application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community. 
3.  The Cooperation Council shall, within three years of the entry into force of this  Agreement, 
adopt the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2.  Until the implementing 
rules are adopted, practices incompatible with paragraph 1 shall be dealt with  by  the Parties 
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197 on their respective territories according to their respective legislation. This shall be without 
prejudice to paragraph 6. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1 (iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first four years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by Slovenia shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Slovenia 
shall be regarded as an area identical to  those areas of the Community described in 
Article 92 (3) (a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Cooperation 
Council shall, taking into account the economic situation of Slovenia, decide whether 
that period should be extended by further periods of four years. 
(b)  Each party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia by reporting 
annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by providing, on request, information on aid schemes. On request by one Party, 
the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public aid. 
5.  With regard to products referred to in Chapters II and III of Title II 
- paragraph 1 (iii) shall not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  must  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and in particular of those established in Council Regulation 
No 26/1962. 
6.  If  the Community or Slovenia considers that a particular practice is incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph 1,  and: 
- is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3, or 
- in the absence of such rules, and if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious injury 
to the interests of the other Party or material injury to  its domestic industry, including 
its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Cooperation Council or after 
30 working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1 (iii),  such appropriate measures may, 
where the WTO Agreement applies thereto, only be adopted in accordance with the procedures. 
and under the conditions laid down thereby and by any other relevant instrument negotiated 
under its auspices which are applicable between the Parties. 
7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary adopted in accordance with paragraph 3, 
the Parties shall exchange information taking into account the limitations imposed by the 
requirements of professional and business confidentiality. 
8.  This Article shall not apply to the products covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community which are the subject of Protocol 2. 
198 Article 34 (EA  66) 
1.  The  Parties  shall  endeavour  wherever  possible  to  avoid  the  imposition  of restrictive 
measures, including measures relating to  imports for balance of payments purposes.  A Party 
adopting such measures shall present as  soon as  possible to the other Party a timetable for 
their removal. 
2.  Where one or more Member States of the Community or Slovenia is  in serious balance 
of payments difficulties,  or under imminent threat thereof,  the Community or Slovenia, as 
the  case may be, may, in accordance with the conditions established under the WTO Agreement, 
adopt restrictive measures, including measures relating to  imports,  which shall be of limited 
duration and may  not go beyond what is strictly necessary to  remedy the balance of payments 
situation.  The Community  or Slovenia,  as  the  case  may  be,  shall  inform  the  other Party 
forthwith. 
3.  Any restrictive measures shall not apply  to  transfers related to  investment and in  particular 
to  the  repatriation  of amounts  invested  or reinvested  or any  kind  of revenues  stemming 
therefrom. 
Article 35 (EA  67) 
With regard to public undertakings, and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Cooperation Council shall ensure that as from the third year following the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, in particular Article 90 thereof,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
199 8.  Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the 
European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Latvia, of the other part 
Council Decision of 19 December 1994 
(94/976/EC) I 
[ ... ] 
Article 26 
The Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to  as  'the Member States') 
and Latvia shall progressively adjust any  State monopolies of a commercial character so as 
to  ensure that, by the end of the fifth year following the entry into force of this Agreement, 
no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of the Member States and of Latvia. The Joint Committee will be informed 
about the measures adopted to implement this objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 32 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and Latvia: 
(i)  all  agreements  between undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by one or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in the  territories  of the 
Community or of Latvia as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid,  which distorts or threatens to distort competition by  favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85, 86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
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201 Community or, for products covered by the ECSC Treaty, on the basis of corresponding rules 
of the ECSC Treaty including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Joint Committee shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
Until these rules are adopted, the provisions of this Agreement on interpretation and application 
of Articles VI,  XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade shall be applied 
as the rules for the implementation of paragraph 1  (iii) and related parts of paragraph 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by Latvia shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Latvia shall 
be regarded as an area identical to those areas of the Community described in Article 
92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Joint Committee 
shall, taking into account the economic situation of Latvia, decide whether that period 
should be extended by further periods of five years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid, inter alia  by reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to products referred to  in Chapters II and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1(iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and in particular of those established in Council Regulation No 
26. 
6.  If the Community or Latvia considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph 1,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to cause serious 
prejudice to the interests of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Joint Committee or after 30 
working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article,  such appropriate 
measures may,  where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
202 7.  Notwithstanding any  provisions to the contrary adopted in conformity with paragraph 3, 
the Parties shall exchange information taking into account the  limitations imposed by the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
[  ... ] 
Article 34 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Joint Committee shall ensure that,  as from  the fourth  year following  the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, notably Article 90, and the relevant CSCE principles, in particular entrepreneurs' 
freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[ ... ] 
Article 36 
1.  The Parties recognize that an important condition for the establishment of free trade between 
Latvia  and  the  Community  and  the  further  economic  integration  of the  former  into  the 
Community  is  the approximation of Latvia's existing and future  legislation to  that of the 
Community. Latvia shall endeavour to  ensure that its trade and trade-related legislation will 
be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
2.  The approximation of laws shall extend to  trade-related matters, in particular dumping, 
rules on competition, customs legislation, statistics, technical rules and standards. 
3.  The Community shall provide Latvia with technical assistance for the implementation of 
these measures,  which may include inter alia: 
- the exchange of experts, 
- the provision of early information especially on relevant legislation, 
- organization of seminars, 
- training activities, 
- aid for the translation of legislation in the relevant sectors, 
- aid for improving customs procedures and statistics, 
- aid for trade-related legislation in the context of approximation of Latvia's legislation to 
European Union laws. 
203 9.  Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between the 
European Community, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and 
the Republic of Lithuania, of the other part 
Council Decision of 19 December 1994 
(94/978/EC) I 
[  ... ] 
Article 26 
The Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to as  'the Member States') 
and Lithuania shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character so 
as to ensure that, by the end of the fifth year following the entry into force of this Agreement, 
no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of the Member States and of Lithuania The Joint Committee will be informed 
about the measures adopted to implement this objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 33 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement, in so far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and Lithuania: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by one or more  undertakings  of a  dominant position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Lithuania as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid,  which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
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205 Community or, for products covered by the ECSC Treaty, on the basis of corresponding rules 
of the ECSC Treaty including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Joint Committee shall, within three years of the entry into force of this Agreement, 
adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
Until these rules are adopted, the provisions of this Agreement on interpretation and application 
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade shall be applied 
as  the rules for the implementation of paragraph 1  (iii) and related parts of paragraph 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any  public 
aid granted by Lithuania shall be assessed taking into account the fact that Lithuania 
shall be regarded as  an area identical to those areas of the Community described in 
Article  92(3)(a)  of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community.  The  Joint 
Committee shall,  taking  into  account  the  economic  situation  of Lithuania,  decide 
whether that period should be extended by further periods of five years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by reporting 
annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid given 
and by providing, upon request,  information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to products referred to in Chapters II and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1(iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1  (i)  should  be assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and in particular of those established in Council Regulation No 
26. 
6.  If the Community or Lithuania considers that a particular practice is  incompatible with 
the terms of paragraph 1,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to  in paragraph 3,  or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause serious 
prejudice to  the interests of the other Party or material injury to its  domestic industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Joint Committee or after 30 
working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this Article, such appropriate 
measures may, where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are applicable between the Parties. 
206 7.  Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary adopted in conformity with paragraph 3, 
the Parties  shall exchange information taking  into  account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
[  ... ] 
Article 35 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Joint Committee shall ensure that,  as  from  the fourth  year following  the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, notably Article 90,  and the principles of the concluding document of the  April 
1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), notably 
entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
Article 37 
1.  The Parties recognize that an important condition for the establishment of free trade between 
Lithuania and the Community and the further economic integration of the former into the 
Community is the approximation of Lithuania's existing and future  legislation to  that of the 
Community.  Lithuania shall endeavour to  ensure that its trade and trade-related legislation 
will be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
2.  The approximation of laws shall extend to the following  areas,  in particular dumping, 
rules on competition, customs legislation, statistics,  technical rules and standards. 
3.  The Community shall provide Lithuania with technical assistance for the implementation 
of these measures, which may include inter alia: 
- the exchange of experts, 
- the provision of early information especially on relevant legislation, 
- organization of seminars, 
- training activities, 
- aid for the translation of Community legislation in the relevant sectors. 
[  ... ] 
207 10.  Agreement on free trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Estonia, of the other part 
Council Decision of 19 December 1994 
(94/97 4/EC) I 
[  ... ] 
Article 25 
The Member States of the European Union (hereinafter referred to  as  'the Member States') 
and Estonia shall progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character so  as 
to  ensure that, by the end of the fifth year following the entry into force  of this  Agreement, 
no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of the Member States and of Estonia. The Joint Committee will be informed 
about the measures adopted to  implement this objective. 
[  ... ] 
Article 32 
1.  The following are incompatible with  the  proper functioning of the Agreement, in so  far 
as  they  may affect trade between the Community and Estonia: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or of Estonia as  a whole or in  a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring certain 
undertakings or the  production of certain goods. 
2.  Any practices contrary to  this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from 
the application of the  rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
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209 Community or, for products covered by the ECSC Treaty, on the basis of corresponding rules 
of the ECSC Treaty including secondary legislation. 
3.  The Joint Committee shall,  within three years of the entry into force  of this Agreement, 
adopt by  decision the necessary rules for the implementation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
Until these rules are adopted, the provisions of this Agreement on interpretation and application 
of Articles VI,  XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade shall be applied 
as  the rules for the implementation of paragraph 1  (iii) and related parts of paragraph 2. 
4.  (a)  For the purposes of applying the provisions of paragraph 1(iii), the Parties recognize 
that during the first five  years after the entry into force of this Agreement, any public 
aid granted by Estonia shall be assessed taking into  account the fact  that Estonia shall 
be regarded as an area identical to those areas of the Community described in Article 
92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The Joint Committee 
shall, taking into account the economic situation of Estonia, decide whether that period 
should be extended by further periods of three years. 
(b)  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by  reporting 
annually to  the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the  aid given 
and by  providing, upon request, information on aid schemes.  Upon request by  one 
Party, the other Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public 
aid. 
5.  With regard to  products referred to  in Chapters II  and III of Title III: 
- the provision of paragraph 1(iii) does not apply, 
- any  practices  contrary  to  paragraph  1(i)  should  be  assessed  according  to  the  criteria 
established by the Community on the basis of Articles 42 and 43  of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and in particular of those established in Council Regulation No 
26. 
6.  If  the Community or Estonia considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph  1,  and: 
- is  not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in paragraph 3, or 
- in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens  to  cause serious 
prejudice  to  the  interest of the  other Party  or material injury  to  its  domestic  industry, 
including its services industry, 
it may  take appropriate measures after consultation within the Joint Committee or after 30 
working days following referral for such consultation. 
In the case of practices incompatible with paragraph 1  (iii) of this  Article,  such appropriate 
measures may,  where the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade applies thereto, only be 
adopted in conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by  the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and any other relevant instrument negotiated under its auspices 
which are  applicable between the Parties. 
210 7.  Notwithstanding any  provisions to the contrary adopted in conformity with paragraph 3, 
the  Parties  shall exchange information taking  into  account the  limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
[  ... ] 
Article 34 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Joint Committee shall ensure that as from the fourth year following the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European 
Community,  notably Article 90,  and  the  principles of the concluding document of the April 
1990  Bonn  meeting  of the  Conference  on  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  notably 
entrepreneurs'  freedom of decision,  are upheld. 
[  ... ] 
Article 36 
1.  The Parties recognize that an important condition for the establishment of free trade between 
Estonia  and  the  Community  and  the  further  economic  integration  of the  former  into  the 
Community is  the approximation of Estonia's existing and  future  legislation to  that of the 
Community. Estonia shall endeavour to ensure that its trade and trade-related legislation will 
be gradually made compatible with that of the Community. 
2.  The  approximation of laws shall extend to  the following  areas  in  particular:  dumping, 
rules on competition, customs legislation, statistics, technical rules  and  standards. 
3.  The Community shall provide Estonia with technical assistance for the implementation 
of these measures,  which may include inter alia: 
- the exchange of experts, 
- the provision of early information especially on relevant legislation, 
- organization of seminars, 
- training activities, 
- aid for the translation of Community legislation in the relevant sectors. 
[ ... ] 
211 11. Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
one part, and the Russian Federation, of the other part 
Council decision of 17 July 1995 
(95/414/EC) I 2 
[  ... ] 
Article 11 
[  ... ] 
In respect of anti-dumping or subsidy investigations, each Party agrees to examine submissions 
by the other Party and to inform the interested parties concerned of the essential facts  and 
considerations on the basis of which a final decision is to be made. Before definitive anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are imposed, the Parties shall do their utmost to bring about 
a constructive solution to the problem. 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
PAYMENTS, COMPETffiON AND OTHER ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
[  ... ] 
Article 17 
Competition 
1.  The Parties agree to work to remedy or remove through the application of their competition 
laws or otherwise, restrictions on competition by enterprises or caused by State intervention 
in so far as  they may affect trade between the Community and Russia. 
1  OJ L 247, 13.10.1995, p.  1. 
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213 2.  In order to  attain the objectives mentioned in paragraph  1: 
2.1.  The  Parties,  within  their  respective  competences,  shall  ensure  enforcement  of laws 
addressing restrictions on competition by enterprises within their jurisdiction. 
2.2.  The Parties shall refrain from granting export aids favouring  certain undertakings or the 
production of products other than primary products. The Parties also declare their readiness, 
as from the third year from the date of entry into force of the Agreement on Partnership 
and Cooperation, to establish for other aids  which distort or threaten to  distort competition 
in  so  far  as  they  affect  trade  between  the  Community  and  Russia,  strict disciplines, 
including  the  outright  prohibition  of certain  aids.  These  categories  of aids  and  the 
disciplines applicable to each shall be defined jointly within a period of three years after 
entry into force of the  Agreement on Partnership and  Cooperation. 
Upon request by one Party,  the other Party shall provide information on its aid schemes 
or in particular individual cases of State aid. 
2.3.  During a transitional period expiring five years after the entry into force  of the Agreement 
on Partnership and Cooperation, Russia may take measures inconsistent with paragraph 2.2, 
second  sentence,  provided  that  these  measures  are  introduced  and  applied  in  the 
circumstances referred to  in Annex Ill. 
2.4.  In the  case of State  monopolies  of a commercial character,  the  Parties  declare  their 
readiness, as from the third year from  the date of entry into force of the Agreement on 
Partnership and Cooperation, to ensure that there is no discrimination between nationals 
and companies of the Parties regarding the conditions under which goods are procured 
or marketed. 
In the case of public undertakings or undertakings to  which Member States or Russia 
grant exclusive rights, the Parties declare their readiness,  as  from  the third year from 
the date of entry into force of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, to ensure 
that there is neither enacted nor maintained any measure distorting trade between the 
Community and Russia to  an  extent contrary  to  the Parties'  respective interests. This 
provision shall not obstruct the performance, in law or fact,  of the particular tasks assigned 
to  such undertakings. 
2.5.  The period defined in paragraphs 2.2 and 2.4 may be extended by agreement of the Parties. 
3.  Consultations may take place within the Joint Committee at the request of the Community 
or Russia on the restrictions or distortions of competition referred to  in  paragraphs  1 
and 2 and on the enforcement of their competition rules, subject to  limitations imposed 
by  laws  regarding  disclosure  of information,  confidentiality  and  business  secrecy. 
Consultations may also comprise questions on the interpretation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Party with experience in applying competition rules shall give full consideration to 
providing the other Party, upon request and within available resources, technical assistance 
for the development and  implementation of competition rules. 
214 5.  The above provisions in no way affect a Party's rights to apply adequate measures, notably 
those referred to  in Article  11,  in order to  address distortions of trade. 
[  ... ] 
Article 31 
1.  This  Agreement shall  remain  in  force  until  the  entry  into  force  of the  Agreement on 
Partnership and Cooperation signed on 24 June  1994. 
[ ... ] 
215 ANNEX II 
DEROGATIONS FROM ARTICLE 8 (QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS) 
1.  Exceptional measures which derogate from the provisions of Article 8 may be taken by 
Russia in the form of quantitative restrictions on a non-discriminatory basis as  provided 
for in Article XIII of the GAIT. Such measures can only be taken after the end of the 
first calendar year following signature of the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation. 
2.  Those measures may only be  taken in  the circumstances mentioned in Annex III. 
[  ... ] 
216 ANNEX Ill 
TRANSITIONAL PERIOD FOR PROVISIONS ON COMPETITION AND FOR 
THE INTRODUCTION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS 
The circumstances mentioned in Article  17 (2.3) and in Annex II, paragraph 2 are understood 
in respect of sectors of the  Russian economy which: 
- are undergoing restructuring, or 
- are facing  serious difficulties, particularly  where these entail serious social problems in 
Russia,  or 
- face  the  elimination  or a drastic  reduction  of the  total  market  share  held  by  Russian 
companies or nationals in a given sector or industry in Russia,  or 
- are  newly emerging industries in Russia. 
[  ... ] 
217 PROTOCOL 1 
ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COAL AND STEEL CONTACT GROUP 
1.  A  Contact  Group  is  established  between  the  Parties.  The  Group  is  composed  of 
representatives of the Community and of Russia. 
2.  The Contact Groups exchanges information on the situation of the coal and steel industries 
in both territories and on trade between them,  particularly with the purpose of identifying 
such problems as  might arise. 
3.  The Contact Group also examines the situation of the coal and steel industries at world 
level,  including developments in international trade. 
4.  The Contact Group exchanges all  useful information on the structure of the industries 
concerned, the development of their production capacities, the science and research progress 
in the relevant fields, and the evolution of employment. The Group also examines pollution 
and environmental problems. 
5.  The  Contact  Group  also  examines  the  progress  made  in the  framework  of technical 
assistance between the Parties, including assistance to financial,  commercial and technical 
management. 
6.  The Contact Group exchanges all relevant information as to attitudes taken, or to be taken 
in the appropriate international organizations or fora. 
7.  As and when both Parties agree that the presence and/or participation of representatives 
of the industries is appropriate, the Contact Group is enlarged to  include them. 
8.  The Contact Group meets twice a year,  alternately on the territories of each Party. 
9.  The chairmanship of the  Contact Group  is  held alternately  by  a  representative of the 
Commission of the European Communities and a representative of the Government of 
the Russian Federation. 
[ ... ] 
JOINT DECLARATION IN  RELATION TO ARTICLE 17  (2.2) 
'Primary products' are those defined as such in the GATT. 
[  ... ] 
COMMUNITY DECLARATION IN  RELATION TO  ARTICLE 17 
The provisions of the Agreement are without prejudice to the competences of the European 
Community and its Member States in the field of competition. 
[ ... ] 
218 12. Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
one part, and Ukraine of the other part 
1 2 
[  ... ] 
Article 11 
(PCA Ukraine:  Article  19) 
[  ... ] 
In respect of anti-dumping or subsidies investigations, each Party agrees to examine submissions 
by  the  other Party and to  inform the interested parties concerned of the essential facts  and 
considerations on the basis of which a final  decision is  to be made.  Before definitive anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are imposed, the Party shall do  the utmost to bring about 
a constructive solution to  the problem. 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
PAYMENTS, COMPETITION AND OTHER ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
(PCA Ukraine: Titles V and VI) 
[  ... ] 
Article 17 
(PCA Ukraine:  Article 49) 
1.  The  Parties  agree  to  work  to  remedy  or  remove,  through  the  application  of their 
competition laws or otherwise, restrictions on competition by enterprises or caused by 
State intervention in so far as  they may  affect trade between the Community and  Ukraine. 
I  OJ L 311, 23.12.1995, p.  1. 
2  Entered into force on 1 February 1996 (see OJ L 316, 30.12.1995). 
219 2.  In order to  attain the objectives mentioned in paragraph  1: 
2.1.  The  Parties  shall  ensure  that  they  have  and  enforce  laws  addressing  restrictions  on 
competition by enterprises within their jurisdiction. 
2.2.  The Parties shall refrain from  granting State aids  favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of goods other than primary products as defmed in the GAlT, or the provision 
of services,  which distort or threaten to distort competition in so far  as  they  affect trade 
between the Community and Ukraine. 
2.3.  Upon request by one Party, the other Party shall provide information on its aid schemes 
or on particular individual cases of State aid.  No information needs to  be provided which 
is covered by legislative requirements of the Parties on professional or commercial secrets. 
2.4.  In the case of State  monopolies  of a commercial character,  the Parties  declare  their 
readiness, as  from the fourth year from  the date of entry into force  of this  Agreement, 
to  ensure that there is  no discrimination between nationals of the Parties regarding the 
conditions under which goods are procured or marketed. 
2.5.  In  the  case  of public  undertakings  or undertakings  to  which  Member  States  of the 
European Union or the Ukraine grant exclusive rights, the Parties declare their readiness, 
as  from the fourth  year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement,  to  ensure 
that there is neither enacted nor maintained any  measure distorting trade between the 
Community and Ukraine to  an  extent contrary to  the Parties'  respective interests. This 
provision shall not obstruct the performance, in law or fact,  of the particular tasks assigned 
to  such undertakings. 
2.6.  The period defined in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5  may be extended by agreement of the Parties. 
3.  Consultations may take place within the Joint Committee at the request of the Community 
or Ukraine on the restrictions or distortions of competition referred to  in paragraphs  1 and 
2 and on the enforcement of their competition rules,  subject to  limitations imposed by laws 
regarding disclosure of information, confidentiality and business secrecy. Consultations may 
also comprise questions on the interpretation of paragraphs  1 and 2. 
4.  The Parties with experience in  applying competition rules shall give full  consideration 
to  providing other Parties, upon request and within available resources, technical assistance 
for the development and implementation of competition rules. 
5.  The above provisions in no  way  affect the Parties'  rights to  apply adequate measures, 
notably those referred to  in Article  11,  in order to  address distortions of trade in goods or 
services. 
[ ... ] 
220 Article 30 
1.  This  Agreement  shall  be applicable  until  the  entry  into force  of the  Partnership  and 
Cooperation Agreement signed on 14 June 1994. 
[ ... ] 
JOINT DECLARATION CONCERNING ARTICLE 11 
It is understood that the provisions of Article  11  are neither intended to,  nor shall slow down, 
hinder or impede  the  procedures  provided  for  in  the  respective  legislations of the  Parties 
regarding anti-dumping and subsidies investigations. 
[  ... ] 
221 13. Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of the other part 
1 2 
[  ... ] 
Article 10 
(PCA Moldova:  Article  18) 
[  ... ] 
In respect of anti-dumping or subsidies investigations, each Party agrees to examine submissions 
by the other Party and  to  inform the interested parties concerned of the essential facts  and 
considerations on the basis of which a final  decision is to be made.  Before definitive anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are imposed, the Party shall do  the utmost to  bring about 
a constructive solution to the problem. 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
PAYMENTS, COMPETITION AND OTHER ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
(PCA Moldova:  Titles V and VI) 
[ ... ] 
Article 16 
(PCA Moldova:  Article 48) 
1.  The Parties agree to work to remedy or remove, through the application of their competition 
laws or otherwise, restrictions on competition by  enterprises or caused by  State intervention 
in so far as  they may affect trade between the Community and the Republic of Moldova. 
I  OJ L 40, 17.2.1996, p.lO. 
2  Entered into force on 1 May  1996 (see OJ L 90, 11.4.1996). 
223 2.  In order to  attain the objectives mentioned in paragraph  1: 
2.1.  the  Parties  shall  ensure  that  they  have  and  enforce  laws  addressing  restrictions  on 
competition by enterprises within their jurisdiction; 
2.2.  the Parties shall refrain from granting State aids favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of goods other than primary products as defmed in the GATT, or the provision 
of services, which distort or threaten to  distort competition in so far as  they affect trade 
between the Community and the Republic of Moldova; 
2.3.  upon request by one Party, the other Party shall provide information on its aid schemes 
or on particular individual cases of State aid.  No information needs to  be provided which 
is covered by legislative requirements of the Parties on professional or commercial secrets; 
2.4.  in  the  case of State monopolies  of a  commercial character,  the Parties declare their 
readiness, as from the fourth year from the date of entry into force of their Agreement, 
to ensure that there is no discrimination between nationals of the Parties regarding the 
conditions under which goods are procured or marketed; 
2.5.  in the case of public undertakings or undertakings to which Member States of the European 
Union  or the  Republic  of Moldova  grant  exclusive  rights,  the  Parties  declare  their 
readiness, as from the fourth year from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, 
to ensure that there is neither enacted nor maintained any measure distorting trade between 
the  Community  and  the  Republic  of Moldova to  an  extent  contrary  to  the  Parties' 
respective interests. This provision shall not obstruct the performance, in  law or fact, 
of the particular tasks assigned to  such undertakings; 
2.6.  the period defmed in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 may be extended by agreement of the Parties. 
3.  Consultations may take place within the Joint Committee at the request of the Community 
or the Republic of Moldova on the restrictions or distortions of competition referred to in 
paragraph 1 and 2 and on the enforcement of their competition rules,  subject to limitations 
imposed by laws regarding disclosure of information, confidentiality and business secrecy. 
Consultations may also comprise questions on the interpretation of paragraphs 1 and 2. 
4.  The Parties with experience in applying competition rules shall give full consideration 
to  providing other Parties, upon request and within available resources, technical assistance 
for the development and implementation of competition rules. 
5.  The above provisions in no  way affect the Parties' rights to  apply adequate measures, 
notably those referred to in Article 10,  in order to address distortions of trade in goods or 
services. 
[ ... ] 
224 Article 29 
1.  This  Agreement  shall  be  applicable  until  the  entry  into  force  of the  Partnership  and 
Cooperation Agreement signed on 28  November 1994. 
[  ... ] 
JOINT  DECLARATION  CONCERNING ARTICLE  10 
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 are neither intended to,  nor shall slow down, 
hinder or impede  the  procedures  provided  for  in  the  respective  legislation of the  Parties 
regarding anti-dumping and subsidies investigations. 
[  ... ] 
225 14. Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between 
the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the 
one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the other part 
1 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
PAYMENTS, COMPETITION AND OTHER ECONOMIC PROVISIONS 
(PCA Kazakhstan: Title IV) 
[ ... ] 
Article 14 
The Parties agree to examine ways to apply their respective competition laws on a concerted 
basis in  such cases where trade between them is  affected. 
[  ... ] 
Article 27 
1.  This  Agreement  shall  be  applicable  until  the  entry  into  force  of the  Partnership  and 
Cooperation Agreement signed on 23  January  1995. 
[ ... ] 
I  OJ L 147, 20.6.1996, p.  1. 
227 V - Agreement between the European Communities 
and the Government of the United States of America 
regarding the applications of their competition laws Decision of the Council and the  Commission of 10 April 1995 
(95/145/EC, ECSC) I 
[ ... ] 
Article I 
PURPOSE AND DEFINITIONS 
1.  The purpose of this Agreement is  to  promote cooperation and coordination and lessen 
the possibility or impact of differences between the Parties in the application of their competition 
laws. 
2.  For the purpose of this Agreement, the following terms shall have the following definitions: 
A.  'competition law(s)'  shall mean: 
(i)  for the European Communities, Articles 85,  86,  89  and 90 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community, Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, Articles  65  and 66 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and their implementing Regulations 
including High Authority Decision No  24-54, and 
(ii)  for the United States of America, the Sherman Act (15  USC  1-7),  the Clayton Act 
(15  USC  12-27),  the  Wilson  Tariff Act  (15  USC  8-11),  and  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission Act (15 USC 41-68, except as these sections relate to consumer protection 
functions), 
as  well as  such other laws or regulations as  the Parties shall jointly agree in  writing to 
be a  'competition law'. for purposes of this Agreement; 
B.  'competition authorities'  shall mean: 
(i)  for the European Communities, the Commission of the European Communities, as 
to its responsibilities pursuant to the competition laws of the European Communities, 
and 
(ii)  for the United States, the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission; 
1  OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, p. 47; OJ L 131, 15.6.1995, p. 38. 
231 C.  'enforcement  activities'  shall  mean  any  application  of competition  law  by  way  of 
investigation or proceeding conducted by  the competition authorities of a Party; and 
D.  'anticompetitive activities'  shall  mean any  conduct or transaction that is  impermissible 
under the competition laws of a Party. 
Article II 
NOTIFICATION 
1.  Each Party shall notify the other whenever its competition authorities become aware that 
their enforcement activities may  affect important interests of the other Party. 
2.  Enforcement activities as to which notification ordinarily will be appropriate include those 
that: 
(a)  are relevant to enforcement activities of the other Party; 
(b)  involve  anticompetitive  activities  (other than  a merger or acquisition)  carried  out  in 
significant part in the other Party's territory; 
(c)  involve a merger or acquisition which one or more of the parties to  the transaction, or 
a  company  controlling  one  of more  of the  parties  to  the  transaction,  is  a  company 
incorporated or organized under the laws of the other Party or one of its States or Member 
States; 
(d)  involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by  the other 
Party; or 
(e)  involve remedies that would,  in  significant respects,  require or prohibit conduct in the 
other Party's territory. 
3.  With respect to  mergers or acquisitions required by law to be reported to the competition 
authorities, notification under this Article shall be made: 
(a)  in the case of the Government of the United States of America, 
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(i)  not  later than  the  time  its  competition authorities  request,  pursuant to  15  USC 
paragraph  18a(  e),  additional information or documentary material concerning the 
proposed transaction, 
(ii)  when its competition authorities decide to file a complaint challenging the transaction, 
and 
(iii)  where this is possible,  far enough in advance of the entry of a consent decree to 
enable the other Party's views to  be taken into account;  and (b)  in the case of the Commission of the European Communities, 
(i)  when notice of the transaction is published in the Official Journal, pursuant to Article 
4(3) of Council Regulation (EEC)  No 4064/89, or when  notice of the transaction 
is  received under Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty and a prior authorization from 
the Commission is required under that provision, 
(ii)  when its competition authorities decide to initiate proceedings with respect to  the 
proposed transaction, pursuant to  Article 6(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EEC)  No 
4064/89, and 
(iii)  far enough in advance of the adoption of a decision in the case to enable the other 
Party's views to  be taken into account. 
4.  With respect to  other matters,  no~fication shall ordinarily be provided at the stage in an 
investigation when it becomes evident that notifiable circumstances are present, and in any 
event far enough in advance of: 
(a)  the issuance of a statement of objections in the case of the Commission of the European 
Communities, or a complaint or indictment in the case of the Government of the United 
States of America; and 
(b)  the adoption of a decision or settlement in the case of the Commission of the European 
Communities, or the entry of a consent decree in the case of the Government of the United 
States of America; 
to enable the other Party's views to  be taken into account. 
5.  Each Party shall also notify the other whenever its competition authorities intervene or 
otherwise  participate  in  a  regulatory  or judicial  proceeding  that  does  not  arise  from  its 
enforcement activities, if the issues addressed in the intervention or participation may  affect 
the other Party's important interests.  Notification under this paragraph shall apply only to: 
(a)  regulatory or judicial proceedings that are public; 
(b)  intervention or participation that is public  and pursuant to  formal procedures; and 
(c)  in the case of regulatory proceeding in the United States, only proceedings before federal 
agencies. 
Notification shall be made at the time of the intervention or participation or as soon thereafter 
as  possible. 
6.  Notification under this  Article shall include  sufficient information to  permit  an  initial 
evaluation by the recipient Party of any effects on its interests. 
233 Article III 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION 
1.  The Parties agree that it is  in  their common interest to  share information that will (a) 
facilitate  effective application of their  respective  competition laws,  or (b)  promote better 
understanding by them of economic conditions  and  theories  relevant to  their competition 
authorities' enforcement activities and interventions or participation of the kind described in 
Article 11(5). 
2.  In furtherance of this common interest, appropriate officials from the competition authorities 
of each Party shall meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed, to (a) exchange 
information on their current enforcement activities and priorities, (b) exchange information 
on economic sectors of common interest, (c) discuss policy changes which they are considering, 
and (d) discuss other matters of mutual interest relating to  the application of competition laws. 
3.  Each Party will provide the other Party with any significant information that comes to 
the attention of its competition authorities about anticompetitive activities that its  competition 
authorities believe is relevant to,  or may warrant, enforcement activity by the other Party's 
competition authorities. 
4.  Upon receiving a request from the other Party, and within the limits of Articles VIII and 
IX, a Party will provide to the requesting Party such information within its possession as the 
requesting party may describe that is relevant to  an enforcement activity  being considered 
or conducted by the requesting Party's competition authorities. 
Article IV 
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
1.  The competition authorities of each Party will render assistance to the competition authorities 
of the other Party in their enforcement activities, to the extent compatible with the assisting 
Party's laws and important interests, and within its reasonably available resources. 
2.  In cases where both Parties have an interest in pursuing enforcement activities with regard 
to  related  situations,  they  may  agree that it is  in their mutual interest to  coordinate their 
enforcement activities.  In considering  whether particular enforcement activities  should be 
coordinated, the Parties shall take account of the following factors,  among others: 
(a)  the opportunity to make more efficient use of their resources devoted to the enforcement 
activities; 
(b)  the relative abilities of the Parties' competition authorities to obtain information necessary 
to  conduct the enforcement activities; 
(c)  the effect of such coordination on the ability of both Parties to achieve the objectives 
of their enforcement activities; and 
(d)  the possibility of reducing costs incurred by persons subject to the enforcement activities. 
234 3.  In  any  coordination  agreement,  each  Party  shall  conduct  its  enforcement  activities 
expeditiously and,  in so  far as  possible, consistently  with the enforcement objectives of the 
other Party. 
4.  Subject to appropriate notice to  the other Party, the competition authorities of either Party 
may  limit or terminate their participation in  a coordination arrangement  and  pursue  their 
enforcement activities independently. 
Article V 
COOPERATION REGARDING ANTI  COMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE 
TERRITORY OF ONE PARTY THAT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTERESTS OF 
THE OTHER PARTY 
1.  The Parties note that anticompetitive activities inay occur within the territory of one Party 
that, in addition to  violating that Party's competition laws, adversely affect important interests 
of the other Party. The Parties agree that it is in both their interests to address anticompetitive 
activities of this nature. 
2.  If  a Party believes that anticompetitive activities carried out on the territory of the other 
Party are adversely affecting its  important interests, the first Party may notify the other Party 
and may request that the other Party's competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement 
activities. The notification shall be as  specific as possible about the nature of the anticompetitive 
activities and their effects on the interests of the notifying Party, and shall include an  offer 
of such further information and other cooperation as  the notifying Party is  able to  provide. 
3.  Upon receipt of a notification under paragraph 2,  and after such other discussion between 
the Parties as  may be appropriate and useful in the circumstances, the competition authorities 
of the notified Party will consider whether or not to initiate enforcement activities, or to expand 
ongoing enforcement activities, with respect to  the anticompetitive activities identified in the 
notification. The notified Party will advise the notifying Party of its decision. If  enforcement 
activities are initiated, the notified Party will advise the notifying Party of their outcome and, 
to the extent possible, of significant interim developments. 
4.  Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the notified Party under its  competition 
laws and enforcement policies as  to  whether or not to undertake enforcement activities with 
respect  to  the  notified  anticompetitive  activities,  or  precludes  the  notifying  Party  from 
undertaking enforcement activities with respect to  such anticompetitive activities. 
235 Article VI 
A  VOIDANCE OF CONFLICTS OVER ENFORCEMENT ACTIVffiES 
Within the framework of its own laws and to the extent compatible with its important interests, 
each Party will seek, at all stages in its enforcement activities, to take into account the important 
interests of the other Party.  Each Party shall consider important interests of the other Party 
in decisions as  to whether or not to initiate an investigation or proceeding, the scope of an 
investigation or proceeding, the nature of the remedies or penalties sought, and in other ways, 
as  appropriate.  In  considering  one  another's  important  interests  in  the  course  of their 
enforcement activities, the Parties will take account of,  but will not be limited to, the following 
principles: 
1.  While an important interest of a Party may exist in the absence of official involvement 
by the Party with the activity in question, it is recognized that such interests would normally 
be reflected in antecedent laws, decisions or statements of policy by its competent authorities. 
2.  A Party's important interests may be  affected at any stage of enforcement activity by the 
other Party. The Parties recognize, however, that as  a general matter the potential for adverse 
impact on one Party's important interests arising from enforcement activity by the other Party 
is  less at the investigative stage and greater at the stage at which conduct is prohibited or 
penalized, or at which other forms of remedial orders are imposed. 
3.  Where it appears that one Party's enforcement activities may adversely affect important 
interests of the other Party, the Parties will consider the following factors, in addition to any 
other factors that appear relevant in the circumstances, in seeking an appropriate accommodation 
of the competing interests: 
(a)  the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of conduct within the 
enforcing Party's territory as  compared with conduct within the other Party's territory; 
(b)  the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in the anticompetitive 
activities  to  affect  consumers,  suppliers  or competitors  within  the  enforcing  Party's 
territory; 
(c)  the relative significance of the effects of the anticompetitive activities on the enforcing 
Party's interests as compared with the effects on the other Party's interests; 
(d)  the existence or absence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated 
by the enforcement activities; 
(e)  the degree of conflict or consistency between the enforcement activities and the other 
Party's laws or articulated economic policies; and 
(f)  the extent to which enforcement activities of the other Party with respect to the same 
persons,  including judgments or undertakings  resulting  from  such  activities,  may  be 
affected. 
236 Article VII 
CONSULTATION 
1.  Each Party agrees to consult promptly with the other Party in response to a request by 
the other Party for consultation regarding any matter related to this Agreement and to attempt 
to conclude consultations expeditiously with a view to reaching mutually satisfactory conclusions. 
Any  request  for  consultations  shall  include the  reasons  therefore  and  shall  state  whether 
procedural time-limits or other considerations require the consultations to  be expedited. 
These consultations shall take place at the appropriate level, which may include consultations 
between the  heads of the competition authorities concerned. 
2.  In each consultation under paragraph 1,  each Party shall take into account the principles 
of cooperation set forth in this Agreement and shall be prepared to explain to the other Party 
the  specific results of its application of those principles to the issue that is the  subject of 
consultation. 
Article VIII 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
1.  Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, neither Party is required to provide 
information to the other Party if disclosure of that information to the requesting Party (a)  is 
prohibited by the law of the Party possessing the information, or (b) would be incompatible 
with important interests of the Party possessing the information. 
2.  Each Party agrees to maintain, to the fullest extent possible, the confidentiality of any 
information provided to it in confidence by the other Party under this Agreement and to oppose, 
to the fullest extent possible, any application for disclosure of such information by a third 
party that is not authorized by the Party that supplied the information. 
Article IX 
EXISTING LAW 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws, 
or as  requiring any change in the laws,  of the United States of America or the European 
Communities or of their respective States or Member States. 
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COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THIS  AGREEMENT 
Communications under this Agreement, including notifications under Articles II and V,  may 
be carried out by direct oral, telephonic, written or facsimile communication from one Party's 
competition authorities to  the other Party's authority.  Notifications under Articles II,  V and 
XI, and requests under Article VII, shall be confirmed promptly in writing through diplomatic 
channels. 
Article XI 
ENTRY INTO FORCE, TERMINATION AND REVIEW 
1.  This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 
2.  This Agreement shall remain in force until 60 days after the date on which either Party 
notifies the other Party in  writing that it wishes to  terminate the Agreement. 
3.  The Parties shall review the operation of this Agreement not more than 24 months from 
the date of its entry into force,  with a view to assessing their cooperative activities, identifying 
additional areas  in which they could usefully cooperate and identifying any other ways  in 
which the Agreement could be improved. 
The Parties agree that this review will include,  among other things,  an analysis of actual or 
potential cases to  determine  whether their  interests  could be  better served  through closer 
cooperation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement. 
DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this twenty-third day of September 1991, in the English 
language. 
For the Commission of the European Communities 
For the Government of the United States of America 
238 CORRIGENDA 
1 
Corrigenda to Decision 95/145/EC, ECSC of the Council and the Commission of 
10 April 1995 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between 
the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
regarding the application of their competition laws 
(Official Journal of the European Communities,  L 95,  27.4.1995) 
The exchange of interpretative letters with the Government of the United States of America 
should be replaced by the following text: 
Exchange of interpretative letters with the Government of the United States 
of America 
[  ... ] 
Dear [name], 
As you are aware, on 9 August 1994, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held 
that the European Commission was not competent to  conclude the  'Agreement between the 
Commission of the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
regarding the application of their competition rules'. 
In order to  remedy  this  situation and to  assure the  continuation of the  application  of the 
Agreement, the Council has decided on [date]  to  conclude the Agreement. However, as  the 
Agreement will now be concluded by the Council on behalf of the European Community and 
by the Commission on behalf of the European Coal and Steel Community, certain corrections 
to  the text of the Agreement are necessary. These are set out in detail in the Annex to this 
letter,  which forms an integral part of this letter. 
As  these corrections do not affect the substance of the Agreement, we consider that they  can 
be made through an exchange of letters. We should therefore be grateful if you would confirm 
your acceptance of the corrections contained in this letter. 
Moreover, in order to  ensure a clear understanding of the European Communities' interpretation 
of the Agreement, we set out below two interpretative statements: 
1.  In the light of Article IX of the Agreement, Article VIII( 1) should be understood to mean 
that the information covered by the provisions of Article 20 of Council Regulation  17/62 or 
by equivalent provisions in other regulations in the field of competition may not under any 
circumstances be communicated by the Commission to  the  US  antitrust authorities, save with 
the express agreement of the source concerned. 
I  OJ L 131, 15.6.1995, p.  38. 
239 Similarly, the information referred to in Articles ll(6) and ill of the Agreement may  not include 
information covered by Article 20 of Regulation 17/62 nor by equivalent provisions in other 
regulations in the field of competition, save with the express agreement of the source concerned. 
2.  In the light of Article VIII(2) of the Agreement, all information provided in confidence 
by either of the Parties in accordance with the  Agreement will be considered as  confidential 
by the receiving party which should oppose any  request for disclosure to  a third party unless 
such disclosure is: 
(a)  authorized by the Party supplying the  information, or 
(b)  required under the law of the receiving Party. 
This is  understood to  mean that: 
each Party assures the confidentiality of all  information provided in confidence by  the 
other Party in accordance with the  receiving Party's applicable rules,  including those 
rules intended to assure the confidentiality of information gathered during a Party's own 
enforcement activities, 
each Party shall use all the legal means at its disposal to  oppose the  disclosure of this 
information. The European Communities recall the principles which govern the relationship 
between the Commission and the Member States in the application of the competition 
rules as enshrined, for example, in Council Regulation 17/62. The Commission after notice 
to the US competition authorities,  will inform the Member State or Member States whose 
interests are affected of the notifications sent to  it by the US  antitrust authorities. The 
Commission, after consultation with the US competition authorities,  will also inform such 
Member State or Member States of any  cooperation and coordination of enforcement 
activities. However, as regards such activities, either competition authorities will respect 
the other's request not to  disclose the information which it provides when necessary to 
ensure confidentiality, subject to  any contrary requirement of the applicable law. 
We should be grateful if you would also confirm that these interpretative statements do  not 
present any  difficulties for the US  Government. 
Yours sincerely, 
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CHANGES TO THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT NECESSITATED BY THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE COMMISSION ON  BEHALF OF 
THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY AND BY THE COUNCIL 
ON BEHALF OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
1 
Title 
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of 
America regarding the application of their competition laws 
Parties 
The  European  Community and the  European  Coal and Steel Community on the  one hand 
(hereinafter referred to  as  'the  European  Communities') 
Recital No 2 
Noting that the  European Communities and the Government of the United States of America 
share the  view that the sound and effective enforcement of competition law is  a matter of 
importance to  the efficient operation of their respective markets and to trade between them; 
Execution 
For the  European Community 
For the  European Coal and Steel Community 
For the Government of the United States of America. 
1  All changes have been underlined (italic in this publication). 
241 VI - Decision No  1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association 
Council of 22  December 1995 on implementing the 
final phase of the Customs Union (CE-TR 106/1/95) CHAPTER IV - APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
1 
[  ... ] 
SECTION II 
Competition 
A - COMPETITION RULES OF THE CUSTOMS UNION 
Article 32 
1.  The following  shall be  prohibited as  incompatible with the  proper functioning  of the 
Customs Union, in so far as  they may  affect trade between the Community and Turkey:  all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by  associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which have as  their objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition, and in particular those which: 
(a)  directly or indirectly fix  purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b)  limit or control production markets, technical development or investment; 
(c)  share markets or sources of supply; 
(d)  apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e)  make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no  connection 
with the subject of such contracts. 
2.  Any  agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall automatically be 
void. 
3.  The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
any  agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; 
any  decision or category of decisions by  associations of undertakings; 
any concerted practice or category of concerted practices; 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical 
or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which 
does not: 
(a)  impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions  which are  not indispensable to  the 
attainment of these objectives; 
(b)  afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial 
part of the products in question. 
I  OJ L 35, 13.2.1996, p.  1. 
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1.  Any  abuse by one of more undertakings of a dominant position in  the territories of the 
Community and/or Turkey as  a whole or in  a substantial part thereof shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the  proper functioning of the Customs Union,  in so  far  as  it may  affect 
trade between the Community and Turkey. 
2.  Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a)  directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b)  limiting production, markets or technical development to  the prejudice of consumers; 
(c)  applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d)  making  the  conclusion  of contracts  subject  to  acceptance  by  the  other  parties  of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
Article 34 
1.  Any aid granted by Member States of the Community or by Turkey through State resources 
in any form  whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall,  in  so  far as  it affects  trade between 
the Community and Turkey, be incompatible with the proper functioning of the Customs Union. 
2.  The following  shall be compatible with the functioning  of the Customs Union: 
(a)  aid having a social character,  granted to  individual consumers,  provided that such aid 
is  granted without discrimination related to  the origin of the products concerned; 
(b)  aid to  make good the damage caused by  natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; 
(c)  aid granted to the economy of certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected 
by the division of Germany, in so far as  such aid is required in order to compensate for 
the economic disadvantages caused by  that division; 
(d)  for  a period of five  years  from  the  entry  into  force  of this  Decision,  aid  to  promote 
economic development of Turkey's less-developed regions,  provided that such aid does 
not adversely affect trading conditions between the Community and Turkey to an extent 
contrary to the common interest. 
3.  The following may be considered to be compatible with the functioning of the Customs 
Union: 
(a)  in conformity with Article 43(2) of the Additional Protocol, aid to promote the economic 
development of areas where the  standard of living is  abnormally low  or where there is 
serious underemployment; 
246 (b)  aid to  promote the execution of an  important project of common European interest or 
to  remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State of the Community 
or of Turkey; 
(c)  for  a period of five years after the entry into force of this Decision,  in conformity with 
Article 43(2) of the Additional Protocol, aids aiming at accomplishing structural adjustment 
necessitated by the establishment of the Customs Union. The Association Council shall 
review the application of that clause after the aforesaid period; 
(d)  aid to  facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic 
areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions between the Community 
and Turkey to  an  extent contrary to  the common interest; 
(e)  aid to  promote culture and heritage conservation where such aid does not adversely  affect 
trading conditions between the Community and Turkey to  an extent contrary to the common 
interest; 
(f)  such other categories of aid as  may be specified by  the Association Council. 
Article 35 
Any  practices contrary  to  Articles 32,  33  and 34 shall be assessed on  the basis of criteria 
arising from the application of the rules of Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community and its  secondary legislation. 
Article 36 
The Parties shall exchange information, taking into account the limitations imposed by  the 
requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
Article 37 
1.  The Association Council shall,  within two years  following  the  entry  into force  of the 
Customs Union, adopt by decision the necessary rules for the implementation of Articles 32, 
33 and 34 and related parts of Article 35. These rules shall be based upon those already existing 
in the Community and shall inter alia specify the role of each competition authority. 
2.  Until these rules are adopted: 
(a)  the authorities of the Community or Turkey shall rule on the admissibility of agreements, 
decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in accordance with 
Articles 32 and 33; 
(b)  the  provisions  of the  GAT  Subsidies  Code  shall  be  applied  as  the  rules  for  the 
implementation of Article 34. 
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1.  If  the Community or Turkey considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the 
terms of Article 32, 33  or 34, and: 
is not adequately dealt with under the implementing rules referred to in Article 37, or 
in the absence of such rules,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause serious 
prejudice to the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, 
it may  take appropriate measures after consultation within the Joint Customs Union Committee 
or after 45  working days following  referral for such consultation. Priority shall be given to 
such measures that will least disturb the functioning of the Customs Union. 
2.  In the case of practices incompatible with Article 34,  such appropriate measures may, 
where  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  applies  thereto,  only  be  adopted  in 
conformity with the procedures and under the conditions laid down by the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and any  other relevant instrument negotiated under its  auspices which 
are applicable between the Parties. 
B- APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATION 
Article 39 
1.  With a view to  achieving the economic integration sought by the Customs Union, Turkey 
shall ensure that its legislation in the field of competition rules is made compatible with that 
of the European Community, and is applied effectively. 
2.  To comply with the obligations of paragraph  1,  Turkey shall: 
(a)  before  the  entry  into  force  of the  Customs  Union,  adopt  a law  which  shall  prohibit 
behaviours of undertakings under the conditions laid down in  Articles 85  and 86 of the 
EC Treaty.  It shall also  ensure  that,  within  one year after the  entry  into  force  of the 
Customs Union, the principles contained in block exemption regulations in force  in the 
Community, as  well as  in the case-law developed by EC  authorities, shall be  applied in 
Turkey. The Community shall inform Turkey as soon as possible of any procedure related 
to the adoption, abolition, or modification of block exemption regulations by the EC after 
the entry into force of the Customs Union.  After such information has been given, Turkey 
shall have one year to adapt its legislation, if necessary; 
(b)  before the entry into force of the Customs Union, establish a competition authority which 
shall apply these rules and principles effectively; 
(c)  before the entry into force of this Decision, adapt all its aids granted to  the textile and 
clothing sector to the rules laid down in the relevant Community frameworks  and guidelines 
under Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty. Turkey shall inform the Community of all 
its  aid  schemes  to  this  sector  as  adapted  in  accordance  with  these  frameworks  and 
guidelines. The Community shall inform Turkey as  soon as  possible of any  procedure 
related to  the adoption, abolition or modification of such frameworks and guidelines by 
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has been given, Turkey shall have one year to  adapt its legislation; 
(d)  within two years after the entry into force  of this Decision, adapt all  aid schemes other 
than those granted to the textile and clothing sector to  the rules laid down in Community 
frameworks and guidelines under Articles 92 and 93  of the EC Treaty. The Community 
shall inform Turkey as soon as possible of any procedure related to the adoption, abolition 
or modification  of such  frameworks  and  guidelines  by  the  Community.  After  such 
information has been given, Turkey shall have one year to  adapt its legislation; 
(e)  within two years after the entry into force  of the Customs Union, inform the Community 
of all aid schemes in force in Turkey as  adapted in accordance with point (d). If  a new 
scheme is to  be adopted, Turkey shall inform the Community as soon as  possible of the 
content of such scheme; 
(f)  notify the Community in advance of any  individual aid to  be granted to  an  enterprise 
or a  group  of enterprises  that  would  be  notifiable  under Community  frameworks  or 
guidelines had it been granted by a Member State, or of individual aid awards outside 
of Community frameworks or guidelines above an amount of ECU  12 million and which 
would have been notified under EC law had it been granted by a Member State. 
Regarding individual aids granted by  Member States and  subject to  the analysis by  the 
Commission, on the  basis of Article 93  of the EC Treaty, Turkey will be informed on 
the  same basis as  the Member States. 
3.  The Community and Turkey shall communicate to  each other all  amendments to their 
laws concerning restrictive practices by  undertakings. They shall also inform each other of 
the cases when these laws have been applied. 
4.  In relation to information supplied under paragraph 2, points (c), (e) and (f), the Community 
shall have the right to  raise objections against an  aid granted by Turkey which it would have 
deemed unlawful under EC law had it been granted by  a Member State. If  Turkey does not 
agree  with the  Community's opinion,  and  if the  case is  not  resolved  within  30 days,  the 
Community and Turkey shall each have the right to  refer the case to  arbitration. 
5.  Turkey shall have the right to  raise objections and seize the Association Council against 
an aid granted by  a Member State which it deems to be unlawful under EC law. If  the case 
is not resolved by  the Association Council within three months, the Association Council may 
decide to  refer the case to  the Court of Justice of the European Communities. 
Article 40 
1.  The Community shall inform Turkey as  soon as  possible of the adoption of any  decision 
under Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the EC Treaty which might affect Turkey's interests. 
2.  Turkey shall be entitled to  ask for information about any  specific case decided by  the 
Community under Articles 85,  86 and 92 of the. EC  Treaty. 
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With regard to  public undertakings to  which special or exclusive rights have been granted, 
Turkey shall ensure that, by the end of the first  year following the entry into force of the 
Customs Union, the principles of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
notably Article 90, as  well as  the principles contained in the secondary legislation and the 
case-law developed on this basis, are upheld. 
Article 42 
Turkey shall progressively adjust, in  accordance with the conditions and the timetable laid 
down by the Association Council, any State monopolies of a commercial character so  as  to 
ensure that,  by  the end of the second year following the entry into force of this  Decision, 
no discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed exists 
between nationals of the Member States and of Turkey. 
Article 43 
1.  If the Community or Turkey believes that anticompetitive activities carried out on the 
territory of the other Party are adversely affecting its interests or the interests of its undertakings, 
the first Party may notify the other Party and may request that the other Party's competition 
authority initiate appropriate enforcement action.  The notification shall be  as  specific as possible 
about the nature of the anticompetitive activities and their effects on the interests of the notifying 
Party, and shall include an offer for such further information and other cooperation as  the 
notifying Party is  able to  provide. 
2.  Upon receipt of a notification under paragraph 1 and after such other discussion between 
the Parties as  may be appropriate and useful in the circumstances, the competition authority 
of the notified Party will consider whether or not to initiate enforcement action, with respect 
to  the  anticompetitive activities identified in the notification. The notified Party will advise 
the notifying Party of its decision. If enforcement action is  initiated, the notified Party will 
advise the notifying Party of its outcome and,  to the extent possible, of significant interim 
developments. 
3.  Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the  notified Party under its competition 
laws and enforcement policies as to whether or not to undertake enforcement action with respect 
to  the notified anticompetitive activities, or precludes the notifying Party from undertaking 
enforcement action with respect to  such anticompetitive activities. 
[  ... ] 
250 VII - Free trade agreements and association 
agreements 1.  Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Swiss Confederation 
Additional Agreement concerning the validity for the Principality of Liechtenstein, of 
the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Swiss 
Confederation 
Regulation (EEC) No 2840172 of the Council of 19 December 1972 
1 
[ ... ] 
Article 1 
The aim of this Agreement is: 
(a)  to  promote through the  expansion of reciprocal trade the  harmonious development of 
economic  relations  between  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the  Swiss 
Confederation and thus  to foster in  the  Community and in Switzerland the  advance of 
economic activity, the improvement of living and employment conditions, and increased 
productivity and financial stability; 
(b)  to provide fair conditions of competition for trade between the  Contracting Parties; 
(c)  to  contribute  in  this  way,  by  the  removal  of barriers  to  trade,  to  the  harmonious 
development and expansion of world trade. 
[  ... ] 
Article 23 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the  proper functioning  of the Agreement in so  far 
as  they  may affect trade between the Community and Switzerland: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition as  regards the production of or trade 
in  goods; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Contracting Parties as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
1  OJ L 300, 31.12.1972 (French version); OJ Special Edition, 31.12.1972 (English version). 
253 (iii)  any  public aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Should a Contracting Party consider that a given practice is incompatible with this Article, 
it may take appropriate measures under the conditions and in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in Article 27. 
[  ... ] 
Article 27 
1.  In the event of a Contracting Party subjecting imports of products liable to  give rise to 
the difficulties referred to  in Articles 24  and 26  to  an  administrative procedure, the purpose 
of which is to  provide rapid information on the trend of trade flows,  it shall inform the  other 
Contracting Party. 
2.  In the cases specified in Articles 22 to 26, before taking the measures provided for therein 
or,  in cases to  which paragraph 3(d) applies,  as  soon as  possible, the Contracting Party in 
question shall supply the Joint Committee with all relevant information required for a thorough 
examination of the situation with a view to  seeking a solution acceptable to  the Contracting 
Parties. 
In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the functioning 
of the Agreement. 
The safeguard measures shall be notified immediately to  the Joint Committee and shall be 
the  subject of periodical consultations within the Committee, particularly with a view  to  their 
abolition as  soon as  circumstances permit. 
3.  For the implementation of paragraph 2,  the following  provisions shall apply: 
(a)  As regards Article 23, either Contracting Party may refer the matter to the Joint Committee 
if it considers that a given practice is  incompatible with the proper functioning of the 
Agreement within the meaning of Article 23(1). 
The Contracting Parties shall provide the Joint Committee with all relevant information 
and  shall  give  it  the  assistance  it requires  in order to  examine  the  case  and,  where 
appropriate, to eliminate the practice objected to. 
If the Contracting Party in question fails to  put an end to the practice objected to  within 
the period fixed  by  the Joint Committee, or in  the  absence of agreement in  the  Joint 
Committee within three months of the matter being referred to  it,  the Contracting Party 
concerned may  adopt any  safeguard measures it considers necessary  to  deal  with  the 
serious difficulties resulting from the practices in question; in particular, it may withdraw 
tariff concessions. 
(b)  As regards Article 24, the difficulties arising from the situation referred to in that Article 
shall be referred for examination to the Joint Committee, which may  take any  decision 
needed to  put an end to  such difficulties. 
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an  end  to  the  difficulties  within  30 days  of the  matter being  referred,  the  importing 
Contracting Party is authorized to  levy  a compensatory charge on the product imported. 
The compensatory charge shall be calculated according to  the  incidence on the  value 
of the  goods  in  question  of the  tariff disparities  in  respect  of the  raw  materials  or 
intermediate products incorporated therein. 
(c)  As  regards Article 25,  consultation in the Joint Committee shall take place before the 
Contracting Party concerned takes the appropriate measures. 
(d)  Where exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action  make prior examination 
impossible, the Contracting Party concerned may,  in the situations specified in Articles 
24,  25  and 26 and also in the case of export aids  having a direct and immediate incidence 
on trade,  apply forthwith the  precautionary measures strictly  necessary  to  remedy  the 
situation. 
[  ... ] 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
CONCERNING THE REGIONAL APPLICATION OF CERTAIN PROVISIONS 
OF THE AGREEMENT 
The European Economic Community declares that the application of any  measures it may 
take under Article 23,  24, 25  or 26 of the Agreement, in accordance with the procedure and 
under the arrangement set out in Article 27,  or under Article 28,  may  be limited to  one of 
its  regions by  virtue of Community rules. 
DECLARATION BY THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
CONCERNING ARTICLE 23(1)  OF THE AGREEMENT 
The  European  Economic  Community  declares  that  in  the  context  of  the  autonomous 
implementation of Article 23(1) of the Agreement which is incumbent on the Contracting Parties, 
it will assess any practices contrary to  that Article on the basis of criteria arising from the 
application of the rules of Articles 85,  86, 90 and 92 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community. 
255 Agreement between the Member States of the European Coal and Steel Community 
and the Swiss  Confederation 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 18 
1.  The following are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agreement in  so  far 
as  they may affect trade between the Community and Switzerland: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition as  regards the production of or trade 
in goods; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a  dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Contracting Parties as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public  aid  which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by favouring  certain 
undertakings or the  production of certain goods. 
2.  Should a Contracting Party consider that a given practice is incompatible with this Article, 
it may take the appropriate measures under the conditions and in accordance with the procedures 
laid down in  Article 23. 
Article 19 
If  the offers made by Swiss undertakings are likely to be detrimental to  the functioning of 
the common market and if any  such detriment is attributable to a difference in the conditions 
of competition as  regards prices, Member States may  take appropriate measures under the 
conditions and in accordance with the  procedures laid down in Article 23. 
[  ... ] 
Article 23 
1.  In the event of a Contracting Party subjecting imports of products liable to give rise to 
the difficulties referred to  in Articles 20 and 22 to  an  administrative procedure, the purpose 
of which is  to  provide rapid information on the trend of trade flows, it shall inform the other 
Contracting Party. 
2.  In the cases specified in Articles 17 to  22, before taking the measures provided for therein 
or,  in cases to  which paragraph 3(e) applies,  as  soon as  possible,  the Contracting Party in 
question shall supply the Joint Committee with all relevant information required for a thorough 
examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to  the Contracting 
Parties. 
I  OJ L 350, 19.12.1973, p.  13. 
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of the Agreement. 
The safeguard measures shall be  notified immediately to  the Joint Committee and shall be 
the subject of periodical consultations within the Committee, particularly with a view  to their 
abolition as  soon as circumstances permit. 
3.  For the implementation of paragraph 2,  the following  provisions shall apply: 
(a)  As regards Article 18, either Contracting Party may refer the matter to the Joint Committee 
if it considers that a given practice is  incompatible with the  proper functioning of the 
Agreement within the meaning of Article 18(1 ). 
The Contracting Parties shall provide the Joint Committee with all relevant information 
and  shall  give  it  the  assistance  it  requires  in  order to  examine  the  case  and,  where 
appropriate,  to eliminate the practice objected to. 
If  the Contracting Party in question fails  to put an end to the practice objected to  within 
the  period fixed  by  the Joint Committee, or in the absence of agreement in the  Joint 
Committee within three months of the matter being referred to it,  the Contracting Party 
concerned may  adopt any  safeguard measures  it considers necessary  to  deal  with  the 
serious difficulties resulting from the practices in question; in particular, it may withdraw 
tariff concessions. 
(b)  As  regards Article  19,  the Contracting Parties shall provide the Joint Committee with 
all  relevant information and shall give it the  assistance it requires in order to examine 
the case and, where necessary, to  consider appropriate measures. 
If  Switzerland fails  to put an end to  the practice objected to  within the period fixed by 
the Joint Committee, or in the absence of agreement in the Joint Committee, the Member 
States may  adopt the safeguard measures they  consider necessary to  avoid,  or put an 
end to, any detriment to the functioning of the common market; in particular, they may 
withdraw tariff concessions. 
(c)  As regards Article 20, the difficulties arising from the situation referred to in that Article 
shall be referred for examination to the Joint Committee, which may  take any  decision 
needed to put an end to such difficulties. 
If  the Joint Committee or the exporting Contracting Party has not taken a decision putting 
an  end to  the  difficulties  within  30 days  of the  matter being  referred,  the  importing 
Contracting Party is authorized to  levy  a compensatory charge on the product imported. 
The compensatory charge shall be calculated according to  the  incidence on  the value 
of the  goods  in  question  of the  tariff disparities  in  respect  of the  raw  materials  or 
intermediate products incorporated therein. 
(d)  As  regards Article 21,  consultation in the Joint Committee shall take place before the 
Contracting Party concerned takes the appropriate measures. 
257 (e)  Where exceptional circumstances requiring immediate action make prior examination 
impossible, the Contracting Party concerned may, in the situations specified in Articles 
20,  21  and 22 and also in the case of export aids having a direct and immediate incidence 
on trade, apply forthwith the precautionary measures strictly necessary to deal with the 
situation. 
[  ... ] 
258 2.  Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the State of Israel 
Regulation (EEC) No 1274175 of the Council of 20 May 1975
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
The aim of this Agreement is: 
(a)  to  promote through the expansion of reciprocal trade the harmonious development of 
economic relations between the European Economic Community and the State of Israel 
and thus to foster in the Community and in Israel the advance of economic activity, the 
improvement of living and employment conditions, and increased productivity and financial 
stability; 
(b)  to promote cooperation in areas which are of reciprocal interest to the Contracting Parties; 
(c)  to  provide fair conditions of competition for trade between the Contracting Parties; 
(d)  to  contribute  in  this  way,  by  the  removal  of barriers  to  trade,  to  the  harmonious 
development and expansion of world trade. 
[  ... ] 
The rest of the Articles of this Agreement has been amended by Decision of the Council and 
the Commission of 22  December 1995  on the conclusion by  the European Community of 
an  Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the  European Community 
and the European Coal and Steel Community of the one part,  and the State of Israel, on the 
other part (96/206/ECSC, EC) 
2 
I  OJ L 136, 28.5.1975, p. 3. 
2  OJ L 71, 20.3.1996, p.  1. 
259 Decision of the Council and the Commission of 22 December 1995 on the conclusion 
by the European Community of an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related 
matters between the European Community and the European Coal and Steel 
Community, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part 
(96/206/ECSC, EC) 
1 
[  ... ] 
TITLE III 
TRADE-RELATED PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER  1 
Competition 
Article 25 
1.  The following  are incompatible with the proper functioning of this Agreement, in so far 
as they may affect trade between the Community and Israel: 
(i)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; 
(ii)  abuse  by  one or more  undertakings  of a  dominant position  in  the  territories  of the 
Community or Israel as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(iii)  any  public aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Until the necessary rules for implementation of paragraph  1 are adopted according to 
the provisions of the Association Agreement, the provisions of the Agreement on interpretation 
and application of Articles VI,  XVI and XXIII of the GA  TI shall be  applied as  the rules 
for the implementation of paragraph 1 (iii). 
3.  Each Party shall ensure transparency in the area of public aid,  inter alia by  reporting 
annually to the other Party on the total amount and the distribution of the aid  given and by 
providing, upon request,  information on aid schemes.  Upon request by one Party, the other 
Party shall provide information on particular individual cases of public aid. 
4.  With regard to agricultural products referred to in Title II,  Chapter 3,  paragraph 1 (iii) 
does not apply. 
I  OJ L 71, 20.3.1996, p.  1. 
260 5.  If the Community or Israel considers that a particular practice is incompatible with the 
terms of paragraph 1,  and if such practice causes or threatens to  cause serious prejudice to 
the interest of the other Party or material injury to its domestic industry, including its service 
industry, it may take appropriate measures after consultation within the Cooperation Council 
or after 30 days following referral for such consultation. 
With reference to  practices incompatible with paragraph 1 (iii), such appropriate measures, 
when the GATT is applicable to them, may only be adopted in accordance with the procedures 
and under the conditions laid down by the GATT or by any other relevant instrument negotiated 
under its auspices and applicable to the Parties. 
6.  The Parties shall exchange information taking into account the limitations imposed by 
the requirements of professional and business secrecy. 
Article 26 (AA  37) 
1.  The Member States  and  Israel shall  progressively  adjust  any  State monopolies  of a 
commercial character, so as  to  ensure that,  by the end of the fifth year following the entry 
into force of the Association Agreement, no discrimination regarding the conditions under 
which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and 
Israel. 
2.  The Cooperation Council shall be informed about the measures adopted to  implement 
this objective. 
Article 27 (AA  38) 
With regard to public undertakings and undertakings to which special or exclusive rights have 
been granted, the Parties shall take the necessary measures so as  to  ensure that as from the 
fifth year following the date of entry into force of the Association Agreement there is  neither 
enacted nor maintained any measure distorting trade between the Community and Israel to 
an extent contrary to the Parties' interests. This provision should not obstruct the performance 
in law or in fact of the particular tasks assigned to  those undertakings. 
[ ... ] 
261 3.  Protocol laying down the conditions and procedures for the 
implementation of the second stage of the Agreement establishing 
an association between the European Economic Community and 
the Republic of Cyprus and adapting certain provisions of 
the Agreement 
Council Decision of 21  December 1987 (871607/EEC) 
1 
[ ... ] 
Article 13 
Cyprus shall progressively adjust any  State monopolies of a commercial character so  as  to 
ensure that, when the first phase of the second stage has ended, no discrimination regarding 
the  conditions under which  goods  are  procured and  marketed exists between nationals  of 
Member States of the Community and nationals of Cyprus. 
[  ... ] 
Article 27 
1.  The Contracting Parties recognize that the principles laid down in Articles 85  (agreements 
between undertakings), 86  (dominant position of an undertaking), 90 (public undertakings), 
92 (State aid), 95  (taxation of products), 96  (repayments on exportation), 97  (turnover taxes), 
98  (remissions and repayments in respect of exports) and  100 (approximation of laws) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community shall be applied in their relations within 
the Association Council. 
2.  The conditions and detailed rules for the application of these principles and the guarantees 
relating to  their proper application shall be examined by  the Contracting Parties during the 
first  phase of the second stage within the Association Council. 
3.  The measures referred to in paragraph 2 that are essential to ensure the smooth functioning 
of the Customs Union shall be agreed between the Contracting Parties and laid down in a 
Protocol which shall enter into force  at the beginning of the second phase at the  latest. 
I  OJ L 393, 31.12.1987, p.  1. 
263 Article 28 
1.  From the entry into force  of the second stage in accordance with the principles set out 
in  Article  27  concerning  Articles  85,  86  and  92 of the  Treaty  establishing  the  European 
Economic  Community,  the  following  are  incompatible with the  proper functioning  of the 
Agreement in so far as  they may  affect trade between the Community and Cyprus: 
(a)  all  agreements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  associations  of undertakings  and 
concerted  practices  between  undertakings  which  have  as  their  object  or  effect  the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition as  regards the production of or trade 
in goods; 
(b)  abuse  by  one  or more  undertakings  of a dominant  position  in  the  territories  of the 
Contracting Parties as  a whole or in a substantial part thereof; 
(c)  any  public  aid which distorts or threatens to  distort competition by  favouring  certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods. 
2.  Should a Contracting Party note that any  such practice as  is referred to  in paragraph 1 
is being applied by its partner,  it may  take appropriate measures after consultations within 
the Association Council. 
[  ... ] 
264 VIII - Framework Agreement for commercial 
and economic cooperation between 
the European Communities and Canada Council Regulation (EEC) No 2300n6 of 20 September 1976 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article II 
COMMERCIAL COOPERATION 
1.  The Contracting Parties undertake to promote the development and diversification of their 
reciprocal commercial exchanges to  the highest possible level. 
To this end,  they shall, in accordance with their respective policies and objectives: 
(a)  cooperate at the international level and bilaterally in the solution of commercial problems 
of common interest; 
(b)  use  their  best  endeavours  to  grant  each  other  the  widest  facilities  for  commercial 
transactions in which one or the other has an  interest; 
(c)  take fully  into account their respective interests and needs regarding access to and further 
processing of resources. 
2.  The Contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to discourage, in conformity with 
their legislation, restrictions of competition by enterprises of their respective industries, including 
pricing practices distorting competition. 
3.  The Contracting Parties agree, upon request, to consult and review these matters  at the 
Joint Cooperation Committee referred to in Article IV. 
[ ... ] 
I  OJ L 260, 24.9.1976, p.  1. 
267 [ ... ] 
PROTOCOL 
1  CONCERNING COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY AND CANADA 
Article 1 
The provisions of Articles I to V inclusive of the Framework Agreement for commercial and 
economic cooperation between the European Communities and Canada, signed in Ottawa on 
6 July  1976, shall also apply in the matters covered by the Treaty establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community. 
[ ... ] 
I  OJ L 260, 24.9.1976, p. 28. 
268 [  ... ] 
Framework Agreement for commercial and economic cooperation between 
the European Communities and  Canada 
Commission Decision of 17  September 1976 
(761753/Euratom) 
1 
Article II 
COMMERCIAL COOPERATION 
1.  The Contracting Parties undertake to promote the developments and diversification of their 
reciprocal commercial exchanges to  the highest possible level. 
To this end,  they  shall, in accordance with their respective policies and objectives: 
(a)  cooperate at the international level and bilaterally in the solution of commercial problems 
of common interest; 
(b)  use  their  best  endeavours  to  grant  each  other  the  widest  facilities  for  commercial 
transactions in which one or the other has  an  interest; 
(c)  take fully  into account their respective interests and needs regarding access to and further 
processing of resources. 
2.  The Contracting Parties shall use their best endeavours to discourage, in conformity with 
their legislation, restrictions of competition by enterprises of their respective industries, including 
pricing practices distorting competition. 
3.  The Contracting Parties agree, upon request,  to consult and review these matters in the 
Joint Cooperation Committee referred to  in Article IV. 
I  OJ L 260, 24.9.1976, p.  22. 
269 IX - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 
1 
1  Basic instruments and selected documents, Volume IV,  1969. Article XVI 
Subsidies 
Section A - Subsidies in general 
1.  If  any contracting party grants or maintains any  subsidy, including any  form  of income 
or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any  product from, 
or to  reduce imports of any  product into,  its territory,  it shall notify the Contracting Parties 
in  writing  of the  extent  and  nature  of the  subsidization,  of the  estimated  effect  of the 
subsidization on the quantity of the affected product or products imported into or exported 
from its territory and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary.  In any  case 
in  which it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any  other contracting party 
is  cause or threatened by  any  such subsidization, the contracting party granting the subsidy 
shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting party or parties concerned, or with the 
Contracting Parties, the possibilities of limiting the  subsidization. 
Section B - Additional provisions on export subsidies 
2.  The Contracting Parties recognize that the granting by a contracting party of a subsidy 
on  the export of any  product may  have harmful effects for  other contracting parties, both 
importing and exporting, may cause undue disturbance to their normal commercial interests, 
and may  hinder the achievement of the objectives of this Agreement. 
3.  Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to  avoid the use of subsidies on the export 
of primary products. If, however,  a contracting party grants directly or indirectly any form 
of subsidy which operated to increase the export of any  primary product from its territory, 
such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account being taken of 
the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative 
period,  and any  special factors  which may  have affected or may  be affecting such trade in 
the  product. 
4.  Further, as from  1 January  1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting parties 
shall cease to  grant either directly or indirectly any  form  of subsidy on the export of any 
product other than a primary product which subsidy results in the  sale of such product for 
export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to  buyers in 
the domestic market.  Until 31  December 1957,  no  contracting party shall extend the  scope 
of any such subsidization beyond that existing on 1 January  1955 by  the introduction of new, 
or the extension of existing,  subsidies. 
5.  The Contracting Parties shall review the operation of the provisions of this Article from 
time to  time with a view  to examining its effectiveness, in the light of actual experience,  in 
promoting the objectives of this  Agreement and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial 
to  the trade or interests of contracting parties. 
273 Article XVII 
State trading enterprises 
1.  (a)  Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, 
wherever located, or grants to  any enterprise, formally  or in effect, exclusive or special 
privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports 
or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory 
treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports 
or exports by private traders. 
(b)  The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require 
that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, 
make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations, 
including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions 
of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties 
adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to  compete 
for participation in such purchases or sales. 
(c)  No  contracting  party  shall  prevent  any  enterprise  (whether  or not  an  enterprise 
described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph) under its jurisdiction from acting 
in accordance with the principles of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph. 
2.  The provisions of paragraph  1 of this Article shall not apply to  imports of products for 
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for resale or use 
in the production of goods for sale.  With respect to such imports, each contracting party shall 
accord to the trade of the other contracting parties fair and equitable treatment. 
3.  The contracting parties recognize that enterprises of the kind described in paragraph 1(a) 
of this Article might be operated so as  to create serious obstacles to trade; thus negotiations 
on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis designed to limit or reduce such obstacles 
are of importance to the expansion of international trade. 
4.  (a)  Contracting parties shall notify the  Contracting Parties of the products which  are 
imported into or exported from their territories by enterprises of the kind described 
in paragraph 1  (a)  of this Article. 
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(b)  A contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing an import monopoly of 
a product, which is  not the subject of a concession under Article II, shall, on the 
request of another contracting party having a substantial trade in the product concerned, 
inform the Contracting Parties of the import mark-up on the product during a recent 
representative period, or,  when it is  not possible to do so, of the price charged on 
the resale of the product. 
(c)  The Contracting Parties may, at the request of a contracting party which has reason 
to believe that its interests under this Agreement are being adversely affected by the 
operations  of an  enterprise  of the  kind  described  in paragraph  1(a),  request  the 
contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing such enterprise to supply information about its operations related to  the carrying-out of the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
(d)  The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party  to disclose 
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or otherwise be contrary 
to  the  public  interest  or  would  prejudice  the  legitimate  commercial  interests  of 
particular enterprises. 
275 ANNEX I 
NOTES AND SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS 
Ad Article XVI 
The exemption of an  exported product from duties or taxes borne by  the  like product when 
destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts  not 
in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to  be a subsidy. 
Section B 
1.  Nothing in  Section B shall preclude the use by  a contracting party  of multiple rates of 
exchange in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
2.  For the purposes of Section B,  a 'primary product'  is understood to  be any  product of 
farm,  forest  or fishery,  or any  mineral,  in  its  natural  form  or which has  undergone  such 
processing  as  is  customarily  required to  prepare it for  marketing in  substantial  volume in 
international trade. 
Paragraph 3 
1.  The fact that a contracting party has not exported the product in question during the previous 
representative period would not in itself preclude that contracting party from establishing its 
right to  obtain a share of the trade in the product concerned. 
2.  A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to domestic producers 
of a primary product independently of the movements of export prices, which results at times 
in  the sale of the product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for 
the like product to  buyers in the domestic market,  shall be considered not to involve a subsidy 
on exports within the meaning of paragraph 3 if the Contracting Parties determine that: 
(a)  the system has  also resulted, or is so designed as  to  result,  in the sale of the product for 
export at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the like product to buyers 
in the domestic market;  and 
(b)  the  system is  so operated, or is designed so  to operate, either because of the effective 
regulation of production or otherwise,  as  not to  stimulate exports unduly or otherwise 
seriously to prejudice the interests of other contracting parties. 
Notwithstanding such determination by the Contracting Parties, operations under such a system 
shall be subject to  the provisions of paragraph 3 where they  are  wholly or partly financed 
out of government funds  in addition to  the  funds  collected from producers in respect of the 
product concerned. 
276 Paragraph 4 
The intention of paragraph 4 is that the contracting parties should seek before the end of 1957 
to reach agreement to abolish all remaining subsidies as from  1 January  1958; or, failing this, 
to  reach agreement to  extend the application of the standstill until the earliest date thereafter 
by  which they can expect to  reach such agreement. 
Ad Article XVII 
Paragraph 1 
The operations of marketing boards,  which  are  established by  contracting parties  and  are 
engaged in purchasing or selling,  are subject to the provisions of subparagraph (a) and (b). 
The activities of marketing boards which are established by  contracting parties and  which 
do not purchase or sell but lay  down regulations covering private trade are governed by the 
relevant Articles of this Agreement. 
The charging by  a State enterprise of different prices for its sales of a product in different 
markets is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that such different prices 
are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets. 
Paragraph 1(a) 
Government measures imposed to ensure standards of quality and efficiency in the operation 
of external trade, or privileges granted for the exploitation of national natural resources but 
which do not empower the government to  exercise control over the trading activities of the 
enterprise in question, do  not constitute  'exclusive or special privileges'. 
Paragraph 1  (b) 
A  country  receiving  a  'tied loan'  is free  to  take  this  loan into  account as  a  'commercial 
consideration'  when purchasing requirements abroad. 
Paragraph 2 
The term  'goods'  is  limited to  products  as  understood in  commercial practice,  and  is  not 
intended to include the purchase or sale of services. 
277 Paragraph 3 
Negotiations which contracting parties agree to conduct under this paragraph may be directed 
towards  the  reduction of duties  and  other charges  on imports  and  export or towards  the 
conclusion of any other mutually satisfactory arrangement consistent with the provisions of 
this Agreement.  (See paragraph 4 of Article 2 and the note to  that paragraph.) 
Paragraph 4(b) 
The term  'import mark-up'  in  this  paragraph shall represent the margin by  which the  price 
charged by the import monopoly for the imported product (exclusive of internal taxes within 
the  purview of Article Ill, transportation,  distribution,  and  other expenses  incident to  the 
purchase, sale or further processing, and a reasonable margin of profit) exceeds the landed 
cost. 
278 Council Decision of 22 December 1994 concerning the conclusion on behalf of the 
European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements 
reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations 
[  ... ] 
( 1986-94) 94/800/EC) I 
ANNEX JA 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND  TRADE 1994 
Understanding on the interpretation of Article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
2 
MEMBERS, 
Noting that Article XVII provides for obligations on members in respect of the activities of 
the State trading entelj>rises referred to in paragraph 1 of Article XVII,  which are required 
to be consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in GA  1T 
1994 for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders, 
Noting further that members are subject to  their GATI 1994 obligations in respect of those 
governmental measures affecting State trading enterprises, 
Recognizing that this Understanding is without prejudice to the substantive disciplines prescribed 
in Article XVII, 
HEREBY AGREE AS  FOLLOWS: 
1.  In order to ensure the transparency of the activities of State trading enterprises, members 
shall notify  such enterprises to  the Council for Trade in Goods, for review by the working 
party to  be set up under paragraph 5,  in accordance with the following working definition: 
'Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards,  which have 
been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional 
powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or 
direction of imports or exports.' 
This notification requirement does not apply to imports of products for immediate or ultimate 
consumption in governmental  use or in use  by  an  enterprise  as  specified  above  and  not 
otherwise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale. 
I  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p.  1. 
2  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p.  13. 
279 2.  Each  member  shall  conduct  a  review  of its  policy  with  regard  to  the  submission  of 
notifications on State trading enterprises to the Council for Trade in Goods,  taking account 
of the provisions of this Understanding. In carrying out such a review, each member should 
have regard to  the need to  ensure the maximum transparency possible in  its notifications so 
as  to  permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation of the enterprises notified and 
the effect of their operations on international trade. 
3.  Notifications shall be made in accordance with the questionnaire on State trading adopted 
on  24  May  1960  (BISD  9S/184-185),  it being  understood  that  members  shall  notify  the 
enterprises referred to  in paragraph 1 whether or not imports or exports have in fact taken 
place. 
4.  Any member which has  reason to  believe that another member has  not adequately  met 
its  notification obligation may  raise the matter with the member concerned. If the matter is 
not satisfactorily resolved, it may make a countemotification to the Council for Trade in Goods, 
for consideration by the working party set up under paragraph 5,  simultaneously informing 
the member concerned. 
5.  A working party shall be set up, on behalf of the Council for Trade in Goods,  to  review 
notifications  and  counternotifications.  In the  light of this  review  and  without prejudice to 
paragraph 4(  c)  of Article XVIT,  the Council for Trade in Goods may make recommendations 
with regard to the adequacy of notifications and the need for further information. The working 
party  shall  also  review,  in  the  light  of the  notifications  received,  the  adequacy  of the 
abovementioned questionnaire on State trading and the coverage of State trading enterprises 
notified under paragraph  1.  It shall  also  develop  an  illustrative  list showing the  kinds  of 
relationships between governments and enterprises, and the kinds of activities,  engaged in 
by these enterprises, which may be relevant for the  purposes of Article XVII.  It is understood 
that the  Secretariat will  provide a general background paper for the working  party  on the 
operations of State trading enterprises as  they  relate to  international trade.  Membership of 
the working party shall be open to all members indicating their wish to  serve on it.  It shall 
meet within a year of the date of entry into force of the WTO  Agreement and thereafter at 
least once a year.  It shall report annually to  the Council for Trade in Goods. 
1 
[ ... ] 
1  The activities of this working party shall be coordinated with those of the working group provided for 
in Section III of the Ministerial Decision on notification procedures adopted on 15 April 1994. 
280 Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures 
1 
PART I- GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 1 
Definition of a subsidy 
1.1.  For the purpose of this Agreement,  a subsidy shall be deemed to  exist if: 
(a)  (1)  there  is  a financial  contribution by  a government or any  public  body  within  the 
territory of a member (referred to in  this  Agreement as  'government', i.e.  where: 
(i)  a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and 
equity  infusion),  potential  direct  transfers  of funds  or  liabilities  (e.g.  loan 
guarantees); 
(ii)  government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.  fiscal 
incentives such as tax credits); 
2 
(iii)  a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or 
purchases goods; 
(iv)  a government makes payments to a funding  mechanism,  or entrusts or directs 
a private body  to  carry out one or more of the types  of functions  illustrated 
in (i)  to  (iii)  above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice,  in  no  real  sense,  differs  from  practices  normally  followed  by 
governments; 
or 
(a)  (2)  there is any  form  of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI  of GA TI 
1994; 
and 
(b)  a benefit is  thereby conferred. 
1.2.  A subsidy as defined in paragraph  1 shall be subject to  the provisions of Part II or shall 
be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is  specific in  accordance 
with the  provisions of Article 2. 
I  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p.  156. 
See also Council Regulation (EC) No 3284/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against subsidized 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ L 349, 31.12.1994, p. 22). 
2  In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GAIT 1994 (note to Article XVI) and the provisions 
of Annexes I through III to this Agreement, the exemption of an exported product from duties or taxes 
borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or 
taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a subsidy. 
281 Article 2 
Specificity 
2.1.  In order to determine whether a subsidy, as defined in paragraph 1 of Article  1, is specific 
to an enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries (referred to  in this Agreement 
as  'certain enterprises') within the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles 
shall apply: 
(a)  Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to  which the granting authority 
operates, explicitly limits access to  a subsidy to  certain enterprises, such subsidy shall 
be specific. 
(b)  Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to  which the granting authority 
operates, establishes objective criteria or conditions 
1  governing the eligibility for,  and 
the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not exist, provided that the eligibility is automatic 
and that such criteria and  conditions are  strictly adhered to.  The criteria or conditions 
must be  clearly spelled out in  law,  regulation,  or other official document,  so  as  to  be 
capable of verification. 
(c)  If, notwithstanding any  appearance of non-specificity resulting from  the application of 
the principles laid down in subparagraphs (a)  and (b),  there are reasons to  believe that 
the  subsidy may  in fact be specific, other factors  may  be considered.  Such factors  are 
the use of a subsidy programme by a limited number of certain enterprises, predominant 
use by  certain enterprises, the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy 
to certain enterprises, and the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting 
authority in the decision to grant a subsidy. 
2 In applying this subparagraph, account shall 
be taken of the extent of diversification of economic activities within the jurisdiction of 
the granting authority,  as  well as  of the length of time during  which the subsidy programme 
has been in operation. 
2.2.  A subsidy which is limited to certain enterprises located within a designated geographical 
region within the jurisdiction of the granting authority shall be specific. It is understood that 
the setting or change of generally applicable tax  rates by all levels of government entitled 
to  do so shall not be deemed to be a specific subsidy for the purposes of this Agreement. 
2.3.  Any  subsidy falling under the  provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific. 
2.4.  Any determination of specificity under the  provisions of this  Article shall be clearly 
substantiated on the basis of positive evidence. 
1  Objective criteria or conditions, as used herein, mean criteria or conditions which are neutral, which do 
not favour certain enterprises over others, and which are economic in nature and horizontal in application, 
such as number of employees or size of enterprise. 
2  In this regard, in particular, information on the frequency with which applications for a subsidy are refused 
or approved and the reasons for such decisions shall be considered. 
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Article 3 
Prohibition 
3.1.  Except as  provided in the Agreement on agriculture,  the following  subsidies,  within the 
meaning of Article  1,  shall be prohibited: 
(a)  subsidies  contingent,  in  law  or  in  fact, 
1  whether  solely  or  as  one  of several  other 
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I; 
2 
(b)  subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use 
of domestic over imported goods. 
3.2.  A member shall neither grant nor maintain subsidies referred to  in  paragraph  1. 
Article 4 
Remedies 
4.1.  Whenever a member has  reason to believe that a prohibited subsidy is being granted 
or maintained by  another member,  such member may  request consultations with  such other 
member. 
4.2.  A request for consultations under paragraph  1 shall include a statement of available 
evidence with regard to the existence and  nature of the  subsidy in question. 
4.3.  Upon request for consultations under paragraph  1,  the member believed to  be granting 
or maintaining the subsidy in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly  as  possible. 
The purpose of the  consultations shall be  to  clarify the facts  of the  situation and  to  arrive 
at a mutually  agreed solution. 
4.4.  If no  mutually  agreed  solution has  been reached within  30  days 3  of the  rtf!Uest  for 
consultations,  any  member party to  such consultations may  refer the matter to  the Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB) for the immediate establishment of a panel,  unless the DSB  decides 
by  consensus not to  establish a panel. 
1  This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of the subsidy, without having been 
made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or 
export earnings. The mere fact that a subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason 
alone be considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision. 
2  Measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies shall not be prohibited under this 
or any other provision of this Agreement. 
3  Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement. 
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of Experts 
1 (referred to in this Agreement as  the  'PGE') with regard to  whether the measure 
in question is  a prohibited subsidy. If  so  requested, the PGE shall immediately review the 
evidence with regard to the existence and nature of the measure in question and shall provide 
an  opportunity for the member applying or maintaining the measure to  demonstrate that the 
measure in question is  not a prohibited subsidy. The PGE shall report its conclusion to  the 
panel within a time-limit determined by  the  panel.  The POE's conclusions on the issue of 
whether or not the measure in question is a prohibited subsidy shall be accepted by the panel 
without modification. 
4.6.  The panel shall submit its final report to  the parties to  the dispute. The report shall be 
circulated to all members within 90 days of the date of the composition and the establishment 
of the panel's terms of reference. 
4.7.  If  the measure in question is found to  be a prohibited subsidy,  the panel shall recommend 
that the subsidizing member withdraw the  subsidy without delay.  In this regard, the  panel 
shall  specify  in  its  recommendation  the  time-period  within  which  the  measure  must  be 
withdrawn. 
4.8.  Within 30 days of the issuance of the panel's report to  all  members, the report shall 
be adopted by  the DSB  unless one of the parties to  the dispute formally  notifies  the  DSB 
of its  decision to  appeal or the DSB  decides by  consensus not to  adopt the  report. 
4.9.  Where a panel report is appealed, the Appellate Body shall issue its decision within 
30 days from the date when the party to  the dispute formally  notifies its intention to appeal. 
When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 30 days,  it shall 
inform the DSB  in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the  period 
within which it will submit its report.  In  no  case shall the proceedings exceed 60 days.  The 
appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB  and unconditionally accepted by  the parties to 
the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 
days following its issuance to the members. 
2 
4.10.  In the event the  recommendation of the DSB  is  not followed  within the time-period 
specified by  the panel, which shall commence from the date of adoption of the panel's report 
or the Appellate Body's report, the DSB  shall grant authorization to  the complaining member 
to take appropriate 
3 countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the request. 
1  As established in Article 24. 
2  If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose. 
3  This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that 
the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited. 
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22 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding  (DSU),  the arbitrator shall determine  whether 
the countermeasures are appropriate. 
1 
4.12.  For purposes of disputes conducted pursuant to  this Article, except for time-periods 
specifically prescribed in this Article, time-periods applicable under the DSU for the conduct 
of such disputes shall be half the time prescribed therein. 
PART III - ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Article 5 
Adverse effects 
No  member should cause,  through the use of any  subsidy referred to  in paragraphs  1 and 
2 of Article  1,  adverse effects to  the interests of other members, i.e.: 
(a)  injury to  the domestic industry of another member. 
2 
(b)  nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other members 
under GATT 1994 in particular the benefits of concessions bound under Article II of GATT 
1994. 
3 
(c)  serious prejudice to  the interests of another member. 
4 
This Article does not apply to  subsidies maintained on agricultural products as  provided in 
Article  13  of the Agreement on agriculture. 
Article 6 
Serious prejudice 
6.1.  Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 shall be deemed to exist 
in the case of: 
(a)  the total ad valorem subsidization 
5  of a product exceeding 5%; 
6 
1  This expression is not meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that 
the subsidies dealt with under these provisions are prohibited. 
2  The term 'injury to the domestic industry' is used here in the same sense as it is used in Part V. 
3  The term 'nullification or impairment' is used in this Agreement in the same sense as it is used in the 
relevant provisions of  GA  'IT 1994, and the existence of such nullification or impairment shall be established 
in accordance with the practice of application of these provisions. 
4  The term 'serious prejudice to the interests of another member' is used in this Agreement in the same 
sense as it is used in paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994, and includes threat of serious prejudice. 
5  The total ad valorem subsidization shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of Annex IV. 
6  Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the threshold in this 
subparagraph does not apply to civil aircraft. 
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(c)  subsidies to cover operating losses sustained by an enterprise, other than one-time measures 
which are non-recurrent and cannot be repeated for that enterprise and which are given 
merely to  provide time for the development of long-term solutions and to  avoid acute 
social problems; 
(d)  direct forgiveness of debt, i.e. forgiveness of government-held debt,  and  grants to cover 
debt repayment. 
1 
6.2.  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph  1,  serious prejudice shall not be found  if 
the subsidizing member demonstrates that the subsidy in question has not resulted in  any of 
the effects enumerated in  paragraph 3. 
6.3.  Serious prejudice in the sense of paragraph (c) of Article 5 may  arise in any  case where 
one or several of the following apply: 
(a)  the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product of another 
member into the market of the subsidizing member; 
(b)  the effect of the subsidy is to  displace or impede the exports of a like product of another 
member from  a third-country market; 
(c)  the effect of the subsidy is  a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product as 
compared  with  the  price of a like product of another member in the  same  market or 
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; 
(d)  the effect of the subsidy is  an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing member 
in a particular subsidized primary product or commodity 
2  as compared with the average 
share it had during the previous period of three years and this increase follows  a consistent 
trend over a period when subsidies have been granted. 
6.4.  For the purpose of paragraph 3(b  ),  the displacement or impeding of exports shall include 
any  case in which,  subject to  the provisions of paragraph 7,  it has been demonstrated that 
there  has  been  a change in  relative  shares  of the  market to  the  disadvantage  of the  non-
subsidized like product (over an appropriately representative period sufficient to demonstrate 
clear trends in the development of the market for the product concerned, which,  in normal 
circumstances,  shall be at least one year.  'Change in relative shares of the market'  shall include 
any of the following situations: (a) there is an  increase in the market share of the subsidized 
product;  (b)  the  market share of the  subsidized product remains constant in circumstances 
in  which, in the absence of the subsidy, it would have declined;  (c)  the market share of the 
subsidized product declines, but at a slower rate than would have been the case in the absence 
of the subsidy. 
6.5.  For the purpose of paragraph 3(c),  price undercutting shall include any case in which 
such price undercutting has been demonstrated through a comparison of prices of the subsidized 
1  Members recognize that where royalty-based financing for a civil aircraft programme is not being fully 
repaid due to the level of actual sales falling below the level of forecast sales, this does not in itself 
constitute serious prejudice for the purposes of this subparagraph. 
2  Unless other multilaterally agreed specific rules apply to the trade in the product or commodity in question. 
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comparison shall be made at the same level of trade and at comparable times, due account 
being taken of any  other factor  affecting  price  comparability.  However,  if such  a  direct 
comparison is not possible, the existence of price undercutting may be demonstrated on the 
basis of export unit values. 
6.6.  Each member in the market of which serious prejudice is alleged to  have arisen shall, 
subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Annex V, make available to  the parties to a dispute 
arising under Article 7, and to the panel established pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article 7, all 
relevant information that can be obtained as  to the changes in market shares of the parties 
to the dispute as well as concerning prices of the products involved. 
6.7.  Displacement or impediment resulting in serious prejudice shall not arise under para-
graph 3 where any of the following circumstances exist 
1  during the relevant period: 
(a)  prohibition or restriction on exports of the like product from the complaining member 
or on imports from the complaining member into the third-country market concerned; 
(b)  decision by an importing government operating a monopoly of trade or State trading in 
the product concerned to  shift, for non-commercial reasons, imports from the complaining 
member to another country or countries; 
(c)  natural disasters, strikes, transport disruptions or other force majeure substantially affecting 
production, qualities,  quantities or prices of the product available for export from  the 
complaining member; 
(d)  existence of arrangements limiting exports from the complaining member; 
(e)  voluntary  decrease  in  the  availability  for  export of the  product  concerned  from  the 
complaining member (including, inter alia, a situation where firms  in the complaining 
member have been autonomously reallocating exports of this product to  new markets); 
(f)  failure to conform to standards and other regulatory requirements in the importing country. 
6.8.  In the absence of circumstances referred to  in  paragraph 7,  the existence of serious 
prejudice should be determined on the basis of the information submitted to  or obtained by 
the panel,  including information submitted in accordance with the provisions of Annex V. 
6.9.  This Article does not apply to  subsidies maintained on agricultural products as  provided 
in Article 13  of the Agreement on agriculture. 
1  The fact that certain circumstances are referred to in this paragraph does not, in itself, confer upon them 
any legal status in terms of either GATT 1994 or this Agreement. These circumstances must not be isolated, 
sporadic or otherwise insignificant. 
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Remedies 
7.1.  Except as provided in Article 13 of the Agreement on agriculture, whenever a member 
has reason to believe that any subsidy referred to in Article  1, granted or maintained by another 
member,  results  in  injury  to  its  domestic  industry,  nullification  or impairment  or serious 
prejudice, such member may  request consultations with such other member. 
7  .2.  A request for consultations under paragraph  1 shall include a statement of available 
evidence with regard to  (a) the existence and  nature of the subsidy in question,  and (b) the 
injury caused to the domestic industry, or the nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice
1 
caused to the interests of the member requesting consultations. 
7.3.  Upon request for consultations under paragraph 1,  the member believed to  be granting 
or maintaining the subsidy practice in question shall enter into such consultations as  quickly 
as  possible. The purpose of the consultations shall be to clarify the facts of the situation and 
to  arrive at a mutually agreed solution. 
7 .4.  If consultations do not result in a mutually acceptable solution within 60 days, 
2  tflY 
member party to  such consultations may  refer the matter to the DSB  for the establishment 
of a panel, unless the DSB  decides by  consensus not to establish a panel. The composition 
of the panel and its  terms of reference shall be established within  15 days from  the date when 
it is established. 
7.5.  The panel shall review the matter and shall submit its final  report to  the parties to  the 
dispute.  The report shall be circulated to  all  members  within  120 days  of the  date of the 
composition and establishment of the  panel's terms of reference. 
7.6.  Within 30 days of the  issuance of the  panel's report to  all members,  the report shall 
be adopted by  the DSB 
3 unless one of the parties to  the dispute formally  notifies the DSB 
of its  decision to  appeal or the DSB  decides by  consensus not to  adopt the report. 
7. 7.  Where a panel report is appealed,  the Appellate Body shall issue its decision  within 
60 days from the date when the party to  the dispute formally  notifies its intention to appeal. 
When the Appellate Body considers that it cannot provide its report within 60 days, it shall 
inform the DSB  in writing of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period 
within which it will submit its report.  In no case shall the proceedings exceed 90 days.  The 
1  In the event that the request relates to a subsidy deemed to result in serious prejudice in terms of paragraph 
1 of Article 6, the available evidence of serious prejudice may be limited to the available evidence as 
to whether the conditions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 have been met or not. 
2  Any time-periods mentioned in this Article may be extended by mutual agreement. 
3  If  a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose. 
288 appellate report shall be adopted by the DSB  and unconditionally accepted by  the parties to 
the dispute unless the DSB  decides by consensus not to adopt the appellate report within 20 
days following its issuance to  the members. 
1 
7 .8.  Where a panel report or an  Appellate Body report is  adopted in which it is  determined 
that any  subsidy has resulted in adverse effects to the interests of another member within the 
meaning of Article 5, the member granting or maintaining such subsidy shall take appropriate 
steps to  remove the adverse effects or shall withdraw the subsidy. 
7.9.  In the event the member has not taken appropriate steps to  remove the adverse effects 
of the subsidy or withdraw the subsidy within six months from the date when the DSB  adopts 
the panel report or the Appellate Body report, and in the absence of agreement on compensation, 
the  DSB  shall  grant  authorization  to  the  complaining  member  to  take  countermeasures, 
commensurate with the  degree and nature of the  adverse effects determined to exist, unless 
the DSB  decides by consensus to reject the request. 
7.1 0.  In the event that a party to  the dispute requests arbitration under paragraph 6 of Article 
22 of the DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the countermeasures are commensurate 
with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist. 
PART IV- NON-ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES 
Article 8 
Identification of non-actionable subsidies 
8.1.  The following subsidies shall be considered as  non-actionable: 
2 
(a)  subsidies which are not specific within the meaning of Article 2; 
(b)  subsidies which are  specific within the  meaning of Article 2 but which meet all of the 
conditions provided for in paragraphs 2(a), 2(b) or 2(c) below. 
1  If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting shall be held for this purpose. 
2  It is recognized that government assistance for various purposes is widely provided by members and that 
the mere fact that such assistance may not qualify for non-actionable treatment under the provisions of 
this Article does not in itself restrict the ability of members to provide such assistance. 
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actionable: 
(a)  assistance for research activities conducted by firms  or by  higher education or research 
establishments on a contract basis with firms if: 
1
• 
2
• 
3 
the  assistance covers 
4  not more than 75%  of the costs of industrial research 
5 or 50% 
of the costs of pre-competitive development activity; 
6
• 
7 
and provided that such assistance is  limited exclusively to: 
(i)  costs  of personnel (researchers,  technicians  and  other supporting  staff employed 
exclusively in the research activity); 
(ii)  costs of instruments, equipment, land and buildings used exclusively and permanently 
(except when disposed of on a commercial basis) for the research activity; 
(iii)  costs of consultancy and equivalent services used exclusively for the research activity, 
including bought-in research, technical knowledge, patents, etc.; 
1  Since it is anticipated that civil aircraft will be subject to specific multilateral rules, the provisions of 
this subparagraph do not apply to that product. 
2  Not later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures provided for in Article 24 (referred to in this Agreement as  'the 
Committee') shall review the operation of the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) with a view to making 
all necessary modifications to improve the operation of these provisions. In its consideration of possible 
modifications, the Committee shall carefully review the definitions of the categories set forth  in this 
subparagraph in the light of the experience of members in the operation of research programmes and 
the work in other relevant international institutions. 
3  The provisions of this Agreement do not apply to fundamental research activities independently conducted 
by higher education or research establishments. The term 'fundamental research' means an enlargement 
of general scientific and technical knowledge not linked to industrial or commercial objectives. 
4  The allowable levels of non-actionable assistance referred to in this subparagraph shall be established 
by reference to the total eligible costs incurred over the duration of an individual project. 
5  The term 'industrial research' means planned research or critical investigation aimed at discovery of new 
knowledge, with the objective that such knowledge may be useful in developing new products, processes 
or services, or in bringing about a significant improvement to existing products, processes or services. 
6  The term 'pre-competitive development activity' means the translation of industrial research findings 
into a plan, blueprint or design for new, modified or improved products, processes or services whether 
intended for sale or use, including the  creation of a first prototype which would not be capable of 
commercial use. It may further include the conceptual formulation and design of products, processes or 
services alternatives and initial demonstration or pilot projects, provided that these same projects cannot 
be converted or used for industrial application or commercial exploitation. It does not include routine 
or periodic alterations to existing products, production lines, manufacturing processes, services, and other 
ongoing operations even through those alterations may represent improvements. 
7  In the case of prograRUlles which span industrial research and pre-competitive development activity, the 
allowable level of non-actionable assistance shall not exceed the simple average of the allowable levels 
of non-actionable assistance applicable to the above two categories, calculated on the basis of all eligible 
costs as set forth in points (i) to (v) of this subparagraph. 
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(v)  other running costs (such as those of material,  supplies and the like),  incurred directly 
as  a result of the research activity; 
(b)  assistance to disadvantaged regions within the territory of a member given pursuant to 
a general framework of regional development 
1  and  non-specific (within the meaning of 
Article 2)  within eligible regions provided that: 
(i)  each disadvantaged region must be a clearly designated contiguous geographical area 
with a definable economic and administrative identity; 
(ii)  the  region  is  considered  as  disadvantaged  on  the  basis  of neutral  and  objective 
criteria, 
2 indicating that the region's difficulties arise out of more than temporary 
circumstances; such criteria must be clearly spelled out in law,  regulation, or other 
official document,  so as  to  be capable of verification; 
(iii)  the criteria shall include a measurement of economic development which shall be 
based on at least one of the following  factors: 
one of either income per capita or household per capita,  or DGP per capita, 
which must not be above 85% of the average for the territory concerned; 
unemployment rate,  which must be at least 110% of the average for the territory 
concerned; 
as  measured  over  a  three-year  period;  such  measurement,  however,  may  be  a 
composite one and may  include other factors; 
(c)  assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities 
3  to new environmental requirements 
imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden 
on firms,  provided that the  assistance: 
(i)  is  a one-time non-recurring measure; and 
(ii)  is limited to  20%  of the cost of adaptation;  and 
1  A 'general framework of regional development' means that regional subsidy programmes are part of an 
internally consistent and generally applicable regional development policy and that regional development 
subsidies are not granted in isolated geographical points having no, or virtually no, influence on the 
development of the region. 
2  'Neutral and objective criteria'  means criteria which do not favour certain regions beyond what is 
appropriate for the elimination or reduction of regional disparities within the framework of the regional 
development policy. In this regard, regional subsidy programmes shall include ceilings on the amount 
of assistance which can be granted to each subsidized project Such ceilings must be differentiated according 
to the different levels of development of assisted regions and must be expressed in terms of investment 
costs or cost of  job creation. Within such ceilings, the distribution of assistance shall be sufficiently broad 
and even to avoid the predominant use of a subsidy by, or the granting of disproportionately large amounts 
of subsidy to certain enterprises as provided for in Article 2. 
3  The term 'existing facilities' means facilities which have been in operation for at least two years at the 
time when new environmental requirements are imposed. 
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must be fully  borne by  firms;  and 
(iv)  is  directly  linked to and proportionate to  a firm's planned reduction of nuisances 
and  pollution, and does not cover any  manufacturing cost savings which may  be 
achieved;  and 
(v)  is  available  to  all  firms  which  can  adopt  the  new  equipment  and/or  production 
processes. 
8.3.  A subsidy programme for which the  provisions of paragraph 2 are  invoked shall be 
notified in advance of its implementation to  the Committee in accordance with the provisions 
of Part VII.  Any  such notification shall be sufficiently precise to enable other members to 
evaluate the consistency of the  programme with the conditions and  criteria provided for in 
the relevant provisions of paragraph 2.  Members shall also  provide the Committee with yearly 
updates of such notifications, in particular by supplying information on global expenditure 
for each programme, and on any  modification of the programme. Other members shall have 
the  right  to  request  information  about  individual  cases  of subsidization  under  a  notified 
programme. 
1 
8.4.  Upon request of a member,  the Secretariat shall review a notification made pursuant 
to paragraph 3 and, where necessary, may require additional information from the subsidizing 
member concerning the notified programme under review.  The Secretariat shall  report its 
findings to the Committee. The Committee shall, upon request, promptly review the findings 
of the Secretariat (or,  if a review by the Secretariat has not been requested,  the notification 
itself), with a view to determining whether the conditions and criteria laid down in paragraph 
2 have not been met.  The procedure provided for in this  paragraph shall be completed at the 
latest at the first regular meeting of the Committee following  the notification of a subsidy 
programme, provided that at least two months have elapsed between such notification and 
the regular meeting of the Committee. The review procedure described in this paragraph shall 
also apply, upon request, to  substantial modifications of a programme notified in  the yearly 
updates referred to  in paragraph 3. 
8.5.  Upon the  request of a member,  the  determination  by  the  Committee  referred  to  in 
paragraph 4,  or a failure  by  the  Committee to  make  such a determination,  as  well  as  the 
violation,  in individual cases,  of the  conditions  set out in  a notified  programme,  shall  be 
submitted  to  binding  arbitration.  The arbitration  body  shall  present its  conclusions  to  the 
members within 120 days from the date when the matter was referred to the arbitration body. 
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the DSU shall apply to arbitrations conducted 
under this paragraph. 
1  It is recognized that nothing in this notification provision requires the provision of confidential information, 
including confidential business information. 
292 Article 9 
Consultations and authorized remedies 
9  .1.  If,  in the course of implementation of a programme referred to  in paragraph 2 of Article 
8,  notwithstanding the fact that the  programme is  consistent with the criteria laid down  in 
that paragraph, a member has reasons to  believe that this programme has resulted in  serious 
adverse effects to the domestic industry of that member, such as to cause damage which would 
be difficult to  repair, such member may request consultations with the member granting or 
maintaining the subsidy. 
9.2.  Upon request for consultations under paragraph  1,  the member granting or maintaining 
the subsidy programme in question shall enter into such consultations as quickly as  possible. 
The purpose of the consultations shall be to  clarify the facts  of the situation and to  arrive 
at a mutually acceptable solution. 
9.3.  If no  mutually acceptable solution has  been reached in consultations under paragraph 
2 within 60 days of the request for such consultations, the requesting member may refer the 
matter to  the Committee. 
9  .4.  Where a matter is referred to  the Committee, the Committee shall immediately review 
the facts  involved and the evidence of the effects referred to in paragraph  1. If  the Committee 
determines that such effects exist, it may recommend to  the subsidizing member to  modify 
this programme in such a way  as  to  remove these effects. The Committee shall present its 
conclusions within  120 days from the date when the matter is referred to it under paragraph 
3.  In the event the recommendation is not followed  within six  months,  the Committee shall 
authorize the requesting member to take appropriate countermeasures commensurate with the 
nature and degree of the effects determined to exist. 
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Article 10 
Application of Article VI of GATT 1994
1 
Members shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a countervailing duty
2 
on any  product of the territory of any  member imported into the territory of another member 
is  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of Article  VI  of GATT  1994  and  the  terms  of this 
Agreement. Countervailing duties may only be imposed pursuant to investigations initiated 
3 
and  conducted in accordance with the provisions of this  Agreement and the Agreement on 
agriculture. 
Article 11 
Initiation and subsequent investigation 
11.1.  Except as  provided in  paragraph 6,  an investigation to determine the existence, degree 
and effect of any alleged subsidy shall be initiated upon a written application by  or on behalf 
of the domestic industry. 
11.2.  An application under paragraph  1 shall include sufficient evidence of the existence 
of (a)  a subsidy and,  if possible, its amount,  (b) injury within the meaning of Article VI  of 
GATT 1994 as  interpreted by  this  Agreement,  and (c)  a causal link between the  subsidized 
imports and the alleged injury. Simple assertion, unsubstantiated by relevant evidence, cannot 
be considered sufficient to meet the requirements of this paragraph. The application shall contain 
such information as  is reasonably available to  the application on the following: 
(i)  the identity of the applicant and a description of the volume and value of the domestic 
production of the like product by the applicant. Where a written application is made on 
1  The provisions of Part II or III may be invoked in parallel with the provisions of Part V; however, with 
regard to the effects of a particular subsidy in the domestic market of the importing member, only one 
form of relief (either a countervailing duty, if the requirements of Part V are met, or a countermeasure 
under Article 4 or 7) shall be available. The provisions of Parts III and V shall not be invoked regarding 
measures considered non-actionable in accordance with the provisions of Part IV. However, measures 
referred to in paragraph l(a) of Article 8 may be investigated in order to determine whether or not they 
are specific within the meaning of Article 2. In addition, in the case of a subsidy referred to in paragraph 
2 of Article 8 conferred pursuant to a programme which has not been notified in accordance with paragraph 
3 of Article 8, the provisions of Part III or V may be invoked, but such subsidy shall be treated as non-
actionable if it is found to conform to the standards set forth in paragraph 2 of Article 8. 
2  The term 'countervailing duty' shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of 
offsetting any subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any 
merchandise, as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article VI of GATT 1994. 
3  The term 'initiated' as used hereinafter means procedural action by which a member formally commences 
an investigation as provided in Article 11. 
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which the application is made by a list of all known domestic producers of the like product 
(or associations of domestic producers of the  like product) and,  to the extent possible, 
a description of the volume and value of domestic production of the like product accounted 
for by such producers; 
(ii)  a complete description of the allegedly subsidized product, the names of the country or 
countries of origin or export in question, the identity of each known exporter or foreign 
producer and a list of known persons importing the product in question; 
(iii)  evidence with regard to the existence, amount and nature of the  subsidy in question; 
(iv)  evidence that alleged injury to a domestic industry is caused by subsidized imports through 
the effects of the  subsidies; this evidence includes information on the evolution of the 
volume of the allegedly subsidized imports, the effect of these imports on prices of the 
like product in the domestic market and the consequent impact of the imports on the 
domestic industry, as  demonstrated by relevant factors and indices having a bearing on 
the state of the domestic industry, such as those listed in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article  15. 
11.3.  The authorities shall review the accuracy and adequacy of the evidence provided in 
the application to determine the evidence is sufficient to justify the initiation of an investigation. 
11.4.  An investigation shall not be initiated pursuant to paragraph  1 unless the authorities 
have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support for,  or opposition 
to,  the application expressed 
1 by domestic producers of the like product, that the application 
has been made by or on behalf of the domestic industry. 
2 The application shall be considered 
to  have been  made  'by or on behalf of the  domestic industry'  if it is  supported by  those 
domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50% of the total production 
of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support 
for or opposition to the application. However, no investigation shall be initiated when domestic 
producers expressly supporting the application account for less than 25% of total production 
of the like product produced by  the domestic industry. 
11.5.  The authorities shall avoid, unless a decision has been made to  initiate an  investigation, 
any publicizing of the  application for the initiation of an investigation. 
11.6.  If, in special circumstances, the authorities concerned decide to initiate an investigation 
without having received a written application by  or on behalf of a domestic industry for the 
initiation of such investigation,  they  shall proceed only if they have sufficient evidence of 
the existence of a subsidy, injury and causal link, as described in paragraph 2,  to justify the 
initiation of an investigation. 
1  In the case of fragmented industries involving an exceptionally large number of producers, authorities 
may determine support and opposition by using statistically valid sampling techniques. 
2  Members are aware that in the territory of certain members employees of domestic producers of the like 
product or representative of those employees may make or support an application for an investigation 
under paragraph 1. 
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decision whether or not to initiate an investigation and (b)  thereafter, during the course of 
the investigation, starting on a date not later than the earliest date on  which in accordance 
with the provisions of this Agreement provisional measures may  be  applied. 
11.8.  In cases where products are not imported directly from  the country of origin but are 
exported  to  the  importing  member  from  an  intermediate  country,  the  provisions  of this 
Agreement shall be fully  applicable and the transaction or transactions shall, for the purposes 
of this Agreement, be regarded as  having taken place between the country of origin and the 
importing member. 
11.9.  An  application  under  paragraph  1 shall  be  rejected  and  an  investigation  shall  be 
determined promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is not sufficient 
evidence of either subsidization or of injury to justify proceeding with the case. There shall 
be immediate termination in cases where the amount of subsidy is de  minimis, or where the 
volume of subsidized imports, actual or potential, or the injury,  is  negligible.  For the purpose 
of this paragraph, the amount of the subsidy shall be considered to  be de minimis if the subsidy 
is less than  1%  ad valorem. 
11.1 0.  An investigation shall not hinder the procedures of customs clearance. 
11.11.  Investigations shall, except in special circumstances, be concluded within one year, 
and in no case more than  18  months, after their initiation. 
Article 12 
Evidence 
12.1.  Interested members and all interested parties in a countervailing duty investigation shall 
be given notice of the information which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present 
in writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of the investigation in question. 
12.1.1.  Exporters,  foreign  producers or interested members  receiving questionnaires used 
in  a  countervailing  duty  investigation  shall  be  given  at  least  30  days  for  reply. 
1  Due 
consideration should be given to  any  request for an extension of the 30-day period and,  upon 
cause shown, such an  extension should be granted whenever practicable. 
12.1.2.  Subject to  the requirement to  protect confidential information, evidence presented 
in  writing by  one interested member or interested party  shall be  made available promptly to 
other interested members or interested parties participating in the investigation. 
1  As a general rule, the time-limit for exporters shall be counted from the date of receipt of the questionnaire, 
which for this purpose shall be deemed to have been received one week from the date on which it was 
sent to the respondent or transmitted to the appropriate diplomatic representatives of the exporting member 
or, in the case of a separate customs territory member of the WTO, an official representative of the exporting 
territory. 
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text of the written application received under paragraph 1 of Article  11  to the known exporters
1 
and to  the  authorities of the exporting member and shall make it available, upon request,  to 
other interested parties involved. Due regard shall be paid to the protection of confidential 
information,  as  provided for in paragraph 4. 
12.2.  Interested members and interested parties also shall have the right,  upon justification, 
to present information orally. Where such information is provided orally, the interested members 
and interested parties subsequently shall be required to  reduce such submissions to  writing. 
Any  decision of the  investigating  authorities  can only  be  based on  such information and 
arguments as were on the written record of this authority and which were available to interested 
members and interested parties participating in the investigation, due account having been 
given to  the need to protect confidential information. 
12.3.  The authorities shall,  whenever practicable, provide timely opportunities for all interested 
members and interested parties to see all information that is  relevant to  the presentation of 
their cases, that is  not confidential as defmed in paragraph 4,  and that is  used by the authorities 
in  a  countervailing  duty  investigation,  and  to  prepare  presentations  on  the  basis  of this 
information. 
12.4.  Any information which is  by nature confidential (for example, because its disclosure 
would be of significant competitive advantage to a competitor or because its disclosure would 
have a significantly adverse effect upon a person supplying the information or upon a person 
from whom the supplier acquired the information) or which is provided on a confidential basis 
by  parties  to  an  investigation  shall,  upon  good  cause  shown,  be  treated  as  such  by  the 
authorities. Such information shall not be disclosed without the specific permission of the party 
submitting it. 
2 
12.4.1.  The  authorities  shall  require  interested  members  or  interested  parties  providing 
confidential information to furnish non-confidential summaries thereof. These summaries shall 
be in sufficient detail to permit a reasonable understanding of the substance of the information 
submitted in confidence. In exceptional circumstances, such members or parties may indicate 
that such information is  not susceptible of summary.  In such exceptional circumstances,  a 
statement of the reasons why  summarization is not possible must be provided. 
12.4.2.  If the authorities find that a request for confidentiality is not warranted and if the 
supplier of the information is either unwilling to make the information public or to authorize 
its disclosure in generalized or summary form,  the authorities may disregard such information 
1  It being understood that where the number of exporters involved is particularly high, the full text of the 
application should instead be provided only to the authorities of the exporting member or to the relevant 
trade association who then should forward copies to the exporters concerned. 
2  Members are aware that in the territory of certain members disclosure pursuant to a narrowly drawn 
protective order may be required. 
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is  correct. 
1 
12.5.  Except in  circumstances provided for  in  paragraph 7, the authorities shall during the 
course of an  investigation satisfy themselves as  to  the  accuracy  of the information supplied 
by interested members or interested parties upon which their findings  are based. 
12.6.  The investigating  authorities  may  carry  out  investigations  in  the  territory  of other 
members as  required,  provided that they have notified in good time the member in  question 
and unless that member objects to  the investigation. Further, the investigating authorities may 
carry out investigations on the premises of a firm  and  may  examine the records of a firm 
if (a) the firm so agrees and (b) the member in question is notified and does not object. The 
procedures set forth in Annex VI shall apply to investigations on the premises of a firm.  Subject 
to  the  requirements to  protect confidential information, the  authorities shall make the results 
of any such investigations available, or shall provide disclosure thereof pursuant to  paragraph 
8,  to  the firms  to which they pertain and may  take such results available to  the applicants. 
12.7.  In cases  in  which  any  interested  member or interested  party  refuses  access  to,  or 
otherwise does not provide, necessary information within a reasonable period or significantly 
impedes the investigation, preliminary  and final  determination,  affirmative or negative,  may 
be made on the basis of the facts  available. 
12.8.  The authorities shall, before a final determination is made, inform all interested members 
and interested parties of the essential facts  under consideration which form  the basis for the 
decision whether to  apply definitive measures. Such disclosure should take place in sufficient 
time for the parties to  defend their interests. 
12.9.  For the  purposes of this  Agreement,  'interested parties'  shall include: 
(i)  an exporter or foreign producer or the importer of a product subject to  investigation or 
a trade or business association a majority of members of which are producers, exporters 
or importers of such product; and 
(ii)  a producer of the like product in the importing member or a trade and business association 
a majority of the  members  of which produce the  like  product in the  territory  of the 
importing member. 
This list shall not preclude members from  allowing domestic or foreign  parties other than 
those mentioned above to  be included as  interested parties. 
12.1 0.  The authorities  shall provide opportunities for  industrial use of the  product under 
investigation,  and for  representative consumer organizations in cases  where  the product is 
commonly sold at the retail level,  to  provide information which is relevant to  the investigation 
regarding subsidization, injury  and causality. 
1  Members agree that requests for confidentiality should not be arbitrarily rejected. Members further agree 
that the investigating authority may request the waiving of confidentiality only regarding information 
relevant to the proceedings. 
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parties, in particular small companies, in supplying information requested, and shall provide 
any  assistance practicable. 
12.12.  The procedures set out above are not intended to prevent the authorities of a member 
from proceeding expeditiously with regard to initiating an investigation, reaching preliminary 
or final determinations, whether affirmative of negative, or from  applying provisional or final 
measures, in accordance with relevant provisions of this Agreement. 
Article 13 
Consultations 
13.1.  As soon as  possible after an application under Article 11  is  accepted, and in any event 
before the initiation of any  investigation,  members the products of which may  be subject to 
such investigation shall be invited for consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation 
as  to the matters referred to in paragraph 2 of Article  11  and arriving at a mutually  agreed 
solution. 
13.2.  Furthermore, throughout the period of investigation, members the product of which 
are the  subject of the  investigation shall be  afforded a reasonable opportunity to  continue 
consultations with a view to clarifying the factual situation and to arriving at a mutually agreed 
solution. 
1 
13.3.  Without prejudice to  the obligation to  afford reasonable opportunity for consultation, 
these provisions regarding consultations are not intended to prevent the authorities of a member 
from proceeding expeditiously with regard to  initiating the investigation, reaching preliminary 
or final determinations, whether affirmative or negative, or from applying provisional or final 
measures, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. 
13 .4.  The member which  intends  to  initiate  any  investigation  or is  conducting  such  an 
investigation shall permit, upon request, the member or members the products of which are 
subject to such investigation access to non-confidential evidence, including the non-confidential 
summary of confidential data being used for initiating or conducting the investigation. 
1  It is  particularly important,  in  accordance with the provisions of this paragraph, that no  affirmative 
determination whether preliminary or final be made without reasonable opportunity for consultations 
having been given. Such consultations may establish the basis for proceeding under the provisions of 
Part II, III or X. 
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Calculation of the amount of a subsidy in terms of the benefit to the 
recipient 
For the purpose of Part V,  any method used by  the investigating authority to  calculate the 
benefit to  the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be provided for 
in  the  national  legislation  or implementing  regulations  of the  member  concerned  and  its 
application to each particular case shall be transparent and adequately explained. Furthermore, 
any  such method shall be consistent with the following guidelines: 
(a)  government provision of equity capital shall not be considered as  conferring a benefit, 
unless the investment decision can be regarded as inconsistent with the usual investment 
practice (including for the provision of risk capital) of private investors in the territory 
of that member; 
(b)  a loan by  a government shall not be considered as  conferring a benefit, unless there is 
a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the loan pays on the government 
loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable commercial loan which the 
firm could actually obtain on the market. In this case the benefit shall be the difference 
between these two amounts; 
(c)  a loan guarantee by a government shall not be considered as  conferring a benefit, unless 
there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the guarantee pays on 
a  loan guaranteed by  the  government and the amount that  the firm  would  pay  on a 
comparable commercial loan minus the government guarantee. In this case the benefit 
shall be the difference between these two amounts adjusted for any differences in fees; 
(d)  the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by  a government shall not be 
considered as conferring a benefit unless the provision is  made for less than adequate 
remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than adequate remuneration. The adequacy 
of remuneration shall be determined in  relation to  prevailing market conditions for the 
good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, 
quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale). 
Article 15 
Determination of injury 
1 
15 .1.  A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GAIT 1994 shall be based 
on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a)  the  volume of the 
subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market 
1  Under this Agreement the term 'injury' shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury 
to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the 
establishment of such an industry, and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article. 
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1  and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers 
of such products. 
15.2.  With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating authorities shall 
consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsidized imports, either in absolute 
terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing member. With regard to the 
effect of the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether 
there has been a significant price undercutting by  the subsidized imports as  compared with 
the price of a like product of the importing member, or whether the effect of such imports 
is  otherwise to depress prices to  a significant degree or to  prevent price increases,  which 
otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one  nor several of these factors 
can necessarily give decisive guidance. 
15.3.  Where imports of a product from more than one country are simultaneously subject 
to  countervailing duty  investigations, the investigating authorities may cumulatively assess 
the  effects  of such  imports  only  in  they  determine  that  (a)  the  amount of subsidization 
established in relation to the imports from each country is more than de  minimis as  defined 
in paragraph 9 of Article 11  and the volume of imports from each country is  not negligible, 
and (b)  a cumulative assessment of the effects of the imports is appropriate in light of the 
conditions of competition between the imported products and the conditions of competition 
between the imported products and the like domestic product. 
15.4.  The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall 
include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the 
state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, 
productivity, return on investments, or utilization of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; 
actual and potential negative effects on cash flow,  inventories, employment, wages, growth, 
ability to  raise capital or investments and,  in the case of agriculture,  whether there has been 
an increased burden on government support programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor can 
one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance. 
15.5.  It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are,  through the effects
2  of su~idies, 
causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship 
between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an 
examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine 
any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at the same time are injuring the 
domestic industry, and the injuries caused by  these other factors must not be attributed to 
the subsidized imports.  Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia,  the 
volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand 
or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between 
1  Throughout this Agreement, the term 'like product' (produit similaire) shall be interpreted to mean a 
product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence 
of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely 
resembling those of the product under consideration. 
2  As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4. 
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and productivity of the domestic industry. 
15.6.  The effect of the  subsidized  imports  shall  be  assessed  in relation  to  the  domestic 
production of the like product when available data permit the separate identification of that 
production on the basis of such criteria as the production process, producers' sales and profits. 
If  such separate identification of that production is not possible, the effects of the subsidized 
imports shall be assessed by the examination of the production of the narrowest group or range 
of products,  which include the  like  product,  for  which  the  necessary  information can be 
provided. 
15.7.  A determination of a threat of material injury shall be based on facts  and not merely 
on allegation, conjecture or remote possibility. The change in circumstances which would create 
a situation in which the subsidy would cause injury must be clearly foreseen  and imminent. 
In making a determination regarding the existence of a threat of material injury, the investigating 
authorities shall consider, inter alia,  such factors as: 
(i)  the nature of the subsidy or subsidies in question and the trade effects likely  to  arise 
therefrom; 
(ii)  a significant rate of increase of subsidized imports into the domestic market indicating 
the likelihood of substantially increased importation; 
(iii)  sufficient freely disposable, or an imminent, substantial increase in, capacity of the exporter 
indicating the likelihood of substantially increased subsidized exports to the importing 
member's market, taking into account the availability of other export markets to  absorb 
any  additional exports; 
(iv)  whether imports are entering at prices that will have a significant depressing or suppressing 
effect on domestic prices,  and would likely increase demand for further imports; and 
(v)  inventories of the product being investigated. 
No  one of these factors by itself can necessarily give decisive guidance but the totality of 
the factors considered must lead to the conclusion that further subsidized exports are imminent 
and that,  unless protective action is taken, material injury would occur. 
15.8.  With respect to cases where injury is  threatened by subsidized imports, the application 
of countervailing measures shall be considered and decided with special care. 
Article 16 
Definition of domestic industry 
16.1.  For the  purposes of this  Agreement,  the  term  'domestic industry'  shall,  except  as 
provided in paragraph 2,  be interpreted as  referring to the domestic producers as  a whole of 
the like products or of to  those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes 
a  major proportion of the total  domestic  production of those  products,  except that  when 
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1 to the exporters or importers or are themselves importers of the allegedly 
subsidized product or a like product from other countries, the term  'domestic industry'  may 
be interpreted as referring to  the rest of the producers. 
16.2.  In exceptional circumstances, the territory of a member may, for the production in 
question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market 
may be regarded as a separate industry if (a) the producers within such market sell all or almost 
all of their production of the product in question in that market, and (b) the demand in that 
market is not to any substantial degree supplied by producers of the product in question located 
elsewhere in the territory. In such circumstances, injury may be found to exist even where 
a major portion of the total domestic industry is not injured, provided there is  a concentration 
of subsidized imports into such an isolated market and provided further that the subsidized 
imports are causing injury to the producers of all or almost all of the production within such 
market. 
16.3.  When the domestic industry has been interpreted as  referring to the  producers in a 
certain area, i.e. a market as defined in paragraph 2,  countervailing duties shall be levied only 
on the products in question consigned for final consumption to that area When the constitutional 
law of the importing member does not permit the levying of countervailing duties on such 
a basis, the importing members may levy the countervailing duties without limitation only 
if (a) the exporters shall have been given an opportunity to cease exporting at subsidized prices 
to  the  area  concerned or otherwise  give  assurance  pursuant  to  Article  18,  and  adequate 
assurances in this regard have not been promptly given, and (b) such duties cannot be levied 
only on products of specific producers which supply the area in question. 
16.4.  Where two or more countries have reached under the provisions of paragraph 8(a) of 
Article XXIV of GATT 1994 such a level of integration that they  have the characteristics 
of a single unified market, the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be 
the domestic industry referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2. 
16.5.  The provisions of paragraph 6 of Article  15  shall be applicable to this Article. 
Article 17 
Provisional measures 
17 .1.  Provisional measures may be applied only if: 
(a)  an investigation has been initiated in accordance with the provisions of Article 11, a public 
notice has been given to that effect and interested members and interested parties have 
been given adequate opportunities to submit information and make comments; 
1  For the purpose of this paragraph, producers shall be deemed to be related to exporters or importers only 
if (a) one of them directly or indirectly controls the other; or (b) both of them are directly or indirectly 
controlled by a third person; or (c) together they directly or indirectly control a third person, provided 
that there are grounds for believing or suspecting that the effect of the relationship is such as to cause 
the producer concerned to behave differently from non-related producers. For the purpose of this paragraph, 
one shall be deemed to control another when the former is legally or operationally in a position' to exercise 
restraint or direction over the latter. 
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is injury to a domestic industry caused by subsidized imports; and 
(c)  the authorities concerned judge such measures necessary to prevent injury being caused 
during the investigation. 
17.2.  Provisional measures may take the form of provisional countervailing duties guaranteed 
by  cash deposits or bonds equal to  the amount of the  provisionally calculated amount of 
subsidization. 
17.3.  Provisional measures shall not be applied sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation 
of the investigation. 
17.4.  The application of provisional measures shall be limited to as short a period as possible, 
not exceeding four months. 
17.5.  The relevant provisions of Article  19 shall be followed in the application of provisional 
measures. 
Article 18 
Undertakings 
18.1.  Proceedings may 
1 be suspended or terminated without the imposition of provisional 
measures or countervailing duties upon receipt of satisfactory voluntary undertakings under 
which: 
(a)  the government of the exporting member agrees to  eliminate or limit the subsidy or take 
other measures concerning its effects; or 
(b)  the exporter agrees to  revise its prices so that the investigating authorities are satisfied 
that  the  injurious  effect  of the  subsidy  is  eliminated.  Price  increases  under  such 
undertakings shall not be higher than necessary to eliminate the amount of the subsidy. 
It is desirable that the price increases be less than the amount of subsidy if such increases 
would be adequate to remove the injury to  the domestic industry. 
18.2.  Undertakings shall not be sought or accepted unless the authorities of the importing 
member have made a preliminary affmnative determination of subsidization and injury caused 
by such subsidization and, in case of undertakings from exporters, have obtained the consent 
of the exporting member. 
18.3.  Undertakings offered need not be accepted if the authorities of the importing member 
consider their acceptance impractical, for example if the number of actual or potential exporters 
is  too great,  or for other reasons,  including reasons of general policy.  Should the case arise 
and  where practicable, the authorities shall provide to the exporter the reasons which have 
1  The word 'may' shall not be interpreted to allow the simultaneous continuation of proceedings with the 
implementation of undertakings, except as provided in paragraph 4. 
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possible, give the exporters an opportunity to make comments thereon. 
18.4.  If an  undertaking  is  accepted,  the  investigation  of subsidization  and  injury  shall 
nevertheless be completed if the exporting member so desires or the importing member so 
decides.  In such a case, if a negative determination of subsidization or injury is made,  the 
undertaking shall automatically lapse, except in cases where such a determination is due in 
large part to  the existence of an undertaking.  In such cases, the authorities concerned may 
require that an undertaking be maintained for a reasonable period consistent with the provisions 
of this Agreement. In the event that an affirmative determination of subsidization and injury 
is  made, the undertaking shall continue consistent with its terms and the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
18.5.  Price undertakings may be suggested by the authorities of the importing member, but 
no exporter shall be forced  to  enter into  such undertakings.  The fact that governments or 
exporters do not offer such undertakings, or do not accept an invitation to do so,  shall in no 
way prejudice the consideration of the case.  However, the authorities are free to determine 
that a threat of injury is more likely to be realized if the subsidized imports continue. 
18.6.  Authorities of an  importing member may require any  government or exporter from 
whom an undertaking has  been accepted to  provide periodically information relevant to the 
fulfilment of such  an  undertaking,  and to permit verification of pertinent data.  In case of 
violation of an  undertaking, the  authorities of the importing member may  take,  under this 
Agreement in conformity with its provisions, expeditious actions which may constitute immediate 
application of provisional measures using the best information available. In such cases, definitive 
duties may be levied in accordance with this Agreement on products entered for consumption 
not more than 90 days before the application of such provisional measures, except that any 
such retroactive assessment shall not apply  to  imports entered before the  violation of the 
undertaking. 
Article 19 
Imposition and collection of countervailing duties 
19.1.  If, after reasonable efforts have been made to complete consultations, a member makes 
a fmal determination of the existence and amount of the subsidy and that,  through the effects 
of the subsidy, the subsidized imports are causing injury, it may impose a countervailing duty 
in accordance with the provisions of this Article unless the subsidy or subsidies are withdrawn. 
19.2.  The decision  whether  or not  to  impose  a  countervailing  duty  in  cases  where  all 
requirements for the imposition have been fulfilled and the decision whether the amount of 
the  countervailing duty  to  be imposed shall be the  full  amount of the subsidy or less  are 
decisions to be  made by  the  authorities of the importing  member.  It is  desirable  that the 
imposition should be permissive in the territory of all members, that the duty should be less 
than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury 
to  the domestic industry,  and that procedures should be established which would allow the 
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1 
whose interests might be adversely affected by  the imposition of a countervailing duty. 
19.3.  When a countervailing duty is imposed in respect of any product, such countervailing 
duty shall be levied, in the appropriate amounts in each case, on a non-discriminatory basis 
on imports of such product from  all sources found to be subsidized and causing injury, except 
as  to  imports from those sources which have renounced any  subsidies in question or from 
which undertakings under the terms of this Agreement have been accepted.  Any exporter whose 
exports are subject to  a definitive countervailing duty but who was not actually investigated 
for reasons other than a refusal to  cooperate shall be entitled to  an expedited review in order 
that the investigating authorities promptly establish an individual countervailing duty rate for 
that exporter. 
19.4.  No countervailing duty shall be levied
2 on any imported product in excess of the amount 
of the subsidy found to exist, calculated in terms of subsidization per unit of the subsidized 
and exported product. 
Article 20 
Retroactivity 
20.1.  Provisional measures and countervailing duties shall only be applied to  products which 
enter for consumption after the time when the decision under paragraph 1 of Article 17  and 
paragraph 1 of Article  19,  respectively, enter into force,  subject to  the exceptions set out in 
this Article. 
20.2.  Where a final  determination of injury  (but not of a threat thereof or of a material 
retardation of the establishment of an industry) is  made or,  in the case of a final determination 
of a threat or injury, where the effect of the subsidized imports would, in the absence of the 
provisional measures, have led to a determination of injury, countervailing duties may be levied 
retroactively for the period for which provisional measures, if any,  have been applied. 
20.3.  If  the definitive countervailing duty is higher than the amount guaranteed by the cash 
deposit or bond, the difference shall not be collected. If the  definitive duty is  less than the 
amount guaranteed by the cash deposit or bond, the excess amount shall be reimbursed or 
the bond released in an expeditious manner. 
20.4.  Except as provided in paragraph 2,  where a determination of threat of injury or material 
retardation is  made (but no injury has yet occurred) a definitive countervailing duty may  be 
imposed only from the date of the determination of threat or injury or material retardation, 
and any  cash deposit made during the period of the  application of provisional measures shall 
be refunded and any bonds released in an  expeditious manner. 
1  For the purpose of this paragraph, the term 'domestic interested parties' shall include consumers and 
industrial users of the imported product subject to investigation. 
2  As used in this Agreement, 'levy' shall mean the definitive or final legal assessment·or collection of a 
duty or tax. 
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the  application  of provisional  measures  shall  be  refunded  and  any  bonds  released  in  an 
expeditious manner. 
20.6.  In critical circumstances where for the subsidized product in question the authorities 
find that injury which is difficult to repair is caused by massive imports in a relatively short 
period of a product benefiting from subsidies paid or bestowed inconsistently with the provisions 
of GAIT 1994 and of this Agreement and where it is deemed necessary, in order to  preclude 
the recurrence of such injury, to assess countervailing duties retroactively on those imports, 
the  definitive  countervailing  duties  may  be  assessed  on  imports  which  were  entered  for 
consumption not more than 90 days prior to the date of application of provisional measures. 
Article 21 
Duration and review of countervailing duties and undertakings 
21.1.  A countervailing duty shall remain in force only as  long as and to  the extent necessary 
to counteract subsidization which is causing injury. 
21.2.  The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where 
warranted, on their own initiative or,  provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed 
since the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any  interested party 
which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. Interested parties 
shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition 
of the duty is  necessary to  offset subsidization, whether the injury would be likely to continue 
or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as  a result of the review under this 
paragraph, the authorities determine that the countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it 
shall be terminated immediately. 
21.3.  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2,  any definitive countervailing 
duty shall be terminated on a date not later than five  years from its imposition (or from the 
date of the most recent review under paragraph 2 if that review has covered both subsidization 
and injury, or under this paragraph), unless the authorities determine, in a review initiated 
before that date on their own initiative or upon a duly substantiated request made by or on 
behalf of the domestic industry within a reasonable period of time prior to that date, that the 
expiry of the duty would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and 
injury. 
1  The duty may remain in force pending the outcome of such a review. 
21.4.  The provisions of Article 12 regarding evidence and procedure shall apply to any review 
carried out under this Article. Any such review shall be carried out expeditiously and shall 
normally be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review. 
1  When the amount of the countervailing duty is assessed on a retrospective basis, a finding in the most 
recent assessment proceeding that no duty is to be levied shall not by itself require the authorities to 
terminate the definitive duty. 
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under Article  18. 
Article 22 
Public notice and explanation of determinations 
22.1.  When the authorities are satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to justify the initiation 
of an investigation pursuant to  Article  11,  the member or members the products of which 
are  subject to  such  investigation  and  other  interested  parties  known  to  the  investigating 
authorities to  have an interest therein shall be notified and a public notice shall be given. 
22.2.  A public notice of the initiation of an investigation shall contain, or otherwise make 
available through a separate report, 
1  adequate information on the following: 
(a)  the name of the exporting country or countries and the product involved; 
(b)  the date of initiation of the investigation; 
(c)  a description of the subsidy practice or practices to be investigated; 
(d)  a summary of the factors on which the allegation of injury is based; 
(e)  the address to which representations by interested members and interested parties should 
be directed; and 
(f)  the time-limits allowed to interested members and interested parties for making their views 
known. 
22.3.  Public notice shall be given of any preliminary or final determination, whether affirmative 
or negative, of any decision to accept an undertaking pursuant to Article 18, of the termination 
of such an  undertaking, and of the termination of a definitive countervailing duty.  Each such 
notice shall set forth,  or otherwise make available through a separate report,  in sufficient detail 
the findings and conclusions reached on all issues of fact and law considered material by the 
investigating authorities. All such notices and reports shall be forwarded to the  member or 
members the products of which are subject to such determination or undertaking and to  other 
interested parties known to have an interest therein. 
22.4.  A public notice of the imposition of provisional measures shall set forth,  or otherwise 
make available through a separate report, sufficiently detailed explanations for the preliminary 
determinations on the existence of a subsidy and injury and shall refer to  the matters of fact 
and law which have led to  arguments being accepted or rejected. Such a notice or report shall, 
due regard being paid to the requirement for the protection of confidential information, contain 
in particular: . 
1  Where authorities provide information and explanations under the provisions of this Article in a separate 
report, they shall ensure that such a report is readily available to the public. 
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(ii)  a description of the product which is  sufficient for customs purposes; 
(iii)  the amount of subsidy established and the basis on which the existence of a subsidy has 
been determined; 
(iv)  considerations relevant to the injury determination as  set out in Article  15; 
(v)  the main reasons leading to the determination. 
22.5.  A  public  notice  of conclusion or suspension  of an  investigation in  the  case of an 
affirmative determination providing for the imposition of a definitive duty or the  acceptance 
of an undertaking shall contain, or otherwise make available through a separate report, all 
relevant information on the matters of fact and law and reasons which have led to the imposition 
of fmal  measures or the acceptance of an undertaking, due regard being paid to  the requirement 
for the protection of confidential information. 
In particular, the notice or report shall contain the information described in paragraph 4,  as 
well as  the reasons for the acceptance or rejection of relevant arguments or claims made by 
interested members and by the exporters and importers. 
22.6.  A  public notice of the termination or suspension of an  investigation following  the 
acceptance of an undertaking pursuant to  Article  18 shall include, or otherwise make available 
through a separate report,  the non-confidential part of this undertaking. 
22.7.  The provisions  of this  Article  shall  apply  mutatis  mutandis  to  the  initiation  and 
completion of reviews pursuant to Article 21  and to decisions under Article 20 to apply duties 
retroactively. 
Article 23 
Judicial review 
Each member whose national legislation contains provisions on countervailing duty measures 
shall maintain judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for the purpose, inter 
alia, of the prompt review of administrative actions relating to final determinations and reviews 
of determinations within the meaning of Article 21.  Such tribunals or procedures shall be 
independent of the authorities responsible for the determination or review in question,  and 
shall provide all interested parties who participated in the administrative proceeding and are 
directly and individually affected by the administrative actions with access to review. 
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Article 24 
Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures and subsidiary 
bodies 
24.1.  There is  hereby established a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
composed of representatives from  each of the members. The Committee shall elect its own 
chairman and shall meet not less than twice a year and  otherwise as  envisaged by  relevant 
provisions of this Agreement at  the  request of any  member.  The Committee shall carry out 
responsibilities as assigned to  it under this Agreement or by the members and it shall afford 
members the opportunity of consulting on any matter relating to the operation of the Agreement 
or the furtherance of its objectives. The WTO Secretariat shall act as  the secretariat to  the 
Committee. 
24.2.  The Committee may  set up subsidiary bodies as  appropriate. 
24.3.  The  Committee  shall  establish  a  Permanent  Group  of Experts  composed  of five 
independent persons, highly qualified in the fields  of subsidies and trade relations. The experts 
will be elected by  the Committee and one of them will be replaced every year.  The PGE may 
be requested to  assist a panel,  as  provided for in  paragraph 5 of Article 4.  The Committee 
may  also  seek an  advisory opinion on the existence and nature of any  subsidy. 
24.4.  The PGE may be consulted by any  member and  may  give advisory opinions on the 
nature of any subsidy proposed to be introduced or currently maintained by that member.  Such 
advisory opinions will be confidential and  may  not be invoked in proceedings under Article 
7. 
24.5.  In carrying out their functions,  the Committee and any subsidiary bodies may consult 
with  and  seek information  from  any  source  they  deem  appropriate.  However,  before  the 
Committee or a subsidiary body seeks such information from  a source within the jurisdiction 
of a member,  it shall inform the member involved. 
PART VII- NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE 
Article 25 
Notifications 
25.1.  Members agree that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XVI 
of GATT 1994, their notifications of subsidies shall be submitted not later than 30 June of 
each year and shall conform to  the provisions of paragraphs 2 to  6. 
25.2.  Members  shall notify  any  subsidy  as  defined in  paragraph  1 of Article  1,  which is 
specific within the meaning of Article 2,  granted or maintained within their territories. 
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to evaluate the trade effects and to understand the operation of notified subsidy programmes. 
In this connection, and  without prejudice to  the contents and form of the questionnaire on 
subsidies, 
1  members shall ensure that their notifications contain the following information: 
(a)  form of a subsidy (i.e.  grant, loan, tax concession, etc.); 
(b)  subsidy per unit or, in cases where this  is  not possible, the total amount or the annual 
amount budgeted for that subsidy (indicating, if possible, the average subsidy per unit 
in the previous year); 
(c)  policy objective and/or purpose of a subsidy; 
(d)  duration of a subsidy and/or any other time-limits attached to it; 
(e)  statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of a subsidy. 
25.4.  Where specific points in paragraph 3 have not been addressed in a notification,  an 
explanation shall be provided in the notification itself. 
25.5.  If subsidies  are  granted to  specific  products  or sectors,  the  notifications  should be 
organized by product or sector. 
25.6.  Members  which  consider  that  there  are  no  measures  in  their  territories  requiring 
notification under paragraph 1 of Article XVI of GATT 1994 and this Agreement shall so 
inform the Secretariat in writing. 
25.7.  Members recognize that notification of a measure does not prejudge either its  legal 
status under GATT 1994 and in this Agreement, the effects under this  Agreement, or the nature 
of the measure itself. 
25.8.  Any member may,  at any time, make a written request for information on the nature 
and extent of any subsidy granted or maintained by  another member (including any subsidy 
referred to in Part IV),  or for an explanation of the reasons for which a specific measure has 
been considered as  not subject to the requirement of notification. 
25.9.  Members so requested shall provide such information as  quickly as  possible and in 
a comprehensive manner, and shall be ready, upon request, to provide additional information 
to  the requesting member. In  particular, they shall provide sufficient details to enable the other 
member to  assess their compliance with the terms of this  Agreement.  Any  member which 
considers that such information has not been provided may bring the matter to  the attention 
of the Committee. 
25.10.  Any member which considers that any measure of another member having the effects 
of a subsidy has not been notified in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 
XVI of GATT 1994 and this  Article may  bring the  matter to  the  attention of such  other 
member. If the alleged subsidy is  not thereafter notified promptly, such member may itself 
bring the alleged subsidy in question to  the notice of the Committee. 
1  The Committee shall establish a working party to review the contents and form of the questionnaire as 
contained in BISD 95/193-194. 
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taken with respect to  countervailing duties.  Such reports shall be available in the Secretariat 
for inspection by  other members.  Members shall also submit, on a semi-annual basis,  reports 
on any  countervailing duty  actions taken within the  preceding six  months.  The semi-annual 
reports shall be submitted on an agreed standard form. 
25.12.  Each member shall notify the Committee (a)  which of its  authorities are  competent 
to initiate and conduct investigations referred to in Article  11  and  (b) its domestic procedures 
governing the initiation and conduct of such investigations. 
Article 26 
Surveillance 
26.1.  The Committee shall examine new  and full  notifications submitted under paragraph 
1 of Article XVI of GAIT 1994 and paragraph  1 of Article 25  of this Agreement at special 
sessions  held every  third year.  Notifications  submitted  in  the  intervening  years  (updating 
notifications) shall be examined at each regular meeting of the Committee. 
26.2.  The Committee shall examine reports submitted under paragraph  11  of Article 25  at 
each regular meeting of the Committee. 
PART VIII- DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS 
Article 27 
Special and differential treatment of developing country members 
27 .1.  Members recognize that subsidies may play an important role in economic development 
programmes of developing country members. 
27.2.  The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not ~apply to: 
(a)  developing country members referred to  in Annex VII. 
(b)  other developing country members for  a period of eight years from  the date of entry 
into  force of the WTO  Agreement,  subject to  compliance with the  provisions in  para-
graph 4. 
27.3.  The prohibition of paragraph  l(b) of Article 3 shall not apply to developing country 
members for a period of five  years,  and shall not apply to least-developed country members 
for a period of eight years,  from  the date of entry into force of the WTO  Agreement. 
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subsidies  within  the  eight-year  period,  preferably  in  a  progressive  manner.  However,  a 
developing country member shall not increase the level of its export subsidies, 
1  and shall 
eliminate them within a period shorter than that provided for in this paragraph when the use 
of such export subsidies is inconsistent with its development needs. If a developing country 
member deems it necessary to  apply such subsidies beyond the eight-year period, it shall not 
later than one year before the expiry of this period enter into consultation with the Committee, 
which will determine whether an extension of this period is justified, after examining all the 
relevant economic, financial  and development needs of the developing country member in 
question. If  the Committee determines that the extension is justified, the developing country 
member concerned shall hold annual consultations with the Committee to determine the necessity 
of maintaining the subsidies. If  no such determination is made by the Committee, the developing 
country member shall phase out the remaining export subsidies within two years from the 
end of the last authorized period. 
27.5.  A developing country member which has reached export competitiveness in any  given 
product shall phase out its export subsidies for such product(s) over a period of two years. 
However, for  a developing country member which is  referred to  in Annex VII  and which 
has reached export competitiveness in one or more products, export subsidies on such products 
shall be gradually phased out over a period of eight years. 
27  .6.  Export competitiveness in a product exists if a developing country member's export 
of that product have reached a share of at least 3.25% in world trade of that product for two 
consecutive  calendar years.  Export competitiveness  shall  exist  either  (a)  on the  basis  of 
notification by the developing country member having reached expert competitiveness, or (b) 
on the basis of a computation undertaken by the Secretariat at the request of any member. 
For the purpose of this paragraph, a product is defined as a section heading of the Harmonized 
System Nomenclature. The Committee shall review the operation of this provision five years 
from the date of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
27.7.  The provisions of Article 4  shall not apply to  a developing country member in the 
case of export subsidies which are in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 2 through 
5.  The relevant provisions in such a case shall be those of Article 7. 
27.8.  There shall be no presumption in terms of paragraph 1 of Article 6 that a subsidy granted 
by a developing country member results in serious prejudice, as defined in this Agreement. 
Such serious prejudice, where applicable under the terms of paragraph 9, shall be demonstrated 
by positive evidence, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3 through 8 of Article 
6. 
27.9.  Regarding actionable subsidies granted or maintained by a developing country member 
other than those referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 6,  action may not be authorized or taken 
under Article 7 unless nullification or impairment of tariff concessions or other obligations 
1  For a developing country member not granting export subsidies as of the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement, this paragraph shall apply on the basis of the level of export subsidies granted in 1986. 
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or impede imports of a like  product of another member into the market of the  subsidizing 
developing  country  member  or unless  injury  to  a domestic  industry  in  the  market  of an 
importing member occurs. 
27.1 0.  Any countervailing duty investigation of a product originating in a developing country 
member shall be determined as soon as  the authorities concerned determine that: 
(a)  the overall level of subsidies granted upon the product in question does not exceed 2% 
of its  value calculated on a per unit basis; or 
(b)  the volume of the subsidized imports represents less than 4%  of the total imports of the 
like product in the importing mem,ber,  unless imports from developing country members 
whose individual shares of total imports represent less than 4% collectively account for 
more than 9%  of the total imports of the  like product in  the importing member. 
27 .11.  For those developing country members within the scope of paragraph 2(b) which have 
eliminated export subsidies prior to  the expiry of the period of eight years from  the date of 
entry into force of the WTO Agreement, and for those developing country members referred 
to in Annex VII, the number in paragraph  10(a) shall be 3% rather than 2%.  This provision 
shall apply from the date that the elimination of export subsidies is notified to  the Committee, 
and for so long as export subsidies are not granted by the notifying developing country member. 
This provision shall expire eight years from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
27 .12.  The provisions of paragraphs 10 and  11  shall govern any  determination of de  minimis 
under paragraph 3 of Article  15. 
27.13.  The provisions of Part III  shall  not  apply  to  direct forgiveness  of debts,  subsidies 
to  cover social costs, in whatever form,  including relinquishment of government revenue and 
other transfer of liabilities when such subsidies are granted within and directly  linked to  a 
privatization programme of a developing country member, provided that both such programme 
and the subsidies involved are granted for a limited period and notified to the Committee and 
that the programme results in eventual privatization of the enterprise concerned. 
27.14.  The Committee shall, upon request by  an interested member, undertake a review of 
a specific export subsidy practice of a developing country member to  examine whether the 
practice is in conformity with its development needs. 
27.15.  The  Committee shall,  upon  request by  an  interested developing  country  member, 
undertake a review of a specific countervailing measure to  examine whether it is  consistent 
with the provisions of paragraphs  10 and  11  as applicable to  the developing country member 
in question. 
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Article 28 
Existing programmes 
28.1.  Subsidy programmes which have been established within the territory of any member 
before the date on which such a member signed the WTO Agreement and which are inconsistent 
with the provisions of this Agreement shall be: 
(a)  notified to  the Committee not later than 90 days after the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement for such member;  and 
(b)  brought into conformity with the provisions of this Agreement within three years of the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for such member and until then shall 
not be subject to  Part II. 
28.2.  No member shall extend the scope of any such programme, nor shall such a programme 
be renewed upon its expiry. 
Article 29 
Transformation into a market economy 
29.1.  Members in the process of transformation from  a centrally planned into the market, 
free-enterprise  economy  may  apply  programmes  and  measures  necessary  for  such  a 
transformation. 
29.2.  For such members,  subsidy programmes falling  within the scope of Article 3,  and notified 
according to paragraph 3,  shall be phased out or brought into conformity with Article 3 within 
a period of seven years from  the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. In such 
a case, Article 4  shall not apply.  In addition during the same period: 
(a)  subsidy programmes falling  within the scope of paragraph  l(d) of Article 6 shall not 
be actionable under Article 7; 
(b)  with respect to other actionable subsidies, the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article 27 
shall apply. 
29.3.  Subsidy  programmes  falling  within  the  scope of Article  3  shall be  notified to  the 
Committee by the earliest practicable date  after the  date  of entry  into force  of the  WTO 
Agreement. Further notifications of such subsidies may be made up to two years after the 
date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement. 
29.4.  In exceptional circumstances members referred to in paragraph 1 may  be given departures 
from their notified programmes and measures and their time-frame  by the Committee if such 
departures are deemed necessary for the process of transformation. 
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Article 30 
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GA TI 1994 as elaborated and applied by  the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes 
under this  Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein. 
PART XI  - FINAL PROVISIONS 
Article 31 
Provisional application 
The provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 and the provisions of Article 8 and Article 9 shall 
apply  for  a period of five  years,  beginning with  the  date of entry into  force  of the WTO 
Agreement. Not later than 180 days before the end of this period, the Committee shall review 
the operation of those provisions,  with a view to determining whether to extend their application, 
either as  presently drafted or in a modified form,  for a further period. 
Article 32 
Other final provisions 
32.1.  No  specific  action  against  a  subsidy  of another  member  can  be  taken  except  in 
accordance with the  provisions of GA TI 1994,  as  interpreted by this Agreement. 
1 
32.2.  Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of this Agreement 
without the consent of the other members. 
32.3.  Subject to paragraph 4, the provisions of this Agreement shall apply to investigations, 
and reviews of existing measures,  initiated pursuant to  applications  which have been made 
on or after the date of entry  into force for a member of the WTO Agreement. 
32.4.  For the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article 21,  existing countervailing measures shall 
be deemed to  be imposed on a date not later than the date of entry into force for a member 
of the WTO Agreement, except in cases in  which the  domestic legislation of a member in 
force at that date already included a clause of the type provided for in  that paragraph. 
32.5.  Each member shall take all  necessary  steps,  of a general or particular character, to 
ensure, not later than the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement for it,  the conformity 
of its laws,  regulations and administrative procedures with the provisions of this  Agreement 
as  they may apply to  the member in question. 
1  This paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provisions of GATT 1994, where 
appropriate. 
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relevant to  this  Agreement and in the administration of such laws  and  regulations. 
32.7.  The  Committee  shall  review  annually  the  implementation  and  operation  of this 
Agreement, taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall inform annually 
the Council for Trade in Goods of developments during the period covered by such reviews. 
32.8.  The Annexes to  this Agreement constitute an  integral part thereof. 
* 
*  * 
ANNEX I - ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
(a)  The provision by  governments of direct subsidies to  a firm  or an  industry  contingent 
upon export performance. 
(b)  Currency retention schemes or any  similar practices which involve a bonus on exports. 
(c)  Internal transport and  freight  charges  on export shipments,  provided or mandated by 
governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
(d)  The  provision  by  government  or their  agencies  either directly  or indirectly  through 
government-mandated schemes,  of imported or domestic  products or services  for  use 
in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more favourable  than  for 
provisions of like or directly competitive products or services for use in the production 
of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of products) such terms or conditions 
are  more  favourable  than  those  commercially  available 
1  on  world  markets  to  their 
exporters. 
1  The term 'commercially available' means that the choice between domestic and imported products is 
unrestricted and depends only on commercial considerations. 
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direct  taxes 
1  or social  welfare  charges  paid  or payable  by  industrial  or commercial 
enterprises. 
2 
(f)  The allowance of special deductions directly related to  exports or export performance, 
over and above those granted in respect to  production for domestic consumption, in the 
calculation of the base on which direct taxes  are  charged. 
1  For the purpose of this agreement: 
The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms 
of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property~ 
The term 'import charges' shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated 
in this note that are levied on imports; 
The term 'indirect taxes'  shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value-added, franchise, stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges; 
'Prior stage' indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making 
the product~ 
'Cumulative' indirect taxes are multistaged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent 
crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding 
stage of  production~ 
'Remission' of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes; 
'Remission or drawback' includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges. 
2  The members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, appropriate 
interest charges are collected. The member reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in transactions 
between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should for tax 
purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's length. 
Any member may draw the attention of another member to administrative or other practices which may 
contravene this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions. 
In such circumstances, the members shall normally attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities 
of existing bilateral tax treaties or other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights 
and obligations of members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in the preceding 
sentence. 
Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation of 
foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another member. 
318 (g)  The exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of exported 
products, of indirect taxes 
1 in excess of those levied in respect of the production and 
distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption. 
(h)  The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes 
1  on goods 
or services used in the production of exported products in  excess of the  exemption, 
remission or deferral of like prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on goods or services 
used in the production of like products when sold for domestic consumption; provided, 
however, that prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes may be exempted, remitted or deferred 
on exported products even when not exempted, remitted or deferred on like products 
when sold for domestic consumption, if the prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied 
on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product (making normal 
allowance for waste). 
2 This item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines 
on  consumption of inputs in the production process contained in Annex II. 
(i)  The remission or drawback of import charges 
3  in excess of those levied on imported 
inputs  that are consumed in the  production of the  exported  product (making normal 
1  For the purpose of this agreement: 
The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms 
of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property; 
The term 'import charges' shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated 
in this note that are levied on imports; 
The term 'indirect taxes'  shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value-added, franchise,  stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges; 
'Prior stage' indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making 
the product; 
'Cumulative' indirect taxes are multistaged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent 
crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding 
stage of production; 
'Remission' of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes; 
'Remission or drawback' includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges. 
2  Paragraph (h) does not apply to value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof; the 
problem of the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph (g). 
3  For the purpose of this agreement: 
The term 'direct taxes' shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other forms 
of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property; 
The term 'import charges' shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere enumerated 
in this note that are levied on imports; 
The term 'indirect taxes'  shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value-added, franchise,  stamp, transfer, 
inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import charges; 
'Prior stage' indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in making 
the product; 
'Cumulative' indirect taxes are multistaged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for subsequent 
crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in a succeeding 
stage of production; 
'Remission' of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes; 
'Remission or drawback' includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges. 
319 allowance for waste), provided, however, that in particular cases a fmn may use a quantity 
of home-market inputs equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as,  the 
imported inputs as a substitute for them in order to benefit from  this provision if the 
import and the corresponding export operations both occur within a reasonable time-period, 
not to exceed two years. This item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines 
on consumption of inputs  in  the  production  process  contained in Annex  II  and  the 
guidelines in the  determination of substitution drawback systems  as  export subsidies 
contained in Annex III. 
(j)  The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export 
credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes against 
increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium 
rates  which  are  inadequate to  cover the  long-term  operating  costs  and  losses  of the 
programmes. 
(k)  The granting by government (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under 
the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually 
have  to  pay  for  the  funds  so employed (or would have  to  pay  if they  borrowed on 
international capital markets in order to obtain funds  of the same maturity and other credit 
terms and denominated in the same currency as  the export credit), or the payments by 
them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining 
credits, in so far as  they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export 
credit terms. 
Provided however that if a member is a party to an international undertaking on official 
export credits to which at least 12 original members to this Agreement are parties as 
of 1 January  1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original 
members), or if,  in practice a member applies the interest rate provisions of the relevant 
undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall 
not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement. 
(I)  Any other charge on the public account constituting an  export subsidy in the sense of 
Article XVI of GA  TI 1994. 
* 
*  * 
320 ANNEX II - GUIDELINES ON CONSUMPTION OF INPUTS IN 
THE PRODUCTION PROCESS 
1 
I 
1.  Indirect tax rebate schemes can allow for exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage 
cumulative indirect taxes levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported 
product (making normal allowance for waste).  Similarly, drawback schemes can allow for 
the  remission  or drawback  of import charges  levied  on  inputs  that  are  consumed  in  the 
production of the exported product (making normal allowance for  waste). 
2.  The illustrative list of export subsidies in Annex I to  this Agreement makes reference to 
the term  'inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product' in  paragraphs 
(h)  and (i).  Pursuant to  paragraph (h),  indirect tax  rebate schemes can constitute an export 
subsidy  to  the  extent  that  they  result  in  exemption,  remission  or deferral  of prior-stage 
cumulative indirect taxes in excess of the amount of such taxes actually levied on inputs that 
are consumed in the production of the exported product.  Pursuant to  paragraph (i),  drawback 
schemes can constitute  an  export subsidy  to  the  extent that they  result in  a  remission or 
drawback of import charges in  excess of those actually levied on  inputs that are consumed 
in the production of the exported product. Both paragraphs stipulate that normal allowance 
for waste must be made in findings regarding consumption of inputs in the production of the 
exported product. Paragraph (i) also provides for substitution, where appropriate. 
II 
In examining whether inputs are consumed in the production of the exported product,  as  part 
of a countervailing duty  investigation pursuant to  this Agreement,  investigating authorities 
should proceed on the following basis: 
1.  Where it is  alleged that an indirect tax rebate scheme, or a drawback scheme, conveys 
a subsidy by  reason of over-rebate or excess drawback of indirect taxes or import charges 
on inputs consumed in the production of the exported product, the  investigating authorities 
should first determine whether the government of the exporting member has in place and applies 
a system or procedure to confirm which inputs are consumed in the production of the exported 
product and in what amounts. Where such a system or procedure is determined to be applied, 
the investigating authorities should then examine the system or procedure to  see whether it 
is reasonable, effective for the purpose intended, and based on generally accepted commercial 
practices in the country of export. The investigating authorities may deem it necessary to  carry 
out,  in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article  12,  certain practical tests in order to  verify 
information or to satisfy themselves that the system or procedure is being effectively applied. 
1  Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used 
in the production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported 
product. 
321 2.  Where there is no  such system or procedure,  where it is not reasonable, or where it is 
instituted  and  considered reasonable but is  found  not  to  be  applied  or not  to  be  applied 
effectively, a further examination by the exporting member based on the actual inputs involved 
would need to be carried out in the context of determining whether an excess payment occurred. 
If the investigating authorities deemed it necessary, a further examination would be carried 
out in accordance with paragraph  1. 
3.  Investigating authorities should treat inputs as  physically incorporated if such inputs are 
used in the production process and are physically present in the product exported. The members 
note that an input need not be present in the final product in the same form  in  which it entered 
the production process. 
4.  In  determining the amount of a particular input that is  consumed in the production of 
the exported product, a 'normal allowance for waste'  should be taken into account, and such 
waste should be treated as  consumed in the  production of the exported product.  The term 
'waste' refers to that portion of a given input which does not serve an independent function 
in the production process, is not consumed in the  production of the  exported product (for 
reasons such as  inefficiencies) and is not recovered, used or sold by the same manufacturer. 
5.  The investigating authority's determination of whether the claimed allowance for  waste 
is  'normal'  should take into account the production process, the  average experience of the 
industry in the country of export, and other technical factors,  as appropriate. The investigating 
authority  should bear in mind that an  important question is  whether the authorities in the 
exporting member have reasonably calculated the  amount of waste,  when such an  amount 
is intended to be included in the tax or duty rebate or remission. 
* 
*  * 
ANNEX Ill - GUIDELINES IN THE DETERMINATION OF SUBSTITUTION 
DRAWBACK SYSTEMS AS EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
I 
Drawback systems can allow for the refund or drawback of import charges on inputs which 
are consumed in the production process of another product and where the export of this latter 
product contains domestic inputs having the same quality and characteristics as those substituted 
for the imported inputs. Pursuant to  paragraph (i) of the illustrative list of export subsidies 
in Annex I,  substitution drawback system can constitute an export subsidy to  the extent that 
they  result in an excess drawback of the import charges levied initially on the imported inputs 
for which drawback is being claimed. 
322 II 
In examining any substitution drawback system as part of a countervailing duty investigation 
pursuant to  this Agreement, investigating authorities should proceed on the following basis: 
1.  Paragraph (i) of the illustrative list stipulates that home-market inputs may be substituted 
for imported inputs in the production of a product for export provided such inputs are equal 
in quantity to,  and have the  same quality  and  characteristics as,  the imported inputs being 
substituted. The existence of a verification system or procedure is important because it enables 
the government of the exporting member to ensure and demonstrate that the quantity of inputs 
for which drawback is  claimed does not exceed the quantity of similar products exported, 
in whatever form,  and that there is not drawback of import charges in excess of those originally 
levied on the imported inputs in question. 
2.  Where it is alleged that a substitution drawback system conveys a subsidy, the investigating 
authorities should first proceed to  determine whether the government of the exporting member 
has in place and applies a verification system or procedure. Where such a system or procedure 
is  determin~d to be applied, the investigating authorities should then examine the verification 
procedures to  see whether they are reasonable, effective for the purpose intended, and based 
on generally accepted commercial practices in the country of export. To the extent that the 
procedures are determined to  meet this test and are effectively applied,  no  subsidy should 
be presumed to  exist. It may  be deemed necessary by  the investigating authorities to  carry 
out, in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article  12,  certain practical tests in order to  verify 
information or to satisfy themselves that the verification procedures are being effectively applied. 
3.  Where there are no verification procedures, where they are not reasonable, or where such 
procedures are instituted and considered reasonable but are  found  not to be actually applied 
or not applied effectively, there may be a subsidy.  In such cases,  a further examination by 
the exporting member based on the actual transactions involved would need to be carried out 
to  determine whether an  excess payment occurred. If  the  investigating authorities deemed it 
necessary, a further examination would be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2. 
4.  The existence of a substitution drawback provision under which exporters are allowed 
to  select particular import shipments on which drawback is claimed should not of itself be 
considered to  convey a subsidy. 
5.  An  excess drawback of import charges in the sense of paragraph (i)  would be deemed 
to exist where governments paid interest on any monies refunded under their drawback schemes, 
to  the extent of the interest actually paid or payable. 
* 
*  * 
323 ANNEX IV- CALCULATION OF THE TOTAL AD VALOREM SUBSIDIZATION 
(PARAGRAPH l(A) OF ARTICLE 6) 
1 
1.  Any calculation of the amount of a subsidy for the purpose of paragraph  1(a) of Article 
6 shall be done in terms of the cost to  the granting government. 
2.  Except as  provided in paragraphs 3 through 5,  in  determining  whether the  overall rate 
of subsidization exceeds 5%  of the value of the product,  the value of the  product shall be 
calculated as the total value of the recipient firm's
2  sales in the most recent 12-month period, 
for which sales data are available, preceding the period in which the subsidy is granted. 
3 
3.  Where the subsidy is  tied to  the production or sale of a given product,  the  value of the 
product shall be calculated as  the total value of the recipient firm's sales of that product in 
the most recent 12-month period, for which sales data are  available, preceding the  period in 
which the subsidy is  granted. 
4.  Where the recipient firm is  in  a start-up situation, serious prejudice shall be deemed to 
exist if the overall rate of subsidization exceeds 15% of the total funds invested. For purposes 
of this paragraph, a start-up period will not extend beyond the first year of production. 
4 
5.  Where the recipient firm  is located in  an inflationary economy country, the value of the 
product shall be calculated as  the recipient firm's total sales (or sales of the relevant product, 
if the subsidy is tied) in the preceding calendar year indexed by the rate of inflation experienced 
in the  12 months preceding the month in which the subsidy is  to be given. 
6.  In determining the  overall rate  of subsidization in  a given year,  subsidies given under 
different  programmes  and  by  different  authorities  in  the  territory  of a  member  shall  be 
aggregated. 
7.  Subsidies granted prior to the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement,  the benefits 
of which are allocated to future production, shall be included in the overall rate of subsidization. 
8.  Subsidies which are non-actionable under relevant provisions of this Agreement shall not 
be included in the calculation of the  amount of a subsidy  for the purpose of paragraph  1(a) 
of Article 6. 
* 
*  * 
1  An understanding among members should be developed, as necessary, on matters which are not specified 
in this Annex or which need further clarification for the purposes of paragraph l(a) of Article 6. 
2  The recipient firm is a firm in the territory of the subsidizing member. 
3  In the case of tax-related subsidies, the value of the product shall be calculated as the total value of the 
recipient firm's sales in the fiscal year in which the tax-related measure was earned. 
4  Start-up situations include instances where financial commitments for product development or construction 
of  facilities to manufacture products benefiting from the subsidy have been made, even though production 
has not begun. 
324 ANNEX V- PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING INFORMATION 
CONCERNING SERIOUS PREJUDICE 
1.  Every member shall cooperate in the development of evidence to be examined by a panel 
in  procedures under paragraphs 4 through 6 of Article 7.  The parties to  the dispute and any 
third-country member concerned shall notify to the DSB, as soon as the provisions of paragraph 
4  of Article 7  have  been invoked,  the  organization  responsible  for  administration of this 
provision  within  its  territory  and  the  procedures  to  be  used  to  comply  with  requests  for 
information. 
2.  In cases where matters are referred to  the DSB under paragraph 4 of Article 7,  the DSB 
shall,  upon request,  initiate the procedure to  obtain such information from  the government 
of the subsidizing member as necessary to  establish the existence and amount of subsidization, 
the value of total sales of the subsidized firms,  as  well as  information necessary to  analyse 
the  adverse  effects  caused  by  the  subsidized  product. 
1  This  process  may  include,  where 
appropriate, presentation of questions to  the government of the  subsidizing member and of 
the complaining member to collect information, as  well as  to  clarify and obtain elaboration 
of information available to the parties to a dispute through the notification procedure set forth 
in Part VII. 
2 
3.  In the case of effects in third-country markets, a party to a dispute may collect information 
including through the use of questions to the government of the third-country member, necessary 
to  analyse adverse effects, which is not otherwise reasonably available from the complaining 
member or the subsidizing member. This requirement should be administered in such a way 
as  not to  impose an unreasonable burden on the third-country member.  In particular, such 
a member is not expected to  make a market or price analysis specially for that purpose. The 
information to be supplied is  that which is already  available or can be readily obtained by 
this member (e.g.  most recent statistics which have already been gathered by relevant statistical 
services but which have not yet been published, customs data concerning imports and declared 
values of the products concerned, etc.). However, if a party to a dispute undertakes a detailed 
market analysis at its own expense, the task of the person or firm conducting such an  analysis 
shall be facilitated by the authorities of the third-country member and  such a person or firm 
shall be given access to  all information which is  not normally maintained confidential by  the 
government. 
4.  The DSB  shall designate a representative to serve the function of facilitating  the information-
gathering  process.  The  sole  purpose  of the  representative  shall  be  to  ensure  the  timely 
development of the information necessary to facilitate expeditious subsequent multilateral review 
of the dispute.  In particular, the representative may  suggest ways to  solicit most efficiently 
necessary information as  well as encourage the cooperation of the  parties. 
1  In cases where the existence of serious prejudice has to be demonstrated. 
2  The information-gathering process by the DSB shall take into account the need to protect information 
which is by nature confidential or which is provided on a confidential basis by any member involved 
in this process. 
325 5.  The information-gathering process outlined in paragraphs 2 through 4 shall be completed 
within 60 days of the date on which the matter has been referred to  the DSB  under paragraph 
4 of Article 7.  The information obtained during this process shall be submitted to  the panel 
established by the DSB in accordance with the provisions of Part X.  This information should 
include,  inter  alia,  data  concerning  the  amount  of the  subsidy  in  question  (and,  where 
appropriate, the value of total sales of the subsidized firms),  prices of the subsidized product, 
prices of the non-subsidized product, prices of other suppliers to  the market,  changes in the 
supply of the subsidized product to  the market in question and changes in market shares.  It 
should also include rebuttal evidence, as  well as such supplemental information as  the panel 
deems relevant in the course of reaching its conclusions. 
6.  If  the subsidizing and/or third-country member fail to cooperate in the information-gathering 
process, the complaining member will present its case of serious prejudice, based on evidence 
available to it, together with facts and circumstances of the non-cooperation of the subsidizing 
and/or third-country member. Where information is unavailable due to  non-cooperation by 
the subsidizing and/or third-country member, the panel may  complete the  record as  necessary 
relying on best information otherwise available. 
7.  In making its determination, the panel should draw adverse inferences from instances of 
non-cooperation by  any  party involved to  the information-gathering process. 
8.  In making a determination to use either best information available or adverse inferences, 
the panel shall consider the advice of the DSB  representative nominated under paragraph 4 
as  to  the reasonableness of any requests for information and the efforts made by  parties to 
comply with these requests in a cooperative and timely manner. 
9.  Nothing in the information-gathering process shall limit the ability of the panel to  seek 
such additional information it deems essential to a proper resolution to the dispute, and which 
was  not adequately sought or developed during that process.  However, ordinarily the panel 
should not request additional information to complete the record where the information would 
support a particular party's position and the absence of that information in the record is  the 
result of unreasonable non-cooperation by  that party in the  information-gathering process. 
* 
*  * 
326 ANNEX VI- PROCEDURES FOR ON-THE-SPOT INVESTIGATIONS 
PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE 12 
1.  Upon initiation of an investigation, the authorities of the exporting member and the firms 
known  to  be  concerned  should  be  informed  of the  intention  to  carry  out  on-the-spot 
investigations. 
2.  If  in exceptional circumstances it is  intended to include non-governmental experts in the 
investigation team, the firms  and the authorities of the exporting member should be so informed. 
Such  non-governmental  experts  should  be  subject  to  effective  sanctions  for  breach  of 
confidentiality requirements. 
3.  It should be standard practice to  obtain explicit agreement of the firms  concerned in the 
exporting member before the  visit is  finally  scheduled. 
4.  As  soon  as  the  agreement of the  firms  concerned has been obtained,  the  investigating 
authorities should notify the authorities of the exporting member of the names and addresses 
of the firms  to  be visited and the dates agreed. 
5.  Sufficient advance notice should be given to the firms  in question before the visit is made. 
6.  Visits to  explain the questionnaire should only be made at the request of an  exporting 
firm.  In case of such a request, the investigating authorities may place themselves at the disposal 
of the  firm:  such a visit may  only be made if (a) the authorities of the importing member 
notify the representatives of the government of the  member in question and (b)  the latter do 
not object to  the visit. 
7.  As  the main purpose of the on-the-spot investigation is  to  verify information provided 
or to  obtain further details, it should be carried out after the response to  the questionnaire 
has been received unless the firm  agrees to  the contrary and the government of the exporting 
member is informed by the investigating authorities of the anticipated visit and does not object 
to  it:  further,  it should be standard practice prior to  the  visit to  advise the firms  concerned 
of the general nature of the information to  be verified and of any  further information which 
needs to  be provided, though this should not preclude requests to  be made on the spot for 
further details to  be provided in the light of information obtained. 
8.  Enquiries or questions put by the authorities or firms of the exporting members and essential 
to  a successful on-the-spot investigation should,  whenever possible,  be  answered before the 
visit is  made. 
* 
*  * 
327 ANNEX VII - DEVELOPING COUNTRY MEMBERS REFERRED TO 
IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF ARTICLE 27 
The developing country members not subject to the provisions of paragraph  l(a) of Article 
3 under the terms of paragraph 2(a) of Article 27  are: 
(a)  least-developed countries designated as such by the United Nations which are members 
of the WTO; 
(b)  each of the following developing countries which are members of the WTO  shall be 
subject to  the provisions  which  are  applicable  to  other developing country  members 
according to paragraph 2(b) of Article 27  when GNP per capita has reached USD  1 000 
per annum. 
1 Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, 
Guatemala,  Guyana,  India,  Indonesia,  Kenya,  Morocco,  Nicaragua,  Nigeria,  Pakistan, 
Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. 
* 
*  * 
Agreement on trade-related investment measures 
2 
[  ... ] 
Article 9 
Review by the Council for Trade in Goods 
Not later than five years after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, the Council 
for Trade in Goods shall review the operation of this Agreement and,  as  appropriate, propose 
to the Ministerial Conference amendments to  its text In the course of this  review,  the Council 
for  Trade in  Goods  shall  consider whether the  Agreement  should be complemented with 
provisions on investment policy and competition policy. 
1  The inclusion of developing country members in the list in paragraph (b) is based on the most recent 
data from the World Bank on GNP per capita. 
2  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p.  100. 
328 ANNEXJB 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article VIII 
Monopolies and exclusive service suppliers 
1.  Each member shall ensure that any  monopoly supplier of a service in its territory does 
not,  in the supply of the monopoly service in the relevant market,  act in a manner consistent 
with that member's obligations under Article II and specific commitments. 
2.  Where a member's monopoly  supplier competes, either directly or through an  affiliated 
company, in  the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and which is 
subject to that member's specific commitments, the member shall ensure that such  a supplier 
does not abuse its monopoly position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with such 
commitments. 
3.  The Council for Trade in Services may,  at the request of a member which has  a reason 
to  believe that a monopoly supplier of a service of any other member is  acting in  a manner 
inconsistent with paragraph 1 or 2,  request the member establishing, maintaining or authorizing 
such supplier to  provide specific information concerning the relevant operations. 
4.  If, after the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, a member grants monopoly 
rights regarding the supply of a service covered by  its specific commitments, that member 
shall notify the Council for Trade in Services no later than three months before the intended 
implementation of the grant of monopoly rights and  the provisions of paragraphs 2,  3 and 
4 of Article XXI shall apply. 
5.  The provisions of this Article shall also apply  to cases of exclusive service suppliers, where 
a member, formally or in effect, (a) authorizes or establishes a small number of service suppliers 
and (b) substantially prevents competition among those suppliers in its territory. 
[  ... ] 
Article IX 
Business practices 
1.  Members recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers, other than those 
falling  under Article VIII,  may restrain competition and  thereby restrict trade in services. 
I  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p.  190. 
329 2.  Each member shall, at the request of any other member, enter into consultations with a 
view to eliminating practices referred to in paragraph  1.  The member addressed shall accord 
full  and sympathetic consideration to such a request and shall cooperate through the supply 
of publicly available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter in question. The 
member addressed shall also provide other information available to the requesting member, 
subject to its domestic law and to the conclusion of a satisfactory agreement concerning the 
safeguarding of its confidentiality by the requesting member. 
[ ... ] 
Article XV 
Subsidies 
1.  Members recognize that,  in  cert~n circumstances, subsidies may have distortive effects 
on trade in services.  Members shall enter into negotiations with  a  view to developing the 
necessary multilateral disciplines to avoid such trade-distortive effects. 
1 The negotiations shall 
also address the appropriateness of countervailing procedures. Such negotiations shall recognize 
the role of subsidies in relation to the development programmes of developing countries and 
take into account the needs of members, particularly developing country members, for flexibility 
in this  area.  For the  purpose of such  negotiations,  members  shall  exchange  information 
concerning all subsidies related to trade in services that they provide to  their domestic service 
suppliers. 
2.  Any member which considers that it is adversely affected by a subsidy of another member 
may request consultations with that member on such matters. Such requests shall be accorded 
sympathetic consideration. 
[ ... ] 
1  A future work programme shall determine how, and in what time-frame, negotiations on such multilateral 
disciplines will be conducted. 
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ANNEX JC 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
1 
Control of anticompetitive practices in contractual licences 
Article 40 
1.  Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer 
and dissemination of technology. 
2.  Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent members from  specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual 
property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.  As provided 
above,  a  member  may  adopt,  consistently  with  the  other  provisions  of this  Agreement, 
appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices,  which may include, for example, 
exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive package 
licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that member. 
3.  Each member shall enter, upon request, into consultations with any other member which 
has cause to believe that an intellectual property right owner that is  a national or domiciliary 
of the member to which the request for consultation has been addressed is undertaking practices 
in violation of the requesting member's laws and regulations on the subject matter of this 
section, and which wishes to  secure compliance with such legislation, without prejudice to 
any  action under the law and to  the full  freedom of an  ultimate decision of either member. 
The member addressed shall accord full  and sympathetic consideration to,  and shall afford 
adequate opportunity for,  consultations with the requesting member, and shall cooperate through 
supply of publicly, available non-confidential information of relevance to the matter in question 
and of other information available to the member, subject to domestic law and to the conclusion 
of mutually satisfactory agreements concerning the safeguarding of its confidentiality by the 
requesting member. 
4.  A member whose nationals or domiciliaries are subject to proceedings in another member 
concerning alleged violation of that other member's laws and regulations on the subject matter 
of this section, shall, upon request,  be granted an opportunity for consultations by the other 
member under the same conditions as those foreseen in paragraph 3. 
[  ... ] 
I  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 213. 
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TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM: DECLARATION ON DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO THE AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 
ARTICLE VI OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND 
TRADE 1994 OR PART V OF THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND 
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
1 
[ ... ] 
DECLARATION ON  DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
MINISTERS 
RECOGNIZE,  with respect to dispute settlement pursuant to the Agreement on implementation 
of Article VI  of GATT 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on subsidies and  countervailing 
measures, the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising from  anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty measures. 
Understanding on commitments in financial services 
2 
Participants in the Uruguay Round have been enabled to  take on specific commitments with 
respect to  financial  services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (hereinafter 
referred to  as  the  'Agreement') on the basis of an  alternative approach to  that covered by 
the  provisions of Part II of the Agreement.  It was  agreed that this approach could be applied 
subject to  the following understanding: 
(i)  it does not conflict with the provisions of the Agreement; 
(ii)  it does not prejudice the right of any  member to  schedule its specific commitments in 
accordance with the approach under Part III of the Agreement; 
(iii)  resulting specific commitments shall apply on a most-favoured-nation basis; 
(iv)  no  presumption has been created as  to  the degree of liberalization to  which a member 
is committing itself under the Agreement. 
Interested members, on the basis of negotiations, and subject to conditions and qualifications 
where specified,  have inscribed in their schedule specific commitments conforming to  the 
approach set out below. 
A- Standstill 
Any conditions, limitations and qualifications to the commitments noted below shall be limited 
to existing non-conforming measures. 
I  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 261. 
2  OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 270. 
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Monopoly rights 
1.  In addition to  Article VIII of the Agreement, the  following shall apply: 
Each member shall list in its  schedule pertaining to financial services existing monopoly rights 
and  shall endeavour to eliminate them or reduce their scope.  Notwithstanding subparagraph 
1  (b)  of the Annex on financial  services,  this paragraph applies to  the  activities referred to 
in subparagraph l(b)(iii) of the Annex. 
Financial services purchased by public entities 
2.  Notwithstanding Article XIII of the Agreement, each member shall ensure that financial 
service suppliers of any other member established in its territory are accorded most-favoured-
nation treatment and  national  treatment as  regards the  purchase or acquisition of financial 
services by public entities of the member of its territory. 
Cross-border trade 
3.  Each member shall permit non-resident suppliers  of financial  services  to  supply,  as  a 
principal, through an intermediary or as  an intermediary, and under terms and conditions that 
accord national treatment, the following  services: 
(a)  insurance of risks relating to: 
(i)  maritime shipping and commercial aviation and space launching and freight (including 
satellites), with such insurance to cover any or all of the following:  the goods being 
transported, the vehicle transporting the goods and any  liability arising therefrom; 
and 
(ii)  goods in international transit; 
(b)  reinsurance  and  retrocession  and  the  services  auxiliary  to  insurance  as  referred  to  in 
subparagraph S(a)(iv) of the Annex; 
(c)  provision and transfer of financial information and financial data processing as  referred 
to  in  subparagraph  S(a)(xv)  of the  Annex  and  advisory  and  other auxiliary  services, 
excluding intermediation,  relating to banking and other financial services as  referred to 
in subparagraph S(a)(xvi) of the Annex. 
4.  Each member shall permit its residents to  purchase in the territory of any other member 
the financial  services indicated in: 
(a)  subparagraph 3(a), 
(b)  subparagraph 3(b  ),  and 
(c)  subparagraphs S(a)(v) to  (xvi) of the Annex. 
333 Commercial presence 
5.  Each member shall grant financial  service suppliers of any  other member the  right to 
establish or expand within its territory, including through the acquisition of existing enterprises, 
a commercial presence. 
6.  A  member  may  impose  terms,  conditions  and  procedures  for  authorization  of the 
establishment and expansion of a commercial presence in  so  far as  they do not circumvent 
the member's obligation under paragraph 5 and they are consistent with the other obligations 
of the Agreement. 
New financial services 
7.  A member shall permit financial  service suppliers of any  other member established in 
its territory to  offer in its territory any  new financial service. 
Transfers of information and processing of information 
8.  No  member shall take measures that prevent transfers of information or the processing 
of financial information, including transfers of data by electronic means, or that, subject to 
importation rules consistent with international agreements, prevent transfers of equipment, where 
such transfers of information, processing of financial information or transfers of equipment 
are necessary for the conduct of the ordinary business of a financial service supplier. Nothing 
in this paragraph restricts the right of a member to  protect personal data,  personal privacy 
and the confidentiality of individual records and accounts so long as  such right is  not used 
to  circumvent the provisions of the Agreement. 
Temporary entry of  personnel 
9.  (a)  Each member shall permit temporary entry into its territory of the following personnel 
of a  financial  service  supplier of any  other  member  that  is  establishing  or has 
established commercial presence in  the territory of the member: 
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(i)  senior managerial personnel processing proprietary information essential to  the 
establishment,  control  and  operation of the  services  of the  financial  service 
supplier; and 
(ii)  specialists in the operation of the financial service supplier. 
(b)  Each member shall permit, subject to the availability of qualified personnel in its 
territory, temporary entry into its territory of the following personnel associated with 
a commercial presence of a financial service supplier of any  other member: 
(i)  specialists in computer services,  telecommunication services and  accounts  of 
the financial  service supplier; and 
(ii)  actuarial and legal specialists. Non-discriminatory measures 
10.  Each member shall endeavour to  remove or to  limit any  significant adverse effects on 
financial service suppliers of any other member of: 
(a)  non-discriminatory measures that prevent financial service suppliers from offering in the 
member's territory,  in  the form  determined by  the  member,  all  the financial  services 
permitted by the member; 
(b)  non-discriminatory measures that limit the expansion of the activities of financial service 
suppliers into the entire territory of the member; 
(c)  measures of a member,  when such a member applies the same measures to  the supply 
of both banking and  securities services,  and  a financial  service supplier of any  other 
member concentrates its activities in the provision of securities services; and 
(d)  other measures that,  although respecting the provisions of the Agreement, affect adversely 
the ability of fmancial service suppliers of any other member to  operate, compete or enter 
the member's market; 
provided that any action taken under this paragraph would not unfairly discriminate against 
financial service suppliers of the member taking such action. 
11.  With respect to the non-discriminatory measures referred to in subparagraphs 10(a) and 
(b), a member shall endeavour not to limit or restrict the present degree of market opportunities 
nor the benefits already enjoyed by financial service suppliers of all other members as  a class 
in  the  territory  of the  member,  provided  that  this  commitment  does  not  result  in  unfair 
discrimination against financial service suppliers of the member applying such measures. 
C - National treatment 
1.  Under terms and conditions that accord national treatment, each member shall grant to 
financial service suppliers of any other member established in its territory access to  payment 
and clearing systems operated by public entities, and to official funding and refinancing facilities 
available in the normal course of ordinary business. This paragraph is not intended to confer 
access to the member's lender of last resort facilities. 
2.  When membership or participation in, or access to,  any self-regulatory body,  securities 
or futures  exchange or market,  clearing agency,  or any other organization or association, is 
required by  a member in order for financial service suppliers of any  other member to  supply 
financial services on an equal basis with financial service suppliers of the member, or when 
the member provides directly or indirectly such entities, privileges or advantages in supplying 
financial  services,  the  member shall ensure that such entities  accord  national treatment to 
financial service suppliers of any other member resident in the territory of the member. 
335 D - Definitions 
For the purpose of this approach: 
1.  A non-resident supplier of financial  services is  a financial service supplier of a member 
which supplies a financial service into the territory of another member from  an establishment 
located in the  territory of another member,  regardless of whether such  a financial  service 
supplier has or has not a commercial presence in the territory of the member in  which the 
financial service is supplied. 
2.  'Commercial presence'  means an enterprise within a member's territory for the supply 
of financial  services  and  includes  wholly- or  partly-owned  subsidiaries,  joint  ventures, 
partnerships, sole proprietorships, franchising operations, branches, agencies,  representative 
offices or other organizations. 
3.  A new  financial  service is  a service of a financial  nature, including services related to 
existing and new products or the manner in  which a product is delivered, that is not supplied 
by any financial service supplier in the territory of a particular member but which is  supplied 
in the territory of another member. 
336 X - Council Decision of 14 December 1992 
(93/112/EEC) 
1 
I  OJ L 44, 22.2.1993, p.  1. Council Decision of 14 December 1992 extending the Decision of 
4 April 1978 on the application of certain guidelines in the field of 
officially supported export credits 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
The Annex to  the Decision of 4 April  1978 is  hereby  replaced by  the  consolidated text of 
the Arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export credits,  which is  attached to 
this Decision. 
Article 2 
Article 5 of the Decision of 4 April  1978  is  hereby replaced by the following: 
'Article 5 
This Decision shall apply from  16 October 1992 onward.' 
Article 3 
The Decision of 23  March  1992 is hereby repealed. 
Article 4 
The Decision shall apply from  16  October 1992. 
Article 5 
The Decision is  addressed to  the Member States. 
[ ... ] 
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342 I  - FORM AND SCOPE OF THE ARRANGEMENT 
1.  EXPORT CREDIT TRANSACTIONS COVERED 
(a)  Participants shall apply the guidelines contained in the informal Agreement to officially 
supported* export credits with a repayment term*  of two years or more relating to 
contracts for sales of goods and/or services or to  leases equivalent in effect to  such 
sales contracts. 
(b)  Special guidelines apply  to  the following  sectors in accordance with the  provisions 
of paragraph 9: 
1.  ships, 
2.  nuclear power plants, 
3.  power plants other than nuclear power plants, 
4.  aircraft. 
(c)  This Arrangement does not apply to export credits relating to  exports of: 
1.  military equipment, 
2.  agricultural commodities. 
2.  PARTICIPATION 
Present participants are listed in Annex I to  this Arrangement. Countries willing to  apply 
these guidelines may  become participants upon the prior invitation of the then existing 
participants. 
II - GUIDELINES FOR BASIC EXPORT CREDIT TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
3.  CASH PAYMENTS 
Participants shall require purchasers of exported goods and services receiving officially 
supported export credits to make cash payments*  at or before the  starting point*  equal 
to a minimum of 15% of the export contract value.* Participants shall not provide official 
support for such cash payments other than insurance and  guarantees against the usual 
pre-credit risks. 
4.  REPAYMENT 
Participants shall apply the following guidelines for the repayment of export credits that 
are officially supported by way of direct credit, refinancing, eligibility for an interest rate 
subsidy, guarantee or insurance. 
343 (a)  Maximum repayment term 
For the three categories of countries* of destination, the following maximum repayment 
terms shall apply. The export credit agreement and ancillary documents shall not permit 
the extension of the relevant repayment term. 
Countries of destination 
Category  I:  relatively rich 
Maximum repayment terms 
Five years; but after prior notification in accordance 
with paragraph 15(b  )( 1  ),  eight-and-a-half years 
Category  II:  intermediate  Eight-and-a-half years;
1 
Category III:  relatively poor  Ten years 
(b)  Repayment of principal and payment of interest 
I.  Principal  of an  export  credit  shall  normally  be  repaid  in equal  and  regular 
instalments not less frequently than every six months commencing not later than 
six months after the starting point. In the case of leases, this repayment procedure 
may be applied either for the amount of principal only or else for the  amount 
of principal and interest combined. 
2.  Interest* as  set forth in paragraph 5 shall normally not be capitalized during the 
repayment term but shall be payable not less frequently  than every six months 
commencing not later than six months after the starting point. 
3.  If a  participant intends  not to follow  the  normal  practices for  repayments  of 
principal or for payment of interest set forth in 1 and 2, the participant shall give 
prior notification in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 15(b)(1). 
5.  MINIMUM INTEREST RATES 
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Participants providing official financing  support by way of direct credit, refinancing or 
interest rate subsidy shall apply the following minimum rates of interest: 
(a)  Commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs)* 
Participants shall apply the relevant commercial interest reference rates?  The interest 
rate shall not be  fixed  for a period longer than  120 days. If  the  terms of the official 
financing support are fixed before the date of contract, a premium of 20 basis points 
(bp)  is  added to  the  commercial  interest  reference  rate.  The commercial  interest 
reference rate is also used to  compute the discount rate to  be used in the calculation 
of the concessionality level of tied or partially untied aid financing  in  accordance 
with paragraph 24(n). (b)  Special drawing rights (SDRs) based rate
3 
1.  Notwithstanding (a), participants may also choose to  apply  a minimum annual 
interest rate of SDR
3  + 50 bp  where the  country of destination is classified in 
category III. 
2.  Base rates  for  the  above  SDR  rate  are  revised  semi-annually  and  subject to 
adjustment on  15  January and  15  July  according to the following  method: 
(i)  an adjustment is made if the SDR-weighted average of the monthly interest 
rates  referred  to  in  footnote  3,  p.  324,  for  the  immediately  preceding 
December or June respectively differs by  50 basis points or more from the 
SDR-weighted average interest rate underlying the preceding adjustment in 
SDR-based rate.  When such a change occurs, the levels of the SDR-based 
rate set out above shall be adjusted by the same number of basis points as 
the difference in the  SDR-weighted averages;  the recalculated SDR-based 
rate being rounded off to  the nearest five  basis points; 
(ii)  the interest rates for the currencies constituting the SDR-weighted average 
are  the  secondary market yields  of financing  instruments reported to  the 
OECD pursuant to  paragraph 20(a)(i). 
(c)  Interest rate system choice 
Participants are prohibited from taking any action that allows banks to offer throughout 
the life of a floating rate loan the option of either 1 the SDR-based rate,  2 the CIRR 
(at the time of the original contract), or 3 the short-term market rate,  whichever is 
lower. 
6.  LOCAL COSTS* 
(a)  Category II or III countries 
Participants shall not finance,  guarantee or insure credit for more than 100% of the 
value of the goods and services exported, including goods and services supplied by 
third  countries.  Thus,  the  amount  of local  costs  supported  on  credit  terms  and 
conditions will not exceed the amount of the cash payment. They shall not grant such 
support for local costs financed on conditions more favourable than those supported 
for the exports to  which such local costs are related. 
(b)  Category I countries 
The provisions of (a)  shall apply,  provided that any official support is  confined to 
insurance or guarantees. 
7.  MAXIMUM PERIOD OF VALIDITY OF COMMITMENTS,* PRIOR COMMITMENTS 
AND CERTAIN AID COMMITMENTS 
(a)  Participants shall not fix  credit terms and conditions for an  individual export credit 
or line of credit*  whether new or being renewed or prolonged, for a period exceeding 
345 six months. Commitments that were in effect prior to a modification of the guidelines 
of this Arrangement and that became non-conforming because of this modification 
may  not  remain  in  effect  for  more  than  six  months  following  the  date  of the 
modification. 
4 
(b)  Participants shall not fix more than one year credit terms and conditions for individual 
tied  or partially  untied  aid  credits  that  have  a  concessionality  level  below  the 
appropriate minimum specified in paragraph 12(b  )(i). Aid protocols, aid credit lines 
or similar agreements may not be valid for more than two years after their signature. 
Extension of a concessional credit line shall be notified as if it were a new transaction 
with a note, explaining that it is an extension and that it is renewed at terms allowed 
at the time of the notification of the extension. 
8.  TRADE-RELATED CONCESSIONAL OR AID CREDITS
5 
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(a)  Eligibility 
This subparagraph does  not  apply  to  concessional or aid  credits  whether tied or 
partially  untied*  with a  value of less  than  2  million SDR or to  those where the 
concessionality level is 80% or more, except for concessional or aid credits or grants 
that form part of an associated (mixed) credit package, which remain subject to the 
provisions of footnote  12,  p.  326, in any case, derogation from these rules will be 
possible if the participants agree through a common line procedure.
6 
(i)  Tied or partially untied concessional or aid credits, except for credits to least-
developed countries (LDCs), shall not be extended to public or private projects 
that normally should be commercially viable if fmanced on market or Arrangement 
terms. 
The key tests for such aid eligibility are: 
whether the project is  financially  non-viable - i.e.  does  the  project lack 
capacity with appropriate pricing determined on market principles to generate 
sufficient cash flow to cover the project's operating costs and to service the 
capital employed - or 
whether it is reasonable to conclude, based on communication with other 
participants, that it is unlikely that the projects can be financed on market 
or Arrangement terms. 
The above tests are intended to  describe how a project should be evaluated to 
determine whether it should be financed with such aid or with export credits 
on market or Arrangement terms. Through the consultation process, a body of 
experience is expected to develop over time that will more precisely define, for 
both export credit and aid agencies, ex ante guidance as to  the line between the 
two categories of projects. (ii)  There shall be no tied or partially untied concessional or aid credits to  countries 
whose per capita GNP would make them ineligible for  17- or 20-years loans 
from the World Bank.
7 
(b)  Procedure for derogation 
Participants may derogate from the rules in paragraph 8(a) by following the procedures 
in paragraph 14. 
(c)  Notification procedure 
(i)  If a  participant  intends  to  support  trade-related  tied  or partially  untied  aid 
financing: 
- with  a value of 2 million SDR or more and a concessionality level of 80% 
or more, or 
- with a value of less than 2 million SDR and a concessionality level of 50% 
or more, 
the  participant  shall  give  notification  in  accordance  with  the  procedure  in 
paragraph 15(d) to  all  participants and the Secretariat. 
(ii)  If a participant intends to  support trade-related untied,  tied or partially untied 
aid credits not covered by (i),  the participant shall without prejudice to official 
developments assistance -procedures administered by the Development Assistance 
Committee,  give  notification  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  set forth  in 
paragraph 15(c), if the concessionality level*  is  less than 80%.  Concessional 
or aid credits or grants that form  part of an  associated (mixed) credit package 
shall remain subject to  the provisions of footnote  12,  p.  326. 
(iii)  No notification is  required for untied aid financing  with a value of less  than 
2 million SDR and a grant element of more than 50%. 
(iv)  Exception for small projects and  technical assistance 
The reporting requirements of paragraphs  12(b) and  15(c) and (d) do  not apply 
to  the following transactions: 
- aid financing where the official development aid component consists solely 
of technical cooperation that is less than either 3%  of the total value of the 
transaction or USD  1 million,  whichever is  lower,  and 
- capital  projects  of less  than  USD  1 million  that  are  funded  entirely  by 
development assistance grants. 
347 9.  SPECIAL SECTORS 
Participants shall apply the following special guidelines to  the sectors listed below: 
(a)  Ships 
The guidelines of this  Arrangement shall apply to  ships not covered by  the OECD 
Understanding on export credits for ships (Annex II  to  this Arrangement). Efforts 
shall be pursued to arrive at common provisions for all ships. Until common provisions 
for  all  ships  are  agreed  upon,  if,  for  any  type  of ship  that  is  covered  by  that 
Understanding and therefore not by the guidelines of the Arrangement, a participant 
intends to  support terms that would be more favourable  than those terms permitted 
by this Arrangement, the participant shall notify all other participants of such terms 
in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 15(b)(1). 
(b)  Nuclear power plants 
This Arrangement shall apply, except that,  where relevant, the provisions of the Sector 
Understanding  on  export  credits  for  nuclear  power  plants  (Annex  III  to  this 
Arrangement),  which  complements  this  Arrangement,  shall  apply  in  lieu  of the 
corresponding provisions of the Arrangement. 
(c)  Power plants other than nuclear power plants* 
This Arrangement shall apply,  except that the  maximum repayment term shall  be 
12 years. If a participant intends to  support a repayment term longer than five  years 
in transactions with category I countries or a repayment term longer than the relevant 
maximum  term set  forth  in  paragraph 4(a)  for category  II  and  III  countries,  the 
participant will give prior notification in accordance with the procedure set forth  in 
paragraph 15(b)(1). 
(d)  Aircraft 
This Arrangement shall apply, except that,  where relevant,  the provisions of the Sector 
Understanding on export credits for civil aircraft (Annex IV  to  this Arrangement), 
which  complements  this  Arrangement,  shall  apply  in  lieu  of the  corresponding 
provisions of the Arrangement. 
10.  BEST ENDEA  YOURS 
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(a)  Objectives 
1.  The guidelines set out in  this Arrangement represent the most generous credit 
terms and conditions that participants may offer when giving official support. 
All participants recognize that in the course of time these guidelines may  come 
to be regarded as  the normal terms and conditions. They therefore undertake 
to  take the necessary steps to prevent this  risk from  materializing. 2.  In particular,  if,  in  an individual branch of trade or industrial sector to  which 
this Arrangement applies, credit terms  and  conditions less generous to buyers 
than those set forth above in the Arrangement are customary, participants shall 
continue to respect such customary terms and conditions and shall do everything 
in their power to prevent these from being eroded as  a result of recourse to  the 
credit terms and conditions set forth  in this Arrangement. 
(b)  Firm undertaking 
In keeping with the objectives in  (a),  the participants, recognizing  the advantages 
which can accrue if a clearly defined common attitude towards the credit terms and 
conditions for a particular transaction can be achieved, firmly  undertake: 
1.  to  respect strictly the existing procedures for notification and in  particular to 
give prior notification at the latest at the stipulated moment before commitment 
as  well as  to supply all the information in the detail called for in the form  set 
forth in Annex V; 
2.  to  make maximum use of the framework for information exchange (see Annex 
VI)  at an early stage with a view to forming  a common line towards credit terms 
and conditions for particular transactions; 
3.  to  consider favourably face-to-face consultation if a participant so  requests in 
the case of important transactions as set out in the Protocol to  this Arrangement. 
(c)  Maximum delays for replies 
If, in  an exchange of information referred to under (b),  a participant informs another 
participant of the  credit  terms  and  conditions  that  it  envisages  supporting  for  a 
particular transaction and requests similar information from  the  other participants, 
then,  in the absence of a satisfactory reply within seven calendar days, the enquiring 
participants  may  assume  that  the  other will  support the  transaction on  the  most-
favourable  credit terms  and  conditions permitted by  these  guidelines.  In  cases  of 
particular urgency, the enquiring participant may  request a more rapid reply. 
11.  MATCHING 
A participant has the right to match credit terms and conditions notifiable under paragraph 
15,  as  well as credit terms and conditions offered by  a non-participant. The validity of 
a matching commitment may  not exceed the termination date of the commitment being 
matched.  Participants shall match by offering terms that comply  with this Arrangement 
unless the initiating offer does not comply with this Arrangement. A participant intending 
to  match credit terms and conditions: 
(a)  notified by another participant shall follow the procedures set forth in paragraph 16(a) 
or (c)  as  appropriate; 
(b)  offered by  a non-participant shall follow  the procedures set forth in paragraph  16(b  ). 
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A participant shall not: 
(a)  derogate with respect to  maximum repayment terms (whatever the form of support), 
to  minimum interest rates or to  the limitation of the validity of commitments to a 
maximum of six months or extend the relevant repayment terms through an extension 
of the grace period before the start of the repayment beyond the normal practice of 
six months after the starting point; or 
(b)  avail themselves of the possibilities provided under paragraph 15 of this Arrangement 
to support tied or partially untied aid financing that: 
(i)  has a concessionality level of less than 35  or 50% if the beneficiary country is 
a least-developed country as defined by the United Nations; or 
(ii)  does not conform to the provisions on eligibility for aid financing in paragraph 
8(a)(ii) of this Arrangement.
6 
13.  ACTION TO A  VOID OR MINIMIZE LOSSES 
The provisions of this Arrangement are without prejudice to the right of the export credit 
or insurance authority to take appropriate action after the export credit agreement and 
ancillary documents become effective to avoid or minimize losses. 
III - PROCEDURES 
14.  CONSULTATIONS 
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(a)  1.  Any participant seeking clarification about possible trade motivation for a tied 
or partially untied aid credit may request that a full aid quality assessment (see 
Annex VII) be supplied. Any participant may request  consultations'~ in accordance 
with paragraph 14(a)(2) to  (a)(4) with other participants, including face-to-face 
consultations, to  discuss: 
- first,  whether an  aid  offer meets  the  requirements  of the  rules  in  para-
graph 8(a); 
- second, if necessary, whether an aid offer is justified even if the requirements 
of the rules in paragraph 8(a) are not met. 
2.  The consultation shall be completed and the  findings  on both questions  in  1 
notified by the Secretariat to all participants at least 10 working days before the 
earlier of the bid closing date or commitment date. If  there is disagreement among 
the consulting parties, the Secretariat shall invite other participants to  express 
their views within five working days. It shall report these views to  the notifying 
participant,  who  should  reconsider  going  forward  if there  appears  to  be  no 
substantial support for an aid offer. 3.  A donor wishing to  proceed with a project despite the  lack of substantial support 
shall provide prior notification to other participants and shall,  in a letter to  the 
Secretary-General of the OECD, outline the results of the consultations and explain 
the  overriding  non-trade-related  national  interest  that  forces  this  action.  The 
participants expect that such an occurrence will be unusual and infrequent. 
4.  The Secretariat shall monitor the progress and results of the consultation. 
(b)  There shall be consultations for all offers of tied or partially untied concessional or 
aid credits for projects larger than 50 million SDR with a concessionality level of 
less than 80%.  Concessional or aid credits or grants that form part of an  associated 
(mixed) credit package shall remain subject to  the provisions of footnote  12,  p.  326. 
In such consultation,  special weight shall be given to  the  expected availability of 
financing at market or Arrangement terms when considering the  appropriateness of 
such aid credits. 
15.  PRIOR AND PROMPT NOTIFICATIONS 
(a)  Derogations: Procedure for prior notification and discussion 
1.  If a participant intends to  take the initiative to support terms and conditions not 
in  conformity  with  this  Arrangement,  the  participant  shall  notify  all  other 
participants of the terms and conditions it intends to support at least 10 calendar 
days before issuing any commitment. If any other participant requests a discussion 
during this period, the initiating participant shall wait an additional  10 calendar 
days before issuing any  commitment on such terms.  Normally this discussion 
will be by  means of instant communication. 
2.  If the initiating participant moderates or withdraws its intention to  support the 
notified non-conforming terms and conditions, it must immediately inform all 
other participants accordingly. 
3.  A participant intending to  match notified derogating terms and conditions shall 
follow  the procedure set forth  in  paragraph  16(a)(1). 
(b)  Deviations: Procedure for prior notification without discussion 
1.  A  participant  shall  notify,  at  least  10  calendar  days  before  issuing  any 
commitment, all other participants of the terms and conditions if it intends: 
(i)  to  support  a  credit  with  a  repayment  term  of more  than  five  but  not 
exceeding eight-and-a-half years to  a relatively rich country; 
(ii)  not to follow normal payment practices with respect to  principal or interest 
referred to  in paragraph 4(b ); 
(iii)  to support a credit for a power plant other than a nuclear power plant with 
a repayment term longer than the relevant maximum set forth in paragraph 
4(a), but not exceeding  12 years;  or 
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credits for ships applies, credit terms and conditions that would be more 
favourable  than  those  credit  terms  and  conditions  permitted  by  this 
Arrangement. 
2.  If the initiating participant moderates or withdraws its intention to  give  such 
support to  the notified deviating credit conditions, it must immediately inform 
all other participants accordingly. 
3.  A participant intending to  match notified deviating terms and conditions shall 
follow the procedure set forth  in paragraph 16(a)(2). 
(c)  Procedures for prior notification of aid financing 
The procedure set out in paragraph 15(b) shall apply where a participant intends to 
provide or support a transaction covered by  paragraph 8( c  )(ii), except that,  wherever 
paragraph 15(b) refers to a period of 10 calendar days, a period of 30 working days 
before the bid closing date or commitment date,*  whichever comes first,  shall apply 
and that participants intending to match shall use the procedures of paragraph 16(a)(3). 
Notification according to this paragraph cannot substitute procedures for derogation 
in paragraph 8(b). 
(d)  Procedure for prompt notification* 
As  soon  as  a  participant  commits  itself to  supporting  a  transaction  covered  by 
paragraph 8(c)(i), the participants will promptly notify all other participants accordingly. 
(e)  Tying status 
Any participants may  request additional information relevant to  the tying status of 
any credit. 
16.  PROCEDURES FOR MATCHING 
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(a)  Matching terms and conditions notified in accordance with paragraph 15 
1.  Matching of notified derogations: On and after the expiry of the first  10-calendar-
day period referred to in paragraph  15(a)(1), if not discussion is  requested (or 
on and after the expiry of the  second  1  0-calendar-day period if discussion is 
requested) and unless the participant intending to  match has  received notice from 
the initiating participant that the latter has withdrawn its intention to support non-
conforming terms and conditions, any participants will have the right to support: 
(i)  in a  case of 'identical matching',  terms  and  conditions  that include  the 
identical  non-conforming  element  but  that  otherwise  conform  to  the 
guidelines, provided that the matching participant gives as early as possible 
notification of its  intention to  match; or (ii)  in a Gase  of 'other support'  prompted by  the initial derogation,  any other 
non-conforming element of the terms subject to  the restrictions of paragraph 
11, provided that the responding participant introducing a fresh derogation 
initiates a five-calendar-day prior notification and five-calendar-day discussion 
procedure and awaits its completion. This period can run concurrently with 
that  of the  prior  notification  and  discussion  procedure  initiated  by  the 
originally derogating participant but cannot elapse before the end of the 
applicable  10- or 20-calendar-day period referred to under paragraph  15(a)(l). 
2.  Matching of notified derivations: On and after the expiry of the  tO-calendar-day 
period referred to  in paragraph 15(b)(l) and unless the  matching participant has 
received notice from  the initiating participant that the latter has  withdrawn its 
intention to support the terms and conditions notified in accordance with paragraph 
15(b)(1), any participant will have the right to  support: 
(i)  in  a case of 'identical matching',  terms  and  conditions  that include  the 
identical element notified in accordance with paragraph 15(b)(l) but that 
otherwise conform to  the guidelines, provided that the matching participant 
gives notification as  early as  possible of its intention to  match; 
(ii)  in a case of 'other support', any  other element of the terms which does 
not conform to  the guidelines subject to the restrictions of paragraph  11, 
provided that the responding participant initiates a five-calendar-day  prior 
notification procedure without discussion and awaits its completion. This 
period can run concurrently with that of the  prior notification procedure 
started by  the initiating participant, but may  not elapse before the end of 
the applicable  tO-calendar-day period referred to under paragraph 15(b)(l). 
3.  Matching  of a  prior notification  of aid  financing:  The  procedures  set out in 
paragraph 16(a)(2) shall apply where a participant intends to match aid fmancing, 
except that where paragraph  16(a)(2) refers to  a period of 10 calendar days,  a 
period of 30 working  days  before  the  bid closing  date  or commitment date, 
whichever comes first,  shall apply. 
4.  Matching  of a  prompt notification:  No  prior  notification  need  be  given  if a 
participant intends to  match terms and conditions that were subject to  a prompt 
notification according to  paragraph 15(d). 
5.  Discount rate in matching: In matching aid financing, identical matching means 
matching with an  identical concessionality level recalculated with the discount 
rate in force  at the time of matching. 
(b)  Matching terms and conditions offered by a non-participant 
1.  Before considering meeting non-confirming terms and conditions assumed to  be 
offered by a non-participant, a participant shall make every effort to  verify that 
these terms are receiving official support. The participants shall inform all other 
participants of the nature and outcome of these efforts. 
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participant shall  follow  the  prior notification and  discussion procedure under 
paragraph 15(a)(l). 
(c)  Matching non-conforming prior commitments 
1.  A participant intending to match a prior commitment shall make reasonable efforts 
to determine whether the non-conforming terms and conditions of the individual 
transaction  or  credit  line  in  question  will  be  used  to  support  a  particular 
transaction. This participant will be considered to  have made such reasonable 
efforts if it has  informed by  means  of instant communication the  participant 
assumed to  offer such non-conforming terms and conditions of its intention to 
match, but in reply to the instant communication has not been informed within 
three working days, exclusive of the day of reception, that this prior commitment 
will not be used to support the transaction in question. 
(2)  A prior credit line may  be matched by  an  individual transaction or by  means 
of a credit line.  In both cases, the dates of expiry of the  matching offer shall 
not be later than that of the credit line being matched. 
(3)  A  participant  intending  to  match  another  participant's non-conforming  prior 
commitment shall, in the case of: 
(i)  'identical matching', follow the procedure set forth in paragraph 16(a)(1)(i) 
when matching a derogation and paragraph  16(a)(2)(i) when matching a 
deviation; 
(ii)  'other support', follow the procedure set forth in paragraph 16(a)(1)(ii) when 
matching a  derogation prior commitment and the procedure set forth  in 
paragraph 16(a)(2)(ii) when matching a deviating prior commitment. 
17.  INFORMATION ON COMMITMENTS 
As  soon  as  a  participant commits credit terms  and  conditions that  it had  notified  in 
accordance with paragraph  15  or 16,  it shall,  in all cases, inform all other participants 
accordingly by including the notification reference number on the relevant creditor reporting 
system (CRS)  1c  form. 
18.  INFORMATION TO BE SUPPLIED UNDER THE NOTIFICATION AND MATCHING 
PROCEDURES 
The notifications called for by the above procedures shall be made in accordance with 
and contain the information set out in the standard form in Annex V and be copied to 
the Secretariat of the  OECD. 
19.  MONITORING 
The Secretariat shall monitor the implementation of the Arrangement. 
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20.  REGULAR NOTIFICATION AND CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION ON SELECTED 
INTEREST RATES 
(a)  Yields on government or public-sector bonds 
1.  Participants whose currencies constitute the IMP's special drawing rights shall 
notify  by  means of instant communication each month  to  the  Secretariat for 
distribution to all participants the monthly information on yields of government 
or public-sector bonds as  reported in the OECD financial statistics under reference 
number II (2),  (b), that is: 
France: 
Public and semi-public-sector bonds on the secondary market 
Germany: 
Public-sector bonds on the secondary market (8  to  15  years) 
Japan: 
Central government bonds on the secondary market 
United Kingdom: 
Government bonds on the secondary market (10 years) 
United States: 
US  Government notes and bonds on the secondary market (composite: over 10 
years). 
This information shall reach the Secretariat at the latest five  days after the end 
of the month covered by this information. 
2.  Upon receipt of this information, the Secretariat shall calculate the SDR-weighted 
average of interest rates for immediate circulation to  all participants. 
3.  At the beginning of July and of January, the Secretariat will, in accordance with 
the method set forth in paragraph 5(b)(2), calculate on the basis of the SDR-
weighted averages the semi-annual adjustments to  be made to  the SDR-based 
minimum interest rates  set forth  in paragraph 5(b)(1). 
(b)  Commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs) 
1.  Commercial interest reference rates for currencies that are subject to the provisions 
of paragraph 5(a)  shall  be  sent by  means  of instant  communication  at  least 
monthly to  the Secretariat for circulation to  all participants. 
2.  Such notification shall reach the Secretariat not later than five days after the end 
of each month covered by this information. The Secretariat shall then inform 
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shall come into effect on the  15th day  after the end of each month. 
3.  When market developments require the notification of a change in a commercial 
interest  reference  rate  in  the  course  of a  month,  the  changed  rate  shall  be 
implemented 10 days after the date of receipt of the notification of this change. 
21.  REVIEWS 
(a)  Annual review 
1.  The participants shall review at least annually the functioning of the Arrangement. 
The reviews will normally take place in the northern spring of each year.  In the 
review,  they  shall  examine,  inter  alia,  notification  procedures,  derogations, 
implementation and operation of the differentiated discount rate system,  rules 
and procedures on  tied aid, questions of matching,  prior commitments, practices 
on credits for  agricultural commodities and possibilities of wider participation 
in this Arrangement. They shall also review possible modification of the SDR-
based rate, notably with the aim of bringing it closer to  the market interest rates? 
2.  These reviews shall be based on information, on participants'  experience and 
on their suggestions for improving the operation and efficacy of the Arrangement 
and shall take account of the  objectives of the Arrangement and  the prevailing 
economic and monetary situation. The information and suggestions that participants 
which to put forward to this end shall reach the Secretariat not later than 45 days 
before the date of review. 
(b)  Review of commercial interest reference rates 
1.  The  participants  shall  review  periodically  the  operation  in  practice  of the 
commercial interest reference rates with a view to ensuring that the notified rates 
reflect current market conditions and meet the  aims underlying the establishing 
of the rates in operation. Such reviews shall also cover the premium to  be  added 
when these rates are applied. 
2.  Any  participant  may  submit  to  the  chairman  a  substantiated  request  for  an 
extraordinary review in case this participant considers that the commercial interest 
reference  rates  for  one  of more  currencies  no  longer  reflect  current  market 
conditions. 
22.  VALIDITY AND DURATION 
The provisions of this  Arrangement are applicable without time-limit, unless revised as 
a result of the review referred to  in paragraph 21. 
23.  WITHDRAWAL 
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Any  participant may  withdraw from  this Arrangement upon not less  than 60 calendar 
days'  prior written notice to  the other participants. V - DEFINITIONS  AND  INTERPRETATIONS 
24.  For the purposes of this Arrangement, the participants agreed to the following definitions 
and interpretations. 
(a)  Cash payments mean payments to  be received for goods and services exported by 
the completion of the exporter's contractual obligations, the date of completion being 
determined by the starting point. 
The quantum of the minimum cash payments is  established by reference to the total 
export contract value, except that,  in the case of a transaction involving some goods 
or services supplied from outside the exporter's country, the total export contact value 
may be reduced proportionately if the official support from which the exporter benefits 
does not cover those goods and services. 
Retention payments due after the latest appropriate starting point referred to under 
( 1) do not count as cash payments for the purpose of conformity with the guidelines. 
(b)  Export contract value means the total amount to  be paid by the buyer, exclusive of 
interest in the case of an export sale of goods and/or services or to  be paid by the 
lessee, exclusive of the portion of the lease payment equivalent to interest in the case 
of a cross-border lease. 
(c)  The classification  of countries  into  categories  in  paragraph  4(a)  is  based  on  the 
following criteria: 
Category I: 
Countries with a GNP per capita income over USD 4 000 per annum according to 
the definitive 1979 figures shown in the  1981  World Bank Atlas. 
Category II: 
Countries not classified in category I or III. 
Category III: 
Countries eligible for IDA credits plus any  other low-income countries or territories, 
the GNP per capita of which would not exceed the IDA eligibility level. 
(d)  Repayment term and interest rates 
1.  Repayment term means the period of time commencing at the starting point and 
terminating on the contractual date of the final payment. 
2.  Interest excludes: 
(i)  any payment by  way of premium or other charge for insuring or guaranteeing 
supplier credits or financial credits; 
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(ii)  any other payment by way of banking fees or commissions associated with 
the export credit,  other than annual or semi-annual bank charges payable 
throughout the repayment term;  and 
(iii)  withholding taxes imposed by the importing country. 
3.  In the case of an  export through a relay country, the relevant interest rate and 
repayment term  set out in paragraph 4  and 5 are  those  corresponding to  the 
country of final destination in cases: 
(i)  where the  relay  country makes  payment,  if and when received from  the 
country of final destination, to the exporting country on the basis of the 
latter's portion in the total export value; 
(ii)  where there is  security or payment by  the country of final  destination. 
(e)  Commercial interest reference rate means an  interest rate established in accordance 
with Annex VIII to  this Arrangement. 
(f)  Local costs mean expenditure, excluding commissions payable to the exporter's agent 
in the buying country, for the supply from the buyer's country of goods and services, 
that are necessary either for executing the  exporter's contract or for completing the 
project of which the exporter's contract forms  part. 
(g)  Commitment  means  any  arrangement  for  or declaration  on  credit  conditions,  in 
whatever form,  by means of which the intention or willingness to  refinance, insure 
or guarantee supplier credits or to grant,  refinance, insure or guarantee financial  credits 
is brought to the attention of the recipient country, the buyer or the borrower, the 
exporter, or the financial institution. 
(h)  Line of credit means  any  understanding or statement,  in  whatever form,  whereby 
the intention to  grant credit benefiting from official support up  to a ceiling and in 
respect of a series of transactions, linked or not to a specific project, is  brought to 
the attention of the  recipient country,  the  buyer or the  borrower,  or the  financial 
institution  . 
. (i)  Tied aid financing10  is  defined as  loans or grants cf  associated financing packages 
involving a concessionality level greater than 0% that is  in effect tied to  procurement 
of goods and services from the donor country.  Partially untied aid financing
0  is defined 
as  loans or grants or associated financing  packages involving a concessionality level 
greater than 0% that is in effect tied to  procurement of goods and services from the 
donor country and from a restricted number of countries.'' 
1.  Such financing can take the form of either: 
(i)  official development assistance (ODA) loans; 
(ii)  official development assistance grants; (iii)  other official flows (OOF) including grants and loans but excluding officially 
supported export credits that are in confonnity with this Arrangement; or 
(iv)  any association in law or in fact
12  either in the hands of the donor,  lender 
or borrower among two or more of the following: 
- official development assistance loans, 
- , official development assistance grants, 
- other official flows (including grants and loans but excluding officially 
supported export credits that are in conformity with this Arrangement), 
- an  export credit that is  officially  supported  by  way  of direct  credit, 
refinancing, eligibility for an interest subsidy, guarantee or insurance 
to  which this Arrangement applies, other funds at or near market terms 
or cash payments from the buyer's own resources. 
2.  Such financing is defined to  be in effect to  procurement of goods and services 
from one or a restricted number of countries as  soon as: 
(i)  one of the financial  components listed above is not freely  and fully  available 
to finance  procurement from the recipient country, substantially all other 
developing countries and from participating countries, whether by  a formal 
or informal understanding to  that effect between the recipient and the donor 
country; or 
(ii)  it involves  practices that the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the OECD or the  participants may determine to  result in  such tying.
11 
3.  The definition of 'official development assistance'  is identical to that in the  'DAC 
guidelines principles for associated financing and tied and partially untied official 
development assistance'. 
G)  Prompt notification means a maximum delay of two  working days  following  the 
date of commitment within which notification is  to  be given. 
(k)  Prior notification means a maximum delay of 30 working days before the bid closing 
date or commitment date, whichever comes first. 
(1)  Starting point is  the same as  the Berne Union definition currently in use and is  as 
follows: 
1.  in the case of a contract for the sale of capital goods consisting of individual 
items usable in themselves (e.g.  locomotives), the starting point is the mean date 
or actual date when the buyer takes physical possession of the goods in his own 
country; 
2.  in the case of a contract for the sale of capital equipment for complete plant 
or factories  where the supplier has no responsibility for commissioning, the starting 
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point is  the date when the  buyer is  to  take  physical possession of the  entire 
equipment (excluding spare parts) supplied under the contract; 
3.  in the case of construction contracts where the contractor has no  responsibility 
for commissioning,  the  starting point is the date when construction has  been 
completed; 
4.  in the case of any contract where the supplier or contractor has a contractual 
responsibility  for  commissioning,  the  starting  point is  the  date  when  he  has 
completed installation or construction and preliminary tests to ensure that it is 
ready for operation. This applies whether or not it is handed over to  the buyer 
at that time in accordance with the terms of the contract and irrespective of any 
continuing commitment which the supplier or contractor may  have,  for example 
for guaranteeing its effective functioning or for training local personnel; 
5.  in the case of paragraphs 2,  3 and 4 where the contract involves the separate 
execution of individual parts of a project, the date of the starting point is  the 
date of the starting point for each separate part, or the  mean date of those starting 
points or,  where the supplier has a contract, not for the whole project but for 
an essential part of it,  the starting point may  be that appropriate to  the project 
as a whole. 
(m)  Interest rate and official support:  Apart from  agreement on the definition of interest 
set forth  in  paragraph  24(d)(2),  it has  not proved possible  to  establish common 
definitions of interest rate and official support in  the light of differences between 
long-established national systems of export credit and export credit insurance now 
in operation in  the  participating  countries.  Efforts  shall be pursued  to  elaborate 
solutions for  these definitions.  While such definitions are  being elaborated,  these 
guidelines do not prejudice present interpretations. In order to  facilitate these efforts, 
notes concerning actual practices in this area, including information on annual or 
semi-annual bank charges payable throughout the repayment term and considered 
as part of interest, as they result from the different national systems, were transmitted 
to  the  Secretariat of the  OECD  and  distributed  to  all  participants  in  document 
TD/CSUS/78.12 and addenda. 
(n)  1.  Concessionality level is very  similar in concept to the grant element used by 
the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.  In the case of grants,  it 
is  100%.  In  the  case of loans,  it is the difference between the nominal value 
of the loan and the discounted present value of the future debt service payments 
to be made by the borrower, expressed as  a percentage of the nominal value 
of the loan,  and is calculated in accordance with the method of calculating the 
grant element used by the DAC, except that: 
(i)  the discount rate used in calculating the concessionality level of a loan in 
a given currency is  subject to change on an annual basis on 15  January 
and is  calculated as  follows: 
- for currencies where CIRR is less than  10%:  CIRR + % (10-CIRR), - for other currencies: CIRR, 
where CIRR is the average of the monthly CIRRs valid during the six-month 
period extending from  15 August of the previous year through 14 February 
of the current year.  The calculated rate is  rounded to the nearest 10 basis 
points. If  there is more than one CIRR for the currency, the CIRR for the 
longest maturity shall be used for this calculation; 
(ii)  the base date for the calculation of the concessionality level is  the starting 
point as defined in paragraph 24(1). 
2.  For the purpose of calculating the overall concessionality level of an associated 
financing  package,  the  concessionality  levels  (i)  of export credits  that are in 
conformity with this Arrangement, (ii) of other funds  at or near market rates, 
(iii) of other official funds with a concessionality level of less than the minimum 
permitted by paragraph  12(b),  except in cases of matching/
4  or (iv)  of cash 
payments that are from  the buyer's own resources are considered to  be zero. 
The overall concessionality level of a package is determined by dividing (i) the 
sum of the results obtained by multiplying the nominal value of each component 
of the package by the respective concessionality level of each component by  (ii) 
the aggregate nominal value of the components. 
3.  The discount rate for a given aid loan is the rate that is in effect at the time of 
notification, 
15  except in cases of prompt notification, where the discount rate is 
the rate in effect at the time of commitment. A change in the discount rate during 
the life of a loan does not change its concessionality level. 
4.  Without prejudice to  3,  when calculating the concessionality level of individual 
transactions initiated under an  aid credit line, the discount rate is the rate that 
was originally notified for the credit line. 
(  o)  Power plants other than nuclear power plants are complete power stations not fuelled 
by nuclear power - or parts thereof - comprising all components, equipment, materials 
and services, including the training of personnel, directly required for the construction 
and commissioning of such non-nuclear power stations. Not included are items for 
which  the  buyer is  usually  responsible,  in particular costs  associated  with  land 
development, roads, construction village, power lines, switchyard and water supply, 
as  well as  costs arising in  the buyer's country from official procedures  (e.g.  site 
permit, construction permit, fuel  loading permit). 
Notes and references 
*  The asterisk refers to the relevant definitions or interpretations set forth in paragraph 24. 
For countries in category II that were classified in category III before 6 July  1982, the 
maximum repayment term shall be  10 years. 
361 CIRRs shall equal a base rate  plus  100 basis points.  For each currency,  the base rates 
may be either: 
(i)  three-year government bond yields for repayment terms up to and including five  years, 
five-year government bond yields for over five  up  to  and including eight-and-a-half 
years,  and seven-year government bond yields for over eight-and-half years, or 
(ii)  five-year government bond yields for all maturities. 
Each participant shall initially select one of the two  base rate systems for its currency. 
Other participants shall use this system for financing offered in that currency. A participant, 
with a six-month advance notice and with the counsel of the participants may change to 
the other system for its currency, and other participants shall then use that system for that 
currency. The yen CIRR is the long-term prime rate minus 20 basis points for all maturities. 
The ecu CIRR is the secondary market yield on medium-term ecu bonds in the Luxembourg 
Stock Exchange plus 50 basis points. 
(i)  SDR means the IMF special drawing right weighted average of the interest rates notified 
pursuant to paragraph 20(a). These currencies are the US  dollar, German mark, Japanese 
yen, French franc  and pound sterling. In the calculation of the average interest rate, 
each currency shall be given the weight set by the IMF for the valuation of the special 
drawing right. 
(ii)  After any  semi-annual period, a change in the SDR-weighted average interest rate 
shall be computed only on the basis of the IMF weightings of the SDR valuation basket 
in effect at the end of the semi-annual period. 
Special transition rules for transactions under tied aid credit lines notified before 15 February 
1992: 
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a transitional period for existing credit lines,  during which it will be possible to  notify 
commercially viable projects without using the  special consultations and  procedures 
that are part of the Helsinki package, shall last  until  15  August 1992; 
the validity of such notifications made after 15  February and at the latest  15  August 
shall be one year maximum; 
after 15  August 1992 it shall be possible to  give tied aid to projects in countries with 
GNP above the threshold, but for the rest of the lifetime of the credit line only non-
commercially viable projects will be financed; 
notifications of such projects will also have a validity of one year only; 
tied aid credit lines to  countries with a GNP above the threshold cannot be prolonged; 
and 
for Mexico only, tied aid credits can be given to  commercially viable projects even 
after 15  August and up to 31  December 1992, based on already notified tied aid credit 
lines. The validity of offers on such projects notified in  the  15 August to 31  December 
period shall be one year at a maximum. In return,  the credit lines to  Mexico will not 
be prolonged after 31  December 1992,  and it will not be possible to  notify either 
commercial or non-commercial projects after 31  December 1992. The participants are agreed on the following  general principle: 
'OECD members' export credit and tied aid credit policies should be complementary; those 
for export credits should be based on open competition and the free  play of market forces; 
those for tied aid credits should provide needed external resources to  countries, sectors 
or projects with little or no access to the market financing,  ensure best value for money, 
minimize trade distortion and contribute to developmentally effective use of these resources.' 
There are three means by  which a participant may  proceed with a non-conforming offer 
under paragraph 8(a): 
common lines; 
justification on aid  grounds through support by  a substantial body  of participants -
paragraphs  14(a)(1) and  14(a)(2); and 
through a letter to the Secretary-General- paragraph 14(a)(3), which the participants 
expect will be unusual and infrequent. 
GNP per capita over USD 2 465 in  1990. A country will only be moved to  or from  this 
category after its World Bank category has been unchanged for two consecutive years. 
Notwithstanding classifications of countries ineligible or eligible to  receive tied aid,  tied 
aid policy for Bulgaria, the  Czech and  Slovak Federal Republic,  Hungary,  Poland and 
Romania is covered by  the participants'  agreement,  as  long as  such agreement is in force, 
to  try  to avoid such credits other than outright grants, food  aid and humanitarian aid.  The 
OECD ministers endorsed this policy in June  1991. 
At which time, they may request,  among other items, the following  information: 
assessment of a detailed feasibility  study/project appraisal; 
whether there is a competing offer with non-concessional or aid financing; 
expectation of the project generating or saving foreign currency; 
whether there is cooperation with multilateral organizations such as the World Bank; 
presence of international competitive bidding (ICB), in particular if the donor country's 
supplier is the lowest evaluated bid; 
environmental implication; 
private-sector participation; 
timing of the notification (e.g.  six months prior to  bid closing or commitment date) 
of concessional or aid credits. 
Refer to  Annex IX to the Arrangement,  'Future work'. 
10  It is  understood that the  terms  'tied aid  financing'  and  'partially untied aid  financing' 
exclude aid programmes of multilateral or regional institutions. 
11  These definitions do not prejudge the distinction made in the DAC on the quality of aid 
as  concerns tied, partially untied and untied aid. 
363 12  Associated financing transactions may take various forms,  such as  'mixed credit', 'mixed 
financing',  'joint financing',  'parallel financing'  or single integrated transactions. Their 
main characteristic is that the concessional component is  linked in law in fact to  the non-
concessional component, that either the non-concessional or the concessional component 
or the whole financing package is in effect tied or partially untied and that the availability 
of concessional funds is conditional upon accepting the linked non-concessional component. 
Association or linkage in  fact is determined by such factors  as  the existence of informal 
understandings between the recipient and the donor authority, the intention by the donor 
through the use of ODA to facilitate the acceptability of a fmancing  package,  the effective 
tying of the whole fmancing  package to  procurement in the donor country, the tying status 
of ODA and the modality of tender and/or of the contract of each financing transaction 
or any  other practice, identified by the DAC or the participants in which a de facto liaison 
exists between two or more financing components. 
None of the following practices shall prevent the determination that an association or linkage 
in fact exists:  contract splitting through the separate notification of component parts of 
one  contract;  splitting  of  contracts  financed  in  several  stages;  non-notification  of 
interdependent parts of a contract, non-notification arising from the partial untying of a 
financial package. 
13  In cases of uncertainty as  to whether a certain financing practice falls  within the scope 
of the above definition, the donor country shall furnish evidence in support of any claim 
to  the effect that such a practice is  untied. 
14  In identical matching, the concessionality level of any  OOF in the initiating participant's 
offer shall be included in the calculation of the initial offer's concessionality level if the 
matching offer contains an  OOF that is included in its  concessionality level, even if the 
OOF in  the  initial  offer has  a  concessionality  level  below  the  minimum  permissible 
concessionality level. 
15  If a  change  of currency  is  made  before  the  contract  is  concluded,  a  revision  of the 
notification is required. The discount rate used to calculate the concessionality level will 
be the one applicable at  the time of the revision. However, if the alternative currency is 
indicated in the original notification and all necessary information is provided, a revision 
is not necessary. 
* 
*  * 
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THE PARTICIPANTS TO THE CONSENSUS, 
Whereas at the OECD ministerial meeting of 17  and  18  May  1983,  the ministers enjoined 
the competent bodies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to take 
prompt action to improve existing arrangements so as to strengthen transparency and discipline 
in the area of aid and trade-related concessional finance by all  appropriate means; 
Whereas the participants to the consensus recognize the advantage which can occur if a clearly 
defined common attitude toward the credit terms for a particular transaction can be achieved 
and if maximum use is made of the existing arrangements for exchanging information at an 
early stage; 
Whereas the framework for information exchange (Annex VI) lays down rules for exchanging 
information amongst members of the OECD group on export credits and credit guarantees; 
Whereas this framework outlines procedures to be followed in the  event that all members 
taking part in an exchange of information agree to accept that the credit terms for  a particular 
transaction should be the subject of a binding obligation; 
Whereas at a meeting of the OECD consensus group in April 1984 all participants firmly 
undertook to consider favourably face-to-face consultations if a participant so requests in the 
case of important transactions; 
Whereas this undertaking was motivated by the unsatisfactory functioning of existing procedures 
for exchanging information in a number of important transactions; 
Whereas the implementation of the provisions of the consensus can be jeopardized if procedures 
for exchanging information do not function efficiently; 
Whereas any weakening in consensus discipline risks provoking wasteful export credit and/or 
tied aid credit competition and increasing subsidies; 
Whereas the search for a common attitude does not prejudice the possibility for participants 
to  retain their rights  and liberty  as  to  whether to  insure or finance  credits for  a particular 
transaction, in the framework of their international obligations, 
HAVE DECIDED AS  FOLLOWS: 
Within the framework of existing procedures in the field of officially supported export credits 
and tied aid credits,  and with a view to improving transparency, the participants: 
1.  confirm that they will strive to  provide the fullest possible details on the credit terms and 
conditions which they may be considering offering for any transaction which is the subject 
of an exchange of information; 
365 2.  acknowledge that the interests of all participants are best served if agreement can be reached 
at an early stage on a common attitude on the export credit conditions for a particular 
transaction and if the provisions of that agreement are maintained; 
3.  reaffirm,  therefore,  the  need  to  promote  common  attitudes,  particularly  on important 
transactions; 
4.  recognize that in certain instances, notably when existing exchange of information procedures 
are perceived to be functioning in an unsatisfactory manner, face-to-face consultations could 
facilitate the adoption of a common line; 
5.  undertake, in such circumstances, to respond favourably to any such request for early face-
to-face consultations and to attend any meeting arranged in order to reach a common attitude 
on credit terms in conjunction with other interested participants. In this respect, particular 
attention will be paid to the observance and common interpretations of the guidelines; 
6.  confirm,  moreover,  the  importance  they  attach  to  a  strict  observation  of the  formal 
notification procedures provided for in the Arrangement. 
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LIST  OF PARTICIPANTS 
Australia 
Austria 
Canada 
European Economic Community 
1 
Finland 
Japan 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United States 
1  Composed of the following Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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UNDERSTANDING ON EXPORT CREDITS FOR SHIPS •• 
I 
1.  For any contract relating to  any new seagoing ship or any conversion of a ship
1 to  be 
negotiated from  1 December 1979 onwards, participants in this Understanding agree to 
abolish existing official facilities
2  and to introduce no new official facilities  for export 
credits on terms providing: 
(i)  a maximum duration exceeding eight-and-a-half year~ from delivery and repayment 
other than by  equal instalments at regular intervals of normally six months and a 
maximum of 12 months; 
(ii)  payment by delivery of less than 20% of the contract price; 
(iii)  an interest rate of less than 8%  net of all  charges.
4 
2.  This minimum interest rate of 8% will  apply to the credit granted with official support 
by  the shipbuilder to  the buyer (in a supplier-credit transaction) or by a bank or any other 
party in the shipbuilder's country to  the buyer or any other party in the buyer's country 
(in a buyer-credit transaction) whether the official support is given for the whole amount 
of the credit or only part of it. 
3.  The minimum interest rate will also apply to the credit granted with support by government 
participating in the  Understanding, in the shipbuilder's country to the shipbuilder or to 
any other party, to enable credit to be given to  the shipowner or to  any other party in 
the shipowner's country, whether this official support is  given for the whole amount of 
the credit or only part of it. 
4.  In so far as other public bodies participate in measures to  promote exports, the participants 
agree to  use all possible influence to  prevent the financing of exports on terms which 
contravene the above principles. 
5.  The participants, recognizing that it is highly desirable to  set a limit to  credit terms for 
exports, also agree to  make their best endeavours to ensure that no  more favourable terms 
than those set out above will be offered to buyers by  any other means. 
6.  Any participants in the Understanding which wishes, for genuine aid reasons, to  concede 
more favourable terms in a particular case is not precluded from doing so, provided that 
adequate  notice  of this  decision  is  given  to  all  the  parties  to  the  Understanding  in 
accordance with the procedure established for this purpose.  For those cases,  'adequate 
notice'  shall be interpreted as  requiring that notification be made to  all participants if 
possible at least six weeks before a promise is  given,  at any stage of the negotiations, 
••  This Annex is equivalent to the Annex to the OECD Council resolution concerning a revision of the 
understanding on export credits for ships (30 July 1981), OECD reference ((81) 103 final), adopted on 
30 July 1981. 
368 to  commit  the  use  of funds  for  that  purpose,  and  in  any  case  at  least  six  weeks 
authorization is  given so as  to commit them. 
7.  Prior notice shall also  be  given in  accordance  with  the  procedure agreed between the 
participants of any decision taken for exceptional reasons other than those specified in 
clause 6,  to support terms more favourable in any  way than those of the Understanding. 
Support (including the provision of aid) will be refused for any  order finally  placecf  on 
more favourable terms before all other participants in the Understanding have been given 
prior notice in accordance with the procedure agreed. 
8.  Any  participant in the Understanding may,  provided that it applies the procedures agreed 
between the participants, support more favourable terms in a particular substantiated case 
to  match terms of officially supported transactions, or contravention of the above terms 
by other participants, or competition from  non-participating countries. 
II 
9.  Any participant in the Understanding may obtain information from any  other participant 
on terms of any  official support for an export contract in order to  ascertain whether the 
terms contravene this  Understanding. The participants undertake to  supply all  possible 
information requested with all possible speed.  According to  the rules  and practices of 
the  OECD,  any  participant may  ask the  Secretary-General to  act on its  behalf in  the 
aforementioned matter and to circulate the information obtained to  all participants in the 
Understanding. 
I 0.  Each participant undertakes to notify the Secretary-General of its system for the provision 
of official support and of the means of implementation of the Understanding. 
III 
II.  This Understanding becomes effective as  soon as  all  members of Working Party No  6 
have notified the Secretary-General of their adherence to  it or as  soon as  the  participants 
having so notified the Secretary-General decide that they constitute a representative majority 
of members of Working Party No 6; any participants which disagrees as to what constitutes 
a representative majority would not be bound by the others' decision. The Understanding 
is open to  other member countries of the OECD. 
12.  This Understanding shall be subject to  review as  often as  requested by  the participants, 
and in any case at intervals not exceeding one year.  Any  participant may withdraw from 
this Understanding upon giving to its partners three calendar months'  notice of its intention 
to do so. Within this period, at the request of any of these partners, there shall be a meeting 
of Working  Party  No  6  to  review  this  Understanding,  and  any  other  participant,  on 
notification to its partners, may withdraw from  this Understanding on the same effective 
date as  the participant which first gave notice. 
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Ship conversion means any  conversion of seagoing vessels of more  than  1 000 grt on 
condition that conversion operations entail radical alterations to the cargo plan,  the  hull 
or the propulsion system. 
Official facilities are those which enable credits to be insured, guaranteed or financed by 
governments,  by  governmental  institutions,  or  with  any  form  of direct  or  indirect 
governmental participation. 
Given the special nature of the transactions for vessels transporting liquefied natural gas, 
the duration of authorized credit for this type of ship only is  increased to  10 years. 
Interest rate,  net of all charges, means that part of the credit costs (excluding any credit 
insurance  premiums  and/or  any  banking  charges)  which  is  paid  at  regular  intervals 
throughout the credit period and which is directly related to the amount of credit. 
An order shall be deemed to  have been finally  placed as soon as  the buyer has committed 
himself irrevocably under a written and signed agreement to buy from  the exporter and 
to pay according to specified terms, even if the agreement is subject to reservations which 
can be withdrawn only by the exporter. 
370 ANNEX/II 
SECTOR UNDERSTANDING ON EXPORT CREDITS FOR 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
A.  Form and scope 
The Sector Understanding: 
complements the Arrangement on guidelines for officially  supported export credits; 
sets out the particular complementary guidelines which are applicable to  officially 
supported export credits relating to  new contracts for the export of complete nuclear 
power stations or parts thereof, comprising all components, equipment, materials and 
services, including the training of personnel, directly required for the construction 
and commissioning of such nuclear power stations;
1 
does not apply to items for which the buyer is usually responsible, in particular costs 
associated with land development, roads, construction village, power lines,  switchyard 
and water supply, as  well as  costs arising in the buyer's country from official approval 
procedures (e.g.  site permit, construction permit, fuel  loading permit). 
B.  Credit terms and conditions 
(a)  Maximum interest rate 
The maximum repayment terms of an  officially supported credit shall be  15  years. 
(b)  Minimum interest rate 
(i)  Category I and II destination countries 
Special commercial interest reference rate (SCIRR). 
(ii)  Category III destination countries 
Current Arrangement SDR-based rate plus 100 basis points or the SCIRR, where 
the  'SDR-based rate' is defmed as  the relevant minimum interest rate specified 
in  paragraph 5(b) of the  Arrangement applicable  to  credits  with  the  longest 
repayment terms destined for Category III. 
(iii)  Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) and (ii), in cases where the fixed  interest rate 
commitment is limited initially to a maximum period not exceeding  15  years 
starting from the date of contract award, the minimum interest rate for that period 
shall be the current Arrangement SDR-based rate plus 75  basis points or the 
SCIRR.  For the  remaining period until  the complete repayment of the  loan, 
official support shall be limited to  guarantees or interest rate  support at the 
appropriate SCIRR prevailing at  the  time of roll-over.  In  no  event shall  the 
maximum repayment period exceed  15  years. 
371 (iv)  For all currencies that are used by  participants in officially supported export 
credits,  the  special  commercial  interest  reference  rates  (SCIRRs)  are  the 
appropriate Arrangement CIRRs plus 7  5 basis points? If a currency has more 
than one CIRR, the CIRR for the longest term shall be used. 
(c)  Local cost and capitalization of interest 
Official  financing  support  at  rates  other  than  SCIRRs  for  both  local  cost  and 
capitalization of interest accruing before the starting point taken together shall not 
cover an amount exceeding 15%  of the export value. 
C.  Official support for nuclear fuel
3 
(i)  The initial fuel  load shall consist of no  more than: 
the initially installed nuclear core, plus 
two subsequent reloads,  together consisting of up to  two thirds of a nuclear 
core. 
Official support for the initial fuel  load shall cover a maximum repayment term of 
four years from  delivery. The minimum interest rate on the initial fuel  load shall 
be at the rates in  the Arrangement. 
(ii)  Official support for subsequent reloads of nuclear fuel shall be made available without 
interest rate support (i.e.  only guarantees or financing  at CIRRs  may  be offered) 
and  shall  be on  repayment terms  no  longer than  two  years  from  delivery.  It is 
understood that repayment terms of over six months are exceptional in recognition 
of which the procedure of paragraph 14(a) of the Arrangement will apply. 
(iii)  Reprocessing and spent-fuel management (including waste disposal) shall be paid 
for on a cash basis. 
D.  Free fuel or services 
Participants shall not provide free  nuclear fuel  or services. 
E.  Tied aid credits 
Participants shall not provide tied aid credits, associated financing  (as defined by the DAC), 
aid loans or grants or provide any other kind of financing at credit conditions that are 
more favourable than those set out in  this Understanding. 
F.  Prior notification and consultation 
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Participants  shall  notify  and  consult  each  other under  the  terms  agreed  upon  in  the 
Appendix to  this Understanding. G.  Review 
The provisions of the Sector Understanding are subject to review each year,  normally 
at the spring meeting of the participants. 
Notes and references 
Where  a  partial  supplier  provides  equipment  for  which  he  has  no  responsibility  of 
commissioning, he may offer CIRRs as an alternative providing that the maximum period 
from date of contract does not exceed 10 years. 
Except that for the Japanese yen, the SCIRR is the Arrangement CIRR plus 40 basis points. 
It is understood that for the time being the separate provision of uranium enrichment services 
shall not be subject to financing conditions more favourable than those applicable to  the 
provision of nuclear fuel. 
* 
*  * 
Appendix 
Prior consultations on terms of export credits for nuclear power plants 
1.  In the light of past practical experience with one major project and taking into account 
the  progress  which  has  been  made  in  certain  respects  in the  current  negotiation,  the 
participants recognize the advantages which can accrue if, pending agreement on a formal 
arrangement on export credits for nuclear power plants,  a common attitude towards the 
credit terms can be achieved for particular export credit transactions of such plant.  They 
therefore agreed as an interim measure to engage in prior consultation in all cases where 
a participant intends to give support to  such a transaction. 
2.  To this end,  the Participant initiating the consultation shall notify by means of instant 
communication at least 10 days before taking a final decision all  other participants of the 
terms it intends to  support specifying, inter alia, the following details: 
(a)  cash payments; 
(b)  repayment term (including starting point of credit, frequency of instalments for repaying 
principal amount of credit, and whether these instalments will be equal in amount); 
(c)  currency and value rating of the contract (in accordance with paragraph 7 of Annex V); 
(d)  interest rate; 
373 (e)  support for  local  costs  (including  the  total  amount  of local  costs  expressed  as  a 
percentage of the total value of goods and services exported, the terms of repayment, 
and the nature of the support to be given); 
(f)  portion of project to be financed, with  separate information for initial fuel load, when 
appropriate; 
(g)  any other relevant information, including references to  related cases. 
3.  Each participant having received the initial notification by the consulting participant shall 
in the following  10 days not take a final decision on the terms it will support, but shall 
within  five  days exchange with  all  other participants in the  consultation  views  on the 
appropriate credit terms  for the  transaction in question with the objective of achieving 
a common attitude on such terms. 
4.  If  by these exchanges of views by means of instant communication a common attitude 
is not achieved within  10 days after the receipt of the initial notification, the final decision 
of each participant in the consultation will be delayed an additional 10 days during which 
period  further  efforts  to  achieve  a  common  attitude  will  be  made  at  face-to-face 
consultations. 
374 ANNEX IV 
SECTOR UNDERSTANDING ON  EXPORT CREDITS FOR CIVIL AIRCRAFT 
Chapter I 
LARGE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFf 
1.  Form and scope 
This chapter complements the Arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export 
credits. It sets out the particular complementary guidelines that are applicable to officially 
supported export credits for financing  sales or leases of large civil aircraft listed in the 
Appendix and supersedes the terms of the OECD  'Standstill'  (TC/ECG/M/75.1, item 6 
and Annex III,  A)  with respect to  such aircraft. 
2.  Objective of this chapter 
The objective of this chapter is  to  establish a balanced equilibrium that,  on all markets: 
equalizes competitive financial conditions between participants; 
neutralizes finance  among participants as  a factor in the  choice among competing 
aircraft;  and 
avoids distortion of competition. 
3.  Credit terms and conditions 
(a)  Cash payments 
The minimum cash payment is  15%  of the  aircraft's total price (the price of the 
airframe and any  installed engines plus the spare engines parts described in paragraph 
9). Participants shall not provide official support for such cash payments other than 
insurance and guarantees against the usual pre-credit risks. 
(b)  Maximum  repayment term 
The maximum repayment term of an officially supported credit is  12 years. 
4.  Minimum interest rates 
(a)  Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, the following minimum interest rates, 
inclusive of credit insurance premiums and guarantees, apply where participants 
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are providing official financing support by way of direct credit,  refmancing or interest 
rate subsidy: 
1.  Financing in  US  dollars: 
Number of years in maximum repayment term 
Up  to  10 years  Over 10 to  12  years 
TB  1  0 + 120 basis points  TB  1  0 +  17 5 basis points 
Where TB  10 means  10-years treasury bond yields at constant maturity, averaged 
over the previous two calendar weeks. 
2.  Financing in the currencies of the currency cocktail (German mark,  French franc, 
pound sterling, ecu).
1 
A currency cocktail package, based on  10-year government bond yields for the 
German mark,  French franc  and the pound sterling,
2  plus a margin applies.  This 
margin,  calculated as  a weighted  average of the  margins  applicable  to  each 
currency, is equal to the margin applicable in the case of fmancing  in US dollars. 
In the case of financing in ecus, the minimum rate applicable is the long-term 
ecu bond yield
3  less 20 basis points plus  a margin equal to the margin applicable 
in the case of financing in US  dollars. 
(b)  Interest rate  adjustments 
An adjustment is  made to  the minimum rates of interest set out in (a)  if the two-
weekly  average of the  10-year government bond yields at constant maturity at the 
end of each two-week period differs by  IO  basis points or more from  the average 
of the  I 0-year government bond yields at constant maturity at the end of the last 
two  calendar weeks of June  I985.  When such  a change occurs,  the  level of the 
minimum rates of interest set out above are adjusted by  the same number of basis 
points and the recalculated minimum rates are rounded off to  the  nearest 5 basis 
points. Subsequently, minimum rates of interest are adjusted on a two-weekly basis 
according to  the aforementioned method if there is  a change of I 0 basis points or 
more in the interest rate underlying the preceding change in minimum rates of interest. 
Similar provisions apply to  the ecu in  the case of changes in the ecu bond yield. 
(c)  Special adjustments 
I.  If  a participant believes that at least two significant sales in any six-month period: 
(i)  for which participants are direct competitors; an4 (ii)  on  which  offers  have  been  made  with  official  financial  support  (see 
paragraphs 5(a) and (b)) 
have been concluded on a pure cover basis, other than Private Export Funding 
Corporations (PEFCO) at a fixed interest rate below the applicable minimum 
interest rates specified in this chapter; the participants shall consult immediately 
in order to determine the interest rates on the basis of which the sales have been 
concluded and, if necessary, to  find  a permanent solution that ensures that the 
objectives of paragraph 2 are fully  met. 
2.  If  during these consultations: 
(i)  it cannot be determined whether the interest rates for the sales in question 
were  at,  above,  or equivalent  to  the  applicable  minimum  interest  rates 
specified in this chapter; and 
(ii)  if a  solution  cannot  be  found  within  30  days  from  the  start  of the 
consultations 
then the minimum interest rates specified in paragraph 4(a)(l) are  reduced by 
15  basis points, unless the participants agree that the sales concerned are not 
significant. In no case is the interest rate for the 10-year option reduced below 
TB  10 plus 105  basis points.  Such adjustments are made without prejudice to 
continuing  consultations  to  find  a  solution,  including  the  possibility  of a 
recoupment in the event that additional cases do  not occur. 
3.  If, in any  six-month period, two or more sales for which participants are direct 
competitors are concluded on a floating-rate pure cover basis, consultations to 
ensure that the objectives of paragraph 2 are fully  met shall be held at the request 
of any participant. 
(d)  Differential between 10- and 12-year financing operationl 
1.  If, subject to  the  conditions outlined below, at the end of the period between 
1 July  1985 and  1 July  1986, 66% or more of all sales of aircraft, financed either 
by means of official support or by PEFCO, have been concluded on a 10-year 
term, then the  minimum interest rate on the  1  0-year financing option shall be 
increased by  15  basis points. 
If, during the following year,  66% or more of all sales of aircraft, financed either 
by means of official support or by PEFCO, have been concluded on a 10-year 
term, then the participants shall review the differential between 10- and  12-year 
financing  options with a view to  finding  a permanent solution to  the problem 
of equating the differential between the two options. If, on the other hand, 66% 
or more  of the  above  sales  have  been  concluded  under  the  10- to  12-year 
financing option, then the minimum interest rate on the  1  0-year financing option 
shall be decreased by  1  0 basis points. 
377 2.  If,  subject to  the conditions outlined below, at the end of the period between 
1 July  1985 and 1 July  1986, 66% or more of all sales have been concluded 
on a 10- to  12-year term, then the minimum interest rate on the 10-year financing 
option shall be decreased by 15  basis points. 
If,  during the following year,  66%  or more of all sales of aircraft have been 
concluded under the  10- to  12-year term, then the participants shall review the 
differential between 10- and 12-year financing  options with a view to  finding 
a permanent solution to  the problem of equating the differential between the 
two options. If, on the other hand,  66% or more of the above sales have been 
concluded under the 10-year option, then the 10-year minimum interest rate shall 
be increased by  10 basis points. 
(e)  Date of determination of interest rate  offer 
A participant may offer the borrower a choice of one of the two following methods 
for selecting the date on which the minimum interest rate (as defined in  paragraphs 
4(a) et seq.) on official interest rate financing (see paragraph 5(a)) and on PEFCO 
financing  (see  paragraph  5(b))  is  determined.  The selection  by  the  borrower is 
irrevocable. The minimum rate is: 
(i)  the minimum rate prevailing on the date of the offer by the lender;  or 
(ii)  the  minimum rate  prevailing on whichever one of a  series  of dates  may  be 
selected by the borrower. The date selected shall in no  event be later than the 
date of deli very of the aircraft. 
5.  Amount of financing 
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(a)  Official fixed interest rate financing 
1.  The maximum percentage of the aircraft total price (as that term is defined in 
paragraph 3(a)) that may be financed at the fixed minimum rates specified in 
paragraph 4(a) by means of official financing support is 62.5% when repayment 
of the  loan  is  spread over the entire  life  of the  financing  and  42.5%  when 
repayment of the loan is spread over the later maturities. Participants are free 
to use either repayment approach, subject to  the ceiling applicable to  that pattern. 
A  participant offering such a tranche shall notify the other participants of the 
amount, the interest rate, the date on which the interest rate is set, the validity 
period for the interest rate and the pattern of repayment. 
2.  The participants will review the two ceilings at the time of each review pursuant 
to paragraph 16 to examine whether one ceiling provides more advantages than 
the other with a view to adjusting the  more advantageous so that a balance is 
more evenly struck. (b)  PEFCO financing 
1.  Fixed-rate funds  may  be officially financed  in  a  manner comparable to  that 
provided  by  the  Private  Export  Funding  Corporations  (PEFCO).  Weekly 
information on PEFCO's borrowing costs and applicable lending rates, exclusive 
of official guarantee fees on fixed-rate finance for immediate disbursement and 
for disbursement over a series of dates, for contract offers and for bid offers, 
shall be communicated to  the other participants on a regular basis. A participant 
offering such a tranche shall notify the other participants of the amount, interest 
rates, date on which interest rate is  set, validity period for the interest rate and 
pattern of repayments. Any participant matching such financing offered by another 
participant shall match it in all of its terms and conditions other than the validity 
period of offers of commitments (see paragraph 6). 
2.  The rates  as  notified shall be applicable by all participants as  long as the 24-
months disbursement interest rate does not exceed 225  basis points above TB 
10 (see paragraph 4). In the event the 24-month rate exceeds 225 basis points, 
participants  are  free  to  apply  the  rate  of 225  basis  points  for  24-months' 
disbursement and all the corresponding rates and shall consult immediately with 
a view to  finding a permanent solution. 
(c)  'Pure cover' tranche 
Official support by means of guarantees only (pure cover) is  permitted subject to 
the ceiling specified in (d).  However, a participant offering such a tranche shall notify 
the other participants of the amount, term, pattern of repayments, and,  where possible, 
interest rates. 
(d)  Total official support 
The total amount of funds benefiting from official support pursuant to  paragraphs 
5(a),  (b)  and (c) shall not exceed 85% of the total price as  defined in paragraph 
3(a). 
6.  Validity period of commitments 
The duration of fixed interests rate offers of commitment on the tranches of financing 
defined in paragraphs 5(a) and (b) shall not exceed three months. 
7.  Fees 
Commitment and management fees are not included in the interest rate. 
8.  Security 
Participants retain the right to decide upon security acceptable to themselves autonomously 
and will communicate fully to other participants on this point, as requested or when deemed 
appropriate. 
379 9.  Spare engines and spare parts 
The financing of these items is  provided as  a function  of the size of the  fleet of each 
specific aircraft type,  including aircraft being acquired, aircraft already of firm order or 
aircraft already owned, on  the following basis: 
for the first five aircraft of the type in the fleet:  15% of the  aircraft price (airframe 
and installed engines); 
for the sixth and subsequent aircraft of that type in the fleet:  10%  of the aircraft 
price (airframe and installed engines). 
Participants reserve the right to change their practice and match the practices of competing 
participants in matters of detail relating to  the timing of the first repayment with  respect 
to  spare engines and spare parts. 
10.  Tied aid credits 
Participants shall not provide tied or partially untied aid financing,  or provide any  other 
kind of financing on credit conditions that are  more favourable than those set out in  this 
chapter. 
11.  Prior commitments 
Participants reserve the right to  honour all financing commitments made prior to  1 July 
1985 and the dates of all subsequent changes in interest rates.  They reserve the right to 
match offers made by  other participants. 
12.  Model changes 
It is  understood that when a loan contract has  been concluded on one type of aircraft, 
the terms contained therein cannot be transferred to another type bearing a different model 
designation. 
13.  Leases 
It is  also  understood that a participant may  match a  12-year officially supported lease 
transaction with a 12-year repayment term and  85% credit financing  support, subject to 
the other terms  and conditions of this chapter. 
14.  Competition reference point 
In the event of officially supported competition, aircraft that are in the list of large civil 
aircraft in the Appendix and that compete with other aircraft may benefit from the same 
export credit terms and  conditions. 
15.  Procedures 
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The procedures outlined in the Arrangement on guidelines of officially supported export 
credits  apply  to  this  chapter.  In  addition,  should  any  participant believe  that  another participant is offering an officially supported export credit that is not in conformity with 
the guidelines without giving advance notice, consultations shall be held within 10 days 
upon request. 
16.  Review 
The information procedures and conditions outlined in this chapter are subject in principle 
to  an annual review.  However, the participants shall review the provisions of this chapter 
whenever requested, notably in relation to the possible development of certain financing 
and interest rate trends  (see paragraphs 4(c) and (d)). 
Chapter ll 
ALL AIRCRAFf EXCEPT LARGE COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFf 
17.  Form and scope 
This chapter complements the Arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export 
credits. It sets out the particular complementing guidelines that are applicable to officially 
supported export credits financing contracts for the international sale or lease of new (not 
used) aircraft and, if ordered concurrently with the aircraft or if ordered for manufacturing 
or assembly into such aircraft,  engines,  subassemblies and spare parts of aircraft not covered 
by Chapter I. It does not apply to  hovercraft. 
18.  Participation 
The rules on participation of the Arrangement shall apply. 
19.  Best endeavours 
The provisions of this  chapter represent the most generous terms that participants are 
allowed to  offer when giving official support.  Participants shall,  however,  continue to 
respect customary  market terms for different types  of aircraft and shall do  everything 
in their power to prevent these terms from being eroded.
5 
20.  Categories of aircraft 
The following categories have been agreed upon in view of the competitive situation: 
A.  turbine-powered aircraft - including helicopters - (e.g.  turbo-jet,  turbo-prop,  and 
turbo-fan  aircraft),  with generally between 30 and 70 seats.  In  case a new  large 
turbine-powered aircraft with over 70 seats is being developed, immediate consultations 
shall be held upon request with a view to  agreement on the classification of such 
an  aircraft in  this  category or in  Chapter I of this  Understanding in  view of the 
competitive situation; 
B.  other turbine-powered aircraft, including helicopters; 
C.  other aircraft,  including helicopters; 
An illustrative list of aircraft in categories A and B is  given in the Appendix. 
381 21.  Credit terms and conditions 
Participants undertake not to support credit terms more favourable than those set out in 
this paragraph. 
Category A: 
Ten years at SDR-based rate for recipient countries classified in category III or respective 
CIRRs. 
Category B: 
Seven years at SDR-based rate for recipient countries classified in category III or respective 
CIRRs. 
Category C: 
Five years at SDR-based rate for recipient countries classified in category III or respective 
CIRRs. 
22.  Sales or leases to third countries (relay countries) 
In cases where the aircraft are to be on-sold or on-leased to  an end-buyer or end-used 
in  a  third  country,  the  interest  rate  shall  be  that  applicable  to  the  country  of final 
destination. 
23.  Matching provisions 
In the event of officially supported competition, aircraft competing with those from another 
category or chapter shall for a specific sale be able to benefit from matching of the same 
export credit terms  and  conditions.  Before  making the  matching  offer,  the  matching 
authority shall make reasonable efforts to determine the export credit terms and conditions 
the competing aircraft benefits from. The matching authority will be considered to  have 
made such reasonable efforts if it has informed by  means of instant communication the 
authority assumed to offer the terms it intends to  match of its intention to  do  so but has 
not been informed within three working days that the terms it intends to match will not 
be used to support the transaction in question. 
24.  Insurance premiums and guarantee fees 
Participants shall not waive in part or in total insurance premiums or guarantee fees. 
25.  Tied aid credits prohibition 
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Participants shall not provide tied aid financing,  partially untied aid financing, or any other 
kind of financing or credit conditions that are more favourable than those set out in this 
chapter. 26.  Consultation and notification procedures 
The procedures of the Arrangement shall apply to  officially supported export credits not 
in conformity with the terms of this  chapter.  In addition,  should any  participant believe 
that  another  participant  may  be  offering  an  officially  supported  export  credit  not  in 
conformity with this chapter without giving advance notice, consultations shall be held 
within  10 days upon request. 
27.  Review 
4 
The provisions of this chapter are  subject to  review annually,  normally during the spring 
meeting of the participants to  the Arrangement. In the review,  the participants will examine 
possible modifications of the provisions, notably in order to  bring them closer to market 
conditions. 
6  In  addition,  if market conditions or customary  financing  practices change 
considerably,  any  participant is entitled to  ask for a special review of the  provisions. 
Notes and references 
The  currency  cocktail  financing  for  the  A  300  and  A  310  consists  of the  following 
percentages of the following currencies: 
German mark or ecu:  40%; 
French franc  or ecu:  40%; 
pound sterling, or 
US  dollar or ecu:  20%. 
For the A 320, the currency cocktail consists of the following percentages of the following 
countries: 
German mark or ecu:  33.7% (provisional); 
French franc  or ecu:  40.0%  (provisional); 
pound sterling, or 
US  dollar or ecu:  26.3%  (provisional). 
At constant maturity,  averaged over the previous two calendar weeks. 
As published by the Luxembourg Stock Exchange - long-term bond series, averaged over 
the previous two calendar weeks. 
For the operational purposes of this paragraph, it is understood that: 
the test sample will  include only those cases in  which two  financing  options have 
been offered by  at least one participant; 
the activation of an  interest rate adjustment may take place only if 66%  of sales of 
aircraft according to  one option have been concluded under two  or more  separate 
transactions; 
383 the term 'sales of aircraft' signifies that each separate aircraft sold is included in the 
sample. 
Best endeavours  shall  be  made,  inter alia,  with  respect  to  the  willingness  to  respond 
favourably to the invitation by another participant to consult on possibilities of achieving 
conditions as  close as  the market as  possible, for example in matching. 
Pending  the  review  on  official  support  for  export of used  aircraft  and  conditions  for 
maintenance, spare parts and service contracts, these goods and services are covered by 
the Arrangement on guidelines for officially supported export credits. The tied aid  credits 
prohibition in paragraph 25 of this chapter applies. 
* 
*  * 
Appendix 
Dlustrative list 
All other similar aircraft that may  be introduced in the future shall be covered by  this  Sector 
Understanding and shall be added to  the  appropriate list in due course.  These lists are not 
exhaustive  and  serve  only  to  indicate  the  type  of aircraft  to  be  included  in  the  different 
categories where doubts could arise. 
LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFf 
Manufacturer 
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Airbus 
Airbus 
Airbus 
Airbus 
Airbus 
Airbus 
Boeing 
Boeing 
Boeing 
Boeing 
British Aerospace 
Fokker 
Lockheed 
McDonnell Douglas 
McDonnell Douglas 
Designation 
A 300 
A310 
A  320 
A  321 
A 330 
A  340 
B 737 
B 747 
B 757 
B 767 
BAe  146 
F  100 
L-100 
MD-80 series 
MD-11 CATEGORY A AIRCRAFT 
Turbine-powered aircraft- including helicopters- (e.g.  turbo-jet,  turbo-prop, and turbo-fan 
aircraft), with generally between 30 and 70 seats. In case a new large turbine-powered aircraft 
with over 70 seats is being developed, immediate consultations shall be held upon request 
with a view to agreement on the classification of such an aircraft in this category or in Chapter 
I of this Understanding in view of the competitive situation. 
Manufacturer 
Aeritalia 
Aeritalia!  Aerospatiale 
Aeritalia!  Aerospatiale 
Aerospatiale/MBB 
Boeing Canada 
Boeing Vertol 
Broman (US) 
British Aerospace 
British Aerospace 
Canadair 
Canadair 
Cas  a 
Domier 
EH Industries 
Embraer 
Fokker 
Gulfstream America 
Saab 
Saab 
Short 
Short 
Short 
etc. 
CATEGORY B  AIRCRAFT 
Designation 
G 222 
ATR42 
ATR 72 
C160 Transall 
Dash 8 
234 Chinook 
BR 2000 
BAe ATP 
BAe Jetstream 41 
CL 21ST 
RJ 
CN 235 
DO 328 
EH-101 
EMB  120 Brasilia 
F 50 
Gulfstream 1-4 
SF 340 
2000 
SD 3-30 
SD 3-60 
Sherpa 
Other turbine-powered aircraft, including helicopters 
Manufacturer 
Aerospatiale 
Beech 
Beech 
Beech 
Bell Helicopter 
Bell Helicopter 
Designation 
AS  322 
1900 
Super King Air 300 
Starship 1 
206B 
206L 
385 Bell Helicopter 
Bell Helicopter 
Boeing 
British Aerospace 
British Aerospace 
British Aerospace 
British Aerospace 
Canadair 
Canadair 
Cas  a 
Cas  a 
Cessna 
Cessna 
Claudius Domier 
Dassault Breguet 
Domier 
Embraer/F  AMA 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Fairchild 
Gates Learjet 
Gulfstream America 
IAI 
Mitsubishi 
Piaggio 
Pilatus Britten-Norman 
Piper 
Piper 
Reims 
SIAl-Marchetti 
Westland 
etc. 
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212 
412 
F 406 
BAe Jetstream 31 
BAe 125 
BAe 1000 
BAe Jetstream Super 31 
Challenger 601 
CL 215  (water bomber) 
c 212-200 
c 212-300 
Citation 
441  Conquest III 
CD2 
Falcon 
Do 228-200 
CBA  123 
Merlin/300 
Metro 25 
Metro III V 
20, 30 and 55  series 
Gulfstream III and IV 
Arava 101  B 
Mu2 Marquise 
p  180 
BN2T Islander 
PA-42-100 (Cheyenne 400) 
PA-42-720 (Cheyenne III A) 
Cessna-Caravan II 
SF 600 Canguro 
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STANDARD FORM FOR NOTIFICATIONS REQUIRED UNDER 
PARAGRAPHS 15  AND 16 
Points to be covered in each and every notification: 
1.  Name of authority/agency responsible under the Arrangement for making notifications. 
2.  Reference number (country indications, serial number,  year). 
3.  We are notifying 
- under paragraph (choose one) of the Arrangement: 
- 15(a)  derogation, 
- 15(b)(l)(i)  'long term'  credit to a category I country, 
- 15(b)(l)(ii) 
- 15(b)(l)(iii) 
- 15(b)(l)(iv) 
- 15(c) 
- 15(d) 
- 16(a)(l)(i) 
- 16(a)(l )(ii) 
- 16(a)(2)(i) 
- 16(b )(2)(ii) 
- 16(a)(3) 
- 16(a)(4) 
- 16(b)(2) 
- 16(c)(3)(i) 
- 16(c)(3)(ii) 
'abnormal'  payment practices, 
'long term'  credit for a conventional power plant, 
'derogating'  credit for ship, 
aid financing, concessionality leveVgrant element less than 50/80%, 
tied or partially untied aid financing, concessionality level 50/80% 
or more, 
identical matching of a derogation, 
matching by  other support of a derogation, 
identical matching of a transaction notified under paragraph 15(b)(l) 
(specify (i)  to  (iv)), 
matching by other support of a transaction notified under paragraph 
15(b)(l) (specify  (i) to  (iv)), 
matching  a  transaction  notified  under  paragraph  15(c)  (specify 
'identical' or 'by other support'), 
matching of a transaction notified under paragraph 15(d), 
matching terms offered by  a non-participant, 
identical matching of a prior commitment, 
matching by other means of a prior commitment, 
- under the Understanding on export credits for nuclear power plants, 
- under the Sector Arrangements for civil aircraft. 
4.  Country of buyer/borrower. 
387 5.  Name,  location and status (public/private) of buyer/borrower. 
6.  Nature of project/goods to be exported; location of project; closing date of tender if relevant, 
expiry date of credit line. 
7.  (a)  Contract value. 
(b)  Value of the credit or credit line. 
(c)  Value of exporter's national share. 
(d)  Minimum contract value of credit line. 
These values shall be stated as follows: 
- the exact value in the denominated currency for a line of credit, 
- the value of an individual project or contract should be disclosed in terms of value 
ratings in accordance with the following  scale in special drawing rights (SDRs): 
Category 1:  up to  1 000 000 
Category II:  from  1 000 000  to  2 000 000 
Category III:  from  2 000 000  to  3 000 000 
Category IV:  from  3 000 000  to  5 000 000 
Category V:  from  5 000 000  to  7 000 000 
Category VI:  from  7 000 000  to  10 000 000 
Category VII:  from  10 000 000  to  20 000 000 
Category VIII:  from  20 000 000  to  40 000 000 
Category IX:  from  40 000 000  to  80 000 000 
Category  X:  from  80 000 000  to  120 000 000 
Category XI:  from  120 000 000  to  160 000 000 
Category XII:  from  160 000 000  to  200 000 000 
Category XIII:  from  200 000 000  to  240 000 000 
Category XIV:  from  240 000 000  to  280 000 000 
Category XV:  exceeding 280 000 000* 
* Indicate actual level within multiples of 40 000 000 SDR. 
When using this  scale please indicate currency of the contract. 
388 8.  Credit terms which reporting organization intends to  support (or has supported): 
(a)  cash payments; 
(b)  repayment term (including starting point of credit, frequency of instalments for repaying 
principal amount of credit, and whether these instalments will be equal in amount); 
(c)  interest rate; 
(d)  support for  local  costs  (including  the  total  amount  of local  costs  expressed  as  a 
percentage of the total value of goods and services exported, the terms of repayment, 
and the nature of the support to be given). 
9.  Any other relevant information, including references to  related cases and where relevant: 
(a)  justification for:  matching (specify reference number of notification matched or other 
references) or granting long-term credits for category I countries or conventional power 
plants, etc.; 
(b)  the overall concessionality level of the tied and partially untied aid financing calculated 
in  accordance  with  paragraph  24(n)  and  the  discount  rate  used  to  calculate  that 
concessionality level; 
(c)  treatment of cash payments in the calculation of the concessionality level; 
(d)  development aid or premixed credit or associated finance; 
(e)  restrictions on use of credit lines. 
389 ANNEX VI 
FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE (FIE) 
1.  Scope 
The framework for information exchange (FIE) concerns credit terms and conditions for 
any export credit or credit guarantee transactions that are covered by  paragraph  l(a) of 
the Arrangement, as well as  any aid transaction that is covered by the notification procedures 
of paragraph 15. 
2.  Information exchange 
(a)  A participant: 
may address to  another participant an enquiry on the attitude it takes in respect 
of a third country, of an institution in a third country or of a particular method 
of doing business; 
who has received an application for official support,  may address an enquiry to 
another participant giving the  most favourable  credit terms  that the  enquiring 
participant would be willing to  support; or 
who has received allegations that another participant has offered official support 
that derogates from the guidelines of the Arrangement, may  address an  enquiry 
to  another participant, stating the details of any such allegation. 
If  an enquiry is to more than one participant, it shall contain a list of addresses. A copy 
of all enquiries shall be sent to  the Secretariat. 
(b)  The participant to  whom an enquiry is  addressed shall respond within seven calendar 
days  with as  much information as  is  available at that time. The reply shall include, 
if possible, the best indication that the participant can give of the decision likely to 
be taken.  If necessary, the full  reply  shall follow  as  soon as  possible. Copies shall 
be sent to  the other addressee of the enquiry and to the Secretariat. 
(c)  If  an answer to  an enquiry subsequently becomes invalid because an application has 
been made, changed or withdrawn, because other terms are being considered, or for 
any other reason,  a follow-up  reply  shall be  made  at once and copied to  all  other 
addresses of the enquiry and to the Secretariat. 
(d)  All communications shall be made between the designated contract points in  each 
country by  means of instant communication (e.g.  electronic mail,  telex,  telefax) and 
shall be confidential. 
3.  Common line proposals 
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(a)  The  information  exchange  or face-to-face  consultations  (see  the  Protocol  to  the 
Arrangement) may  lead to a common line.  A proposal for a common line shall be sent to  all participants, all DAC contact points and the Secretariat. The proposal shall 
be dated and shall be in the following format: 
(1)  reference number,  as  for Arrangement notifications, but followed by  'Common 
line'; 
(2)  name of the importing country and buyer; 
(3)  name or description of the project as precise as possible to clearly identify the 
project; 
(4)  terms and conditions foreseen by the instigating country; 
(5)  common line proposal; 
(6)  nationality and name of known competing bidders; 
(7)  commercial and financial bid closing date and tender number to  the extent it is 
known; and 
(8)  other relevant information,  including reasons for proposing the common line, 
availability of studies of the project or special circumstances. 
(b)  A  common line  proposal may  contain terms and conditions that are  more or less 
favourable than terms and conditions allowed under the Arrangement. 
4.  Common line procedure 
(a)  The participants should react on a common line proposal as  quickly as  possible but 
in  any  case  within  20 calendar days.  A  reaction  can  be  a  request  for  additional 
information, acceptance, rejection,  a proposal for modification of the common line 
or an alternative proposal for a common line.  A participant who replies that it has 
no position because it has not been approached by an exporter or by the  authorities 
in the recipient country in case of aid credit for the project, is deemed to have accepted 
the common line proposal. When such a participant is approached after the common 
line has gone into effect,  it may apply the procedures of paragraph 5 if it wishes to 
extend softer terms than those stipulated in the common line. 
(b)  The Secretariat shall,  after a period of 20 calendar days,  inform all participants of 
the status of the common line proposal. If  no  participant has rejected the common 
line proposal, but not all participants have accepted it, the proposal shall be retained 
for a second period of eight calendar days. 
(c)  If the instigating participant and a participant who has proposed a modification or 
alternative cannot agree on a common line within the second period, this period can 
be extended by their mutual consent. The Secretariat shall inform all  participants of 
such an extension. 
(d)  After the second period, any participant who has not explicitly rejected the common 
line proposal shall be deemed to  have accepted the common line.  Nevertheless,  any 
participant,  including  the  instigating  participant,  may  make  his  acceptance  of the 
common line conditional on the explicit acceptance of one or more participants. 
391 (e)  The Secretariat shall inform all participants that the common line has either gone into 
effect or has been rejected. The common line will take effect three calendar days after 
this  announcement.  The Secretariat shall  on  the  on-line  system make  available  a 
permanently updated record of all common lines that are accepted or undecided. 
5.  Validity of a common line 
(a)  1.  The rules of an agreed common line supersede the rules of the Arrangement only 
for the project specified in the common line. 
2.  The participants who have agreed to the common line should inform the Secretariat 
when the common line is no longer of interest. 
3.  The Secretariat shall initiate a review of the common line after each period of 
two  years  from  the date  on which  the  common line has  come into  force  by 
reminding the participants. The common line shall remain in force if any  participant 
so indicates within 14 calendar days. 
(b)  The intention to submit a bid that is more favourable than agreed in the common line 
must be notified to all participants and to the Secretariat at least 60 calendar days 
before any commitment. The notification must include an explanation of the reason 
for the commitment as  well as a justification of how the commitment does not result 
in a purchasing decision (possibly including the outcome of an ICB procedure) which 
is influenced by the availability of aid. If  any participant, interested in this specific 
transaction  so  requests,  the  Secretariat shall  organize  a  face-to-face  consultation. 
Participants shall refrain from making any commitments until 28  calendar days after 
the face-to-face consultation unless an  alternative common line is established, or 60 
days after notification.  Any participant can reserve the right of matching a finance 
offer which is more favourable than agreed in the common line in accordance with 
paragraph 16 of the Arrangement. 
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CHECKLIST OF DEVELOPMENTAL QUALITY OF 
AID-FINANCED PROJECTS 
To ensure developmental quality of projects in developing countries financed  totally or in 
part by official development assistance (ODA), a number of criteria have been developed in 
recent  years  by  the  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC)  of the  OECD.  They  are 
essentially contained in the: 
(a)  'DAC principles for project appraisal',  1988; 
(b)  'DAC guiding principles for  associated financing  and  tied  and  partially untied official 
development assistance',  1987; 
(c)  'Good procurement practices for official development assistance',  1986. 
I - CONSISTENCY OF THE PROJECT WITH THE RECIPIENT COUNTRY'S OVERALL 
INVESTMENT PRIORITIES  (PROJECT SELECTION) 
1.  Is the project part of investment and public expenditure programmes already approved 
by  the central financial  and planning authorities of the recipient country? 
(Specify  policy document mentioning the project,  for example public  investment 
programme of the recipient country). 
2.  Is the project being co-financed with an international development finance institution? 
3.  Does  evidence  exist  that  the  project  had  been  considered  and  rejected  by  an 
international development finance institution or another DAC member on grounds 
of low developmental priority? 
4.  In case of a private-sector project,  has  it been approved by the government of the 
recipient country? 
5.  Is the  project covered by  an  intergovernmental agreement providing for a broader 
range of aid activities by the donor in the recipient country? 
II - PROJECT PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL 
6.  Has  the project been prepared, designed and appraised against a set of standards 
and criteria broadly consistent with the 'DAC principles for project appraisal'  (PPA)? 
Relevant principles concern project appraisal under: 
(a)  Economic aspects  (paragraphs 30 to  38  of the PPA). 
(b)  Technical aspects (paragraph 22 of the PPA). 
(c)  Financial aspects  (paragraphs 23  to  29  of the PPA). 
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competitive market, has the concessionary element of the aid financing been passed 
on to the end-user of the funds?  (Paragraph 25  of the PP  A.) 
(d)  Institutional assessment (paragraphs 40 to  44 of the PPA). 
(e)  Social and distributional analysis (paragraphs 47  to  57 of the PPA). 
(f)  Environmental assessment (paragraphs 55  to  57  of the PPA). 
III - PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
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7.  What procurement mode will be used among the following? (For definitions, see 
principles listed in 'Good procurement practices for ODA'). 
(a)  International competitive bidding (Procurement Principle III and its Annex 2: 
'Minimum conditions for effective international competitive bidding'). 
(b)  National competitive bidding (Procurement Principle IV). 
(c)  Informal competition or direct negotiations (Procurement Principle V,  A or B). 
8.  Is it envisaged to check price and quality of suppliers? (Paragraph 63  of the PPA.) ANNEX VIII 
DETERMINATION OF COMMERCIAL INTEREST REFERENCE RATES 
1.  The participants have accepted the following aims for evaluating specific commercial interest 
reference rates (CIRRs): 
(i)  the CIRR should be representative of final commercial lending rates of interest in 
the domestic market of the currency concerned; 
(ii)  the CIRR should closely correspond to  a rate for a first class domestic borrower; 
(iii)  the CIRR should be based, where appropriate, on the funding cost of fixed interest 
rate finance over a period of not less than five years; 
(iv)  the CIRR should not lead to  a distortion of domestic competitive conditions; 
(v)  the CIRR should closely correspond to a rate available to first-class foreign borrowers. 
2.  In view of these aims, the participants have decided that CIRRs shall be set at  a fixed 
margin above their respective base rates. 
(a)  For each currency, the base rates may be either: 
(i)  three-year government bond yield for repayment terms up to and including five 
years, five-year government bond yields for over five up to and including eight-
and-a-half years, and seven-year government bond yields for over eight-and-a-half 
years; or 
(ii)  five-year government bond yields for all maturities; 
except where the participants have agreed otherwise. 
(b)  The fixed margin is  100 basis points,  except where the  participants have agreed 
otherwise. 
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FUTURE WORK 
(i)  DDR 
The Participants shall review the DDR formula by  the end of 1993. This could lead to 
changes in the formula for all currencies, which further reflects appropriate long term 
market rates,  taking into account the characteristics of aid credits. 
(ii)  Target for global untying 
From the perspective that global untying of aid is  one of the best ways to  reduce trade 
distortions, the Participants shall cooperate with the DAC to develop targets for untying 
by the end of 1992. In the context of this further work,  a more precise definition of the 
circumstances in which aid can be considered to  be untied or partially untied needs to 
be developed. 
(iii)  Sectors 
The Participants note that negotiations will take place in the GATT context on subsidies 
for agriculture and for steel plant and equipment. The need for further or complementary 
guidelines in the Agreement on guidelines for officially supported export credits in these 
areas  will be considered when the outcome of the negotiations in the  GATT context is 
known. 
(iv)  Premiums 
In accordance with their international obligations, the participants reaffirm the general 
principle that the  level  of premia charged  for  export credit insurance  should not  be 
manifestly inadequate to  cover long-term costs and losses,  and  will review this section 
upon completion of the Uruguay Round.  In the meantime,  these concepts need to be 
further clarified and a report shall be made by  the ECG to  this end. 
(v)  SDR-based rate 
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The Participants shall review the SDR-based rate formula by the end of 1993.  This could 
lead to the elimination of the SDR-based rate and a new  agreement on a DDR reached 
at the same time. XI - Rules applicable to international trade 
in civil aircraft 1.  GATT Agreement on trade in  civil aircraft of 12 April 1979 
1 
[  ... ] 
Article 1 
Product coverage 
1.1.  This Agreement applies to  the following products: 
(a)  all civil aircraft, 
(b)  all civil aircraft engines and their parts and components, 
(c)  all other parts, components, and subassemblies of civil aircraft, 
(d)  all ground flight simulators and their parts and components, 
whether used as  original or replacement equipment in the manufacture, repair, maintenance, 
rebuilding, modification or conversion of civil aircraft. 
1.2.  For the purposes of this Agreement 'civil aircraft' means (a) all aircraft other than military 
aircraft and (b) all other products set out in Article 1.1. above. 
[  ... ] 
Article 6 
Government support, export credits, and aircraft marketing 
6.1.  Signatories note that the provisions of the Agreement on interpretation and application 
of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Agreement 
on subsidies and countervailing measures) apply to trade in civil aircraft. They affirm that 
in their participation in, or support of, civil aircraft programmes they shall seek to avoid adverse 
effects on trade in civil aircraft in the sense of Articles 8.3.  and 8.4. of the Agreement on 
subsidies and countervailing measures. They also shall take into account the special factors 
which apply in the aircraft sector, in particular the widespread governmental support in this 
area,  their international economic interests, and the desire of producers of all signatories to 
participate in the expansion of the world civil aircraft market. 
6.2.  Signatories agree that pricing of civil aircraft should be based on a reasonable expectation 
of recoupment of all costs, including non-recurring programme costs, identifiable and pro-rated 
1  Including the Protocol (1986) amending the Annex to the Agreement, published by GA TI, Geneva, 1990. 
399 costs  of military  research  and  development on aircraft,  components, and  systems that are 
subsequently applied to  the production for such civil aircraft,  average production costs,  and 
financial costs. 
[  ... ] 
Article 8 
Surveillance, review, consultation, and dispute settlement 
8.1.  There shall be established a Committee on Trade in Civil Aircraft (hereinafter referred 
to  as  'the Committee') composed of representatives of all signatories. The Committee shall 
elect its own chairman. It shall meet as necessary, but not less than once a year, for the purpose 
of affording signatories the opportunity to consult on any  matters relating to  the  operation 
of this Agreement, including developments in the civil aircraft industry, to determine whether 
amendments are required to ensure continuance of free  and undistorted trade, to examine any 
matter for  which it has  not been possible to  find  a satisfactory  solution through bilateral 
consultations, and to carry out such responsibilities as  are assigned to it under this Agreement, 
or by  the signatories. 
8.2.  The Committee shall review annually the implementation and operation of this Agreement 
taking into account the objectives thereof. The Committee shall annually inform the Contracting 
Parties to the GATT of developments during the period covered by such review. 
8.3.  Not later than the end of the third year from the entry into force of this Agreement and 
periodically thereafter, signatories shall undertake further negotiations, with a view to broadening 
and improving this Agreement on the basis of mutual reciprocity. 
8.4.  The Committee may establish such subsidiary bodies as  may be appropriate to  keep 
under regular review the application of this Agreement to ensure a continuing balance of mutual 
advantages.  In particular, it shall establish an appropriate subsidiary body in order to ensure 
a continuing balance of mutual advantages, reciprocity and equivalent results with regard to 
the implementation of the provisions of Article 2 above related to product coverage, the end-use 
systems, customs duties and other charges. 
8.5.  Each signatory shall afford sympathetic consideration to and adequate opportunity for 
prompt consultation regarding representations made by another signatory with respect to any 
matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
8.6.  Signatories  recognize  the  desirability  of consultations  with  other  signatories  in  the 
Committee  in  order  to  seek  a  mutually  acceptable  solution  prior  to  the  initiation  of an 
investigation to determine the existence, degree and effect of any  alleged subsidy.  In  those 
exceptional circumstances in  which no  consultations occur before such domestic procedures 
are initiated, signatories shall notify the Committee immediately of initiation of such procedures 
and enter into simultaneous consultations to seek a mutually agreed solution that would obviate 
the need for countervailing measures. 
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maintenance,  rebuilding,  modification or conversion have been or are likely to be  adversely 
affected  by  any  action  by  another  signatory,  it  may  request  review  of the  matter by  the 
Committee. Upon such a request,  the Committee shall convene within 30 days and shall review 
the matter as  quickly as  possible with a view to  resolving the issues involved as  promptly 
as  possible  and  in  particular  prior  to  final  resolution  of these  issues  elsewhere.  In  this 
connection, the Committee may issue such rulings or recommendations as  may be appropriate. 
Such review shall be without prejudice to  the rights of signatories under the GAIT or under 
instruments multilaterally negotiated under the  auspices of the GAIT, as  they  affect trade 
in civil aircraft.  For the  purposes of aiding consideration of the issues involved, under the 
GAIT and such instruments,  the Committee may  provide such technical assistance as  may 
be appropriate. 
8.8.  Signatories agree that,  with respect to  any  dispute related to  a matter covered by  this 
Agreement, but not covered by other instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices 
of the GA TI, the provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement and the 
provisions of the Understanding related to  notification, consultation, dispute settlement and 
surveillance shall be applied, mutatis mutandis, by the  signatories and the Committee for the 
purposes of seeking settlement of such dispute. These procedures shall also be applied for 
the settlement of any  dispute related to  a matter covered by  this Agreement and by  another 
instrument multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the  GA TI, should the  parties to 
the dispute so agree. 
[ ... ] 
401 2.  Agreement between the European Economic Community and 
the Government of the United States of America concerning 
the application of the GATT Agreement on trade in civil aircraft 
and on trade in large civil aircraft 
Decision of the Council of 13 July 1992 
(92/496/EEC) 
1 
[ ... ] 
Article 1 
Government-directed procurement, mandatory subcontracts and 
inducements 
With respect to issues concerning Article 4 of the GA  'IT Agreement on trade in civil aircraft 
('Aircraft Agreement'), the Parties agree to act in conformity with the interpretative note to 
Article 4 of the Aircraft Agreement contained in Annex I to this Agreement. 
Article 2 
Prior government commitments 
Government support to current large civil aircraft programmes, committed prior to the date 
of entry into force of this Agreement, is not subject to the provisions of this Agreement except 
as  otherwise provided below. The terms and conditions on which such support is granted shall 
not be modified in such a manner as  to render it more favourable to  the recipients; however, 
de  minimis modifications shall not be deemed inconsistent with this provision. 
Article 3 
Production support 
As of entry into force of this Agreement, Parties shall not grant direct government support 
other than what has already been firmly committed for the production of large civil aircraft. 
This prohibition shall apply both to existing and to future programmes. 
I  OJ L 301, 17.10.1992, p. 31. 
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Development support 
4.1.  Governments  shall provide support for  the development of a new  large civil aircraft 
programme only where a critical project appraisal, based on conservative assumptions, has 
established that there is  a reasonable expectation of recoupment,  within  17  years from the 
date of first disbursement of such support, of all costs as defined in Article 6(2) of the Aircraft 
Agreement, including repayment of government supports on the terms and conditions specified 
below. 
4.2.  As  of entry into force  of this Agreement, direct government support committed by a 
Party for the development of a new large civil aircraft programme or derivative shall not exceed: 
(a)  25% of that programme's total development cost as estimated at the time of commitment 
(or of actual development costs,  whichever is  lower);  royalty payments on this tranche 
shall be  set at the time of commitment of the development support so as  to  repay this 
support at an interest rate no  less than the cost of borrowing to  the government within 
no  more than  17  years from  first disbursement; plus 
(b)  8%  of that programme's total development cost as estimated at the time of commitment 
(or of actual development costs,  whichever is lower);  royalty payments on this tranche 
shall be set at the time of commitment of the development support so as  to repay this 
support at an interest rate no  less than the cost of borrowing to  the government plus  1% 
within no  more than 17  years from first disbursement. 
These calculations shall be made on the basis of the forecast of aircraft deliveries in the critical 
project appraisal. 
4.3.  Royalty  payments per aircraft shall  be  calculated at the  time  of commitment of the 
development support to  be repaid on the following basis: 
(a)  20%  of aggregate payments calculated in accordance with  Article 4.2 is  payable on the 
basis of the delivery of a number of aircraft corresponding to 40%  of forecast deliveries; 
(b)  70% of aggregate payments calculated in  accordance with Article 4.2 is  payable on  the 
basis of the delivery of a number of aircraft corresponding to  85% of forecast deliveries. 
Article 5 
Indirect government support 
5.1.  Parties shall take such action as is necessary to ensure that indirect government support 
neither confers unfair advantage upon manufacturers of large civil aircraft benefiting from 
such support nor leads to  distortions in international trade in large civil aircraft. 
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production of any  of the products covered by  this  Agreement,  net of recoupment,  derived 
from indirect support shall not exceed in any  one year: 
(a)  3% of the annual commercial turnover of the civil aircraft industry in the Party concerned 
for the products covered by this  Agreement; or 
(b)  4% of the annual commercial turnover of any  one firm in the Party concerned for the 
products covered by  this Agreement. 
5.3.  Benefits from indirect support shall be deemed to  arise when there is  an  identifiable 
reduction  in  costs  of large  civil  aircraft  resulting  from  government-funded  research  and 
development in the aeronautical area performed after the entry into force of this Agreement. 
Where it can be demonstrated that the results of research and development have been made 
available on a non-discriminatory basis  to  large civil aircraft manufacturers of the Parties, 
benefits deriving from such technologies shall be excluded from  the calculation in paragraph 
5.2.  However,  identifiable benefits may  result  when large  civil  aircraft manufacturers  are 
responsible for,  or have early access to,  the conduct or results of such research. 
If a Party has  reason to believe that other indirect supports provided by  a government are 
resulting in identifiable reductions in the costs of large civil aircraft, the Parties shall consult 
with a view towards quantifying such reductions and including them in the calculation described 
above. 
Benefits from indirect support resulting from the technology obtained through government-funded 
research and development or through other government programmes shall normally be calculated 
in terms of the reduction in the cost of research and development and in the reduction in the 
cost of the production equipment or production process technology. 
Article 6 
General purpose loans 
Parties shall assume no  liability for specific loans that aircraft manufacturers make or make 
available, through direct loans, guarantees, or otherwise, to airlines, other than through official 
export credit financing consistent with the Large Aircraft Sector Understanding of the  OECD 
Understanding on official export financing. 
Article 7 
Equity infusions 
Equity infusions are excluded from  the scope of this Agreement.  Equity infusions will not, 
however, be provided in  such a manner as  to  undermine the  disciplines of the Agreement. 
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Transparency 
8.1.  To the extent necessary to ensure effective implementation of this  Agreement, Parties 
shall exchange on a regular,  systematic basis,  all  public information of a kind governments 
make available to their respective national elected assemblies relating to  matters covered by 
this Agreement and its Annexes. 
Such public information will include at minimum the total amount of government support 
for new  development projects  and its share of total development costs,  aggregate data on 
disbursements and repayments relating to direct government supports for commercial aircraft 
programmes, the annual commercial turnovers of the civil aircraft industry as  specified in 
Article 8.5(b) and the aggregate amounts of identifiable indirect benefits received by  large 
civil aircraft manufacturers. 
8.2.  Furthermore,  with  regard  to  prior government  commitments  for  large  civil  aircraft 
programmes described in Article 2,  a complete list of such commitments by  the Parties to 
this  Agreement  already  disbursed  or committed  shall  be  separately  provided,  including 
information on the type of repayment obligation and the planned period of repayment.  Annual 
disbursement and repayments relating to  these programmes on an  aggregate basis shall also 
be notified to  the other Party for each government providing these supports. In addition,  a 
Party shall notify the other Party to this Agreement of any  changes which render the terms 
and conditions of such support commitments more favourable to the recipient,  including:  changes 
in the repayment period, failure to repay the support, or reduction of the scheduled repayments. 
8.3.  Furthermore, with regard to future large civil aircraft programmes, Parties shall provide, 
at  the  time  of government commitment,  the  following  specific  information  in  relation  to 
development support for each of the governments providing such support: 
the total amount of government support; 
the share of government support as  a percentage of estimated total development cost; 
the  anticipated return to  the government; 
the planned period of repayment of government support; and 
the forecast number of planes on which the calculations made in accordance with Article 
4.2 are based. 
8.4.  In the course of the consultations provided for under Article  11  of this  Agreement, Parties 
shall  exchange  information  on  government  commitments  and  support  for  each  of the 
governments providing such support including both not limited to: 
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any  changes  which  render the terms and conditions more favourable  to  the  recipient, 
including changes in the repayment period, failure  to  repay the support, or reduction of 
the scheduled repayments;  and annual disbursements and repayments on a per programme basis for new programmes 
launched in accordance with Article 4. Such information will be provided at the first regular 
consultation  taking  place  at  least  12  months  after  the  end of the  year in  which  the 
disbursements and repayments are made. 
8.5.  In the course of consultations under Article  11: 
(a)  Parties will on an annual basis provide information on new government-funded research 
and development undertaken or initiated during the previous year and on ongoing research 
and development projects in the aeronautical area, including per programme details on 
those projects in which large civil aircraft manufacturers participate. This shall include 
information on the area of activity and the amount of government funding for such projects; 
(b)  Parties will provide information on identifiable benefits derived from indirect supports 
for each large civil aircraft programme. 
This will include recoupment per programme received from large civil aircraft manufacturers. 
The following  specific  information  will  be  provided  on an  annual basis  for  each of the 
governments providing such support: 
1.  the annual commercial turnover of the civil aircraft industry in the Party concerned in 
relation to products covered by the Agreement; 
2.  the annual commercial turnover in relation to products covered by the Agreement of each 
firm in the Party concerned which manufactures products covered by the Agreement; and 
3.  the total amount of indirect benefits as defined in Article 5.2 for the civil aircraft industry 
in relation to the products covered by the Agreement and for each firm involved in the 
manufacture of such products. 
8.6.  If a Party considers that additional information directly relevant to the implementation 
of the provisions of this Agreement is  necessary, such information will be provided upon duly 
motivated request. 
8.7.  Parties shall, upon duly motivated request,  provide at the time of commitment of new 
development support non-proprietary information on the critical project appraisal in so far 
as this relates to the provisions of Article 4.1. 
8.8.  Any information not in the public domain, which a Party may  provide, shall, at the request 
of the Party providing the information, be considered as proprietary. A recipient government 
shall take all measures necessary to ensure that information thus designated not be disclosed 
to anyone outside that government even after expiry or termination of the present Agreement. 
In addition, proprietary information shall not be used in possible trade disputes except for 
the purposes of confidential internal government discussion and decisions in relation to the 
implementation of the Agreement. 
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an  annual basis.  Any disagreement concerning information to  be provided pursuant to  this 
Article shall be resolved through consultations under Article  11. 
8.10.  Parties  shall  provide  information on new  infusions of equity  or changes in equity 
positions by governments into firms engaged in civil aircraft production, including the amount 
and type of equity provided. 
8.11.  Parties will encourage firms engaged in the manufacture of large civil aircraft to increase 
the public disclosure of disaggregated financial results of their civil aircraft operations through 
the separation of reporting on military and  civilian aircraft operations and the  adoption of 
lines of business financial reporting. These disaggregated financial results would at a minimum 
be expected to  include information on sources and uses of funds,  including specific information 
on revenue, operating income, net assets, capital investment and government equity infusions. 
8.12.  Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to  require any Contracting Party to furnish 
any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests. 
Article 9 
Exceptional circumstances 
9.1.  Where, as  a result of an  unforeseen, exceptional situation, the survival of a significant 
proportion of the civil aircraft manufacturing activities in one of the Parties 
1  and the continued 
financial  viability of the  company or the division of a company responsible for such civil 
aircraft  manufacture  are  put  in  jeopardy,  that  Party  may  derogate  temporarily  from  the 
disciplines laid down in this Agreement.  In  this context, the disaggregated financial results 
of civil  aircraft  operations  will  be  reported  publicly  by  that company  or division. 
2  This 
derogation may not be invoked, however, in respect to  the disciplines applying to the launch 
of new civil aircraft programmes as  specified in  Article 4. 
9.2.  The Party concerned shall provide notice of its  intentions to  the  other Party  and  an 
opportunity for prior consultations unless it is prevented from doing so for legal reasons and 
shall in any  event notify the other Party immediately of its reasons for invoking this Article 
and fully disclose the specific measures which it has taken, including the amount and nature 
of the measures, and their expected duration. 
1  For the purposes of this paragraph, 'Parties' shall be deemed to include any of the individual Member 
States of the Community. 
2  These disaggregated financial results would at a minimum include information on sources and uses of 
funds including specific information on revenue, operating income, net assets, capital investment and 
government equity infusions. 
408 Article 10 
Avoidance of trade conflicts and litigation 
1  0.1.  Parties  shall  seek  to  avoid  any  trade  conflict  on  matters  covered  by  the  present 
Agreement. 
1 
10.2.  They  will  not  self-initiate  action  under  their  national  trade  laws  with  respect  to 
government supports granted in conformity with this Agreement for as long as this Agreement 
is  in force.  However,  nothing in this paragraph shall prevent a Party from  abrogating this 
Agreement on  grounds of non-compliance by  the other Party. 
1  0.3.  In order to  avoid trade conflict they will strongly encourage private parties to request 
the use of the provisions of Article  11  to  resolve any  disputes on  matters covered by  this 
Agreement. If, however,  private petitioners request that action be taken under national laws 
on matters covered by this Agreement,  the petitioners'  government will immediately inform 
the other Party and offer to enter into consultations in accordance with Article 11. The Party 
against whom such action is  brought shall have the  right either to  suspend the application 
of some or all of the provisions of the present Agreement or to  terminate the Agreement  15 
days after the conclusion of consultations. 
1  0.4.  In the conduct of any  investigations of trade allegations concerning products covered 
by  this Agreement that have been initiated under national trade laws  as  the  result of private 
petitions. Parties shall, consistent with their law,  take account of representations concerning 
compliance with the terms  of this Agreement. 
Article 11 
Consultations 
11.1.  Parties shall consult regularly and,  in  any  case,  at least twice a year,  to ensure correct 
functioning of the Agreement. 
11.2.  A Party may  request consultations on  any development related to  the functioning of 
the present Agreement.  Such consultations shall be held not later than 30 days following the 
date on which the request is  received. 
11.3.  Parties agree to  seek to resolve any  disputes within three months of the date of the 
initial request for  consultations. Consultations will  not be  deemed to  be concluded for  the 
purposes of Articles 8 and 9 of this Agreement before this three-month period has  expired. 
1  Action with respect to 'matters covered by the present Agreement' refers to trade actions relating to direct 
and indirect government support as defined by this Agreement. It does not include actions relating to 
dumping, intellectual property protection, or antitrust or competition laws. 
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GATT Agreement on trade in civil aircraft 
12.1.  The Parties shall propose jointly to  other signatories of the Aircraft Agreement that 
disciplines along the lines of those laid down in the present Agreement and the interpretative 
note given in Annex I be incorporated in the aforementioned GATT Agreement. The Parties 
shall also propose that the improved dispute settlement provisions agreed in the Uruguay Round 
be used to resolve any dispute arising out of the implementation of the new Aircraft Agreement. 
12.2.  The Parties shall make their utmost efforts to ensure that these or similar disciplines 
are  incorporated into the Aircraft Agreement or adopted by  key  signatories  at the  earliest 
possible date,  and also to expand the coverage of the disciplines provided by this Agreement 
to  all the products covered in the Aircraft Agreement. 
12.3.  If multilateralization has not been achieved in one year,  the Parties shall review the 
question of the continued application of this bilateral Agreement. 
[  ... ] 
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INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE GATT AGREEMENT ON TRADE 
IN CIVIL AIRCRAFT BY SIGNATORIES OF THE AGREEMENT 
Article 4 of the GATT Agreement on trade in civil aircraft (hereinafter referred to  as  'the 
Agreement') deals with three specific issues: 
government-directed procurement (paragraph 2), 
mandatory subcontracts (paragraph 3), 
inducements (paragraph 4  ). 
[  ... ] 
Article 4.4 
(Inducements) 
This paragraph states that signatories agree to  avoid attaching inducements of any  kind  to 
the  sale  or  purchase  of civil  aircraft  from  any  particular  source  which  would  create 
discrimination against suppliers from  any  signatory. 
This means that signatories shall refrain from the use of negative or positive linkages between 
the sale or purchase of civil aircraft and other government decisions or policies which  might 
influence such sale or purchase whenever there is a competition between suppliers of signatories. 
The following is  an  agreed illustrative, non-exhaustive list of such prohibited inducements: 
rights and restrictions relating to  the airline industry, such as  landing or route rights; 
general economic programmes and  policies,  such as  import policies,  measures  aiming 
at changes in bilateral trade imbalances, policies on alien workers or debt rescheduling; 
development assistance programmes and policies, such as grant aid, loans and infrastructure 
fmancing; it is understood that the use of such assistance for the purchase of civil aircraft 
does  not fall  under this  category to  the  extent that the granting of these  funds  is  not 
conditional on such purchase taking place; 
defence and national security policies and programmes. 
Without prejudice to  Article 4.3, this also means that signatories shall not intervene in any 
way,  nor exert any direct or indirect pressure on other governments or any entity involved 
in  procurement decisions, including the establishment of any  link of a negative or positive 
character between decisions concerning the procurement of civil aircraft and any  other issue 
or action in any other area which might affect the interest of the importing country. 
[  ... ] 
411 ANNEX II 
For the purposes of the present Agreement,  the following  definitions  shall apply: 
1.  'large civil aircraft': with respect to such aircraft produced in the United States by existing 
manufacturers  of large  civil  aircraft  and  in  the  European  Community  by  the  Airbus 
consortium, or their successor entities,  all  aircraft,  as  defined in Article  1 of the GATT 
Agreement on trade in civil aircraft, except engines as  defined in Article  1.1 (b) thereof, 
that are designated for passenger or cargo transportation and have 100 or more passenger 
seats or its equivalent in cargo configuration; 
2.  'derivative' means an aircraft model the major design elements of which are derived from 
a prior aircraft model; 
3.  'total development cost', as  referred to in Article 4.2:  the following cost items, incurred 
prior to the date of certification, are those which may be taken into account in assessing 
the  'total development cost'  referred to in Article 4.2: 
preliminary design, 
engineering design, 
wind-tunnel, structural, system and laboratory tests, 
engineering simulators, 
equipment development work, except for work directly financed by  equipment and 
engine manufacturers, 
flight tests,  including associated ground support,  and analysis necessary to  obtain 
certification, 
documentation required for certification, 
the cost of manufacture of prototypes and test aircraft,  including spares and  such 
modifications as may be necessary to obtain certification,  less the estimated fair market 
value of flight aircraft after refurbishment, 
jigs and tools, except machine tools,  for use on specific programmes; 
4.  'production': all manufacturing, marketing and sales activities other than those described 
under point 3 with the exception of official export credit financing consistent with the 
Large  Aircraft  Sector Understanding  of the  OECD  Understanding  on  official  export 
financing; 
5.  'indirect government support': fmancial support provided by a government or by any public 
body within the territory of a Party for aeronautical applications, including research and 
development, demonstration projects and development of military aircraft,  which provide 
an  identifiable benefit to  the development or production of one or more specific large 
ci vii aircraft programmes; 
412 6.  'direct government support': means any  financial support provided by  a government or 
by any public body within the territory of a Party which is provided: 
1.  for specific large civil aircraft programmes or derivatives;  or 
2.  to specific companies to  the extent that large civil aircraft programmes or derivatives 
directly benefit; 
7.  'royalty payment'  means repayment of a certain predetermined amount of development 
support per aircraft delivered. 
413 Annex: Towards an international framework of 
competition rules COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL
1 
This Communication is about the international aspects of competition law. It examines whether 
public international law,  and especially  the  WTO,  should be complemented by  a specific 
framework to support competition law enforcement. 
2 
The concepts and proposals set out in this paper build on the report of the group of experts 
established by Commissioner van Miert in June 1994. That report, entitled Competition policy 
in the new trade order: Strengthening international cooperation and rules,  was  published in 
July  1995. 
The  experts'  report  covered  both  bilateral  and  multilateral  cooperation  in  the  field  of 
competition. Their parallel development was  considered to be complementary and mutually 
supportive. Thus,  although the emphasis of this Communication is  on multilateral aspects, 
the further development of bilateral cooperation agreements is equally important and  would 
have a favourable impact on work in a multilateral setting. 
I.  Introduction 
(a)  A global perspective on competition rules:  Why  international rules are needed 
Two  developments  have  characterized  international  economic  activity  in  recent  decades: 
liberalization and globalization. Eight negotiating rounds since GATT was established in 194  7 
have brought import tariffs down to  historically low levels: from around 35% to  below 4%.
3 
This has led to a massive growth in the volume of trade in goods and services, doubling every 
seven to eight years and growing from around USD 200 billion in the early  1960s to  exceed 
USD 5 000 billion in  1994. Foreign direct investment has grown at an even more spectacular 
rate - by a factor of 30 in less than 25  years. National economies are more open to  foreign 
competition today than ever before. 
At the microeconomic level firms  have adopted global strategies. Liberalization and technological 
progress  have  driven  them  to  adopt  new  production  methods:  exploiting  the  comparative 
advantage of countries, improving their mobility, shifting factors of production, moving into 
1  COM (96)284 final,  18.6.1996. See also the document 'Competition policy in the new trade order: 
Strengthening international cooperation and rules' (cat No CM-91-95-124-EN-C). 
2  The scope of this Communication is limited to anti-competitive practices of enterprises.  There are many 
governmental practices that have an effect on competition, such as subsidies, which are grouped together 
with private practices in the EC Treaty's chapter on competition rules. These are by and large already 
covered by rules under the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
3  This is the trade-weighted average of industrial tariffs that will apply in developed countries once the 
reduction commitments of the Uruguay Round have been fully implemented. Some 40% of European 
imports will even be duty free. Developing countries generally committed themselves in the round to 
bind their duties in a horizontal way for the first time, with highest levels mostly around 20 to 35%. 
Remaining quantitative restraints on imports, in specific sectors such as agriculture or textiles, but also 
with regard to generic practices such as voluntary export restraints, are to be phased out by all  WTO 
members. 
417 new markets etc.  Firms often need to be present on different markets at the same time to  stay 
competitive. As a result countries have become interdependent and the markets of many goods 
and services have become regional or even global. 
The number and size of transnational firms has increased. There are more commercial practices 
that have an international dimension than ever before. These can lead to an increase in cross-
border anti-competitive practices:  cartels with international effects,  agreements whose effect 
is to exclude (foreign) competitors in an unfair way, international abuses of a dominant position, 
or international mergers with anti-competitive effects. Such practices can limit competition 
and undermine the benefits of liberalization. 
These developments call into question the domestic nature of competition rules and the absence 
of binding  rules  at  the  international  level.  Many  countries  or regions  have  implemented 
comprehensive  competition  policies,  but  lack  appropriate  instruments  to  apply  domestic 
competition rules to  anti-competitive practices with an international dimension, as well as  to 
obtain relevant information outside their jurisdiction. A framework is then necessary to enhance 
the effective enforcement of competition rules. 
In the Community anti-competitive practices are effectively dealt with in an even-handed and 
non-discriminatory way  across Member States.  Competition policy is  a cornerstone of the 
Community legal order.  But there are no competition rules at the global level, and in  many 
foreign markets the means for  redress against anti-competitive practices that undermine the 
efforts of our companies trying to compete are inadequate. 
There are then four main reasons why the adoption of international rules on competition should 
be considered: 
(i)  as  part of the Community's strategy on market access:  anti-competitive practices  are 
keeping our firms out of third country markets but they cannot, in  the absence of proper 
enforcement measures in those third markets, be tackled effectively without international 
rules.  European firms  also face  a competitive disadvantage if they have to  compete on 
world markets with foreign producers operating from  home markets that are subject to 
less vigorous competition policies. Multilateral rules would promote more equal conditions 
of competition world-wide; 
(ii)  to  avoid conflicts of law  and jurisdiction between countries and to  promote a gradual 
convergence of competition laws.  There is  a real  need to  minimize the jurisdictional 
conflicts  and  resulting  trade  conflicts  that  can  arise,  not  only  from  extraterritorial 
application of certain competition laws, but also from the application of competition law 
to  anti-competitive practices conceived abroad but implemented within one's jurisdiction. 
Convergence and conflict avoidance  would  also  increase  the  legal  security  of firms 
operating in different jurisdictions,  as  well  as  reduce their costs of compliance  with 
competition laws; 
(iii)  to  increase the effectiveness and coherence of the Community's own competition policy 
enforcement. As it is in many countries, competition policy is a key factor in supporting 
418 the competitiveness of European industry, in protecting a sound functioning of our market 
economies and in  maximizing consumer welfare. It needs instruments of cooperation 
to  take account of the effects of globalization; 
(iv)  enhanced commitment to  competition policy enforcement would strengthen the trading 
system along the lines of our legal systems and market economies, of which competition 
law is  a basic feature. 
These concepts are further developed below. 
(b)  The  competition perspective 
Within the Community the elimination of trade barriers and the  application of competition 
law have gone hand in hand.  This approach is  unique in  the world.  The competition policy 
of the Community has, in its development over 35 years,  grown to full maturity  and is rigorous 
and neutral in its application. 
1 Consequently, the Community has  become a highly integrated 
market, with the competition provisions of the Treaty protecting the integrity of the common 
market.  In a larger perspective, however, the Community's competition policy  and instruments 
have remained essentially domestic, inward-looking and limited to conduct implemented within 
the common market and  affecting trade between our Member States. 
Absence of an instrument to deal with trans-border cases 
Many  countries  or regions  which  have  implemented  comprehensive  competition  policies 
nonetheless  lack  the  necessary  instruments  to  apply  domestic  competition  rules  to  anti-
competitive practices with an  international dimension.  For example,  information central to 
the investigation may be located outside their jurisdiction and thus be beyond their reach. In 
the  absence of the necessary proof of anti-competitive conduct,  competition authorities are 
unable to take remedial action. 
Avoidance of conflict of law and remedies 
The  1980s  and  1990s  have  seen  a  significant  increase  in  international  mergers,  strategic 
alliances, joint ventures, licensing agreements, etc.  These arrangements may  face  examination 
by different authorities at the same time with a potential for a conflict in the law  or remedy 
applied to  the same case.  In an  extreme example,  divergences in the laws applicable to  the 
same set of facts  may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality of the behaviour under 
review.  However, even where there is a common view  as  to  the  anti-competitive nature of 
the conduct, the remedies imposed in  each jurisdiction may  be incompatible. 
1  In parallel, those Member States who did not have competition authorities prior to the establishment of 
the Community, have enacted legislation and set up enforcement structures at national level. 
419 Greater convergence of laws and  cooperation between competition authorities would reduce 
the likelihood of such conflicts and promote greater legal certainty for  business. 
Avoiding unnecessary duplication of work and costs 
The review of commercial practices involves considerable work and costs, both for competition 
authorities and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review. If  the  same commercial 
practice falls within several jurisdictions, the  costs increase accordingly.  Greater cooperation 
and  the  elimination  of unnecessary  duplication  of effort  can  reduce  costs  to  competition 
authorities and  business alike. 
Export cartels 
Certain practices are difficult to tackle under present rules by any  agency.  For example, export 
cartels have,  for  trade reasons  (the wish of countries to  improve their terms of trade),  not 
been subject to  competition law in exporting countries. 
1 For legal and practical reasons too, 
competition law has not been applied. In the absence of an effect on the exporting country's 
markets,  the competition authority has no jurisdiction over export cartels.  For the importing 
country, export cartels have an  effect on  the market and so jurisdiction can be established, 
but the evidence needed to  prove the existence of the  cartels is  located outside the importing 
country's jurisdiction. 
In all these cases the instruments at the disposal of the Community and its Member States 
are inadequate. 
More generally,  in today's liberalized world the Community cannot be without an  external 
dimension to its competition policy. The Community interest is to seek the same commitment 
to  competition enforcement from  our partners  in  their  markets  as  we  apply  to  operators, 
irrespective of their origin, on ours. 
(c)  The  trade perspective 
Balance of access opportunities 
Anti-competitive practices affect the balance of access opportunities negotiated between WTO 
members. They belong to  the next barriers to  trade in a liberalized world.  The application 
of competition  law  contributes  to  creating  accessible  markets  and  to  assuring  the  overall 
openness and stability of the trading system. Community efforts in this area need to be matched 
by  our  partners.  Competition  policy  is  now  clearly  trade-related,  and  the  application  of 
competition law principles on export markets  will  help level the  playing field  and promote 
equal conditions of competition for our firms  competing on international markets. 
1  Export cartels are a specific problem in so far as their negative effects are only felt in the market of the 
importing country, while the relevant information is situated in the exporting country. The latter of course 
has neither an interest, nor the jurisdiction to take action. 
420 While governments today are subject to  very  strict international disciplines in respect of the 
laws they make or the measures they apply, as  soon as  these have an effect on trade,  no  rules 
exist at the international level to control anti-competitive commercial practices. Such practices 
can replace formal  governmental barriers that have been reduced or eliminated.  Arguably, 
the incentive for firms to engage in anti-competitive behaviour impeding market access (such 
as  cartels combined with boycotts, exclusionary abuse of a dominant position, exclusionary 
vertical restraints) increases with the reduction of tariffs and other barriers. Also, as industrial 
structures in emerging economies increase in sophistication, so will the devices used by firms 
to  protect the market from foreign competition. Finally, governments whose freedom of action 
to  support  domestic  industries  through  administrative  measures  has  been  curtailed  by 
international rules may  be tempted to maintain lax  standards of competition regulation or 
enforcement, or to  grant exceptions, to protect specific industrial sectors. 
Although competition rules do exist on many of our export markets,  anti-competitive practices 
are often impossible to tackle without active enforcement by the domestic competition authority. 
In the absence of international rules our firms  have to rely exclusively on the commitment 
and tenacity of third country agencies to  have their concerns addressed. 
1 
Recent developments confirm that real or perceived anti-competitive practices can generate 
trade friction and that the trading system has been unable to  resolve disputes effectively in 
the absence of agreed rules of conduct. 
2 
Trade instruments 
The inadequate application of competition principles on different markets can have other trade 
effects.  Cartelization or similar restrictive behaviour in a foreign country can enable firms 
to  make supra-competitive profits at home and then sell products on export markets below 
cost price. This may trigger the use of legitimate trade instruments such as anti-dumping duties 
by the importing country. But the use of trade instruments will not address the activity on 
the exporting country's market and may also have negative side effects.  From an economic 
perspective it is therefore less efficient than tackling the conduct on the exporting firm's home 
market. 
Even where there is  no evidence of dumping, the protection afforded to  companies through 
an inadequate application of competition rules on their home markets may place them in an 
advantageous position when competing on foreign markets. 
1  Note, however, that in the US the enforcement system is geared towards private action in civil courts: 
private parties are actively encouraged to bring cases by the possibility of winning treble damages.  The 
competition provisions in the  EC Treaty and national legislations can also be invoked by private parties 
before national courts. Domestic courts in third countries are often not, however, as easily accessible. 
2  Note, however, that in May 1995 Kodak filed a petition with the US Government (USTR) under Section 
301 of the US Trade Act, alleging that there are anti-competitive barriers restricting open access to the 
Japanese market for consumer photographic film and paper. On 13 June 1996, acting USTR Barshefsky 
made a determination of 'unreasonable practices' and initiated dispute settlement in the WTO, on the 
grounds of 'nullification and impairment' of  expected GATT benefits and violation of GATS commitments. 
Consultations will also be conducted under the 1960 GATT decision  on restrictive business practices. 
421 (d)  Jurisdictional issues:  avoiding unilateral measures 
Some competition authorities pursue policies to  address market access problems, caused by 
anti-competitive practices on foreign  markets, by extending the territorial scope of their national 
competition rules. This raises concerns of jurisdiction 
1 and sovereignty, and can lead to conflicts 
between countries. Moreover, there are limits to  the effectiveness of such a policy given the 
legal and practical obstacles to  seeking information outside one's jurisdiction. 
Enhanced international  cooperation  would  limit competition  authorities'  need to  resort  to 
extraterritorial action. There are compelling advantages to solving problems through cooperation, 
especially if such cooperation improves the likelihood that the anti-competitive behaviour can 
be eliminated. 
(e)  Historical background and recent developments 
There have been many initiatives to  establish rules on anti-competitive conduct in the past. 
The Havana Charter was based on the concept of comprehensive rules covering both public 
and private practices and devoted a whole chapter to restrictive business practices. 
2  The Charter 
was not ratified, however, and  was succeeded by the more modest GAIT, which examined 
the trade-competition interface a number of times in the  1950s and 1960s, but with no clear 
result. 
3 In the 1970s, a full  competition code was fmally  negotiated in the framework of Unctad 
at the request of developing countries. 
4  Its provisions are not binding. 
The OECD has carried out significant work in  the international competition area for many 
years. It has adopted a Recommendation that includes a non-binding but functioning  notification 
instrument between agencies,  which has been revised a number of times. 
5 
1  See the 1995 US international antitrust enforcement guidelines. US  attempts to impose its law beyond 
its jurisdiction led Canada, France, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland to adopt blocking 
legislation.  Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act also allows trade action to be taken to counter the toleration 
by foreign governments of anti-competitive practices. 
2  See its Chapter V. The 1947 Charter foresaw the establishment of an international trade organization 
to oversee world trade. The organization was mandated to act against anti-competitive practices: it would 
have had an investigative capacity and be entitled to issue recommendations on remedial measures. The 
Charter, which also included rules on investment, was not adopted and a number of its provisions were 
brought together in the less ambitious GATT Treaty that was, in tum, superseded by the WTO on 1 January 
1995. 
3  See GATT BISD 7S/29, 9S/28,170. 
4  The set of multilaterally agreed equitable principles and rules for the control of restrictive business practices 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1980 (UN Doc. N35/48 (1980)). 
5  Amended in 1995. This Recommendation includes a voluntary dispute settlement procedure, which has 
never been used (C (95) 130/final). 
422 The WTO  contains  limited  tailor-made  rules  on  competition  in  each  of its  three  'pillar' 
Agreements. 
1 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has  an annexed Agreement 
on trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) which provides for a review, to be conducted 
within  five  years  of its  entry  into  force,  to  consider  whether  the  Agreement  should  be 
complemented with provisions on competition policy. 
2  The Agreement on the trade-related 
aspects  of intellectual  property  rights  (TRIPs)  contains  provisions  on  the  control of anti-
competitive practices or conditions in contractual licenses, relating to the transfer of technology 
or of other proprietary information. It also recognizes the right of countries to  regulate such 
practices  through  their domestic  laws,  and  it provides  for  consultations  and  exchange of 
information between governments where there is  reason to  believe that licensing  practices 
or conditions constitute an abuse and have an  adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market.  Likewise, the General Agreement on trade in services (GATS) contains provisions 
on consultation and exchange of information, similar to  those in the TRIPs Agreement,  and 
requires countries to  ensure that monopoly services providers do  not abuse their position in 
activities outside the scope of their monopoly privilege. 
However, the scope of these provisions remains very limited for the effective control of anti-
competitive  practices  at  the  international  level.  More  importantly,  the  lack  of  more 
comprehensive multilateral principles and standards for the application and enforcement of 
competition policies may undermine past and present international trade liberalization efforts. 
Parallel to  the above developments an increasing number of countries have negotiated bilateral 
agreements on cooperation between their competition authorities. Such Agreements have been 
negotiated in the  Union both at Community  and  national  level.  At Community  level,  for 
example,  a cooperation agreement has been concluded with the US.  Amongst other things 
it provides for notification of enforcement activities by one party that may  affect the important 
interests  of the  other;  information  exchange  in  certain  circumstances;  consultation  and 
cooperation and avoidance of conflicts over enforcement activities. The so-called positive comity 
instrument stands out, 
3 because it permits a party whose important interests are  affected by 
anti-competitive practices within the other party's territory to ask the latter to examine them 
and take appropriate measures.  In general, the substance of these treaties has also evolved 
and their contents are more developed today than before. 
1  The WTO has three 'pillar' Agreements, covering trade in goods (GATT), trade in services (GATS) and 
the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs). The Agreement establishing the WTO 
itself as well as the integrated Dispute Settlement Understanding overarch the three separate Agreements. 
The WTO also includes a number of Plurilateral Agreements, which are binding between the signatories 
only. 
The GATT Agreement on trade in goods contains a provision to ensure commercial conduct of enterprises 
that have been granted special or exclusive rights (Article XVII GATT - which does not function very 
well). It has been argued that anti-competitive conduct could be tackled through a so-called 'non-violation' 
complaint. 
2  Multilateral rules on investment are currently being negotiated in the OECD and the WTO may start work 
in this field soon. Competition rules may contribute to ensuring that (foreign) investments are only made 
under sound and competitive conditions. 
3  See Article V. 
423 Notwithstanding the wide consensus on the promotion of deeper bilateral cooperation among 
competition authorities, bilateral cooperation agreements, similar to OECD efforts, remain limited 
in scope and in effect. In scope, because although increasing, only the EU and a limited number 
of countries which are very actively involved in enforcing competition policies, have entered 
such agreements;  and,  in effect,  because these agreements do not contain substantive rules 
or principles. 
Another question  is  whether,  next  to  the  above,  the  proliferation  of sector-specific  trade 
agreements  that  include  competition  provisions  which  each  have  their  own  specific 
characteristics, can be kept coherent. This becomes more significant as the interrelationship 
between trade in goods, services and foreign investment increases, and as respective geographic 
markets  overlap.  At  best,  firms  will  press  governments  to  ensure  that  their  policies  are 
streamlined and consistent. At worst, they will seek to exploit the provisions of such agreements 
for narrow corporate advantage through forum-shopping. 
A more coordinated policy grouping together a number of countries and straddling all sectors 
of the economy then needs to be considered. 
II.  Which forum? 
There are four alternative fora to  house an international framework:  the OECD, Unctad,  the 
negotiation of a separate, stand-alone agreement,  or the  WTO. 
The OECD has  been involved in the  area of international competition rules for a long time 
and is serviced by an independent secretariat.  It has  the organizational capacity to  cater for 
the negotiation of an  agreement on international competition rules.  However, the OECD has 
three disadvantages:  it does not have a track record of dealing with binding commitments 
and dispute settlement, it does not provide the disciplines on competition-related trade measures 
(which are dealt with in the WTO),  and,  importantly, it has a limited membership. 
Unctad developed  a full  competition code in the  1970s  which  has  been  regularly  revised. 
However, many of the  same objections that apply  to  the OECD also  apply to  Unctad,  for 
example the absence of a tradition of dealing with binding commitments and the lack of an 
overlap with competition-related trade disciplines (which are dealt with in WTO). 
It may be difficult to gather the necessary political momentum in different countries for an 
independent, stand-alone agreement, and its functioning would be likely to have higher overhead 
costs. 
The WTO is the prime candidate for a framework of competition rules:  it has  a near universal 
membership. 
1 The WTO can provide a balanced response sensitive to  the  varying interests 
and concerns of both developed and developing countries. 
1  Over 25 former State-trading economy countries, amongst which China and Russia, are currently negotiating 
their accession to the WTO. 
424 The WTO is the recognized institution for trade-related international economic rules.  Many 
of its present rules are closely related to competition issues (especially those on subsidies, 
State enterprises and intellectual property).  Some of its agreements already have a number 
of specific provisions to  address anti-competitive practices (see I (e)). 
The institutional infrastructure of the WTO includes a system of transparency and surveillance 
through  notification requirements  and  monitoring  provisions.  These are  common to  many 
WTO/GA  TT agreements. The WTO also provides a forum  for continuous negotiation and 
consultation,  where  its  members  could  bring  their  trade-related  competition  concerns. 
Furthermore, the organization has a reinforced and legalized dispute settlement system between 
governments. This can back-up agreed rules and provide means for conflict resolution. 
The WTO also caters for the possibility of negotiating an  agreement with specific disciplines 
between a limited number of signatories (thereby creating a so-called Plurilateral Agreement 
under Annex IV  to the WTO Agreement). 
III.  An international framework of rules on competition - issues for consideration 
A premise of this Communication is that the creation of an International Competition Authority, 
with its own powers of investigation and enforcement, is not a feasible option for the medium 
term. Countries would at this stage be unwilling to accept the constraints on national sovereignty 
and policies that such a structure would impose. The proposals set out below and in the annex 
therefore reflect a more modest approach, built on  commitments binding governments and 
providing intergovernmental procedures. This is  also the model on which the international 
trading system has been built since the Second World War. 
Work on a framework of international competition rules is  most likely to  make headway if 
a progressive approach is adopted. The objective would be to  strengthen competition policy 
coordination in steps (building-blocks approach). This could be achieved through the creation 
of a working  group in WTO,  whereby initial work might be  limited to  those areas  where 
consensus can be mustered at an early stage, and more ambitious objectives would be tackled 
later. The main steps can be identified as  follows: 
(a)  Adoption of domestic competition structures 
A first step could be taken by WTO members committing themselves individually to assuring 
the existence of domestic competition structures. The core elements of such a structure would 
be: 
- having  basic  competition rules  in domestic  laws  to  address  anti-competitive practices, 
covering restrictive agreements of companies, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers; 
- having or creating domestic enforcement structures to guarantee an effective implementation 
of those rules,  including proper investigatory instruments and  appropriate sanctions; 
425 - ensuring access for private parties to the domestic enforcement authorities, including national 
courts, on equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory terms. 
(b)  Adoption of common rules 
In  parallel WTO Members could seek to  identify  a core of common principles,  and  work 
towards their adoption at international level.  This would: 
- promote equal conditions of competition world-wide; 
- facilitate  closer cooperation between competition authorities  and  pave  the  way  for  the 
coordination of international enforcement activity;, 
- promote a gradual convergence of competition laws. 
Common  principles or rules  can be developed  progressively  and  step  by  step.  It may  be 
opportune, in a first stage, to  concentrate on horizontal restraints (price or output fixing  or 
market sharing cartels, bid-rigging, group boycotts, export cartels). Work on other practices 
(abuse of a dominant position, certain vertical restraints such as exclusive distribution or supply 
agreements) could start in parallel, but may  take more time. 
(c)  Establishment of an instrument of cooperation between competition authorities 
Transparency is  an  essential  element of a framework of competition.  Provisions  could be 
developed on notification, information exchange and cooperation between competition authorities. 
These could include provisions regarding cooperation procedures, for example when agencies 
are  launching parallel investigations into the  same practice.  Negative and  positive comity 
instruments could also be developed further. 
1 
(d)  Dispute settlement 
Apart from  its  natural role as  a permanent forum  for negotiation adapting or strengthening 
agreed rules and obligations, the WTO also provides a compliance mechanism to  help settle 
disputes  between  governments  when  a country  claims  that  agreed  WTO  rules  have  been 
breached. Private parties do not have  access  to  the WTO's dispute settlement system.  The 
WTO  mechanisms  could  be  applied  if a country  for  example  fails  to  set  up  a  domestic 
competition structure or if it fails to react in a specific case to  a request for enforcement action 
lodged by  another WTO  member. The relevant rules could be adapted, if necessary, to  the 
specificities of competition law and policy,  and could be applied in a progressive way. 
The above concepts are further developed in the annex. 
1  These could be inspired by OECD provisions as well as those in bilateral agreements.  The principle of 
negative comity implies that a party will take into account the important interests of another party before 
action is taken.  Through the positive comity  instrument (see also pp. 7), a party may request another 
to act on the basis of its own powers, to investigate activities which adversely affect the important interests 
of the first party. 
426 IV.  Related issues 
(a)  Who  should participate? 
An international agreement on competition rules  would bring benefits to all nations of the 
trading community. All countries could participate in an agreement to incorporate competition 
law provisions in their domestic laws. 
At the same time the application of the cooperation and enforcement provisions would require, 
of participating countries, that they have a sophisticated administration capable of handling 
sensitive  information  and of assessing  commercial practices in a  dynamic  context.  Many 
developing countries do  not yet have this administrative machinery. 
It is  therefore realistic to  expect that,  if adopted,  cooperation provisions of a competition 
agreement would, in a first stage,  apply only between a limited number of signatories with 
mature antitrust agencies. Provisions could group together developed and advanced developing 
countries to start with,  and gradually come to  include more countries. Any country able to 
shoulder the obligations of the agreement could be eligible to participate. 
A different intensity of cooperation, for example in the field of information exchange, could 
apply between different countries. 
(b)  The  interest of developing countries 
Private anti-competitive practices have long been a concern for developing countries. As the 
turnover of many  multinationals  has  come to surpass  the  GDP of middle-size developing 
countries, developing countries have seen a growing need for a minimum of discipline on 
private conduct in their markets. It was in response to this that Unctad developed its competition 
code in  1980. It would certainly be  consistent with this stance for developing countries to 
support a further strengthening of international rules if these came to cover practices,  such 
as export cartels, that today escape effective control. 
1 
Even if developing  countries  might  not,  in  a  first  stage,  participate  in  the  provisions  on 
cooperation between  competition  authorities  (see  III  (a)),  they  would  be  beneficiaries  of 
enhanced control over anti-competitive practices with an international dimension. They would 
also,  like other WTO members,  have  access to the dispute settlement provisions if agreed 
basic rules and enforcement structures had not been properly implemented by other countries. 
Moreover,  they  would benefit from  the  acceptance by  developed  or newly  industrialized 
countries of MFN obligations in the competition field,  even if their own obligations were lighter 
(e.g.  in respect of transitional periods).  Finally,  all  WTO  members,  including  developing 
1  Note, however, that a competition framework cannot be a panacea for the difficulties faced by developing 
countries as a result of their limited domestic instruments and capacities of investigation. This reinforces 
the need for developing countries to be able to benefit from technical assistance. 
427 countries, would benefit from possible dispute settlement judgements which might create new 
market access opportunities. 
In so far as competition rules can ensure that investments are made under sound and fair 
conditions, effective competition structures can support liberal investment regimes. 
The  establishment  of appropriate  competition  structures  is  a  complex  task  and  requires 
substantial resources and training. A framework on competition should include provisions on 
technical assistance for those countries requesting it. 
(c)  The  relation to  trade defence  instruments 
The relation between the elaboration of a competition framework and the functioning of existing 
trade instruments is a key issue in the trade-competition debate. It is true that the incorporation 
of competition provisions into trade law and/or more comprehensive and effective enforcement 
of competition policies through increased international cooperation would lessen the need to 
have recourse to  instruments of commercial defence.  However, competition instruments cannot 
be seen as  substitutes for trade instruments. The latter only lose their raison d'  etre in the context 
of fully integrated markets. A framework of competition rules would, therefore, complement 
present trade law and create a new instrument to tackle anti-competitive behaviour in markets 
which are not integrated. Thus the development of new instruments would complement, not 
supplant, present instruments. 
The above is illustrated by practice within the EC itself. Anti-dumping action is excluded on 
intra-Community trade,  as  this is  a fully  integrated market. 
1 This integration has meant,  for 
Member States, the elimination of all tariffs, the elimination of measures of equivalent effect 
to tariffs (which is a wider concept than GAIT's national treatment obligation) and the adoption 
of the four freedoms (goods, services - including establishment, capital - including investment, 
and labour). The single market programme and relative currency stability have been added 
to this.  Competition law has been applied effectively, amongst others with an explicit objective 
to  integrate  the  markets  of Member States,  by  an  authority  with  autonomous  powers  of 
investigation and enforcement. All of these elements are absent in present day world trade. 
Finally the framework explored under point II falls  well short of EC competition structures, 
and would have to prove its worth. 
1  The EEA Agreement between the EC and EFTA countries follows the same approach: anti-dumping is 
excluded in  those areas where the acquis communautaire has been taken over. In trade between the 
Community and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, however, anti-dumping action can still be 
taken, as well as between the US, Canada and Mexico in the NAFf  A context.  The same applies between 
the EU and Turkey: anti-dumping action remains a possibility despite the customs union agreement. 
428 (d)  The  relation to  the  Community legal order and Member States 
A basic assumption of this Communication is  that a framework of competition rules,  negotiated 
in WTO, would be compatible with EC competition law,  in  particular the provisions of the 
EC Treaty. The WTO instrument would,  as is traditional in GATT/WTO, apply to governments 
and not be self-executing or have direct effect. It would also be much more general than the 
relevant provisions under EC law, and the emphasis would in the first stages be on procedural 
obligations.  For these reasons  alone it is  highly unlikely  that there should  be  any  friction 
between a WTO panel report on the rules agreed in the WTO,  and a European Court of Justice 
case law  on Articles 85  and 86  and related legislation. 
1 
Moreover,  firms  are  already,  including  those  within  the  Community,  subject  to  different 
competition regimes, and an objective of an international framework is to promote equivalent 
and rational application of competition principles on different markets. 
A  second  issue  concerns  the  question  of participation  in  an  international  framework.  As 
competition is not an exclusive Community competence, international cases  might involve 
either the Community (if trade between Member States were affected) or a single Member 
State (if it alone were affected). A framework of rules would have to  take account of both 
cases, while preserving the unity of Community action in the  trade field. 
V.  Conclusions 
The Commission requests the Council to  take note of this Communication. 
Noting that by  pursuing stronger multilateral efforts the benefits of greater convergence and 
improved competition standards and enforcement would be realized worldwide; 
Considering that an international framework of competition rules can promote a level playing 
field  and could therefore reduce the costs, distortions and conflicts in international trade arising 
from  differing domestic competition regimes; 
Recognizing that alongside continued bilateral cooperation with principal partners,  stronger 
multilateral cooperation in the field of competition is desirable and feasible at this  time,  and 
would contribute significantly to a more efficient, stable, and integrated global economy, from 
which both the Community and its Member States, as well as  all WTO members, would benefit; 
Recognizing that the possible development of an international framework of competition rules 
is in the interest of all trading nations, irrespective of their level of development; 
1  A case where a WTO instrument and a corresponding EC regulation are even closer than in the competition 
field is anti-dumping. In this case the latter is even an implementation of the former, yet friction between 
panel reports based on the WTO instrument, and European Court of Justice judgments based on the EC 
regulation, has so far been avoided. 
429 Considering that the Community has a sound experience in applying uniform competition 
principles across different countries; 
The Commission recommends the Council to conclude along the following lines: 
(i)  the Community should prepare a position for the WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore 
in December 1996; this should propose to WTO members that the organization establish 
a Working Party to conduct exploratory work, from  1997 onwards, on the development 
of an international framework of competition rules; 
(ii)  such a framework could include, in particular, a commitment by all countries to adopt 
domestic  competition rules and enforcement structures and,  for a  limited number of 
countries,  an instrument to  allow  information  to  be exchanged between competition 
authorities, an instrument to request action on foreign markets, and an intergovernmental 
dispute settlement mechanism; 
(iii)  that the European business community should be consulted and appropriately associated 
as  progress in this area is made; 
(iv)  that the  Community  should  take  the  lead  on this  issue  and  initiate  efforts  to  build 
international consensus and encourage other WTO members to support multilateral work 
in this field; 
(v)  to request the OECD and Unctad to pursue their work on trade and competition taking 
account of developments in WTO. 
430 ANNEX 
This annex outlines the main concepts set out under Part III of the Communication. Many 
of the concepts have been extracted from OECD documents and other sources, and are included 
on an exploratory basis. 
(a)  Adoption of domestic competition structures 
The process towards an international framework of competition rules could be  carried out 
in a progressive way.  A first step could be to ensure that each country provides for competition 
rules in its national legislation, covering restrictive agreements,  abuse of dominant position 
and mergers. This would include the provision of a set of equitable procedures ensuring an 
effective application of the rules, including investigatory instruments and appropriate penalties, 
as  well as  access to  the judicial system, transparency and non-discrimination. 
Although an  increasing  number of countries have  a sophisticated competition law  for  the 
effective control of restrictive business practices,  some  (developing) countries have yet  to 
introduce such rules.  An added advantage of agreement by all countries to enact competition 
laws is  that domestic courts would become an  integral part of enforcement procedures,  as 
they  are in most industrialized countries already. 
1 Firms could not then be obliged to  respect 
agreements which were forbidden:  these would be unenforceable before national courts. 
Another important issue is  sectoral comprehensiveness. A recent OECD study has revealed 
that even in OECD countries substantial gaps exist in the coverage of competition laws; most 
countries exclude sectors of the economy from their competition law application. 
2  A first step 
in addressing this could be taken by  a listing of these sectors and a commitment to stand-still 
and gradual reduction by all countries. 
3 
Competition rules  should likewise apply  to  all  economic operators.  Public enterprises  and 
companies with  special or exclusive rights should be covered, except for that part of their 
activities where their public task overrides the interests of competition law application. 
(b)  Agreement on common rules 
There is  general recognition of the negative effects on competition of horizontal restrictive 
practices: cartels, market sharing, boycott of foreign firms,  price fixing, bid rigging, collective 
exclusive dealing. It should be possible to  formulate international provisions at  an early stage 
to  combat these practices.  Relevant provisions should also  cover export cartels.  These are 
exempted from the applicability of competition law  in  exporting countries.  Although such 
1  A similar approach was adopted in the Uruguay Round negotiations on the respect of intellectual property 
rights (TRIPs). 
2  Overview on Coverage of  competition laws and policies by Professor B. Hawk. 
3  See OECD work in this respect. 
431 cartels are covered by the legislation of most importing countries, 
1  they  are hard to  tackle 
due to  a lack of information in the importing country. An international agreement to outlaw 
export cartels would put an  end to  these  'beggar thy  neighbour'  policies. 
Vertical  restrictions,  such  as  exclusive  distribution  or supply  agreements,  should  also  be 
considered, but a longer period may be required to reach consensus, and countries may wish 
to  maintain a greater degree of latitude in their assessment of the effects on competition of 
vertical restraints. 
2 
A common approach to vertical restrictions could be found by  concentrating on restrictions 
which create barriers to  market access.  The working group could examine to  what extent 
competition authorities could take into account the international dimension and weigh the effects 
on domestic competition of market access restrictions, when a complaint is  lodged through 
the provisions of the international framework (see below). 
Such a review by  a competition authority would reflect the facts  that no  adequate assessment 
of competition cases can be made without careful examination of the international context: 
competition policies cannot be identical in different countries,  and  that each market needs 
to  be assessed in its own context, in consideration of the economic conditions and structures 
influencing the  openness, and thus the competitive situation, of that market.  In their review 
of practices, competition authorities would,  as  many already do,  give weight to factors  such 
as:  the effect of trade barriers (tariffs and non-tariff barriers),  regulatory barriers (i.e.  divergent 
standards, restrictions on distribution or supporting services), foreign investment barriers, the 
import  and  foreign  investment  ratio,  and  the  corporate  groupings  structure.  Competition 
authorities would continue to base their decisions on the efficiency goals that are fundamental 
to  competition policy. But the principle, that the international dimension needs be taken into 
account in international cases,  would be incorporated into common rules  with respect to  all 
anti-competitive practices. 
3  As a market would be assessed to be more closed, greater weight 
would be given to  the importance of foreign competition to  balance entry barriers. 
This approach  might also be  useful in working  towards  agreement on  abuse  of dominant 
position.  It is  generally agreed that exclusionary practices, hindering of access to  essential 
facilities,  practices  with  possible  foreclosure  effects  such  as  fidelity  rebates  or  tying 
arrangements, and production limitation can all  amount to  abuse of dominant position.  As 
European competition policy enforcement has shown, these practices are capable of affecting 
1  For example wood pulp-judgment of the European Court of Justice of 27 September 1988, 1988 ECR 
5193. 
2  Partly due to differences in underlying objectives and principles, the Community and some trading partners 
have different approaches: the Community is relatively strict on vertical restrictions that interfere with 
market integration - export bans and some territorial restrictions; the US  takes a more tolerant view. 
An exception is resale price maintenance which is prohibited in most jurisdictions. 
3  This approach  is  similar to the one taken  in  the  Havana Charter (Article 46), where an  absence of 
government action to prevent a limitation of access to markets could constitute a violation of its provisions. 
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice follows similar lines, i.e. that a practice should be 
assessed in its economic and legal context, and to the weight traditionally given to the objective of ensuring 
market access, although only between Member States. For example Henninger (Delimitis) -judgment 
of the European Court of Justice of 28 February 1991. 
432 trade and creating access barriers. Other practices would require further consideration: excessive 
pricing, predatory pricing, some vertical arrangements. 
There has been a great increase in the number of international mergers. It would be premature 
to suggest international substantive rules in this area.  At the same time, firms nowadays have 
to notify the same merger to several different competition authorities. Procedural harmonization 
would avoid unnecessary duplication of efforts of firms  and  agencies and,  in encouraging 
cooperation, would limit the potential for contradictory decisions. 
1  A first step could be taken 
by harmonizing notification filing forms  and deadlines. 
2 
(c)  Establishment of instruments of cooperation between competition authorities 
Meaningful  information  exchange  is  a  key  element  of cooperation  between  competition 
authorities. At the same time business information is subject to  strict legal protection in all 
jurisdictions and it is  difficult to imagine confidential documents being exchanged between 
competition authorities as  a routine matter. 
3 
Information exchange would have to be developed cautiously. In a general sense the will of 
agencies to cooperate will certainly be the greatest when they are investigating the same case 
and intend to apply similar enforcement criteria. Exchange becomes more difficult when different 
solutions are being envisaged. At the extreme there may be a situation where one agency seeks 
clear enforcement measures while a counterpart has no  intention of taking action.  Although 
the last example is  the most difficult, it is then that the need for exact information may be 
the most acute. 
An important first step towards the development of rules on information exchange could be 
to  catalogue the types of information that are considered confidential in different countries, 
and what forms  of legal protection apply. 
1  The 1990 Merger Regulation has extrajurisdictional effects: it includes competence for the Commission 
to examine mergers of firms headquartered outside the EC if they have a turnover of ECU 5 billion  or 
more and where two of the undertakings concerned have a turnover within the EC of at least ECU 250 
million. As more agencies scrutinize mergers it is possible that one agency may forbid it, while another 
imposes conditions such as divestiture of certain parts or alternatively may see no objection at all. 
2  The OECD 1993 Whish/Wood 'Merger Process Convergence Report' has made a number of proposals 
to harmonize international procedures in the field of merger notifications. 
3  It should be recalled that extensive international information exchange possibilities do exist in certain 
sectors, for example, between authorities controlling securities trade.  And different levels of information 
exchange have already been agreed in the competition field: the EEA Agreement, for example, provides 
for a sharing of information between the Commission and the EFT A Surveillance Authority.  Although 
the EC/US Cooperation Agreement does not provide for the exchange of confidential information, US 
Congress in 1994 did pass new legislation to enable the antitrust agencies to pursue reciprocal arrangements 
for the purpose of exchanging confidential information, even in cases where sanctions that may be taken 
are different from those under US law. 
433 An international framework could, in the beginning, provide for the exchange of non-confidential 
business information between a group of core participating countries. A further step might 
be taken if this mechanism is felt to function well,  by  considering whether certain authorities 
are ready to exchange information of a more detailed nature bilaterally on the basis of consent. 
Clearly, such an exchange of confidential information would have to be made subject to  a 
set of criteria and guarantees. It is conceivable that agencies would wish to  make exchange 
subject to  the fulfilment of certain conditions (e.g.  guarantees on confidentiality or limits to 
the use of the supplied information): in particular the receiving authority would have to commit 
itself to refraining from taking extraterritorial action on the basis of that information. In any 
case, full exchange obligations are likely to  be a longer term objective. 
Clearly the European business community should be consulted and closely associated as options 
and conditions regarding the exchange of confidential information are explored. 
In anti-dumping investigations officials actually have extra-jurisdictional information-gathering 
possibilities - they are usually given direct access to the files of the firms  they investigate 
in third countries. A similar element could be considered in competition cooperation by enabling 
officials to  assist their colleagues in third countries when investigations are being pursued. 
The cooperation procedures that apply in internal Community cases between DGIV and Member 
State authorities is one example of such procedures. 
Another key element of cooperation between authorities is  the positive comity instrument, 
which has already been included in recent bilateral competition agreements. 
1  Options need 
to be explored to develop this concept further and to incorporate provisions that will generate 
enforcement by third country agencies, while respecting each others' autonomy. In particular 
it could be considered whether and under what conditions competition authorities could, within 
reasonable limits, be obliged to investigate on behalf of one another, and to  have to  indicate 
to  a  requesting  counterpart  within  an  agreed  time  limit  whether  enforcement  action  is 
envisaged. 
2 A decision not to  act would have to be reasoned and supported by relevant factual 
material. 
(d)  Dispute settlement 
The gains of international cooperation have been set out earlier. It is clear, however, that the 
advantages would be the greatest if countries can be committed to abide by  agreed rules. That 
would generate a commitment to enforcement. A framework should therefore have a binding 
character. 
1  See also the footnote on page 426. 
2  This has implications for the allocation of resources of antitrust agencies. It may be necessary, in a first 
stage, to put a maximum on the  amount of complaints one agency could lodge to another within a 
framework per year, or to have a threshold (e.g. turnover in the product concerned) below which the 
mechanism would not apply. 
434 A central question concerning the development of a dispute settlement system, which would 
apply between governments, relates to the standard of review that an international panel could 
apply.  At a first stage, review by  a panel might concentrate on procedural aspects:  whether 
a country has enacted a domestic competition structure as  agreed; if a country is subject to 
information exchange obligations, whether these have been complied with; and, if a country 
has commitments in this area, whether the transparency motivation and timetable requirements 
of the positive comity instrument have been met in  a specific case. The dispute settlement 
system could be extended to  include review of whether the statement of the reasons for the 
national decision was adequate,  whether the facts  have been accurately stated, whether there 
has been any  'manifest error of appraisal'  of the facts or whether there has been a 'misuse 
of powers'. 
An important issue would be the deadlines applied to resolution of international disputes. This 
is  because firms  confronted by  anti-competitive practices in  many cases have the option of 
asking for application of a protective trade measure. These can be activated at short notice. 
Clearly a framework to  tackle anti-competitive practices through competition instruments will 
have to  function with short deadlines if it is  to  offer a credible alternative. 
Another key issue relates to remedies when a country is condemned by an independent panel. 
Countries could be authorized,  in the absence of corrective action by a foreign  agency and 
under specified conditions, to take extra-jurisdictional action through use of their own domestic 
competition laws.  In cases where this is  not viable,  (for example if there are no subsidiaries 
of the  targeted firm or firms  in one's jurisdiction), measures usually  foreseen in the trade 
context, such as the withdrawal of tariff concessions, 
1  are likely  to  be more acceptable than 
competition sanctions, e.g.  international fines,  as  a next step. 
2 
In so far as an agreement on competition might include binding elements, it is possible 
that a derogation clause of some kind may be considered necessary. This would cater 
for cases where the essential interest of a party is felt to outweigh the enforcement interest 
of a trading partner requesting action, for example if the latter has invoked the positive 
1  The WTO system is geared towards conflict resolution and the withdrawal of trade concessions is only 
used as a measure of last recourse. In WTO the resolution of conflicts has a sliding scale starting with 
( 1) agreement of the parties at any point during proceedings through consultations; (2) after determination 
by a panel of a violation of WTO rules, a request to bring the incriminating measure or practice into 
conformity with the WTO; (3) if this is not possible, the offering of compensation (by means of new 
or enlarged market access opportunities, for example through  tariff reductions or other liberalizing 
commitments), and finally, if neither (1), (2), or (3) are possible; (4) the authorization to suspend an 
equivalent amount of concessions. 
2  From a competition angle the withdrawal of trade concessions may seem to contradict the objective of 
increasing competition, as its effect would be to lessen access opportunities to a market. In GATT/WTO 
practice, however, the ability to withdraw trade concessions has actually had a liberalizing effect, and 
has pressed countries to bring their practices into line with GATT law.  Countermeasures have only been 
authorized once. 
435 comity  instrument.  Such  an  exceptional  situation  could  arise  if an  authority  allows 
restructuring agreements with restrictive effects. Such issues have been resolved in trade 
law cases by allowing GA  TTIWTO members,  in exceptional cases, to derogate temporarily 
from their obligations and take safeguard action to protect their domestic industries. A 
similar approach in competition cases, provided measures taken are time-limited, justified, 
non-discriminatory and transparent, might need to be considered. 
436 European Commission 
Directorate-General Competition 
Competition law in  the European  Communities 
Volume lilA - Rules  in  the international field 
Luxembourg: Office for Official  Publications of the  European  Communities 
1997 - 436 pp.  - 16.2 x 22.9  em 
Vol.  lilA: ISBN  92-827-7636-0 
Vol.  IA-IIIB:  ISBN  92-826-6752-9 
Price  (excluding VAT)  in  Luxembourg:  ECU  24 
Information on European competition policy 
The Directorate-General for Competition (DG IV)  provides public  access to  information on 
European competition policy via Europa, the European Union's world wide web server (site: 
http://europa.eu.int). Europa contains information on the activities of the Union's institutions, 
and DG IV's homepage may  be accessed through the section dealing with the activities of 
the European Commission. 
DG IV's pages contain information on the main areas of competition policy, namely antitrust, 
mergers, liberalization, State aid and international aspects.  Under each of these headings, the 
user can find  sections containing press  releases published in the  previous two  weeks,  Acts 
published in the Official Journal in the previous month, the full texts of Community legislation 
in force and a list, with references, of Commission decisions and of judgments delivered by 
the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
Separate sections set out speeches given and articles published by  the Commission Member 
with special responsibility for competition policy, the Director-General of DG  IV  and DG 
IV officials, previous issues of the EC Competition Policy Newsletter,  the Annual Report on 
competition policy, an updated list of Community publications on competition available to 
the public, plus other documents of interest,  links  with the  websites of other national and 
international competition authorities,  and other items of interest. Venta  •  Salg  •  Verkauf  •  nwMow:;  •  Sales  •  Vente  •  Vendita  •  Verkoop  •  Venda  •  Myynti  •  Forsaljning 
Monoteur belgeiBelgosch Staatsblad 
Jean De Lannoy 
L1brame europeenne1Europese Boekhandel 
DAN MARK----------------
J  H  Schultl lnformatoon A1S 
Bundesanze1ger Verlag 
G C  Eleftheroudakos SA 
ESPANA  ________________  _ 
Mundi Prensa Llbros, SA 
Boleton Ofocial del Estado 
Mundi Prensa Barcelona 
FRA_'::CE  _ 
Journal offocoel 
Government Supploes Agency 
~ubllcatto'l<"> SPct10n 
4-5 Harcourt Road 
Dublin 2 
Tel  (353-1 i 661  '11  11 
Fa• (353 11475 27 60 
~----
Licosa SpA 
V1a  Due a 111  CaldLfla  1,1 
Casella postale 5:)2 
1-501 ~5 ~lrPnZP 
Tel  (39-55i 64 54 15 
FdX  (3~-551 64 12 '57 
E-rDatl  ltc-osa@ttbu.' 11 
URL  tcl382 olea •t'VIrtiJal  Ltbrary,b!bllot·vetnna 
llcosa'tt1  h'rn 
GRAND-QLJC>-1~QE LUXEMBOURG  _  SCHWEIZISUISSE:SVIZZER4 
Messageroes du 11vrc Sari  OSEC 
Messa genes Paul Kraus 
~JEDERLAND 
SDU Serv1cecentrum Uitgevers 
Chr:st:.Jttel  Plant11nstraat 2 
Postbu~ ~rJ014 
2500 Et~ 's-Gravenha')e 
Tel  131-701  378 98 80 
Fa• i31-7CI  378 97 83 
~ mad  sdu(Wsdu nl 
URL  www  sdtJ  ill 
OS  TERRciCH 
Manz'sche Verlags- und Umversttats-
buchhandlung Gmbh 
S18benbrunner1gd~~e 21 
Pusttacb i 
A-105C  W1en 
Tel  (43-')53 1[1  334 '340 
Fa, 143-n 53 '(·  1 339 
E.-mall  3Uslieferung<g'imanz co  '-J.f 
URL  www  austr1a Ell net 81/manz 
PORTUGAL  _______  _ 
lmprensa Nac1onal-Casa da Maeda, EP 
16A 
D1stnbU1dora de Livros Bertrand Ld  ~ 
Hurl  r.Jac:  Terrds ao~ Vales  4 A 
Apartado GOC37 
P-27(;~ AmarJora Code)( 
Tel  (351-IJ 495 90 50:495 >i7 87 
fax 1351  1  '1  4% 02 55 
SUO~I:FINLMID 
Akateemmen Klljakauppa 1 
SVERIGE  _______  _ 
BTJ AB 
LINITEO hiNGDOM 
The Stat1onery Off1ce Ltd 
(Agency Section) 
S  i  Nmr- Elms L:1n...; 
LOndon SWS 5JR 
Tel  {44  1711 87.19080 
Fa•  :44-171: 873 8463 
URL  #\NY.  th!-:!  std!IOnery-oHICe (0 uk 
Bokabud Larusar Blondal 
Skol~vordu~IIQ, 2 
IS  101  ReyKJ3<ik 
Tel  (354) 'i5 15 650 
Fa>  (:l54) 55  25 56(1 
NORGE 
NIC Info AIS 
o~tl::'niUVelen 18 
Boks 6512 Etterstal.l 
N-0606 Oslo 
Tel  (47-221974501' 
Fa  ...  {47-?2: 97 45 45 
Stampt.,ntJJC11slraRe 
CESKA f1EPIJBLir A 
NIS CR- prodeJna 
CYPR1l_~-- _____________  _ 
Cyprus Chamber Of Commerce &  Industry 
MAGYARORSZA_Q_ ____________  _ 
Euro Info Serv1ce 
E.~rupd Haz 
Marg1tsz1gct 
PO Box 475 
H-139G Rudape;t 62 
Te!  :l6 1)  11150611'1 1621£. 
F3A  13~-1 i 302 50  35 
F-mall  ewomfo@ma1l matav nu 
URL  www eurotnfo hu 1tnclex.  htm 
MALTA 
Miller D1stnbutors Ltd 
Malta '11tewat1on~l A1roort 
POBo, 25 
LOA 05 Mal:a 
Tel  (356: 66 4.\ d~ 
Fax (356)67 h7 ~Y 
~'JLSkA  __  --------·---------
Ars Polona 
~ URKIY[C_ 
Dunya lnfotet A S 
BALCJ~_I.J_A  -------------~---
Europress-Euromed1a Ltd 
59, Bid V1tosh;, 
BG-' 000 Sol1a 
Tel  115q-2, 80 4h 41 
Fat 1359-21 ao  45 41 
Med1atrade Ltd 
P:;tv!.::t  Hatza  1 
hR t J000 Zagrab 
Tel  1385-1141 O.l  ~2 
Fa' :385-1:44 40 59 
ROMii~------­
Euromedla 
Sir 
Rl) 
Tel 
;=a, 
SLOVAKIA  __  _ 
Slovenska Techmcka Kn1zmca 
Namest1e slobody 1  :j 
SLU-81 ~23 Brat1slavd I 
Tel  :4?-71  53 18 364 
Fa'' 142-71 53  t s 364 
E-mail  europ<.._QJtbb1  sltk stub3. sk 
SLO\/Ec'-'N.,_IA,__ ________  __ 
Gospodarskt Vestmk 
Zal0zn1ska skup1na d d 
DunaJska ce~ta 5 
Sl-1 000 LJublJana 
Tel  (386)61 133 03 'i4 
FaK  (386) 61  133 91  28 
E-ma1i  bel1crl@gves1n1k  Sl 
URL  www qvestniK Sl 
ISRAEl _______________  __ 
R.O. Y  International 
Sub aq~nt tc•r the Palestlfllall Authonty 
Index Information Services 
~SSIA________  _ _________  _ 
CCEC 
60-letlya CJktyRbrya A\  c, 
11  ~312 Mo~cow 
Tel  11)951  135 52 27 
Fat 10951  I J5  Ci2  27 
A~STRAc-=Lc_ciAc__  ______________  _ 
Hunter Publications 
Un1quem&0t abonnemt-nts· 
Subscnpt1ons only 
Renouf Publishong Co. Ltd 
12~4 Algom1 Road 
"'1 B 3W2:  ~~ttawa, Ontarro 
TPI  :-~-613) 741  7]  33 
Fav (1-81:1) 741  54 39 
E.-mall  renmA@foo.  nstn ca 
lJRL  fa~ NSTN Ca:- ·enout 
fG'rPT 
The Middle East Observer 
Sr;enf Street 
JAPAN 
PSI-Japan 
39  3~ 732 
:_:;.g  '~9  ;-"~2 
---------------------
2QuTH AFfi_i_C£_ ___  _ 
Saito 
IJ_I'J_IT~ STATES OF AMERICA 
Bernan Associates 
Mund1-Prensa Mexico. SA de CV 
R1u  Pa.nwco,  141 
Delegac:lrlrl C  uauhternoc 
ME-061)(,·(;  MPYICD OF 
Tel  (52-5) 553 5E  52'S(; 
Fa• (52-SI '114 f.7 9':1 
E-mail  1  ()4 164 23compuc;erve com 
REPLIBLIQUEOE~CO~R~E~~--------­
Kyowa Book Company 
1 F1  P~1vung Hwa Bldg 
~1~:~2 ~a~;~~~ng Donq  Mapo hu 
Tel  ,82  ~~ 322  6750,1 
Fax  {Bc-2i 322 6782 
E  mi311  kyowa2@ktnet •:D  kr 
ANIJ[Fi~ LANDER/OTHER COUNTRIES: 
,;_LJTRES,_,_Pe_:_A Y'-"S'----------
Bitte wenden Sie s1ch  an em Buro lhrer 
Wahl ' Please contact the sales off1ce of 
your cho1ce • Veu1llez vous adresser au 
bureau de vente de votre cho1x Price (excluding VAT) in Luxembourg: ECU 24 
***  *  EUR  * 
* 00 *  *===*  *** 
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
L-2985 Luxembourg 
ISBN  92-827-7636-0 
111111111111  111111 I  IIIII 
9 "789282 776360
11 > 
0 
(J) 
0 
00 
0  s: 
I 
00 
c.o 
cb  c.n 
eX>  c.n 
cp 
m 
z 
0 